A point does not make trend:  

The case for a psychoanalytic jurisprudence (Attention/Awareness)  

David H. Cook  

Hills-Cook Outcomes Consulting Company  

Abstract  

**Purpose:** To build an argument based on cost-benefit at the private person level and with the primary care physician tasked with a supporting role, an argument that radiates through normal and abnormal thinking, and on to ‘costs’ ranging from everyday life to the likes of today’s skewed reliance on opioid based pain medications. This is about the longitudinal execution of life as driven by the three heavily comingled rationalizations of dissociation, introspection and the transference, and, not the measurement of execution which is nothing more than a discourse about a point in time. Views on execution of life are addressed by traversing the work of Richard von Krafft-Ebing, William James, Sigmund Freud, Pierre Janet, Mary Whiton Calkins, Edward Titchener, Melanie Klein, Karen Horney, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Harry Stack Sullivan, Michael Balint, Edith Jacobson, Carl Rogers, John Bowlby and Amos Tversky, with special consideration reserved for Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll, 1865) and Walter Mitty (Thurber, 1939). This paper and its companion “Proposed cataloging scheme of the CSAT-SAMHSA-DHHS data model (Standards)” are offered as preemptive to discussion of psychoanalytic jurisprudence as synonymous to communications in health care and as a superset to the current therapeutic jurisprudence, where this paper presents the micro view with the companion focused on the macro view. A separate paper, “Rationalizations common to Alcoholism and Ischemic Heart Disease but not to Diabetes (Reasoning)” applies the combined macro and micro views to “…risk factors [that] account for over three quarters of Ischemic heart disease: the leading cause of death worldwide” (WHO, 2009a, p. v), while alcohol independent of outer drugs is the greatest cost to society.  

**Design/Methodology/Approach:** “Beginning with the teachings of ancient Greek philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the virtues of intellectual life over passionate life were extolled” (Goldenberg, 1999). ‘Extolled’, however, seems to be an understatement given “Psychoanalytic psychology has not won easy acceptance. Freud’s findings, from the outset, aroused much opposition. Critics objected most strongly to the ‘clinical’ discoveries, especially those regarding sexuality, made by psychoanalysts while treating their patients. (As one of Freud’s early disciples, Carl G. Jung, soon learned, criticism tended to die down if these sexual findings were de-emphasized)” (Schoenfeld, 1984, p. 2). Thus, the approach in this paper is to account for the acknowledgement of passionate life before and after Freud’s approach to sex as an integral and factual part of life, in tandem with the defusing a person’s intense narcissistic need that is masked over by escapism with in-fact and in-kind recidivism the basis. The anchor for this approach is Krafft-Ebing’s “scientific fairy tale” assessment of Freud’s reference to sexuality (Freud, 1896|1962, p. 189). To provide an idea of the focus of research in the development of this paper, there are 576 references with copyright years ranging from 1621 to 2017 and the average copyright year is 1952. A bar chart with the number of references per year precedes the first reference.  

**Research limitations/Implications:** This is about the structured CSAT-SAMHSA-DHHS data model with respect to a full accounting of the theory of circumstances and ambiguity aversion, which frames the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. Limitations are in the form of time and uncertainty, the dynamics that frustrate the discovery of what does and does not work, with basis in “fear as [a] primitive emotion” (Stanley, 1894). Implications are the enabling of a person’s self-directed
psychoanalysis via an exercise denoted ‘the flattening of life’ as a proxy for free associations that are guided by the structured data model that in turn is extensible to a fascinating exploration of what is implied but not necessarily discernable by time and uncertainty. The net result is the time and uncertainty neutral structured data model pathway into circumstances and ambiguity is a contrarian dualism of conscious-curious versus Freud’s implied dualism of conscious-unconscious.

Findings: The issue is the three rationalizations as being the basis of both the overt and covert execution of life via Freud’s reality and pleasure principles respectively. Overt execution is accomplished by resistance alternating between defense and offense mechanisms. Covert execution requires an intense narcissistic need to be the subset of resistance. A parallel issue is that therapeutic jurisprudence, in tandem with bipolar disorder, is reductionist.

Social implications: This paper leverages the undeniable resilience of the longitudinal event known as life, as each new day is a declining percentage of that event, versus, trend being extrapolated from a point in time – the principle weakness of the three rationalizations. This paper’s title includes three ideas, two that are written and one that is implied. (1) “A point does not make trend”, accounts for health care communications being countered by rationalizations. (2) “Attention/Awareness”, accounts for conscious and preconscious mental processes respectively. The implied – “A message may make trend”, accounts for all unconscious mental processes, which in turn allows for the reference to psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

Originality/value: With life the ultimate wager, the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence acknowledges the value of varied approaches over time to an understanding of the human mind as being key to unlocking the secrets held by inertia and structure, while accepting outlier arguments as challenges to be reconciled.

Keywords: progression, psychoanalytic jurisprudence, recidivism, standards, substance abuse, therapeutic jurisprudence, working memory

Paper type: Original writing.
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Introduction

This paper and its companion “Proposed cataloging scheme of the CSAT-SAMHSA-DHHS data model: The case for a psychoanalytic jurisprudence (Standards)” are about connecting historical foundations of mental life to execution of mental life where the definition of each historical and execution is largely conjecture given experience with analysis of Ischemic heart disease the anchor. Neither paper is a prerequisite to the other as this paper presents the micro view and the companion the macro view. A separate paper, “Rationalizations not common to Diabetes but common to Alcoholism and Ischemic Heart Disease (Reasoning)” applies the combined macro and micro views to “…risk factors [that] account for over three quarters of Ischemic heart disease: the leading cause of death worldwide” (WHO, 2009a, p. v), while alcohol independent of other drugs is the greatest cost to society.

This paper has two anchors – one for discussion and one for reference. The first is about sex while the second is about Ischemia – Ischemia first.

Ischemia causal chain

Figure 1 shows the causal chain of Ischemia. The chain begins with initial demographics, advances through life’s choices, then on to unintended consequences with the debilitating condition the result. The causal chain describes the ‘what’ of the progression from the initial demographics to the final debilitating condition but fails to address the ‘why’ of the progression, which is principally the impetus in the form of three rationalizations as presented in the companion paper. The three rationalizations are dissociation, introspection and transference, with purity of each of the three likely the exception, that there is a little of each in the other two. Prefix the rationalizations with seduction to be discussed with sex, and the ‘why’ of progression is fully described. This gives rise to two tasks – the character of progression and the play-out of the three rationalizations which illustrates progression at a point in time, with focus on progression over time spanning the balance of this paper.

The character of progression is set as the contra to regression as set forth in Edward Glover’s assessment of addiction: “The approach to drug addiction was (and still is) profoundly influenced by the concept of regression. ...The idea of progression implies that psycho-pathological states are exaggerations of ‘normal’ stages in the mastering of anxiety and can be arranged in a rough order of precedence. It is, of course, implicit in Freud’s original pronouncement regarding paranoid states: namely, that the symptom is in part an attempt at restitution, i.e., an advance from the unconscious situation it covers. Not only does it restore some link with reality, however inadequate, it performs also a protective function ...the core of an addiction or even of a severe obsessional state may depend more on the reduction of an underlying paranoid layer than on the most careful analysis of the recognized habit-formation or obsessional superstructure” [Italics in original] (Glover, 1936). Progression is transparent to age, education and income as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1 - Ischemic Causal Chain
between the first two columns of Figure 1, with reduced emphasis on paranoia of any character versus the superstructure of everyday life. That seduction is the norm with progression to safe harbor the mask.

Given that Ischemia is a medical issue the momentary play-out of the three rationalizations will be illustrated with an interaction between physician and patient. With dissociation, the patient is saying to the physician “I will ignore you”, with introspection the patient is saying “I know myself better than you think I do”, and with transference the patient is saying “I will control you”. Thus, it is practical, perhaps wise, to assume that the patient enters the physician-patient relationship replete with Glover’s reference to anxiety and that the patient’s only choice is the mastering of [that] anxiety. The practical analgesic to the capacity for rationalizations is to focus on the reduction of anxiety with Balint’s “mutual investment company” (Matalon, 1999) as the approach, with an aesthetic view of psychology as basis. Once these two topics, relationship and approach, are presented attention with then turn to the first anchor, sex, as the opener to the intended micro-oriented call for a psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

In the physician-patient relationship the physician wears two ‘hats’. The first ‘hat’ is about being a doctor, a human biologist, whose focus is a clinical point-in-time with respect to the patient. The second ‘hat’ is about being engaged with the patient’s rationalizations with the goal to be humanism-based curative versus being an unintended enabler of anxiety – Balint’s focus. “What is the legacy of Michael Balint’s work and what can be said of its application to efforts to heighten the physician's appreciation of the centrality of the doctor-patient relationship in effective medical practice? The oft-quoted reference to the ‘doctor as drug’ was not only an enchanting idea but also an ingenious way to help physicians trained essentially in the traditional medical model to see that they could readily incorporate the skillful use of the doctor into a framework of practice to which they were already accustomed. It is not clear that Balint consciously foresaw this as a way to decrease resistance to a new way of thinking, but it appears to have had great power. It was essentially Balint's way of translating into the medical context his theory that it was the relational aspect of interaction that was curative rather than the drugs that the physician dispensed” [Italics added] (Lipsitt, 1999). Supporting rationale for Balint’s approach is clinical consultation, effectively having a functional psychology, consciousness and socialization, in synch with the environment – to be expanded in the discussion of Preparatory topical issues – Association (unconscious reality) (p. 16) – as the first ‘hat’, versus a focus on aesthetics, effectively a relational aspect of interaction as the second ‘hat’. “Functional psychology as a method for the reformulation in terms of concrete experience of both psychologic and philosophic problems has hitherto been focused on those types of conscious experience the reconstructive character and bearings of which are most obvious ... the act of attention. ...This emphasis is due, no doubt, partly to the inherent difficulty of analyzing immediate experience, since it functions as a whole and therefore without revealing its constituent elements; partly to the influences under which functional psychology began to take shape as a system; and partly to the newness of the whole method, which is, in fact, only just becoming aware of its full implications, and has not yet had time to state, much less to solve, all its problems. ...The most psychologically unsophisticated person, if he has any aesthetic interests, will not hesitate, I think, to range his moments of unmistakable aesthetic enjoyment — whether of creation or of appreciation — on the side of immediate rather than of reflective experience. In such moments at their purest we all have a sense of exemption and release from the pressure and the precariousness of life” (Adams, 1906). Now, sex...

Propagation of the human species

“Beginning with the teachings of ancient Greek philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the virtues of intellectual life over passionate life were extolled” (Goldenberg, 1999). ‘Extolled’, however,
seems to be an understatement given “Psychoanalytic psychology has not won easy acceptance. Freud’s findings, from the outset, aroused much opposition. Critics objected most strongly to the ‘clinical’ discoveries, especially those regarding sexuality, made by psychoanalysts while treating their patients. (As one of Freud’s early disciples, Carl G. Jung, soon learned, criticism tended to die down if these sexual findings were di-emphasized)” (Schoenfeld, 1984, p. 2). (Jung’s position versus Freud with sex, will be addressed in the closing paragraphs of the discussion of Mental scientists below (p. 27.).

From the limited information in the prior paragraph there is enough ‘evidence’ to declare Freud a culprit when in principle he was a mentalist who was surrounded by theorists – clinical, one patient at a time, versus observant of the execution of life by some set of persons over some segment of time, and, with emphasis on evolution in some respect, but principally conduct. The tasks now are to address Freud as both a constrained observer and as a frustrated culprit, then, define seduction, resolve Freud to evolution, resolve evolution to the above three rationalizations (p. 6) with special attention given to seduction, resolve fear to circumstances and ambiguity, and then move on with a full introduction to the balance of this paper beginning with Preparatory topical issues (p. 16). A considerable portion of what follows is devoted to a tracing of the evolution of the understanding of mental life up to and through the year 1890, the effective launch of what has become psychoanalysis with August 1890 the date assigned by James to the Preface of his two-volume Principles of Psychology, not to suggest the James was a proponent of psychoanalysis, but to recognize the transition of thought From Soul to Mind (Reed, 1997, pp. ix-xvi), which covers from Erasmus Darwin to William James.

**Freud as a constrained observer**

Freud was a scientist with limited availability to information versus where we folks stand in this era with the internet the obvious advantage. There are six issues here.

First, Freud’s professional life spanned the Panic of 1893, the First World War 1914-1918, the Depression 1929-1939, and the formation of the Second World War 1939-1945. The First War taught Freud that “Egotism and cruelty are primitive impulses in us” [Italics in original] (Southard, 1919), with an extension of that lesson the psychoanalysis of the dark side of society as provided by Freud to Einstein in 1932, and with Leon Steinig, a League of Nations Official, the pivot between Freud and Einstein (Nathan, 1960, chap. 6, pp. 166-213). That lesson unfortunately remains with us. Consider how few years of true world peace since Freud’s death in 1939. Then there is the current primitive impulses entertainment factor in the form of “first-person-shooter video gamers” (Montag, 2011). For emphasis, the world as experienced by Freud was equally experienced by all persons around him, beginning with his patients, with no reason to doubt as-experienced continuity on to this very day – do consider the Queen’s verdict, “Sentence first – verdict afterwards” (Carroll, 1865, p. 187). Taking primitive impulses one step further, we have “fear as [a] primitive emotion” (Stanley, 1894). Regarding the shooter video games, the player gets an artificial sense of invincibility, that, unfortunately, does not carry through to real-time life – a psychopathology in and of itself.

Second, Freud as a trained neurologist was in competition with self-proclaimed experts regarding the dynamics of society, including to this day – “…Freud’s views (as usual) where over the top…” (Eysenck, 2000, p. 238). The anchor of those dynamics, labeled the Industrial Revolution of 1760 to 1830 by a variety of historians, was factually “The system of human relationships that is sometimes called capitalism had its origins long before 1760, and attained its full development long after 1830, there is a danger of overlooking the essential fact of continuity” (Ashton, 1948, p. 2). The 1760-1830 era included four influential publications – The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (1776), Essay on the principle of population by Thomas Malthus (1798), Principles of political economy and taxation by David Ricardo (1817) and Principles of Political Economy by Stuart Mill (1848) – together these four writings defined
the politics of economy which was inherited by Freud. The continuity of the development of capitalism spanned many benefits with betterment of the standard of living of the middle class especially the lower middle class – clerks, etc., benefits that were not shared uniformly as the expansion of capitalism necessitated change. While 'Individualism' and 'Laisser-Faire' were “the characteristic instrument of social purpose” as capitalism evolved, the inertia of contra-individual (collectivism) introduced resistance and stress (Ibid, pp. 127-141). At the individual level – “All change is traumatic, even change for the better. The very gratification of wishes generates dislocations; as Freud once pointed out, humans resist giving up a pleasure they once enjoyed and dislike waiting for the dividends that later, greater pleasures might bring” (Gay, 1998, p. 15). Then there is the standard human approach to any array of elements in life – “True, the psychology of research has established that all too often historians, like other scientists, start with their conclusions already settled in their minds” [Italics added] (Ibid, p. 230) – to which one must add the issue of scientific fraud (Crocker, 2011a; Crocker, 2011b) and volunteer bias (Maslow, 1952).

Third, continuing with Freud as a trained neurologist, in 1885 he was granted a traveling bursary (grant) for studies in Paris and Berlin. The purpose of the grant was to advance his knowledge of the anatomy of the nervous system only to find himself experiencing a diversion of his scientific interests from neurology to psychology, and, with an unplanned interest in sexual matters to follow (Freud, 1896|1962, pp. 3-15). Focus here is on the political economy of sexuality and the subsequent resistance faced by Freud as noted above (Schoenfeld, 1984, p. 2). One of the offshoots of the evolution of capitalism is a wealthy class. The wealthy of the day was far from done with their determined arrogance and they had help from "Malthus, who dealt not so much with the causes of wealth as with the causes of poverty, with the distribution of wealth rather than with its production" (Toynbee, 1884|1956, p. 1). It was during this state of things, with population rapidly increasing, that Malthus wrote. “Yet he was not thinking directly of the Poor Law... human misery was not the result of human injustice and of bad institutions, but of an inexorable law of nature, viz., that population tends to outstrip the means of subsistence. This law would in a few generations counteract the effects of the best institutions that human wisdom could conceive... To the ‘positive check’ of misery and vice, he added the ‘preventive check’ of moral restraint, namely, abstinence from marriage” (Ibid, p. 79). Hence, the wealthy were equipped with two responses to the pauper – (1) the intent of the original Poor Law in 1549, the Statute of Labourers, had nothing to do with the maintenance of the poor; its objective was to repress their vagrancy (Ibid, p. 69), and (2) the Malthus comment about abstinence from marriage. The wealthy had a second trademark – loftiness with respect to sex, a focus that allowed them to distance themselves from the pauper and the associated poverty-spawned prostitution, thereby incorporating into their ethic the Malthus comment about abstinence from marriage, a stance that removed from open discussion the biological side of being human with recognition of such an essential component of Freud's work. The wealthy had a third trademark that being coyness about logic. In their cleverness, they could insure the basic law of economics – supply and demand, would not enter discussion. That the level of prostitution was in line with demand for said services (Ibid, p. 84).

Fourth, Freud as the emerging psychologist was burdened with the anti-thesis to his future work. "In 1887, Vincent Van Gogh tentatively predicted that 'perhaps someday everyone will be neurotic’” (Gay, 1986, pp. 333). The behavior that Van Gogh referred to was the focus of the wealthy on nervousness, as if it were a trademark. "By the 1860’s and 1870’s, physicians and popular journalists had promoted the idea of nervousness into a widely discussed phenomenon, and cultural critics began to link it to the stress they thought typical of, in fact, virtually unique to, the society of their time” (Ibid, p. 333), failing to consider the role of the human mind and motive, and that the panacea of nervousness was not available to the poor who by default were stigmatized with women bearing the brunt. The discovery
and promotion of nervousness in the nineteenth century therefore turns out to be largely another eloquent witness to the anxiety that innovation generates. ... Freud would later give this defensive strategy the name of projection” (Ibid, p. 349). The reference to projection is not to be taken as the highlighting of a clinical term but to draw attention to that word as a very powerful social force – that anxiety as a neurosis is a subset of anxiety in the form of hysteria, which in turn is a subset of fear (Jones, 1913) . From this paper’s abstract, a parallel issue is that therapeutic jurisprudence, in tandem with bipolar disorder, is reductionist. Later in this paper (p. 89) nervousness will be resolved to melancholia, then on to hysteria, and then on to bipolar disorder to include a full accounting of the claim of reductionist.

Fifth, Freud was consistently countered by colleagues in his own circle that went beyond constructive and spirited debate. One such person, Wilhelm Reich, took his arguments regarding sexual freedom too far and tragically died in a prison in the United States (Sterba, 1982, p. 88). There is a larger issue that goes beyond hardened intellectual positions with Freud bashing the result. Two examples: (1) From the Invention of hysteria, “Freud was the disoriented witness of the immensity of hysteria and the manufacturing of images. His disorientation was not without bearing on the beginnings of psychoanalysis” (Didi-Huberman, 2003, p. xii). (2) An extension of internet-based research which was nonexistent in Freud’s lifetime, “The picture of the state of things was and is erroneous. We must reevaluate Freud’s belief in the independence of his discovery of dream meaning. He said with reference to dreams that ‘I do not know of any outside influence which drew my interest or inspired me with any helpful expectations’. It may be that he did not know of any influence; it may be that he altogether forgotten the influence. But this is not to say the influence did not exist” (Sand, 1992).

Sixth, the unintended consequences of Freud’s writing in German versus in English with Freud’s Civilization and its discontents (Freud, 1930|1961, pp. 59-148) the reference. At issue is the implied context of any writing with interest limited to an economic orientation versus an emotional orientation with discomfort (economic) versus discontent (emotional) taken as the poles. This topic develops the discomfort-discontent poles as two anchors to be followed by discussion. The first anchor is about German versus English – “I have always found the translation of the German title ‘Das Unbehagen in der Kultur’ unsatisfactory. Unbehagen means ‘not feeling comfortable’, referring to a psychic state; it means being disturbed by a feeling of insecurity or the state of insufficient gratification of basic needs. ‘Discomfort’, in my opinion, comes nearer to Unbehagen then ‘discontent’, which in German would be Unzufriedenheit. ‘Civilization’ is not quite congruent with the German Kultur; however, ‘culture’, the only other term in English at our disposal, has a slightly different meaning. I would translate the title as ‘Discomfort in our Culture’” [Italics in original] (Sterba, 1982, p. 113). The second anchor is from a prior paper – “The position in this paper is three terse points – (1) girls have it easy, they know that they are not boys; (2) boys have it hard, they are clueless; (3) girls pay the price. Resolution of these points must occur in reverse order – (3) eliminate the burden placed on girls; (2) inspire boys to gain firm identity; (1) inspire girls to be girls” (Cook, 2015a). Now discussion. What is implied by the title of the book Feminism and its discomforts by Mary Jo Buhle (Buhle, 1998), with “A century of struggle with psychoanalysis” as its subtitle, is the issue. Buhle followed Freud’s naming. Had she followed Sterba’s suggestion, the title might have been Feminism and its discomforts, or, Discomforts in our feminism, where the latter implies a reaction to an elusive definition versus observable realities – hence, an economic issue. Stated differently and with “to eliminate the burden placed on girls [and boys]” the starting point, the idea is to recognize focus on change not as a self-referencing analgesic, but instead to focus on a presumed analgesic in isolation parallel to psychoanalysis being recognized as the second derivative [of the calculus] that is intended to explore the impetus of change as well as preexisting entrenchment, which enforces the economic issue. The opening two pages of Buhle’s Introduction
exposes three issues. (1) At the 1909 conference at Clark University where Sigmund Freud lectured, the feminist Emma Goldman was in attendance. She passed a note to Freud requesting that he talk about sex. “Freud allegedly replied that he could no more ‘be driven to the subject than away from it’” … “Freud continued with ‘We ought not to exalt ourselves so high as completely to neglect’ he warned, ‘what was originally animal in our nature. Nor should we forget that the satisfaction of the individual’s happiness cannot be erased from among the aims of our civilization’”. (2) The narrative continues on page 2 to the word ‘libido’, the word that is given little notice, a word that another author has advanced to Freud’s theory of motivation (Mendelson, 1974, pp. 249-252), distilling to support of the idea of elusive definition but with focus set at denial, an emotional issue. (3) The second support of the idea of elusive definition is the emphasis placed on the word ‘IN’ – “But feminism encompasses far more than these goals [higher education, etc.]. Feminism promises nothing less than, another devotee instructed, ‘a changed psychology, the creation of a new consciousness IN women’” – again, ‘IN’ (Buhle, 1998, p. 241). Equating feminism to psychoanalysis is not acceptable to far too many – men, yes men – while women are burdened with too much negative images beginning with hysteria, a term that was derived from the Greek word for uterus (Freud, 1888|1966, p. 41). Not referenced by Buhle and so very important to this paper is the ‘Anna O’ case of 1880, Breuer’s patient, the first case history of “the talking cure”, the free associations of psychoanalysis – the flattening of life as advanced in this paper. Macro social data shows that at ages 12 and 13 girls are equal to boys with respect to substance abuse but with boy versus girl data skewed to boys beginning at age 14 (NSDUH, 2016, Tables 2.43A. 2.44A. 2.45A). With detail deferred to the next heading, at issue is myth principally about family, thus nudging girls to the ‘rightful’ (‘wrongful?’) place in the social fabric. While the underlying theme of this paper is a gender independent ‘IN’, until feminism and psychoanalysis are accepted as synonyms and as an overt theme, discomforts versus discontent remains an issue with refinement in the discussion of Resolve fear to circumstances and ambiguity (p. 15).

**Freud as a frustrated culprit**

This is an extension of Malthus. In May 1896 Freud delivered a lecture with an 1892 paper about hysteria its basis. That lecture was preceded by publication in 1886 of the first edition of *Psychopathia Sexualis* by Richard von Krafft-Ebing, a forensic psychiatrist, which gave visibility to sexual deviations. (Krafft-Ebing’s twelfth edition dated 1900 with publication in 1915 is referenced in this paper with the 15-year lapse accounted for by his students assembling material for publication after his death in 1902.)

In the first edition’s 1886 preface, Krafft-Ebing sets forth what is best characterized as denial of a serious social problem: “It is remarkable that the sexual life has received but a very subordinate consideration on the part of philosophers. Schopenhauer ([*The World as Will and Idea*] thought it strange that love had been thus far a subject for the poet alone, and that, with the exception of superficial treatment by Plato, Rousseau, and Kant, it had been foreign to philosophers. What Schopenhauer and, after him, the *Philosopher of the Unconscious*, E. v. Hartmann, philosophized concerning the sexual relations is so imperfect, and in its consequences so distasteful, that, aside from the treatment in the works of Michelet (*L’amour*) and Maritagezza (*Physiology of Love*), which are to be considered more as brilliant discussions than as scientific treatises, the empirical psychology and metaphysics of the sexual side of human existence rest upon a foundation which is scientifically almost puerile. ...The poets may be better psychologists than the psychologists and philosophers; but they are men of feeling rather than of understanding, and at least one-sided in their consideration of the subject. They cannot see the deep shadow behind the light and sunny warmth of that from which they draw their inspiration” (Krafft-Ebing, 1900|1915, p. v-vi). With Krafft-Ebing’s preface noted, the three points in the above discussion of discomfort (economic) versus discontent (emotional) – elusive definition, myth and ‘IN’ – can be consolidated to a single thought: “The sudden loss of virile powers often produces melancholia or is the
cause of suicide when life without love is a blank” (Ibid, p. 13). (Here love is not about romance but is about purpose, a feeling of worth.)

Regarding Freud as a culprit, at issue is Krafft-Ebing’s reaction to Freud’s lecture, not complimentary to say the least. “[Freud] reported [to Fleiss] on having given a lecture before that society [psychiatry and neurology] on the aetiology of hysteria. [Freud] went on to remark that ‘the donkeys gave it an icy reception’ and that Krafft-Ebing, who was in the chair, said it sounded like a scientific fairy tale” (Freud, 1896|1962, p. 189). In the body of the referenced 1892 paper Freud states “But the most important finding that is arrived at if an analysis is thus consistently pursued is this: Whatever case and whatever symptom we take as our point of departure, in the end we infallibly come to the field of sexual experience. So here first time we seem to have discovered an aetiological precondition for hysterical symptoms” [Italics in original] (Ibid, p. 199). It seems that Krafft-Ebing’s focus on sexual deviations would be sufficient for reception of Freud’s seduction theory, parallel to what is implied by equating the plight of persons with mental illness (Schoenfeld, 1984, chap. 3, pp. 25-52) to the rights afforded to criminal defendants (Ibid, chap. 4, pp. 53-76) with the latter the primary subject of the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. Thus, the sequence is this – [mentalist] the 1892 targeted clinical observation, [theorist] the 1894 targeted forensic observation, [impasse] the 1896 criticism by the ‘donkeys’. Specifically, Krafft-Ebing took sexual conduct as an outlier of life versus Freud’s observations that sexual conduct is normative to life.

Define seduction (with progression to safe harbor)

Simply stated seduction is the application of Influence and expectations. Typically, at least in the contemporary sense, influence is implemented by advertising [the impetus to progression] in the commercial world, while expectations [of safe harbor], also in a contemporary sense, are implemented by the immediate social structure.

Aligning seduction to Freud while voiding any reference to contemporary requires an expansion of two propositions. (1) Unresolved anger is internalized as guilt, while unresolved guilt is internalized as shame [anger-guilt-shame]. (2) Unresolved shame triggers self-defense anger where the resultant anger must be accepted as not resolvable, the anger is internalized as guilt with more shame [shame-anger-guilt] (Cook, 2014a, pp. 35-36). Each proposition begs a question – what causes the anger, what causes the shame.

It is necessary and efficient to resolve shame to seduction as being driven by a person’s voices from the past – emotional abuse. Settling on seduction as a broad influence on the causal chain of Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6) is accomplished by disconnecting seduction from a physical act, Freud’s original construction, and connecting it to a voice. A very reasonable example – a small child has an accident during potty training, which is followed by their frustrated parent’s “you ought to be ashamed of yourself” admonishment (Ibid, p. 36).

Equally necessary and efficient is the resolving of anger to attachment, as a strong to weak continuum, "...attachment theory has contributed to a better understanding of personality processes and individual differences in adulthood ... tripartite topology of secure, avoidant and anxious-ambivalent attachment styles” (Mikulincer, 1998). The secure person handles anger as a natural part of life while others are denied healthy resolution, as will be addressed with the discussion Resolve evolution to the three rationalizations (p. 14).
Resolve Freud to evolution

The starting point is the above reference – Krafft-Ebing took sexual conduct as an outlier of life, versus Freud’s observations that sexual conduct is normative to life – but with Krafft-Ebing representing all silence with respect to sex as normative and with Freud the vocal outlier.

Before moving into this discussion, a technical comment about presentation. As a point of organization Freud’s theory of instincts or drives – source, aim, object – is the template that joins a topic to a common denominator. Hence five characteristics with the current array targeted to Freud versus evolution:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>topic</th>
<th>source</th>
<th>aim</th>
<th>object</th>
<th>common denominator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>biological evolution</td>
<td>Charles Darwin (1809-1882)</td>
<td>Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829)</td>
<td>Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)</td>
<td>propagation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 - Evolution to Propagation

“I was already alive when Charles Darwin published his work on the *Origin of Species*” (Freud, 1932|1964, p. 173), as he reminded an audience. However, that connection goes beyond his span of life and has him explicitly and implicitly a student of Darwin and Darwin’s work throughout his life. On the explicit side, Freud, who attended medical school from 1873 to 1882, had a direct link to Darwin through his medical school professors Carl Claus (zoologist), Ernst Wilhelm Brücke (physiologist) and Theodore H. Meynert (neuroanatomist), with his indirect link the parallel between physical and psychoanalytic evolution – adaptation in life (Ritvo, 1990, pp. 1-2). While Freud had no link with Lamarck who will be introduced by Darwin in the next paragraph, of note is the existence of three rival claims (Ibid, p. 47) about how evolution takes place with those claims adapted to this writing via the layout in Table 1: (1) that which adopts the theory of natural selection – Darwin, (2) that which maintains that acquired characters are inherited – Lamarck, (3) that which, in trying to penetrate deeper into the mystery of life, ascribes to living matter a purposefulness – Freud. Now, an accounting of Darwin versus history, then Darwin’s accounting of Lamarck, with an accounting of Darwin versus Freud which validates Freud as the vocal outlier, as object, in Table 1.

The starting point is the extent of credit given to Darwin and his methodical investigation. “The idea of the evolution of organisms, so far from originating with Darwin, is a very old one. Glimpses of it appear in the ancient Greek philosophers, especially Empedocles and Aristotle; modern philosophy from Bacon onward shows an increasing definiteness in its grasp of the conception; and in the age preceding Darwin’s – Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck had given it a fairly concrete expression. As we approach the date of the publication of *The Origin of Species* adherence to the doctrine not only by naturalists but by poets, such as Goethe, becomes comparatively frequent; and in the six years before the joint announcement of Darwin and Wallace, Herbert Spencer had been supporting and applying it vigorously in the field of psychology [and biology]. To these partial anticipations, however, Darwin owed little” (Darwin, 1872|1909, p. 6). Now, Lamarck...

“Lamarck was the first man whose conclusions on the subject excited much attention. This justly-celebrated naturalist first published his views in 1801; he much enlarged them in 1809 in his *Philosophic Zoologique*, and subsequently, in 1815, in the Introduction to his *Hist. Nat. des Animaux sans Vertebres*. In these works, he upholds the doctrine that species, including man, are descended from other species. He first did the eminent service of arousing attention to the probability of all change in the organic, as well as in the inorganic world, being the result of law, and not of miraculous interposition. Lamarck
seems to have been chiefly led to his conclusion on the gradual change of species, by the difficulty of
distinguishing species and varieties, by the almost perfect gradation of forms in certain groups, and by
the analogy of domestic productions. With respect to the means of modification, he attributed
something to the direct action of the physical conditions of life, something to the crossing of already
existing forms, and much to use and disuse, that is, to the effects of habit. To this latter agency, he
seems to attribute all the beautiful adaptations in nature – such as the long neck of the giraffe for
browsing on the branches of trees. But he likewise believed in a law of progressive development; and as
all the forms of life thus tend to progress, in order to account for the existence at the present day of
simple productions, he maintains that such forms are now spontaneously generated” (Ibid, p. 10). Now, Darw

“There is nothing in modern philosophy that appears to me so extraordinary, as the revival of what has
long been considered as the exploded doctrine of equivocal, or, as Dr. [Erasmus] Darwin calls it,
spontaneous generation; by which is meant the production of organized bodies from substances that
have no organization, as plants and animals from no pre-existing germs of the same kinds, plants
without seeds, and animals without sexual intercourse. … And this I assert is nothing less than the
production of an effect without any adequate cause” [Italics added] (Priestley, 1809). Thus, Freud’s
reference to sexuality is only an extension of Darwin’s evolution as set in Table 1 (Evolution, p. 13), with
adaptation to follow...

Resolve evolution to the three rationalizations

As above, Freud’s theory of instincts or drives – source, aim, object – is the template that joins a topic to
a common denominator. Here it is three sets of five characteristics...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>topic</th>
<th>source</th>
<th>aim</th>
<th>object</th>
<th>common denominator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dynamics</td>
<td>Sigmund Freud</td>
<td>Pierre Janet</td>
<td>William James</td>
<td>Mary Whiton Calkins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rationalizations</td>
<td>transference</td>
<td>dissociation</td>
<td>introspection (suppression)</td>
<td>Edward Titchener</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(repression)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1867-1927)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adaptation</td>
<td>secure</td>
<td>avoidant</td>
<td>anxious-ambivalent</td>
<td>attachment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 - Adaption

In this Table adaptation is the place holder for Lamarckian evolution, the whole of Table 1, which in turn
sets Freud as polar – he as the object of Table 1 and the source of Table 2. The entries under source,
aim and object reflect ‘tends towards’ while the common denominator reflects breadth versus each of
its respective three entries. While this table is the global reference for the next major heading,
Preparatory topical issues, p. 16, its implications to the target psychoanalytic jurisprudence will be
addressed now. This includes evolutionary ethics, therapeutic action and existentialism.

Evolutionary ethics is what Freud, Janet, James, Calkins and others were about with respect to the
relationship between human beings and the immediate social structure as the basis for a person’s
protection of self. Darwin did not address the evolution of the moral consciousness, dismiss the moral
consciousness to instinctive and emotional terms as a characteristic of survival of the fittest, nor the
consciousness of duty on social instincts (Tufts, 1909).
Therapeutic action extends neutrality to the three rationalizations on the strength of adaptation which is molded by a person’s understanding of their fears and foibles, which in turn both define and protect that person, hence Freud as both source and object. Freud rejected a basic social instinct such as a herd instinct, in favor of sexual instincts as the defining basis for all human expression versus social and even the herd (Bocock, 1977). Any model of therapeutic action considers both intrapsychic and intersubjective dimensions that are about self-reflexive (self as the subject, the ‘I’) and self-awareness (self as the object, the ‘me’), that in turn allow for the alignment between adaptation and rationalizations (Aron, 2000).

Existentialism is about “being in the world” (Frankl, 1967), the basis for discussion of the CSAT-SAMHSA-DHHS data model, the seventh track below (p. 59; p. 161). Existentialism is also about an understanding of the character of adaptation if progression is to be understood, where introspection as a subset of attention is the candidate pathway to the fundamentals of progression — “It would, of course, be preposterous to claim the out-and-out behaviorist as a self-psychologist; in truth, his rejection of introspection as a psychological method proves that he is really no psychologist at all but a biologist concentrating his attention on human behavior” (Calkins, 1916; Calkins, 1919). Now, an overview of attention (interest) as an amorphous phenomenon, followed by a survey of introspection in isolation.

“Herbart’s theory states that interest is common with, as well as opposed to, desire, will, and aesthetic judgment. Interest is the result of the interaction of a number of ideas or systems of ideas. Dewey defines interest as the ‘consciousness of worth’, and proposes that interest is active, teleological and emotional. Stumpf identifies attention with interest, and interest with feeling. Locke was the first English writer to define attention, and (Stewart) Mill’s analysis offers the first account of attention in which interest is identified to it. Sully emphasized the necessity of investigating the relation of interest to attention. The concomitance of interest with attention is also emphasized by Titchener. Finally, James refers to interest as a selecting principle. Ladd considers it as a feeling, and according to Calkins, attention or interest is the feeling of clearness” (Arnold, 1906a). Now the survey of introspection in isolation.

“Introspection can never give us a system of psychology. The ‘pure’ psychology of the middle nineteenth-century was, as we have seen, systematized by metaphysics; and modern systems, in order to be systematic, inevitably appeal to something — to the unconscious, to the nervous system, to laws of mental growth and mental organization — which is not discoverable by introspection. ...Introspection is psychological observation; and observation is a way of getting facts, ‘observations’ in the passive sense, data, materials of science. ...A good deal of misunderstanding is due, simply and solely, to the ambiguities of language. What, for instance, does a writer mean by ‘psychological methods’? He may mean the specific methods which the psychologist, in his capacity and by his training as psychologist, employs in his psychologizing: methods, therefore, which have not been acquired by the physicist and physiologist [or computer scientist]. Or he may mean methods which the systematizing psychologist employs in the construction of a rounded science of psychology: methods, therefore, which so far as they are not specifically psychological in the sense just indicated are common to all systematizes of science” (Titchener, 1912a).

Resolve fear to circumstances and ambiguity

Covered here is the economics of attention and awareness versus the economics of circumstances and ambiguity, with fear synonymous with decision making that is guided by the three rationalizations — “that fear, as indeed every emotion, does not consist of pain or cognition-revivals in any form, but is a feeling reaction from the representation of the feeling potency of the object” (Stanley, 1894). With the subjective expected utility theory of decision making under uncertainty of modern economic theory
(Ghirardato, 2002), an accounting of discomfort (economic) versus discontent (emotional) is possible and requires three steps.

First, attention and circumstances are synonymous as is awareness and ambiguity. Second, circumstances encompass rationalism and skepticism as a continuum and as advanced by experience. Third, ambiguity is not about relative probability but is about knowledge as molded by experience versus scholastic efforts. “With reference to experience as it now is, such idealism is half opposed to empiricism and half committed to it, – antagonistic, so far as existing experience is regarded as tainted with a sensational character; favorable, so far as thought renders this experience even now prophetic of some final, all-comprehensive, or absolute experience, which in truth is one with reality” [Italics in original] (Dewey, 1906).

Thus, discontent comports with attention and circumstances with its execution somewhere between rationalism and skepticism confirming emotional, while discomfort comports with awareness and ambiguity and is under the influence of ambiguity confirming economic. Of the two – discontent and discomfort, the latter is more open to adaptation as the resolution of ambiguity thus allowing circumstances to morph to attachment.

This Introduction concludes by giving extensive character to Titchener’s qualified assessment of introspection above versus the rationalizations in Table 2 (Adaption, p. 14) in the form of four groups of topics – Preparatory topical issues (below), Formation of a mind science (post-Hume association) (p. 35), Migration of a mind science (perpetual adaptation) (p. 40) and Summary of this paper (p. 54).

**Preparatory topical issues**

This topical summary spans metaphor and sexuality, association (unconscious reality), philosophers (conceptual), philosophers (mental), mental scientists, mistakes and cognitive psychology. The destination is Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34).

**Metaphor and sexuality**

The immediate task is to describe psychological thought as it passed through Freud’s life with the objective to highlight the difference between clinicians such as Freud who immersed themselves in the patient’s recollections about life versus the social observers who recorded history at a point in time thus implying that history does not necessarily repeat itself – which is not true. Topics include an overview, studies of persons who were all modern once (and still are), and sexuality.

An overview about the development of theory has “…the work of the nineteenth century in psychology has been indeed most important. It has established the science; it has set the direction of its future movement. It remains for the twentieth century to reach practical applications of its results, and to improve the methods and instruments of further discovery. The present outlook is that social psychology will be carried on in France and America, genetic psychology in England and America, experimental psychology in Germany and America” (Baldwin, 1905). This implies that the past evolves into today, which, in turn, evolves into the future, a continuity in thought as people build on the work of others as additional information and insight becomes available. The alternative is to either counter an argument as Jung did with Freud with respect to sexuality (Schoenfeld, 1984, p. 2) or to assume that contributors from the past are precisely past tense with no regard for value, which seems to go against the contemporary focus on evidence. “Whilst few would disagree with the notion of delivering care based on information about what works, there remain significant challenges about what evidence is, and thus how practitioners use it in decision making in the reality of clinical practice. …The delivery of effective, evidence-based patient-centered care will only be realized when a broader definition of what
counts as evidence is embraced” (Rycroft-Malone, 2004). This however does not delete the need for forward thinking based on currently available observations that may be evidence, that the reference to observations recognizes the potential for the intent of evidence as an input to future deliberations.

Here is an example of lost contributions to the knowledge base that are based on who was once modern. “The ten studies which constitute this volume are devoted to individuals who are held out as being reasonably characteristic of that modern movement of the last and present century which started with the French Revolution. At any rate, they were all modern once. For the spirit of modernity enjoys, like the priest-god of the ancient grove, only a temporary reign, and is speedily killed by its inevitable successor” [Italics added] (Samuel, 1914, p. vii). Now, a quick survey of the ten studies much of which preempts Freud.

(1) Marie-Henri (Stendahl) Beyle (1783-1842), “...so it is that we entitle Stendhal the patentee of psychology, the inventor of introspection...” (Ibid, p. 1-25).

(2) Christian Johann Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) “...it is even because of this surface inconsistency, this psychological many-sidedness that Heine is a great poet and the one who, mirroring in his own mind the complexity that he saw without, is typically representative of the varied phases of the early nineteenth century” (Ibid, pp. 26-49).

(3) Benjamin Disraeli, 1st Earl of Beaconsfield (1804-1881) “By sheer force of intellect and determination he lifted himself from the Ghetto to the highest position in England. As he himself said, in one of Mrs. Craige’s novels: ‘Many men have talent; few have genius; fewer still have character’” (Ibid, pp. 50-69).

(4) Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900) "...the psychological significance is none the less profound. Is it not turning the tables with a vengeance on the Christian idea of a prospective nonearthly existence, compared with which this existence is a mere shadowy preparation, to pile future life on future life on future life, and every one of them a repetition of man’s life on earth? It is impossible for the affirmation of human existence to be carried further. And this human existence, what is its solution? None, or rather itself! Existence is its own sanction, its own raison d’etre, and he who coldly ravishes the sphinx of life has found a drastic solution far excelling that of any Oedipus” [Italics in original] (Ibid, pp. 70-90).

(5) Johan August Strindberg (1849-1912) "For Strindberg, more than any other European author of our age, has boxed the whole compass of our modernity with its tumults, its aspirations, its perversities; its glaring searchlights of science, its pallid flames of mysticism, and its needle ever pointing to the two opposite though connected poles of sex” (Ibid, pp. 91-113).

(6) Marie Corelli (1855-1924) “Her Weltanschauung, broad, plain, simple, touched at once with a high consciousness of her ethical mission and a ruthless observation for all the sins and follies of the age, is the authentic and spontaneous outcome of her own unique psychology’” [Italics in original] (Ibid, pp. 114-133).

(7) Benjamin Franklin Wedekind (1864-1918) "...making all due allowances for defects, for the superfluous thickness with which sometimes he places his harsh and violent colors, or for occasional amorphous construction, as in Frühlingserwachen, as a master of irony he is indisputably a genius” [Italics in original] (Ibid, pp. 134-160).

(8) Arthur Schnitzler (1862-1931) "...because Schnitzler's plays combining ...the psychological interest of pure 'problem' with the emotional interest of pure 'drama', afford specimens of a type novel to, at any rate, the majority of our theatre-goers, that they provoke something more than a cursory examination, not only of themselves...” (Ibid, pp. 161-195).
(9) Emile Verhaeren (1855-1916) "is the singer of the whole fullness of modern European life as a whole, with its clashes, its complexities, its agonies and its tensions, its deserted country-sides and its pullulating metropoles, its armaments and its Armageddons, its brothels, cathedrals, laboratories and Stock Exchanges, its sciences and its sensualities, its arts, philosophies and aspirations" (Ibid, pp. 196-211).

(10) Filippo Tommaso Emilio Marinetti (1876-1944) founder of the Futurist movement, an expressionist form of art (Ibid, pp. 212-238).

What Samuel has done with the ten studies of persons who were all modern once is set forth evidence based on ‘sufficient reason’, which rest on the ‘psychological processes of imagination’ (Urban, 1897) that in turn overtrumps the dynamics of the three rationalizations with inertia. Now, sexuality....

With sexuality two observations have been presented with one to follow. The first observation was Priestley noting Darwin reverenced spontaneous generation but not sexual intercourse. The second was Krafft-Ebing’s ‘scientific fairytale’ comments about Freud’s focus on sexuality with a reference to ‘donkeys’ Freud’s counter. The additional or third is about recidivism of sexual offenders with comments deferred to the discussion of Leveraging of opportunity is aligned with life style and an intense narcissistic need (pp. 93) below. What is important to this entire focus on psychoanalytic jurisprudence is Freud’s reference to sexuality is only an extension of Darwin’s adaptation with a simple algebraic equality as shown in Figure 2 sufficient to set Freud in sync with Darwin. This simple Figure is sufficient to draw a line of comparison.

On one side is Freud as well as the above ten were all modern once (and still are), while on the other side is forensic analysis which includes Krafft-Ebing, recidivism of sexual offenders, and other forensic theorists – effectively narcissism versus aggression. What is important for now is the asserting of equality between Darwin and Freud as in Figure 2 which requires two steps with respect to Freud but with Darwin and survival of the fittest common to both steps. (1) Instincts are desires and/or wishes (Fromm-Reichmann, 1941|1959, p.49) which does not necessarily imply sexuality. (2) Instincts are identity (Jacobson, 1964, pp. 28-31 & 74-75) which does imply sexuality provided Priestley’s retort to Darwin is not folded into this second step. Deferred is Freud’s reference to ‘donkeys’ (p. 40) as a placeholder for frustration versus obstinate with a little bit of each frustration and obstinate applying to Freud and Krafft-Ebing jointly as neither is innocent with respect to the immediacy of observation versus what is potentially implied by those observations, a simple statement that is a synopsis of the life’s work of each Freud and Krafft-Ebing.

Association (unconscious reality)

Supporting rationale for Balint’s approach is clinical consultation, effectively having a functional psychology, consciousness and socialization in synch with the environment (to be expanded in the discussions of Mary Whiton Calkins (p. 38) and Edward Titchener (p. 39)), as the first ‘hat’, versus a focus on aesthetics, effectively a relational aspect of interaction as the second ‘hat’. This is an alternative view of the above – this however does not delete the need for forward thinking based on currently available observations that may be evidence, that the reference to observations recognizes the potential for the intent of evidence as an input to future deliberations.
Philosophers (conceptual)

This is an extension of survival of the fittest, with Darwin and Freud at center, but without prejudice to either. This presentation is an extension of the reference to ‘Extolled’ above (p. 7) and reflects the thought of persons who were associated with the discipline known as ‘moral philosophy’, today’s psychology. At issue is Wundt’s warning versus the question of science. The gist of what follows is “intelligence is a slippery customer” (Langer, 1942, p. 86) versus subject-object, in an if-then placeholder for progression versus claims of scientific precision.

Wilhelm Wundt in his 1913 essay entitled Psychology’s Struggle for Existence anticipated the problems that Hume warned of – knowledge and probability, and of scepticism, as presented in Philosophers (mental) below (p. 22) – a reminder in the form of “it appears that very few psychologists have any interest at all in work at the interface of psychology and philosophy ... that one clear indication of this is that the Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, which is Division 24 of the American Psychological Association (APA), remains one of the smallest of the APA’s nearly 60 divisions” (Lamiell, 2013a). “In his foreword to that essay, Wundt wrote: ‘Paging through the first section of this work, one might be inclined to view it as a provocation. But one who decides to read through to the end will be convinced that, on the contrary, the work could well be regarded as a peace offering. In the opinion of some, philosophy and psychology should divorce from each other. Now, it is well known that when a married couple seeks a divorce, both members usually are at fault. In these pages, it will be shown that the same is true in this instance, and that if this matter takes the course that both parties want, philosophy will lose more than it will gain, but psychology will be damaged the most. Hence, the argument over the question of whether or not psychology is or is not a philosophical science is, for psychology, a struggle for its very existence’” (Lamiell, 2013b). The direction now is to traverse Comte, (Stewart) Mill, Spencer and Hartley, with the destination the condition of psychology about the time Freud was finishing medical school, and, in effect accounting for each Calkins and Titchener as the common denominators in Table 2 (Adaption, p. 14).

An example of the importance of philosophy – “...Intellectual Idealism, by which I mean the doctrine that we are capable of knowing Reality as it actually is, and that Reality when so known is absolutely rational. ...The general proof of Idealism must consist in showing that, while the determination of Reality by such categories as coexistence, succession, and causality, is capable of vindication so long as it is not s regarded as ultimate, it becomes false when affirmed to be final, and that we are compelled at last to characterize existence as purposive and rational” (Watson, 1895, p. v) . The issue with respect to psychoanalytic jurisprudence is ‘final’ versus ‘purposive and rational’, words that imply mathematical relationships – true – but not with an implied scientific precision. For example, the structure of Figure 2 (Darwin v. Freud, p. 18) is to display comparison but not strict scientific equality.

‘Intellectual idealism’, psychology in the absence of philosophy is the Achilles heel of the three slippery (in a positive sense) rationalizations. While the three, separately and jointly, both define and protect a person, there is no absoluteness implied. To focus on absolute is akin to declaring the location of a multitude of trees while being oblivious to the possible existence of a forest. Comte, (Stewart) Mill and Spencer describe the price of this problem.

“Now, it might seem that, having defined the problem of philosophy, and indicated its three great departments [Nature, Mind and God], our next step would be to take up each of those departments in turn. But, as we have seen, there are eminent thinkers, who, either expressly or by implication, maintain that man is by the very nature of his faculties forever incapable of knowing reality as it ultimately is; and it is therefore advisable to begin by asking whether this skeptical attitude in regard to the object of philosophy has any rational foundation, or whether it does not rather rest upon an
untenable assumption. ...Perhaps the simplest way of approaching this problem will be to examine it in the form in which it is presented by Comte. The fundamental idea which underlies the doctrine of Comte is, that all attempts to obtain an 'absolute' view of existence are necessarily futile. This Comte expresses by saying that, while we are capable of a 'subjective synthesis' of existence, we are by the necessary limitation of our knowledge incapable of an 'objective synthesis'. ...Comte here uses the term 'subjective' in the sense of 'limited' or 'human'; and with this he contrasts an 'objective synthesis', as one in which things would be looked at from the point of view of absolutely complete knowledge. ...The whole history of man is regarded by Comte as the history of association by means of positive science. Man, in his primitive state has two opposite tendencies – the tendency to sociality and the tendency to individualism justified in denying to man all knowledge of the Absolute [as in subservient]" [Italics in original] (Watson, 1895, pp. 21-24).

Regarding aesthetics versus absolute, "...His intellect and his perception perfectly correspond, and therefore he naturally feels pleasure so long as he remains in the aesthetic mood. Such pleasure is very different from the satisfaction which accompanies the resolute willing of what is binding upon him by the law of his reason. The feeling of beauty comes without effort the moment we contemplate the beautiful object disinterestedly, and it therefore gives us a sort of prophecy of that union of reason and sense which no effort of ours can actually realize. Besides the beautiful we frame aesthetic judgments in regard to the sublime. These judgments agree in their main characteristics with those in regard to beauty, but there are important differences. For one thing, the feeling of sublimity arises in us even when the object as perceived has no definite limits, though it is always conceived as a whole. The feelings themselves are also different in kind, for, whereas the feeling of beauty is direct, the feeling of sublimity involves a momentary check to the vital forces, followed immediately by their more vigorous outflow. The mind is at once attracted and repelled, and the accompanying pleasure is therefore negative rather than positive: it is in fact due to the disharmony between the object perceived and an ideal object existing only for thought. Strictly speaking, therefore, there is no sublimity in nature, but only in ourselves, and in ourselves as rational beings" (Ibid, p. 297).

(Stewart) Mill was concerned with the addiction to precision as being superior to perception. "...Mill maintains that the supposed exactness and necessity of mathematics is a delusion. (1) Mathematics is not an exact science. What is the foundation of the science of geometry? Plainly the so-called definitions. But upon what do these definitions themselves rest? They cannot be self-evident, because all that a definition can tell us is the meaning attached to certain terms. Definitions are purely verbal and prove nothing in regard to the reality of that which is defined. ... (2) Nor is geometry a necessary science. Like other sciences it rests upon induction, or, in other words, it states in a general form what experience has shown us to hold good in a number of particular instances. No accumulation of such instances can warrant us in saying that things must be as our experience has shown them to be. It is true that geometry draws its conclusions from figures that are not directly perceived but are only represented in imagination. But imagination can never represent what has not been presented beforehand in perception" (Ibid, p. 5). Thus, life without experience is psychology, while life in tandem with experience is philosophy.

Per Spencer, "...neither man's knowledge nor his moral consciousness can be explained on the principle of natural selection. To know is to be beyond a mere state of passivity: it is to grasp the meaning of existence in virtue of a principle implied in the very nature of the knowing subject; to will is to realize an ideal presented to himself by the subject, an ideal which he has just because he is not limited to his immediate impulses but can put himself at a universal point of view. The progress of knowledge consists in an ever-fuller comprehension of the meaning of the world; the progress in morality consists in an ever-fuller realization of what in his ideal nature man truly is" (Ibid, p. 151). Subject and object,
while having logical connectivity, are in reality logically independent. Subject reflects the immediate state of perception (as seduced) while object reflects the immediate state of existence (Ibid, pp. 151-165).

From this it is fair to suggest that Spencer is about 5% Darwin and 95% Freud. Regarding Darwin, subject and object are in synch with adaptation and instinct respectively. Regarding Freud, subject expands to an evolutionary account of perception with its component source representing immediacy while aim represents historicity and object reflects the immediate state of the interpretation of evolution. This whole idea of adaptation is what separates the existing therapeutic jurisprudence from the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence as shown in Figure 3.

The focus on Hartley (and Mill) is about the association of ideas as subject and the communication of ideas as object. This is about evolution at the nanosecond level and spans instinct as Darwin’s algebraic denominator as subject and Freud’s algebraic numerator as object in Figure 2 (Darwin v. Freud, p. 18).

“The theory of Association of Ideas, now so familiar to us as applied to the different practical fields of language, law, morals, politics, education, religion, and sociology, was first formulated as a philosophical system, and made the serious study of a lifetime, by Hartley” (Bower, 1881, p. 24).

“Not content with showing how large a variety of our mental processes are merely instances of the general law of Association as stated above, and how many of our complex ideas are, on analysis, reducible to simple ideas (the copies, in his language, of sensations), he endeavored to prove that the primary law itself was nothing but the experience of a physical change in first, the nerves, and then the brain, produced in the first instance by the impression on the senses of external objects. For this purpose, he assumed, on certain (chiefly pathological and medical) analogies, that, when sensations are experienced, vibrations in the infinitesimal particles of the medullary substance of the brain are set going by external objects; and surmised that, on the removal of these objects, the vibrations survive in the form of miniature vibrations or vibratnecles which represent or cause what, from the subjective point of view, we call ideas. The ideas (or diminutive vibrations) would necessarily be of the same nature and constitution and have the same arrangement and sequence of their elements as the original vibrations (or sensations) themselves” (Ibid, p. 26-27).

Bower continues “For the first of the above-mentioned purposes of language, namely, the immediate communication of sensations or ideas to others, audible signs (owing to their rapidity and variety, and the flexibility of the human voice) are preferable to visible signs, or the language of action and pantomime, which savage tribes use to a considerable extent, and which, of course, is useless in the dark. For the latter purpose, the permanent recording of thought, the converse is the case: visible marks are preferable to audible, durable signs to evanescent. Mankind first of all invented, by way of visible marks, picture-writing or hieroglyphics, the association here being a direct one between a portrait-representation and the sensible object, the idea of which is intended to be presented to the mind. Gradually the hieroglyphics became less directly pictorial, and more technical; and began to depend more on the various combinations of certain fixed types or picture-symbols, than on the successive imitations in each case of separate sensible objects; till, finally, men arrived at a new method of predetermining the associations requisite for the recording of thought, that, namely, whereby different arrangements of a few letters (which stand for certain simple sounds or motions of the vocal organs preparatory to the emission of sound), are associated with the various audible sounds which constitute the evanescent signs by which ideas and their order are communicated to others. Thus, the
permanent signs have fixed laws of association with the audible, and the audible again with the ideas
which they are intended to convey. The former, therefore, are secondary marks of the ideas, the latter
are immediate and primary. It was of the greatest importance to man, in the first instance, to acquire
the means of communicating to others the sensations affecting him, in order to secure the co-operation
and assistance of his fellow-men in coping with the forces of nature” (Ibid, pp. 46-47).

This survey of subject-object accounts for what will be presented in tracks six (p. 59; p. 149) and seven
(p. 59; p. 161) where subject is expanded to the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence as the subject-
issue, and the CSAT-SAMHSA-DHHS data model is expanded to the object-device.

Philosophers (mental)

Now the condition of psychology about the time Freud was finishing medical school. The nature of this
dialog is a continuation of the prior subject-object representations of Darwin and Freud, but as a normal
distribution where Darwin occupies the left tail, Freud the right tail, and the equal sign of Figure 2
(Darwin v. Freud, p. 18) occupies the central region. Discussion spans fear, doubt, monism versus
dualism, will and consciousness. The starting point is Hume’s discussion of knowledge and probability,
and of scepticism, hence the normal distribution.

Hume’s discussion of knowledge has focus on the equal sign of Figure 2. As his comments extend
through probability the reference to instinct by Darwin and Freud enters focus. As his comments extend
through scepticism the subject-object dyad of each Darwin and Freud enters focus but with any
semblance of certainty stripped away as survival of the fittest is exactly that.

Hume’s ‘of knowledge’: “There are seven different kinds of philosophical relation, viz. resemblance,
identity, relations of time and place, proportion in quantity or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety
and causation. These relations may be divided into two classes; into such as depend entirely on the
ideas, which we compare together, and such as may be changed without any change in the ideas. It is
from the idea of a triangle, that we discover the relation of equality, which its three angles bear to two
right ones; and this relation is invariable, as long as our idea remains the same. On the contrary, the
relations of contiguity and distance betwixt two objects may be changed merely by an alteration of their
place, without any change on the objects themselves or on their ideas; and the place depends on a
hundred different accidents, which cannot be foreseen by the mind. It is the same case with identity
and causation. Two objects, though perfectly resembling each other, and even appearing in the same
place at different times, may be numerically different: And as the power, by which one object produces
another, is never discoverable merely from their idea, it is evident cause and effect are relations, of
which we receive information from experience, and not from any abstract reasoning or reflection.
There is no single phenomenon, even the most simple, which can be accounted for from the qualities of
the objects, as they appear to us; or which we could foresee without the help of our memory and
experience...

It appears, therefore, that of these seven philosophical relations, there remain only four, which
depending solely upon ideas, can be the objects of knowledge said certainty. These four are
resemblance, contrariety, degrees of quality, and proportions in quantity or number. Three of these
relations are discoverable at first sight and fall more properly under the province of intuition than
demonstration. When any objects resemble each other, the resemblance will at first strike the eye, or
rather the mind; and seldom requires a second examination. The case is the same with contrariety, and
with the degrees of any quality. No one can once doubt but existence and non-existence destroy each
other and are perfectly incompatible and contrary. And though it be impossible to judge exactly of the
degrees of any quality, such as colour, taste, heat, cold, when the difference betwixt them is very small:
yet it is easy to decide, that any of them is superior or inferior to another, when their difference is considerable. And this decision we always pronounce at first sight, without any enquiry or reasoning” [Italics in original] (Hume, 1739|1888, p. 69).

Hume’s ‘of probability’: “This is all I think necessary to observe concerning those four relations which are the foundation of science; but as to the other three, which depend not upon the idea, and may be absent or present even while that remains the same, it will be proper to explain them more particularly. These three relations are identity, the situations in time and place, and causation...

All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a comparison, and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant [irregular], which two or more objects bear to each other. This comparison we may make, either when both the objects are present to the senses, or when neither of them is present, or when only one. When both the objects are present to the senses along with the relation, we call this perception rather than reasoning; nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought, or any action, properly speaking, but a mere passive admission of the impressions through the organs of sensation. According to this way of thinking, we ought not to receive as reasoning any of the observations we may make concerning identity, and the relations of time and place; since in none of them the mind can go beyond what is immediately present to the senses, either to discover the real existence or the relations of objects. It is only causation, which produces such a connexion, as to give us assurance from the existence or action of one object, that it was followed or preceded by any other existence or action; nor can the other two relations be ever made use of in reasoning, except so far as they either affect or are affected by it. There is nothing in any objects to persuade us, that they are either always remote or always contiguous; and when from experience and observation we discover, that their relation in this particular is invariable, we, always conclude there is some secret cause, which separates or unites them. The same reasoning extends to identity. We readily suppose an object may continue individually the same, though several times absent from and present to the senses; and ascribe to it an identity, notwithstanding the interruption of the perception, whenever we conclude, that if we had kept our eye or hand constantly upon it, it would have conveyed an invariable and uninterrupted perception. But this conclusion beyond the impressions of our senses can be founded only on the connexion of cause and effect; nor can we otherwise have any security, that the object is not changed upon us, however much the new object may resemble that which was formerly present to the senses. Whenever we discover such a perfect resemblance, we consider, whether it be common in that species of objects; whether possibly or probably any cause could operate in producing the change and resemblance; and according as we determine concerning these causes and effects, we form our judgment concerning identity of the object” [Italics in original] (Ibid, p. 73).

Hume’s ‘of scepticism’: “In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible; but when we apply them, our fallible said uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them and fall into error. We must, therefore, in every reasoning form a new judgment, as a check or controul on our first judgment or belief; and must enlarge our view to comprehend a kind of history of all the instances, wherein our understanding has deceived us, compared with those, wherein its testimony was just and true. Our reason must be considered as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect; but such-a-one as by the irruption of other causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental powers, may frequently be prevented. By this means all knowledge degenerates into probability; and this probability is greater or less, according to our experience of the veracity or deceitfulness of our understanding, and according to the simplicity or intricacy of the question” (Ibid, p. 180),

Discussion continues to fear, doubt, monism versus dualism, will and consciousness, with Hume as basis and with a person’s normal and abnormal, fears and foibles, the reference.
Each fear and doubt have two sides – the normal human reaction to the unknown (of knowledge) and the abnormal foibles that often defy logic (of probability). Either side can be the basis of Glover’s reference to progression (away from) versus his caution about regression (retreat into). First fear, then doubt.

On the Darwin side of Figure 2 (Darwin v. Freud, p. 18) fear is what molds instinct – “It may be considered as plausible that if the first feeling was pain the first emotion was also of the pain character. The first representation of an object as painful induced that reaction of mind which we term an emotion, and the painful emotion we call fear. That the first emotion to appear was fear, as fright, seems likely when we consider that the general alertness and defensiveness imperatively required in the struggle for existence is thereby most immediately and simply attained” (Stanley, 1894).

On the Freud side of Figure 2 doubt is what molds instinct – “Insanity of doubt is a form of mental disturbance which is brought about by certain disturbances of the psychical processes, to which the various names of insistent or fixed ideas or imperative conceptions have been given. The imperative conception or representation plays as important a part in the genesis of the insanity of doubt as the delusion does in the genesis of paranoia. Therefore, this form of mental disturbance has often been termed the ‘malady of fixed ideas’, and before studying it, these fixed ideas or imperative representations must be considered” (Knapp, 1890).

With fear and doubt, knowledge and probability, addressed attention now turns to Hume’s skepticism, which allows focus on what appears to be the hornet’s nest of philosophy – the mind-body problem, monism versus dualism – a subject-object issue, with an alternative view of dualism – the conscious and the unconscious as basis for pluralism deferred to Dynamics: Baseline assumptions (p. 55; p. 62).

Discussion of the remaining two offshoots from Hume – will and consciousness, requires an accounting of the mind-body problem, which includes Descartes’ specification of dualism and Freud’s recognition of dualism as a factor in neurosis, specifically, conscious-unconscious as dualism, otherwise Freud’s position was limited to monism. The starting point is the ‘purity of spirit’ of one monist:

“First of all, I accept a monistic theory of knowledge. The dualist starts with the conception of a subject introduced into the midst of a separately and independently existent objective world. For him the problem of knowledge is how these independent existences, subject and object, can be brought into relation. In the monistic theory of knowledge, it is maintained that to start with the conception of subject and object as independent existences is false method, and that the assumed independence and separateness is no wise axiomatic. Starting then from the common ground of naıve experience it contends that, prior to philosophizing, there is neither subject nor object but just a bit of common practical experience. …It is only when we seek to explain the experience that we polarize it in our thought into subject and object. But what logical right have we, to say that the subject and object which we thus distinguish in thought are separate in existence? No doubt it is a not uncommon and a not unnatural fallacy to endow with independent existence the distinguishable products of our abstract and analytic thought. …But until it shall be shown that ‘distinguishable in thought’ and ‘separate in existence' are interchangeable expressions, or that whatever is distinguishable is also separable, the conclusion is obviously fallacious. And it is this fallacy which the monist regards as the fundamental error of the dualistic theory of knowledge. While dualism, then, starts with what I deem the illegitimate assumption of the independence of subject and object, the monist, starting from the common ground of experience, looks upon subject and object as distinguishable aspects of that which in experience is one and indivisible. It need only be added that this is a theory of knowledge and of the experience of which knowledge is the outcome. Of that which is not known and not experienced it neither asserts nor denies anything. But accepting as it does the reality of experience it does assert that the aspect which we
polarize as objective is just as real, and real in the same sense, as the aspect we polarize as subjective. The reality of object and subject is strictly co-ordinate. And those who hold this view regard as little better than nonsense the assertion that whereas the reality of the subject is unquestionable the reality of the object is a matter that is open to discussion.

Secondly, I accept a monistic interpretation of nature and of man as a product of natural development. The essence of this view is that man as an organism is one and indivisible (though variously maimable), no matter how many aspects he may present objectively and subjectively. That the inorganic and organic world have reached their present condition through process of evolution is now widely accepted. But the dualist contends that mind is a separable existence, *sunt generis*, and forming no part of the natural world into which it is temporarily introduced. Here the monist joins issue and contends that alike in its biological and its psychological aspect the organism is the product of evolution; that mind is not extra-natural nor supra-natural but one of the aspects of natural existence.

Thirdly, I accept and have attempted to develop a form of analytic monism. Assuming a concomitance between the nervous changes in some part of the brain and the psychical states experienced by the individual whose brain it is, and assuming further that the nervous changes are transformations of energy, it is suggested that what is under its objective aspect a complex series of transformations of energy in the nervous tissue is under its subjective aspect a complex series of psychical states. It is also suggested that something allied to consciousness, that is to say of the same aspect in nature (let us call it infra-consciousness), may be similarly associated with all manifestations of energy. One of my critics, Dr. A. R. Wallace, has objected that this suggestion is only an awkward restatement of that which Schopenhauer formulated with much greater clearness. I venture to think that this criticism shows a misapprehension of my view or of that of Schopenhauer. The essence of Schopenhauer's conception, as I understand it, is that the underlying activity in the objective world, namely, that force of which energy is a manifestation, though not the only manifestation, is but the objective aspect of that which is the underlying activity in subjective experience, namely, will. This is a monistic conception which I accept; but my modification of Clifford's mind-stuff hypothesis, though an allied conception, is not the same as that of Schopenhauer” (Morgan, 1894).

These three aspects of monism will not be developed further as exposure of the material is all part of ‘setting the stage’ for therapeutic jurisprudence versus psychoanalytic jurisprudence via dualism, with pluralism (*Mindfulness*, *Otherness*, p. 77) the unavoidable destination given that no human is an isolated island in time. For now, if experience is set aside, the mutually exclusive nature of monism versus dualism relaxes considerably to the point of an implied mutually inclusive within Figure 2 (Darwin v. Freud, p. 18), particularly the equal sign, given the if-then subject-object construction of the representation of each Darwin and Freud. Dualism was crafted by Rene Descartes (1596-1650), and with only what has been presented thus far, it is proper to state that the Freud side of Figure 2 is dualism while the Darwin side is monism with the equal sign expanded to Figure 3 (Adaptation p. 21), i.e., Darwin comports with sociality while Freud comports with individualism. With Darwin, knowledge is experience, hence unary. With Freud, experience begets knowledge, hence binary. Beyond this special simplification monism will come to the fore in the fifth track below (p. 58; p. 137) where it will be asserted, in tandem with bipolar versus hysteria, that therapeutic jurisprudence is reductionist with respect to causality with monism the defining basis of instinct versus each fear and doubt, again, with pluralism the unavoidable destination.

Attention now turns to Descartes specification of dualism and Freud's recognition of dualism as a factor in neurosis, with what is implied by Descartes’ specification the final step in this introduction to the remaining two offshoots from Hume – will and consciousness.
Descartes’ specification of dualism: “Now, the first and principal thing requisite in order rightly to know the immortality of the soul is to form a clear and precise conception of it entirely distinct from all the conceptions we may have of the body; which has in this place been done. It is besides requisite to know that all things which we clearly and distinctly conceive are true after the fashion in which we conceive them; this could not be proved before the fourth Meditation. Moreover, it is necessary to have a distinct conception of the corporeal nature, which conception is given partly in the second, and partly in the fifth and sixth Meditations. And, in fine, we must conclude from all this that the things which we clearly and distinctly conceive to be diverse substances, such as the mind and the body, are in fact substances really distinct from one another, and such is the conclusion drawn in the sixth Meditation; this is again confirmed, in the same Meditation, by the fact that we do not conceive anybody but as divisible, whereas the mind or the soul of man cannot be conceived but as indivisible; for, in fact, we could not conceive the half of any soul, as we can of the smallest of all bodies; and hence we discover that their natures are not only diverse, but in a fashion contrary” (Walker, 1871).

Freud’s recognition of dualism: Freud’s transition from being a medical scientist to a mental scientist probably began when he first recognized Darwin’s work as noted above (p. 13). In his application for funding of studies under Charcot Freud stated his interest to be in hypnosis and hysteria, with his interest in neuropathology and in the mold of a physician (Freud, 1886|1962, p. 6). His subsequent analysis of hysteria was with the balance of a medical and mental scientist: “Hysteria is a neurosis in the strictest sense of the word – that is to say, not only have no perceptible changes in the nervous system been found in this illness, but it is not to be expected that any refinement of anatomical techniques would reveal any such changes. Hysteria is based wholly and entirely on physiological modifications to the nervous system and it essence should be expressed in a formula which took account of the conditions of excitability in the different parts of the nervous system. A physio-pathological formula of this kind has not yet, however, been discovered; we must be content meanwhile to define the neurosis in a purely nosographical fashion by the totality of symptoms occurring in it, in the same sort of way as Graves’ disease is characterized by a group of symptoms – exophthalmos, Struma, tremor, acceleration of the pulse and psychical change – without any closer consideration of the closer connection between these phenomena” (Freud, 1888|1966, p. 41). It is his reference to ‘physio-pathological formula’ and ‘psychical change’ that allows dualism to be cited but not pluralism.

Implied by Descartes’ specification: “What, then, did Descartes do to earn the position he holds in philosophy? He did three things. He taught men how to doubt in a rigorous and systematic manner. He brought into clear and distinct view the subjective method in philosophy, made it the foundation of his system and professed to deduce his theory of the Universe from a self-evident proposition furnished by that method. And, thirdly, taking the widest view of Philosophy, and considering its object to be to furnish a Rationale of the genesis and nature of the Universe, he brought within the circle of his own system almost all the great scientific discoveries of his epoch, whether in the realm of organic or of inorganic nature. In the first place, then, Descartes taught mankind that, ere they can hope to arrive at certainty, they must first learn how to doubt. By precept and example, he enforced this difficult, but necessary, lesson upon them. Before his time men had at most merely played at doubting, when they doubted or pretended to doubt at all. He first set them the example of rigorous and systematic doubt, first impressed upon them the necessity of searching out from the inmost recesses of the mind, and submitting to a cautions and vigilant criticism, every belief they had imbibed, whether, almost unconsciously, through the impressions of their senses as they grew up from infancy to manhood – the "prcejudicia inentis cetatis " he so often warns us against - or from the teachings of authority and from the vast mass of unsifted materials stored up in the writings of all ages" [Italics in original] (Rhodes, 1884). This passage covers completely the modus operandi of psychoanalytic jurisprudence.
Will: As evidence of Wundt’s 1913 warning about the divorce of psychology from philosophy, will presents an opportunity to witness the starkness of psychology alone in the form of a Darwin-monism stance versus psychology in synch with philosophy in the form of Freud-dualism. “In studying the will, most writers begin by examining actions. The simplest movements are taken to be the groundwork of the more complicated, purposive acts. The development of such movements is pursued either through the life of the entire animal world or through the life of the individual. Such an investigation is supposed to throw light upon the origin and growth of volition. The simplest assumption here is, that wherever there is movement, there is, in some form or other, will [Darwin-monism]. ...In volition, as it is generally understood, we have present in consciousness an idea of the end of an action and a desire to realize that end. In the simplest will-acts, as, for example, when I will to move my arm, there is present the idea of the effect to be reached, and a feeling that such an effect is desired by me [Freud-dualism] ” (Thilly, 1894).

Consciousness: Now, the caveat. “Evolution is now generally accepted by thinkers as the most scientific explanation of the processes of life in general; and whatever criticisms may apply to this or that phase of evolutionary belief, most of those whose abilities and training stamp any value upon their opinions regard Lamarck, Darwin, Wallace, Spencer, and some of their followers in scientific research as among the world’s greatest discoverers and benefactors. Yet the details of the doctrine have not all been arranged, and all the accessible facts of experience have not yet been brought into harmony with the general conception. A great task still remains to be accomplished before the field is cleared of contradictions, many of which are our inheritance from past ages of thought in realms other than those of physical research. Theories are still held in metaphysics and philosophy, notably in psychology, which are irreconcilable with those derived from the observed facts of evolutionary science. Confessedly one of the most important and difficult problems still unsettled is that of the origin, nature, and place of Consciousness" [Italics added] (Smith, 1899).

**Mental scientists**

This is about the contemporary evolution of our understanding of consciousness and spans the impact of the transition from the theology-based metaphysics of Descartes (1596-1650) to the theology-void metaphysics of Spinoza (1632-1677) (Wundt, 1897, pp. 87-97), with the impact of that transition quite drawn out from 1833 to 1934.

What follows are two surveys. The first spans from 1943 to 1998 and is a theology-void survey of the transparency of consciousness thus giving credence to the role of monism as an operative superset of dualism when an abstraction of reality is the task as is the case with adaptation and rationalizations of Table 2 (Adaption, p. 14), while the role of monism is an operative subset of dualism when consciousness must reconcile adaptation to the object world subjective as that world normally is. The second spans from 1833 to 1934, the evolution of theology-centric psychological thought to theology-void psychological thought with monism largely dominant. The 1935-1942 gap has no significance. The purpose of the order of discussion is to show that consciousness is not a commodity but is a container that is host to the evolution of thought leaving the dictates of that evolution to adaptation to the perceived object world, “the fascinating problem of identity” (Jacobson, 1964, p. xi) . The purpose is also to set the stage for the transition from monism to dualism and then on to pluralism the underlying theme of the below segment titled *Formation of a mind science (post-Hume association)* (p. 35).

1943 – 1998

The ego, the medium by which conscious communicates with the object world typically in search of identity, is quite adaptive and is typically about dualism given identity as a factor, both rely on monism
for the immediacy of evolution of relevant knowledge. The saga begins with the ego itself – “Eight main conceptions of the ego are summarized: the ego as knower, as object of knowledge, as primitive selfishness, as dominance-drive, as a passive organization of mental processes, as a ‘fighter for ends’, as a behavioral system, and as the subjective organization of culture” (Allport, 1943). The saga continues to the ego’s viewpoint into the object world, personality, and the characteristics of identity, the Big Five – “Surgency, Agreeableness, Dependability, Emotional Stability, and Culture (Tupes, 1961). The saga continues through dualism-developed “decision-making under risk and uncertainty (Laibson, 1998), with an iterative element of identity accomplished, and with monism-oriented experience ‘the professor’.

1833 – 1934

The anchor for this period, labeled the Industrial Revolution of 1760 to 1830 by a variety of historians (p. 8), was factually “The system of human relationships that is sometimes called capitalism had its origins long before 1760, and attained its full development long after 1830, there is a danger of overlooking the essential fact of continuity” (Ashton, 1948, p. 2). The 1760-1830 era included four influential publications defining the politics of economy – The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (1776), Essay on the principle of population by Thomas Malthus (1798), Principles of political economy and taxation by David Ricardo (1817) and Principles of Political Economy by Stuart Mill (1848). This period with 1848 marked as pivotal (Reed, 1997, pp. 109-126), included a new psychology, a new dualism. “In Cartesian dualism, mental states are always and necessarily conscious. There can be no unconscious inferences, because we are always aware of our mental acts. Helmholtz, Wundt, and the other new psychologists redefined mental life to include its unobservable aspects” – with introspection a pure pivot [Italics in original] (ibid, p. 118). To this one must add the pre-framing of theology and theology-void metaphysics of Descartes and Spinoza (p. 27) and we have the play-out of From Soul to Mind (p. 8). Material from the range of years, 1833 to 1934, that is a candidate for discussion, 19 books, spans about 8,800 pages, is a bit much to compress into a few paragraphs, but nevertheless far too important to not devote recognition to the overall contribution to the understanding of mental health. What follows is in two parts – a ‘tombstone’ listing of the material, then discussion limited to the first and the second to the last entries on the ‘tombstone’, with the remaining entries addressed in the first track, Dynamics: Baseline assumptions (p. 55; p. 62). The purpose of this survey is to highlight the shift to ‘sociality’ from ‘individualism’ in Figure 3 (Adaptation p. 21) with discussion of the first entry having ‘individualism’ as being consistent with ‘sociality’, a theme that survives to the second to the last entry which in turn sets ‘individualism’ as dependent on ‘sociality’. An example of distortion – pontifical, will be included as symbolic of the price of the divorce of psychology (known) from philosophy (knowing). That example will be preceded by a significant retort to Jung’s downplay of sex.

The 1890 pivot noted above (p. 8) remains unchanged with the significance of that pivot enhanced by a refined scholarly approach to the unobservable aspects of mental life. Before moving on a prelude is in order – “A considerable dollop of this week’s [journal] contents bear on the effort to control the consequences of drug misuse, and of addiction. One topic coming increasingly to these pages is the provision of supervised injection facilities (SIFs), as a means of diminishing the risk both of unintended fatality from over-estimation of dosage; and of co-morbidity from shared injection devices – e.g., hepatitis, HIV, or even as-yet-unrecognized infectious agents that will become the HIV of the 2020s. It is difficult to know toward which end of the field to run, in this case. To provide an SIF is to risk accusation of ‘enablement’. To fail to do so is to implicitly encourage the illness and deaths of many whose judgment is impaired. Unfortunately, in the latter case, there will be injured bystanders, as well. The solution of relying on long-term clinical trials for guidance is not yet at hand. Clinical Trials are cumbersome and dependent on Federal funding is wishful. And, of course, no one likes injection drug users. It is the ultimate confound in trying to diminish the tide of illness, that our patients are
unattractive. They do stupid and larcenous and sometimes harmful things, to others as well as
themselves. So enlisting sympathy and cooperation on their behalf asks a lot of the many, *those who do not use drugs and yet have difficult lives*” [Italics added] (Haning, 2017). Now, the tombstone...

Brigham, Aramiah (1833), *Remarks on the influence of mental cultivation and mental excitement upon health* (xii + 130 pp), Marsh, Capen & Lyon, Boston.

von Feuchtersleben, Baron Ernst (1847), *The principles of medical psychology* (xx +392 pp), The Sydenham Society, London.

Haven, Joseph (1862), *Mental Philosophy: Including the intellect, sensibilities and will* (590 pp), Gould and Lincoln, Boston.


Kraepelin, Emil (1904), Lectures on clinical psychiatry (xv + 308 pp), Baillière, Tindall and Cox, New York.


Freud, Sigmund (1920), *A general introduction to psychoanalysis* (x + 406 pp), Horace Liveright Publisher, New York.


Amariah Brigham (1798-1849) was an American psychiatrist and, in 1844, one the founding members of the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane, which eventually
became the American Psychiatric Association. While serving as the first director of the Utica Psychiatric Center in New York state, Brigham launched and became the first editor of the Association's official journal, *The American Journal of Insanity, now The American Journal of Psychiatry* (Harms, 1973, p. v). Brigham's core position was that balance in life between work and play was the antidote to psychosomatic disorders, largely what we know today as unipolar depression (Brigham, 1833, pp. 92-101). Brigham makes his point about balance in life with a table that lists 286 persons – “Exhibiting the age attained by some of the most distinguished literary persons in ancient and modern times”, e.g., Shakespeare who died at age 51 and Hippocrates who died at age 109 (Ibid, pp. 123-130). Brigham’s position then was to place ‘individualism’ as a priority that operates within ‘society’ provided boundaries.

All but the last entry in the above ‘tombstone’ are about the coexistence of consciousness and unconsciousness, a factual dualism, with discussion of each person dispersed throughout the balance of this paper as noted in this paper’s index. The immediate task to establish basis for the claim of coexistence of instinct as subservient to adaptation. The starting point is a retort to a claim against the idea of consciousness. “One extreme line of thought, exemplified in the American doctrine of behaviorism, thinks it possible to construct a psychology which disregards this fundamental fact!” (Freud, 1938a|1964, p. 157).

John Broadus Watson (1878-1958), who established the behaviorist line of thinking asserted “… the easiest way to bring out the contrast between the old psychology [introspective] and the new is to say that all schools of psychology except that of behaviorism claim that ‘consciousness’ is the subject matter of psychology. Behaviorism, on the contrary, holds that the subject matter of human psychology is the behavior or activities of the human being [a top down (p. 39) specification]. Behaviorism claims that ‘consciousness’ is neither a definable nor a usable concept; that it is merely another word for the ‘soul’ of more ancient times. The old psychology is thus dominated by a kind of subtle religious philosophy. … No one knows just how the idea of a soul or the supernatural started. It probably had its origin in the general laziness of mankind. Certain individuals who in primitive society declined to work with their hands, to go out hunting, to make flints, to dig for roots, became keen observers of human nature” [Italics in original] (Watson, 1925, p. 3). Watson capitalized on his formulation of behaviorism by joining the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency where he moved advertising to a science that was predicated on prediction and control, the goal of both the proponents of social control and of the business community with respect to consumer loyalty (Kreshel, 1990). In effect, Watson with advertising created the obverse of Adler’s inferiority reaction (Bagby, 1923), a class of individuals who react with confidence in social situations and who have an underlying feeling of superiority as evidenced by their brand loyalty – basically, upscale primates who can be taught to ‘fetch [a brand]’ on demand, thus replicating Pavlov’s work with dogs while contributing nothing to the resolution of substance abuse to include participation in lethal criminal and terrorist organizations, all of which was an extension of Harlow Gale’s prior advertising research at the University of Minnesota from 1895 to 1903 where he ran an experimental psychology laboratory with the development of the psychology of advertising the result. Prior to 1895 Gale was a student of Wundt (Eighmey, 2007). Of note is Watson’s doctoral research – “…on the correlation between increasing complexity of the behavior of the white rat and the growth of medullation in the central nervous system” (Watson, 1936|1961, p. 273) – from which follows “… ‘consciousness’ is neither a definable nor a usable concept...”.

Wundt’s position was precisely the opposite of the track taken by Watson. Wundt’s position descended from Plato’s reference to the cave (Losin, 1996) – that psychology was in dire need of the human heritage as recorded in the writings addressed by philosophy, particularly metaphysics which “involves what it is to be and to become, that is, what must be involved for anything to occur” (Hibberd, 2014).
The more general issue is the nature versus nurture issue, alternatively, being ['sociality'] versus becoming ['individualism'] as the basis of a global understanding of purpose, and, lest we forget, “those who do not use drugs and yet have difficult lives”. Now, the retort to Jung’s downplay of sex...

Aristotle’s account of moral development – “...that ethical development proceeds through three processes: perceiving morally relevant situations, making reasonable ethical decisions, and participating in a fruitful communal life. Navigating through each of these phases requires ‘moral habituation’ ['sociality'] which produces a ‘settled character’ ['individualism'], oriented toward producing ethical outcomes for actions” (Silverstein, 2013).

John B. Watson’s declaration that consciousness is an invention with no basis in fact skips over consequences. As an example of consequences, Watson developed a campaign for Pebeco toothpaste. The ad featured “a seductively dressed young woman smoking a cigarette. The ad encouraged women to smoke as long as Pebeco toothpaste was used regularly. Smoking was glorified as an act of independence and assertiveness for women. ...they were buying sex appeal” (Buckley, 1989, p. 141). Hence, the application of a subliminal message, and, in contrast to what one could reasonably expect from Jung’s downplay of sex. Now, for a candidate result of such a message...

“Fiona Geraghty, a 14-year-old student at a private boarding school, suffered from bulimia. ... Then she hanged herself in her bedroom. Geraghty died last year, but the coroner has only just concluded the inquest into her death. And, somewhat surprisingly, neither the school ... nor the medical establishment ... comes in for any particular criticism. Who is to blame for Geraghty's death, according to the coroner? The ‘fashion industry’ and ‘the media’ and also ‘the Internet’. ...The problems of eating disorders amongst young people, particularly girls, did not exist before the 1970s. From that period onwards, the fashion industry and the magazines promoted thin models and the thin figure” (Piercy, 1971).

There are two issues here – a ‘what’ and a ‘why’. The ‘what’ issue is bulimia (DSM-IV-TR, Code 307.51) a diagnosis based on observations – a concern that is reasonable with young women such as Miss Geraghty. The ‘why’ issue is the mind-molding formed by advertising, particularly that which promotes sex appeal for the sake of appeal versus health, and this leads to covert and overt as the poles of a continuum. At one end is covert, the host of ambivalence (proactive), and at the other end is overt, the host of decisiveness (reactive). In the middle of the continuum is PTSD with reactive in the absence of decisiveness accounting for therapeutic jurisprudence, and with proactive in the absence of ambivalence accounting for the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. Now, pontifical...

It is common for proponents of cognitivism to include a century-long gap in references in papers with the earliest notation limited to James, an example follows.

In his wrestle with conscious versus unconscious James resorts to a fringe idea, “The Material-Monad Theory ...It may be called the theory of polyzoism or multiple monadism; and it conceives the matter thus: Every brain-cell has its own individual consciousness, which no other cell knows anything about, all individual consciousnesses being ejective to each other. There is, however, among the cells one central or pontifical one to which our consciousness is attached. But the events of all the other cells physically influence this arch-cell; and through producing their joint effects on it, these other cells may be said to combine. The arch-cell is, in fact, one of those external media without which we saw that no fusion or integration of a number of things can occur. The physical modifications of the arch-cell thus form a sequence of results in the production whereof every other cell has a share, so that, as one might say, every other cell is represented therein. And similarly, the conscious correlates to these physical modifications form a sequence of thoughts or feelings, each one of which is, as to its substantive being, an integral and uncompounded psychic thing, but each one of which may (in the exercise of its cognitive
function) be aware of THINGS many and complicated in proportion to the number of other cells that have helped to modify the central cell ...Why doesn’t the poor man say soul and be done with it” [Emphasis in original] (James, 1890a, p. 179-180). In a recent paper (Sevush, 2006) James’ En passant idea was taken to factual notice and in support of “The [Single-neuron theory of consciousness] model, it should be stressed, is at this point presented as a hypothesis, not a proven theory”.

This discussion of Mental scientists concludes with an accounting of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll, 1865) and The secret life of Walter Mitty (Thurber, 1939) with Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900|1953. 1-721) the anchor. The underlying issue here, where is the boundary between the formation of the unobservable aspects of mental life and the already accumulated inventory of prior unobservable aspects – which does not necessarily mean the unconscious, the preconscious not the conscious, but only acknowledges the undeniable mathematical fact that each new day of life is a declining percentage of the all of life. Introspection while a factor is likely not very reliable as presumed introspection may only be a mask over wish and/or distortion (Ibid, pp. 122-162). With this contra-take on introspection established it then follows the practical underlying narrative for this discussion has Watson’s subliminal messaging as the centrist anchor and Brigham’s balance in life the outer boundary. One line of thought that could be followed here, and will not be, is the idea of a syndrome and a dream as being two sides of the same coin (e.g., Todd, 1955). Each the current therapeutic jurisprudence and the proposed psychoanalytic jurisprudence are about life in the here and now with the inherited past incorporated differently. Another line of thought that could be followed, and will not be, is symbolism in each the Alice and Walter stories, as any analysis of symbolism suggests the pursuit of precision – “Unless he is warned against doing so, the reader will expect to find in the following chapters analyses of states of consciousness of all orders. The phenomena presented by the emotions as well as those presented by the intellect, will be assumed to fall within the scope of the inquiry. A resolution into their components, not only for thoughts, but also of sentiments, will be looked for. ...A thought, no matter how simple or how complex, contains more or less definable and nameable elements, having connexions that may be described with distinctness. But a sentiment is altogether vague in its outlines and has a structure which continues indistinct even under the most patient introspection” (Spencer, 1873b, pp. 3-4) . Thus, Alice’s story which begins with a rabbit and a rabbit hole (Carroll, 1865, pp. 2-3), extends past she being so big that she barely fits in a normal sized room (Ibid, p. 45), and concludes with she awakening from a dream and recollections of her own child-life at some advanced age (Ibid, pp. 189-192) – this is sentiment. If only one word can replace the ‘vs’ of Figure 3 (Adaptation p. 21), then sentiment is the prime candidate. A practical extension of this focus on sentiment, or emotion as highlighted by Spencer, is the question associated with the long-term effects of childhood bullying (Zarate-Garza, 2017), with this question serving as the bridge to Walter Mitty.

The focus is the longitudinal event known as life that transcends seduction, with seduction to be addressed in the discussion of Method: Resistance to a contrarian investment below (p. 57; p. 98). While many candidates are available, this is about seduction as induced by commercial advertising – James Thurber’s 1939 short story “The Secret Life of Walter Mitty” (Thurber, 1939). Now, a slightly altered excerpt from the story – “While his wife is in a store shopping, Walter is outside the store standing against a wall with a cigarette hanging out of his mouth glaring at a firing squad while at the same time thinking about his planned meeting with ’McMillan, the millionaire banker and close friend of [Franklin D.] Lloosevelt”“. This is about the “squeaky wheel gets the grease”. Another slightly altered take on the logic of life by Walter Mitty – “common sense is much ado about not too much”. Finally, this is about attachment to the wrong idea with good-faith presumption the unfortunate initiator, or, attachment to the wrong idea for any reason, with these two alternatives a perfect lead-in to...
Mistakes

Covered here is the presumption of precision by individuals and in the professional arena. The tone of each topic is “pushing on a string”, which is what happens when one fails to heed the warning issue by Spencer above – the overtrumping of thoughts by sentiments.

The presumption of precision by individuals is largely Freud’s “Psychopathy of Everyday Life” (Freud, 1901|1960, pp. 1-279). This is an extension of sentiments and an area that is largely unaddressed in the current therapeutic jurisprudence while effectively the central dynamic of the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence where self-directed free associations are the normative accounting for Hume’s ‘of probability’, “The three relations of identity, the situations in time and place, and causation” [Italics in original] (Hume, 1739|1888, p. 73). Each Alice and Walter above are the product of literary achievement, which contracts quite sharply with “…the striking fact that a person’s earliest childhood memories seem frequently to have preserved what is indifferent and unimportant, whereas (frequently, though certainly not universally) no trace is found in an adult’s memory of impressions dating from that time which are important, impressive and rich in affect” (Freud, 1901|1960, p. 43).

The normative theme in everyday life is the boundary between the formation of the unobservable aspects of mental life versus the unconscious, the preconscious and the conscious where presumed introspection is a mask over wish and/or distortion. Thus, the capacity for we frail folks to shoot ourselves in the foot and include “slips of the tongue” (Ibid, pp. 53-105), “misreadings and slips of the pen” (Ibid, pp. 106-133), and on to “combined parapraxes” (Ibid, pp. 230-238), and, lest we forget, “determinism, belief in chance and superstition” (Ibid, pp. 239-279) to include, “those who do not use drugs and yet have difficult lives”.

The common theme in this survey of the presumption of precision by individuals is a person’s psychohistory where the likes of Alice and Walter is the mark of fortune while a person’s psychopathology is the mark of misfortune, both of which are largely absent from the current therapeutic jurisprudence by construction.

Attention now turns to the misfortunes that therapeutic jurisprudence does inherit by construction. This includes the myth of objectivity, mistakes in meta-analyses, the setting aside of historical factual evidence, and the setting aside of the knowledge base – these misfortunes are not inheritable by the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence as the individual is the determinant of what is inherited, largely the unobservable aspects of mental life.

The myth of objectivity is about the necessary “evils” – claimed progress being influenced by money and the potential for visibility (Hager, 1982). Mistakes in meta-analyses is about included work that has the potential of uneven balance across the array of effort that was required to create the final writings (Gillman, 2010). The setting aside of historical factual evidence is an extension of the prior references to meta-analyses. While making liberal mention of bipolar disorder (Angst, 2000) when the narrative clearly points to unipolar disorder with the full support of Disability Adjusted Life Years Lost Data (Murray, 1994) with the larger issue the replacing of DSM-II and its basis in Freud with DSM-III and its basis in Kraepelin which in turn open the door to a flood of pharmaceuticals. The setting aside of the knowledge base is about the determination within the Research Domain Criteria (Lilienfeld, 2014) to replace much of the knowledge base with a complete mapping of the human brain thereby asserting that a microscopic measurement at a point in time does explain life.
Cognitive psychology

The discipline of cognitive psychology is about the reorienting of a person’s cognitive appraisal of some facet of life from one perspective to another. By itself that statement has merit in that it encourages a person to reconsider how their past is being carried into their present. Unfortunately, the execution of too many studies under the cognitive psychology umbrella decidedly ignore the unobservable aspects of mental life. There is a multitude of papers written by a professor about an experiment that relies on student volunteer participants. While the students are logically engaged in the experiment based on visions of a better grade, the professor is recording observations based on the eye movement of the individual students as the professor envisions their study as being in line with a contribution to the knowledge base when in fact basis is illogical. The human eye begins with sensory collection into the optic nerve that separates into two branches once that nerve leaves the eye socket – the dorsal and ventral pathways. The anatomical processing of human vision begins with the optic nerve which in turn splits into two pathways with each pathway advancing to different structures of the brain. One pathway is known as the dorsal pathway which is specialized for spatial perception, i.e., “where is it”. The other pathway is known as the ventral pathway which is specialized for object perception, i.e., “what is it” (e.g., Kunde, 2007). From this it is practical to expect the dorsal (where) to provide information with a high probability of accuracy, while any expectation about the ventral (what) requires insight into of-the-moment personal philosophy (Wundt) in tandem with personal introspection (Calkins). Yet, the proponents of cognitive psychology are quite certain in their knowledge about ‘visual working memory’ with that topic, quoted, returning a result set of “about 21,600 results” from Google Scholar. Stated differently, “…the tendency of modern investigation; with what propriety, or leading to what result, the future must decide. The safe course, however, would appear to be a resolution to carry out that eclectic system in medicine, successfully pursued in other partly intangible sciences. The search after the origin and cause of natural phenomena has been wisely abandoned; one being satisfied, after close observation of these operations, to determine the laws by which they are governed” [Italics in original] (Powell, 1852). Thus, a simplistic observation – eye movement, is sufficient to justify extensive narratives.

The trek that leads to credentialing in cognitive psychology is no different than any other discipline – the acquisition of an array of knowledge and skills. What is needed is recognition of that array as being in a state of ‘becoming’ (Dall’Alba, 2009), which applies equally to each therapeutic jurisprudence and the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. While the former therapeutic inherits by construction the need for ‘becoming’, the latter psychoanalytic is heavily dependent on ‘becoming’.

Joining the unobservable aspects of mental life to becoming opens discussion to the contribution that

![Figure 4 - Everyday life](source: Cook, 2014b, pp. 98-99.)
is available via the cognitive psychology discipline. While each new day of life is a declining percentage of a person’s total life, that new day is undeniably the critical reality, for that is where the past is acted out as illustrated in the shaded ellipsoid labeled ‘everyday life’ in Figure 4.

Everyday life is the host of “self-identity, which necessitates the determination of the core of the normal self. The self when normal, experiences various degrees of conscious life without disclosing the principal of its identity. The self stands out as having a unique, persistent identity. Psychology must deal with the active phase of ‘energizing’ as distinguished analytically from other phases of psychomotor activity ... between the identical and the identifying self in the process of self-identification ... the role of imitation in self-identity. The past, present and the future play a decisive role in the ability to imitate the self-copy. The self is sure of itself normally but when this ability is lost, self-identification is also lost ... self-identity is a psychological phenomenon and cannot be affirmed scientifically” (Baker, 1897).

**Formation of a mind science (post-Hume association)**

The discussion of Hume’s of knowledge and probability, and of scepticism, was a philosophical approach to life as a normal distribution. Direction now changes to association, the realm of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34) outside of everyday life, while leaving knowledge, probability and scepticism as is. The logic behind this is rooted in the Industrial Revolution of 1760 to 1830 (p. 8), while 1890 remains the pivot which is to recognize the transition of thought From Soul to Mind (Reed, 1997, pp. ix-xvi) with William James’ Preface to his two-volume Principles of Psychology the anchor. More to the point – “[Psychology], like all other sciences, is based on premises or assumptions which it does not itself question. No matter how far back the investigation is carried this necessary dependence remains. New assumptions may take the place of old ones, but the science still rests on data which it as such cannot vouch for. Built upon these premises a more or less elaborate structure of reasoning and conclusion represents the constructive achievements of the science. There are two ways in which the science can progress. Starting with given premises we may reason forward to ever more remote and more detailed conclusions; or, returning to our starting point, we may work our way backward, questioning our original assumptions and modifying them as the result of wider investigation or in deference to discoveries in other sciences from which they are derived. The first process is in a sense the primary and normal one, but the second is a periodic necessity” (Powers, 1898).

Krafft-Ebing set the second option as the factual necessity on the strength of investigations while James set the second option as the equally factual necessity on the strength of philosophical inquiry. In between Krafft-Ebing and James covered here are Sigmund Freud, Pierre Janet, Mary Whiton Calkins and Edward Titchener, and it must be noted that Calkins was influenced by James, both Freud and Janet were influenced by Charcot, and Titchener was influenced by Wundt.

**Richard von Krafft-Ebing MD (1840-1902)**

Krafft-Ebing was stark in his construction of Psychopathia Sexualis. While the preface remained unchanged from the first edition of 1886, his subsequent editions up to the twelfth gave greater visibility to sexual deviations with his intent to influence legislation and jurisprudence as stated in his preface to the twelfth edition (Krafft-Ebing, 1900|1915, p. viii). To give character to the word ‘stark’, the publishers preface on the following page closed with “The sale of this book is rigidly restricted to the members of the medical and legal professions” (Ibid, p. ix).

Krafft-Ebing built his psychopathy narrative across 238 cases with most dated in the late 1800 but reaching as far back as the 1500’s, and, he made liberal references to libido (e.g., Ibid, pp. 150-151) with libido not an indexed word. This writing has application to therapeutic jurisprudence as a foundation
reference, while only a candidate characterization with respect to the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence, with known versus knowing the rationale.

**William James MD (1842-1910)**

Commentary on James is limited to the official “minute on the life and services of Professor William James [that] was placed upon the records of the faculty of Arts and Sciences, of Harvard University, at the meeting of October 18, 1910”.

“By the death of William James this university loses one who brought it high honor in many lands. As a man of science, he left his mark on several departments of knowledge, while as a literary man he charmed all who read his lucid and picturesque pages. In him science and humanism were singularly combined. Learned as he was, he had none of the pedantry of the scholar. His books, besides illuminating their subjects, were creative of character, and through them he became one of the chief spiritual forces of our time.

He was born in New York, on January 11, 1842, of devout and independent parentage. Throughout life his studies were much disturbed by ill health, to which his dauntless spirit refused to bow. But a somewhat irregular education suited well a nature which was always fretted by routine and profited by whatever was unusual, diverse and expressive of individual character. In his youth, he attended a Lycee in France and afterwards the University of Geneva, there gaining an unusual command of French. His German he acquired a few years later at the University of Berlin. In 1862-64 he was in the Lawrence Scientific School; then for four years in the Harvard Medical School, from which, two years later, he received the degree of M.D. He studied with Agassiz in the Cambridge Museum, and accompanied a scientific expedition to Brazil. He worked at painting under William Hunt, with John La Farge as a fellow pupil. His home training gave him power of expression, for in that home brilliant conversation and literary skill were traditional; while philosophy was at the same time set before him, on the one hand by his theological father, and on the other, by his rationalistic friend, Chauncey Wright. He early showed a strong distaste for such idealistic modes of thought as he believed obscured the concrete realities of experience.

The progress of his mind can be traced in the successive topics of his teaching. In 1873, he became an instructor in anatomy at Harvard; but soon, finding greater interest in physiology, he accepted an assistant professorship in that subject, in 1876. For the next three years, in addition to teaching physiology, he offered a course on the theory of evolution in the department of philosophy. In 1880 he abandoned physiology altogether, becoming in that year assistant professor, and in 1885 professor, of philosophy. He now gave himself enthusiastically to psychology, and under his energetic guidance a psychological laboratory was established here. But after the publication of his treatise on psychology, in 1890, his interest in it declined, and he turned more toward the history of philosophy and the theory of knowledge. In 1892, he resigned the directorship of the laboratory, and after 1897 was never willing to offer a psychologic course. Religion and metaphysics claimed him, and his last years were devoted to the elaboration of a comprehensive philosophy in which the portion known as pragmatism has occasioned wide discussion” (Anonymous, 1910).

James’ diverse career with a maximum of 12 years, 1885-1897, associated with psychology, does not justify authors referring to he as the unconditional sage (e.g., Frey, 2015). His entire association with psychology was as an academician from the perspective of medicine and philosophy with no recorded clinical involvement beyond his medical training.
**Sigmund Freud MD (1856-1939)**

The anchor for these comments about Freud is September 1938 when his interest in writing was set aside by a very serious operation (Freud, 1938a [1964, p. 142]). It was during the estimated three months from July to September that he wrote his unfinished *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (Ibid, pp. 140-207). The task now is to join his prior work to the current era.

The anchors for this joining are (1) Freud as object in Table 1 (Evolution, p. 13), which joins biological evolution to propagation via his source-aim-object, (2) Freud as source in Table 2 (Adaption, p. 14), which joins adaptation to attachment again via his source-aim-object, (3) Glover’s characterization of progression as the contra to Freud’s, which joins adaptation to attachment but this time via the *mastering of anxiety*. The starting point is Freud’s opening paragraphs to his *Outline*...

“Psycho-analysis makes a basic assumption, the discussion of which is reserved to philosophical thought but the justification for which lies in its results. We know two kinds of things about what we call our psyche (or mental life): firstly, its bodily organ and scene of action, the brain (or nervous system) and, on the other hand, our acts of consciousness, which are immediate data and cannot be further explained by any sort of description. Everything that lies between is unknown to us, and the data do not include any direct relation between those two terminal points of our knowledge. If it existed, it would at the most afford an exact localization of the process of consciousness and would give us no help towards understanding them” (Ibid, pp. 144-145). He then, over the next two pages, introduces the id, ego and superego as positioned in the ‘circa 1900’ portion of Table 3.

The position of this author who benefits from contributions to the knowledge base that were factually not available to Freud, is the *mastering of anxiety* defines the day-to-day execution of life with real or imagined seduction the impetus as positioned in the ‘circa 2000’ portion of Table 3. Seduction is a factor in both therapeutic jurisprudence and the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence with recognition decidedly different – in the former it is a contributing factor that may not even be give explicit recognition while in the latter it is the starting point exactly as Freud would have intended.

**Pierre Janet MD (1859-1947)**

As already noted, Freud and Janet began from their investigations as students of Charcot – an inquiry into hypnosis and hysteria, and, ironically, under the same guiding ethic of James – “distinction between knowledge-of-acquaintance (direct familiarity) and knowledge-about (logical insight), we may fairly claim that where direct familiarity is at a minimum the development of any considerable insight is improbable or impossible” [Italics in original] (Mayo, 1951, p. 4).
The starting point for each Janet and Freud was the same – “When the development of clinical psychology is fully documented by historians, it will be found that the modern impulse to interest did not take its rise mainly in psychiatry. The critical interest of the psychiatrist was obviously required, but it was in the ordinary practice of medicine that the problem had its origin. Janet [like Freud] traces the development to the controversy between fluidists and animists, which was a variant of the enduring medical disagreement as to the organic or mental origin of hysteria” [Italics in original] (Ibid, p. 24). It is after this starting point that Freud and Janet diverged in a most complimentary fashion – two sides of the same coin. That “that Janet has had the ‘how’ as the final goal of science, while Freud’s quest has been the solution of the ‘why’” (Roback, 1936). Now, a brief survey of Janet’s work beginning with “…the so-called dissociation, the weakened integrity of awareness and response” [Italics in original] (Mayo, 1951, p. 31).

The complexity of the attentive act (Ibid, pp. 47-65): “Hysteria is, as Janet says, so ‘extraordinary a malady’ of the human organism that no useful purpose outside of medicine would be served by studying it were it not that his observations led him to re-examine, and closely, the processes of perception in the normal person. In doing this, he is led to state a hypothesis which possesses great importance for all psychological study. Our conscious awareness of surrounding, he points out, is an exceedingly complex fact, which can be described only as a balanced relation among an indefinite number of perceptions. Our mental life, he says, ‘consists not only of a succession of phenomena coming one after the other and forming a long series … but each of these successive states is in reality a complex state; it contains a multitude of elementary facts and owes its apparent unity to synthesis alone, to the equilibrium of all these elements’” (Ibid, p. 47).

Obsessive thinking (Ibid, pp. 66-84): “This physician [Janet], like the majority of his colleagues, believed that as the incidence of hysteria diminishes, the incidence of obsession rises. This contention may well possess some validity, but it does not seem possible at present to demonstrate the suspected increase of obsession and anxiety states as evidently as the diminution of hysteria. Janet’s study of obsession was first published in 1903, and even then, he had noticed that this type of patient is encountered more frequently in private practice than in public hospitals. He relates this directly to the fact that ‘a certain measure of intellectual culture plays a part in the development’ of obsession” (Ibid, p. 68).

Obsession and the equilibrium hypothesis (Ibid, pp. 85-102): “It is typical of obsession that the so-called ‘breaks’ are crises of agitation and, as such, are no more than a passing intensification of the ordinary condition of the patient” (Ibid, p.85).

The psychology of adaptation (Ibid, pp. 103-109): “In all his writings Janet claims many times over that the active attention of any given moment is the end result of an exceedingly complex mental and organic state … Janet maintains, and rightly, that the best indication or symptom of normality is the ability every physically fit person possesses of turning his attention, immediately and easily, to a topic or object presented for his consideration by his surrounding” (Ibid, p.103).

Mary Whiton Calkins PhD (1863-1930)

Calkins was the first woman to be elected president of the American Psychology Association (1905), and, the first woman to be elected president of the American Philosophical Association (1918), and, the only person of any era who can be asserted as the common denominator to James, Freud and Janet as implied in Table 2 (Adaption, p. 14). Her entry into psychology, on happenstance which cemented her connectivity to James, was a seminar in psychology with James the professor (Calkins, 1929|1961, p. 31). Aside from her coverage of psychology as an academic discipline, Calkins’ focus spanned thought, the fundamental structure of psychology (effectively Janet), and the intersection of thought and the
fundamental structure – all of which are incidental to therapeutic jurisprudence but necessary to specification of the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence, with the notion of fundamental not necessarily true with respect to James, Freud and Titchener.

Calkins approach to psychology at the textbook level emphasized her “ever strengthening conviction that psychology is most naturally, consistently, and effectively treated as a study of conscious selves in relation to other selves and to external objects – in a word, to their environment, personal and impersonal” (Calkins, 1921, p. vii).

Calkins focus on thought was very targeted: “The discussion of that underlying fact of consciousness, popularly known as the ‘Association of Ideas’, has usually centered in a classification of the kinds of association. The ordinary division into ‘Association by Contiguity’ and ‘Association by Similarity’ involves such misconceptions and makes such false assumptions that there is a growing tendency to reject it in favor of one more accurate and more discriminating. The most fundamental error of the ordinary classification is a sort of ‘prophecy after the event’. The connection between one object of my consciousness and a succeeding one cannot be explained by their contiguity since, as objects of any consciousness, they cannot be said to be contiguous until they have succeeded one another, that is, until the association is already a fact. In the same sense, objects of consciousness cannot be associated by their similarity, since similarity can be predicated of them only when the association is already accomplished” (Calkins, 1892) – the first of four views of the fundamental flaw of the DSM-5 (p. 91).

Regarding the fundamental structure of psychology, Calkins aligned psychology with the fundamentals of logic versus information, i.e., bottom up versus top down, thus enabling a study of conscious selves in relation to other selves and to external objects to be approached as if it were a two-way street: Bottom up mental processing is defined as “processing that is directly influenced by environmental stimuli” (Eysenck, 2000, p. 528). Top down mental processing is defined as “stimulus processing that is affected by factors such as the individual’s past experiences and expectations” (Ibid, p. 537). Thus, Calkins recognition of a structural psychology allows for a ‘self-being-conscious’ as being a phenomenon that is reducible to elements, hence, the quest for a ‘why’ which in turn allows for Freud, while her recognition of a functional psychology allows for ‘self-being-conscious’ that is molded and continually remolded by the social and physical environment, hence, the quest for a ‘what’ which in turn allows for Janet (Calkins, 1906).

Regarding the intersection of thought and the fundamental structure, Calkins advances that intersection to the philosophical realm resulting in monism and dualism operating in parallel. Thus, the structural ‘why’ of self, “[a]n idea-as-such ... is a needlessly artificial abstraction: every idea is experienced as idea-of-a-conscious-possessor-of-ideas” is an expression of monism, while the functional ‘what’ of self, “a mental function is experienced as activity of a mental functioner, or agent. Such a possessor of ideas, or mental functioner, may best be called a self” is an expression of dualism (Calkins, 1908a, 1908b, 1908c).

Edward Titchener PhD (1867-1927)

The emergence of any field brings out the best of distractors and psychology was not exempt, even by persons of stature such as William James who nevertheless did embrace the discipline – “It is curious to find this opinion of the new Psychology in so complete accord with that of the latest apologist of 'Psychology as a Natural Science'. 'A string of raw facts', so Professor James writes; 'a little gossip and wrangle about opinions; a little classification and generalization on the mere descriptive level; a strong prejudice that we have states of mind, and that our brain conditions them; but not a single law, in the sense in which Physics shows us laws, not a single proposition from which any consequence can causally be deduced ... This is no science, it is only the hope of a science” (Titchener, 1893). To an extent, this
dated statement accounts for the distance between the current therapeutic jurisprudence and the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence – the former attempts to over-account for the lack of laws of action while the latter accepts a rudderless individual as the practical starting point, a second view of the fundamental flaw of the DSM-5 (p. 91).

With the less than firm foundation of psychology admitted to recognition, it is time to revisit the placement of Titchener as the common denominator to rationalizations in Table 2 (Adaption, p. 14). At issue is introspection – “The mind, when thinking, cannot survey that part of itself which is used in thought. It can only be contemplated in the past, that is to say, in the history of the individual or of the world” (Titchener, 1893). Further and from the vantage of monism, “we must not tax introspection to make a phenomenon which essentially involves externality” (Peirce, 1892). Returning to the basic issue, is psychology a science, “We may say, for example, that all introspection presupposes the standpoint of descriptive psychology. The results to which it leads belong what Jevons calls ‘empirical knowledge’ and are logically prior to any sort of systematization of conscious phenomena. There are, to be sure, different levels of psychological observation: we may accept a terminology, or a generalization, or the preliminary chapters of a system, and may proceed to observe in these terms and on this basis different backgrounds of observation: we may postulate a certain type of system, and so commit ourselves beforehand to a particular mode of explanation. But the data of introspection are never themselves explanatory of mental causation, or of physiological dependence, or of genetic derivation. The ideal introspective report is an accurate description, made in the interest of psychology, of some conscious process. Causation, dependence, development are then matters of inference” (Titchener, 1912b). This entire issue of introspection points back to Krafft-Ebing’s 1886 statement – “The sudden loss of virile powers often produces melancholia or is the cause of suicide when life without love is a blank” (p. 11), where the reference to ‘love’ is about self-worth.

This focus on the question of science with introspection the pivot is to highlight the difference between the current therapeutic jurisprudence and the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. The former looks upon introspection as a commodity while the latter accepts as a starting point only that the word “‘consciousness’ is notoriously ambiguous, and the question whether the adjective ‘conscious’ suffices to mark off a special class of phenomena must therefore be discussed with great care” (Titchener, 1921). To be resolved with respect to the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence are “The experiences, which make up the subject-matter of psychology [which] may be divided into those of knowing, feeling and willing. We may also speak of consciousness of objects (in a narrower sense), consciousness of state, and consciousness of cause. The elements of these experiences are classified as palpable or impalpable, according as they under observation or as they refuse to be observed and must accordingly be recovered through reflection. Of the palpable elements, sensations belong to all three types of consciousness. Knowing, or the consciousness of objects, includes further, as palpable elements, the images which correspond with sensations, temporal and spatial contents, and the impressions (of 'same,' 'like,' 'different,' etc.) which lie at the basis of general concepts” (Titchener, 1922).

Migration of a mind science (perpetual adaptation)

The prior coverage of Krafft-Ebing, James, Freud, Janet, Calkins and Titchener was oriented to the central region of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34), the left to right boundaries of ‘everyday life’ thus capturing a small portion of the ‘unstable actors’. This discussion concentrates on the transition from ‘adaptation’ to ‘attachment’ of Table 2 (Adaption, p. 14) and is oriented to the full left to right of Figure 4 representation of the ‘unstable actors’ and by construction capturing a small portion of ‘destructive’. Persons covered in this discussion include Melanie Klein, Karen Horney, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Harry Stack Sullivan, Edith Jacobson, Carl Rogers, Michael Balint, John Bowlby and Amos Tversky, with these
persons addressed once a foundation is laid out. That foundation covers constraining issues, a centrist view of sexuality, idealism, adaptation and attachment.

Constraining issues – included here is the limitation of science, the limitation of scientists and being versus becoming. The limitation of science is an extension of the Research Domain Criteria (p. 33). At issue is the backlash of scientific labeling, to cause some number of persons to be treated as inferior to persons who are not caught in the trap created by the label such as within neuroscience that allows findings to be in line with historical prejudices where the chief offender is any reference to the word ‘disease’ (Buchman, 2011). The limitation of scientists is an extension of the prior limitation of science, the allowing of personal prejudices – fears and phobias, to enter the dialog about their work (Boring, 1929). And, being versus becoming is largely the skepticism of Hume versus “There is therefore in the direct or unreflective consciousness in all its forms an unhesitating belief that there is in knowledge a universal and permanent element, which is raised above the mutations of the individual mind. This belief may however be incapable of justifying itself; being assumed as a ready-made fact that does not stand in need of proof, it is possible that science, as well as common sense, has been all the time deluding itself by an assumption of stability which a critical investigation will show to be baseless” [Italics in original] (Watson, 1876). Each of these issues apply to the gap between the current therapeutic jurisprudence and the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence, where the limitation of science applies to the former, the limitation of scientists applies to both, and being versus becoming applies to the latter.

A centrist view of sexuality is a retort to Jung’s deemphasizing sex as well as Krafft-Ebing’s ‘scientific fairy tale’ comment (p. 12) and is neutral to the two forms of jurisprudence. First, the work of Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis, separated deviant behavior from normal behavior with explicit case reports (Oosterhuis, 2012). Second, “the subject of the sexual instinct and its aberrations has long been before the scientific world and the names of many effective toilers in this vast field are known to every student. When one passes beyond the strict domains of science and considers what is reported of the sexual life in folkways and art-lore and the history of primitive culture and in romance, the sources of information are immense. … the part which this instinct plays in every phase of human life and in the development of human character, and has been able to establish on a firm footing the remarkable thesis that psychoneurotic illnesses never occur with a perfectly normal sexual life. Other sorts of emotions contribute to the result, but some aberration of the sexual life is always present, as the cause of especially insistent emotions and repressions” (Freud, 1918). With this centrist view of sexuality, it is time to dismiss Freud’s reference to ‘donkeys’ (p. 12). While that reference is a placeholder for frustration versus obstinate with a little bit of each frustration and obstinate applying to each Freud and Krafft-Ebing, the true issue is the nature of the contribution to the knowledge base by each Freud (process) and Krafft-Ebing (precision) (Powers, 1898). This dismissal does not apply to Jung (p. 31).

Idealism is about drama and is neutral to therapeutic jurisprudence while being addressable from within the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence and includes two very broad issues. First, “Mankind appear to be divided into two classes, the dupers, and the duped. … From all these instances one inference is clear. When we depart from the guidance of reason we are liable to fall into innumerable errors. Ignorance is the source of credulity. We are therefore imperiously called on to instruct ourselves, and to attend to the results of experience. If the many would by the acquirement of knowledge, and a consequent enlargement of mind, raise themselves above the rank of dupes, the number of dupers who have been accustomed to prey on them would speedily decrease, while another numerous class, who are first duped, and then unwillingly lend themselves to spread the imposture, would see through the snare, and no longer without any bad intention act as decoys to others. According to the aphorism of Lord Bacon, ‘knowledge is power’, especially if our attention is directed to that kind of knowledge which
is best adapted to our individual neglect the means of acquiring it, when we have them within our
reach” (Anonymous, 1809). Second, is the realm where heavily dated romanticism overtrumps science
of an age. This is about “the relationship of personality to body shape ... one of the earliest known
forms of psychology” (Hall, 1977).

Adaptation is about fear, time, perception and thought. Each applies to therapeutic jurisprudence likely
in relation to some set of immediate circumstances and while the same is true for the advocated
psychoanalytic jurisprudence, uncertainty must be assumed. Fear has already been referenced as a
primitive emotion (Stanley, 1894). The context here is the deliberate blocking of current activity with a
contrived impediment to progress with depression of some scope a candidate (Janet, 1921). Time
presents two issues with each transparent to either form of jurisprudence. First, the images that pass
through our consciousness may either be continuous or in the form of sequential frames (James, 1886).
Second, there is a psychology of time than includes an inherent risk of association and that is time being
qualified as ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ where the reference point in the consciousness gives rise to the
risk (Nichols, 1891). Perception has its own evolution through contributions to the knowledge base over
time (Bevan, 1958). However, in this paper perception is fixed to seduction in Table 3 (Mental
apparatus, p. 37) with further discussion deferred to the end of this set of foundation statements.

Thought, as a dynamic, is the essential difference between the current therapeutic jurisprudence and
the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence where thought is largely static with the former and highly
fluid with the latter. In its naked, isolated state, thought is a dynamic unto itself and has morphed to the
tune of successive contributions to the knowledge base – “Words referring to feelings and states of
mind were first used to describe behavior or the situations in which behavior occurred. When
concurrent bodily states began to be noticed and talked about, the same words were used to describe
them. They became the vocabulary of philosophy and then of mentalistic or cognitive psychology. The
evidence is to be found in etymology” (Skinner, 1989).

Attachment is about emotion, time, perception, thought, and the inner and outer realms of being.
Emotion as driven by pleasure and pain is the issue – “Pleasure and pain are not the whole of life; but
leave them out, and life and the universe no longer have meaning” (Nichols, 1892). Time is about
philosophical realism – “The problems of philosophy fall naturally into four groups: (1) Problems of
knowing; (2) problems of being; (3) problems of acting; (4) problems of feeling. The subjects with which
these problems deal comprise, respectively, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and esthetics.
Epistemology is itself concerned with two fairly distinct types of problems: (1) the functional problem of
the criteria of truth and the way of attaining it; (2) the structural problem of the nature of knowledge
and the relation of the knower to the known” (Montague, 1912). While perception is a child of Plato’s
Parmenides dialogue (Haldar, 1918), perception with respect to attachment is about boundaries. There
is the absolute self which is the self, and then there is the finite self which is the self that is independent
of other selves with boundaries the difference between the many selves. Thought is about a concrete
understanding of the technical underpinnings of attachment (Calkins, 1907). The inner realm of being is
essentially a mind-body problem exclusive of dualism. The inner realm includes the very personal and
private self that can be called the soul – the mind, and, the public self which is just that – the body
(Calkins, 1908d). The outer realm of being is about the theory of knowledge (Lovejoy, 1908) and is the
superset of the inner realm and includes pragmatism with respect to knowledge that can be
internalized, effectively mind, versus knowledge that cannot be knowable, effectively the birth-to-death
body. The task now is to address perception as being fixed to seduction.
Having perception as synonymous to seduction is about the boundaries of knowledge that are contained in the representation of working memory of Figure 5 where the notation ‘inertia of influence’ is the result of seduction. With knowledge the return point, two comments are necessary. First, ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ (p. 39) are presented without restriction and are quite capable of being at odds with each other. The solution is, at the point of the wording ‘working memory’, there is a third influence and that is ‘middle across’ to be discussed further with Melanie Klein (p. 44). From this the second comment follows and that is ‘aim’, also in line with ‘working memory’, needs no reason to exist – ‘aim’ is a self-fulfilling dynamic thus accounting for the unstable actors and destructive of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34), and in general the entire realm of ‘phantasy’ in that Figure. Now, knowledge, with what follows transparent to either form of jurisprudence...

This discussion of knowledge is limited to the matter of thought with respect to working memory as dynamic and aim as static – “there are but two methods of getting knowledge – and indeed only one, since each of these two is partial, and needs the other for its own completion, and for the attainment of complete knowledge. For ‘knowledge’ now seems to be divided into ‘facts’ and ‘ideas’, neither of which is willing to admit the existence of the other ‘as such’, although they bear a family resemblance. This feud arises because one of these methods founds itself upon ‘external perception’ – a contradiction in terms; the other, upon ‘internal perception’, or, as it prefers to call it, ‘innate ideas’ – which is begging the question, because it assumes the ‘knowledge’ to be "innate" to begin with. These two methods, therefore, seem to be correlative extremes, neither of which can really do without the other, and which most in fact, consciously or unconsciously, find and use a common basis. For, indeed, when severed, and each pursued abstractly, they lead to the same substantial result, though the former only points to it – since it refuses all basis, it can have no capstone; while the latter, we may say, begins with its result, and from that seeks to deduce all the particulars of the other method, and naturally finds no end in that process; or if, as it usually does, it refuses all reality to the material basis of the other, it ends, of course, in – nothing. Idealism is too fond of abolishing facts, especially hard facts, just because they are hard and gross. Materialism, on the other hand, would fain return the compliment by showing thought to be ‘a mere secretion of the brain’; but, in its zealous pursuit of the ‘positive’, it finds the ‘solid’ attenuating itself and escaping from scientific grasp like a very ‘spirit’” (Tuthill, 1879). With this narrative the frame, it then follows that working memory as dynamic comports with ‘facts’ while aim as static comports with ‘ideas’ – usually. It is the ‘usually’ qualifier that is a burden to the current therapeutic jurisprudence, while resolvable within the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

This discussion of Migration of a mind science (perpetual adaptation) concludes with commentary about nine contributors to the knowledge base – Melanie Klein, Karen Horney, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann,
Harry Stack Sullivan, Edith Jacobson, Carl Rogers, Michael Balint, John Bowlby and Amos Tversky, with a terminating epilog.

“In following unfamiliar trails leading to distant goals, we may well pause from time to time and take a backward glance. Courage falters if our best efforts seem to bring us no closer to our objective and if instead the road becomes rougher and more uncertain as unsuspected obstacles threaten to check our progress. But as we look back over the distance that lies between our starting point and our present position, we realize that our striving was not in vain, that we have moved forward in spite of all impediments and have overcome difficulties once considered insuperable” (Kraepelin, 1917|1962, p. 9).

**Melanie Klein (1882-1960)**

Melanie Klein was one of two women – two outstanding pioneers of child analysis, who had emerged in 1925, the second was Anna Freud. Klein and Freud approached child analysis in divergent ways, with their differences the basis of an extensive series of meetings in London from 1941 to 1945, with those meetings host to much debate, the airing of controversies, resulting in a considerable contribution to the knowledge base between the members of three camps – pro-Freud, pro-Klein and neutral. The pro-Freud members were Edward Glover, Melitta and Walter Schmideberg, Willi and Hedwig Hoffer, Barbara Low, Dorothy Burlingham, Barbara Lantos and Kate Friedlander; the pro-Klein members were Susan Isaacs, Joan Riviere, Paula Heimann, Donald Winnicott; and the neutral members were Ernest Jones, Silvia Payne, Ella Sharpe, Marjorie Brierley, William Gillespie, John Bowlby, James Strachey, Michael Balint, and Adrian and Karin Stephen (King, 1991a). Edward Glover has been discussed with the work of Michael Balint and John Bowlby to be addressed below.

Klein’s interest was medicine, but that was not possible, therapy was the only workable choice leaving her with no formal education beyond high school. In 1910, she sought analysis with Sandor Ferenczi and he encouraged her to start analyzing children. She read her first paper to the Hungarian Society in 1919 on “The development of a child” and was elected a member of the Society. In 1921, she moved to Berlin where she established a therapy practice with adults and children. In 1925, she offered to give a series of lectures to the British Society, which culminated in her being invited to join the British Society in London (King, 1991b). During World War I, Anna Freud took the course for teachers and worked as a classroom teacher for five years. In 1918, she attended a meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society for the first time being admitted to the Society in 1922. In line with her background as a teacher, Anna began the development of her approach to child analysis, parallel to the analysis of adults, but with variations that made allowance for the child’s immaturity. The basis for her 1941-1945 battle against Melanie Klein is related to this approach, which specifically revolved around the question of whether the child developed a true transference. Anna Freud felt that children were too young to shift away from the original family members, whereas Melanie Klein held that they could be analyzed through their transference-resistance reactions in much the same way as adults were analyzed. Anna Freud also believed in the use of educational devices with both child and parent, whereas Melanie Klein stuck strictly to analytic methods (Fine, 1985). The following addresses the pre-controversy origin, and three concepts that highlight the importance of advancing the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence to consideration – unconscious phantasy, projective identification and symbolization. While the pre-controversy origin is fundamentally structural psychology, the three concepts are decidedly a functional psychology which allows for ‘self-being-conscious’ that is molded and continually remolded by the social and physical environment, hence, the ‘aim’ of Table 2 (Adaption, p. 14) and Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43), which should be no surprise.

The pre-controversy origin “…Freud, early on, focused on the oedipal drama of the 3- to 5-year age period, Klein’s work centered on the first year of life, when development is most rapid and when the
infant is presumably most impressionable ... this period of early development, as traced by Klein, lays the foundation for the later development of the oedipal conflict in the so-called phallic period, as described by [Sigmund] Freud ... As a result of her clinical work with very young children, she was able to flesh out the pre-oedipal period which, in [Sigmund] Freud's writings, was left in broad, nearly empty outline” (Gerard, 1991).

Unconscious phantasy is effectively the substituting of what-might-be for what-is, and is a counter to uncertainty, be that uncertainty real or imagined, hence, fear, a large portion of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34). This is about the comingling of reality and myth, “This evidence comes both from the dream and from other manifestations of the unconscious” (Furfey, 1919).

Projective identification is the “neurotic vicious circle” (Strachey, 1934) and span projection of self (outer realm of presumed knowledge), introjection into self (inner realm of the presumed self), and the transference which is resistance that is a mask over repression.

Symbolization is the over-compensating for seduction that is most likely imagined versus the deeply internalized ‘inertia of influence’ of Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43) and is “people’s self-perceptions agree substantially with the way they perceive themselves as being viewed by others” (Shrauger, 1991). Included here are a person’s object relationships.

With middle across (p. 43) the primary reference point, the direction of this paper changes to resolving what has been presented thus far to the gap between the first two columns of Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6) – the first column sets basis as the sum of age, education and income while the next column sets execution as the expression of the contents of working memory, the ‘what’ (but not in the Janet sense), leaving the gap, the ‘why’ (in the Freud sense), to be explored. To be sure, that gap is what separates the current therapeutic jurisprudence from the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. Discussion of Karen Horney advances ‘aim’ of Figure 5 to a self-fulfilling prophesy by asserting that ‘aim’ is the acting out of the comingling of unconscious phantasy, projective identification and symbolism. Discussion of Frieda Fromm-Reichmann advances loneliness to consideration in the discussion of the gap between the first two columns of Figure 1. Discussion of Edith Jacobson extends a person’s object relations to the enabling dynamics of the second column of Figure 1. Discussion of Carl Rogers extends the dynamics of Table 2 (Adaptation, p. 14) to a centrist resolving of ‘sociality’ to ‘individualism’ of Figure 3 (Adaptation p. 21). Discussion of Michael Balint extends Titchener’s “hope of a science” to an organizational approach to the exposing of the undercurrents of the rationalizations of Table 2. Discussion of John Bowlby extends the discoveries about attachment that were exposed during the Freud-Klein 1941-1945 controversies to the resolution of adaptation to sexuality of Figure 2 (Darwin v. Freud, p. 18). And, discussion of Amos Tversky exposes the realism of reality by giving character to the first column of Figure 1 on the strength of Wassily Leontief (supply-side economics) and John Maynard Keynes (demand-side economics) thus reframing each adaptation and attachment of Table 2 as ever-evolving dynamics.

Karen Horney MD (1885-1952)

The positions that Horney advances are rooted in rejection of Freud’s theory of instincts with her position shared by Erich Fromm, Adolph Meyer, James S. Platt and Harry Stack Sullivan (Horney, 1950, p. 366). Thus, to Horney, et.al., the entire dynamic of Figure 5 collapses to working memory as depicted but also as the proxy for ‘object’ and ‘source’, hence, ‘aim’ as a self-fulfilling prophesy. The net effect is everyday life of Figure 2 is less about fantasy and more about phantasy much of which is unconscious.

Horney’s anchor, the neurotic process, encompasses the comingling of unconscious phantasy, projective identification and symbolism which runs the risk of being a three-step process.
The first step largely a given – “Under inner stress, however, a person may become alienated from his real self. He will then shift the major part of his energies to the task of molding himself, by a rigid system of inner dictates into a being of absolute perfection. For nothing short of godlike perfection can fulfill his idealized image of himself and satisfy his pride in his exalted attributes which (so he feels) he has, could have, or should have” [Italics added] (Ibid, p. 13).

The second step not necessarily a given but probable – “Unlike Pygmalion, who tried to make another person into a creature fulfilling his concept of beauty, the neurotic sets to work to mold himself into a supreme being of his own making. He holds before his soul his image of perfection and unconsciously tells himself: ‘Forget about the disgraceful creature that you actually are; this is how you should be; and to be this idealized self is all that matters” [Italics in original] (Ibid, p.64).

The third step also not necessarily a given, but if it does to any degree, then the capacity for self-inflicted punishment follows – "...when an individual shifts his center of gravity [neurotic pride] to his idealized self, he not only exalts himself but also is bound to look at his actual self – all that he is at a given time, body, mind, healthy and neurotic – from the wrong perspective. The glorified self becomes not only a phantom to be pursued; it also becomes a measuring rod with which to measure his actual being. And this actual being is such an embarrassing sight when viewed from the perspective of a godlike perfection that he cannot but despise it. Moreover, what is dynamically more important, the human being that he actually is keeps interfering – significantly – with his flight to glory, and therefore he is bound to hate it, to hate himself. And since pride and self-hate are actually one entity, I suggest calling the sum total of the factors involved by a common name: the pride system” [Italics in original] (Ibid, pp. 110-111).

Of the three points, the only first point is addressable via therapeutic jurisprudence and likely in a comply sense, while all three points are addressable by the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence provided the individual shows an interest in change, to include, discovery and further investigation of their innate strengths only to be followed by a fascinating adventure with respect to time versus circumstances and uncertainty versus ambiguity.

Frieda Fromm-Reichmann MD (1889-1957)

These comments about Fromm-Reichmann begin with a recounting of a narrative between she and a young woman who was a patient in the Chestnut Lodge Sanitarium, Rockville, Maryland, with the admission diagnosis set at schizophrenia – “The patient went to see a psychiatrist ... [about] the last psychotherapeutic phase” to which the young woman expressed fear. “When I [Fromm-Reichmann] questioned her about this, the patient broke into spontaneous, healthy tears and said, ‘Are you surprised at my being afraid: how could I help it? All of my friends and relatives have been living their lives during these years, and I could not participate. How do you expect me ever to catch up with them? My [Fromm-Reichmann] serious answer was, ‘That is true; however, you have gathered during these years a tremendous amount of human experience, having had the opportunity to observe practically all types of emotional experience in your fellow patients and yourself. And what are these emotional experiences of the mentally disturbed other than human experiences of the kind we all go through, seen as if under a magnifying glass?’” (Fromm-Reichmann, 1941|1959, p. 4). The position here is the lack of a gathering of “a tremendous amount of human experience” is what allows the second column of Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6) to follow the first column with no intervening conceptual process, a process that is presumed to be lonely. At issue, however, is anxiety.

“Mentally disturbed people [the unstable actors of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34)] try to dispel anxiety by developing mental symptoms. In fact, as first stated by Freud [e.g., An outline of psychoanalysis], mental symptoms are at the same time both the expression of unbearable anxiety and the means of
warding it off. In other words, mental symptoms and mental illness can be understood simultaneously as the outcome of anxiety and as a defense against it” (Fromm-Reichmann, 1941|1959, p. 306). The current therapeutic jurisprudence with its focus on gaining compliance falls short with respect to anxiety, while the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence allows for an individual to address anxiety and so forth provided that person accepts the idea of a fascinating adventure …. Now, loneliness...

“The writer who wishes to elaborate on the problems of loneliness is faced with a serious terminological handicap: Loneliness seems to be such a painful, frightening experience that people do practically everything to avoid it. This avoidance seems to include a strange reluctance on the part of psychiatrists to seek scientific clarification of the subject. Thus, it has come about that loneliness belongs to the least satisfactory conceptualized psychological phenomena; it is not even mentioned in most psychiatric textbooks. Very little is known among scientists about its genetics and psychodynamics, and various experiences which are descriptively and dynamically as different from one another as aloneness, isolation, loneliness in cultural groups, self-imposed aloneness, compulsory solitude, and real loneliness are all thrown into one terminological basket of ‘loneliness’” (Ibid, p. 325) … not realizing the subject matter all along just might have been unqualified aloneness.

*Harry Stack Sullivan MD (1892-1949)*

The subject here is the development of the ego as influenced by the comingling of social biology and social psychology without prejudice towards either the current therapeutic jurisprudence or the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. Focus is on the ego as a self-referencing system that is constantly in receipt of environmental influences with middle-across the integrator of those influences, and with the character of receipt of mature normals versus unstable actors of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34) the issue. This includes compliance versus coercion with respect to “human performances – organizing thought about oneself and others, not on the basis of the unique individual me that is perhaps one’s most valuable possession, but on the basis of one’s common humanity” [Italics in original] (Sullivan, 1953, p.4).

Sullivan and Fromm-Reichmann were colleagues at Chestnut Lodge with their roles quite different – Fromm-Reichmann had direct patient contact while Sullivan’s was indirect through lectures. Schizophrenia was the common focus. The direct-versus-indirect allows a qualification, that psychiatry (direct) is about diagnosis while psychology (indirect) is about investigation, each of which is an “observing art” (Ibid, p. 13) separated only by clinical degree. This distinction is important as both Fromm-Reichmann and Sullivan were psychiatrists, hence, their implied focus was diagnosis versus the destructive of Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43). However, of interest in this paper is self-defeating behavior with Glover’s specification of progression the conceptual descriptor with the result as shown in Figure 6. This dynamic of defenses against anxiety, contra-accommodation, will be advanced to latent schizophrenia (intrapunitive) versus narcissism (extrapunitive) when discussion turns to Joseph Haven, Emil Kraepelin, Eugen Bleuler, Sigmund Freud and mindfulness (p. 77). The task now is to align the self-
referencing ego of mature normals and unstable actors with the middle-across (p. 43) environmental influences that are formed by social biology and social psychology while keeping in mind a person’s assimilation of these influences emerges as their personal constitution with respect to “the unique individual me that is perhaps one’s most valuable possession” – the self and the object world.

Social biology: This is not about the likes of gender but is about intrapunitive as naïve, the formation of a person’s personal constitution, and is a prelude to focus on Lamarckian soft inheritance (Table 4 Soft inheritance, p. 63)). Included here are three principles which Sullivan borrowed from the biology of Seba Eldridge (1925), The Organization of Life (Ibid, pp. 31-45). First is the principle of communal existence, second is the principle of communal organization, third is the principle of functional activity or the processes which make up living. These three principles taken together set forth the relative maturity of a person which in turn set forth the boundaries of the inertia of their personal constitution.

Social psychology: As with social biology this is not about the likes of gender but is about extrapunitive as naïve, the extension of a person’s personal constitution into their object world, with Lamarckian soft inheritance an equal consideration. Here Sullivan refers to two tributaries with the first formed by Adolf Meyer, his psychobiology, with the second formed by George Herbert Mead, his genesis of the self and the nature of mind, with the two tributaries merging as a response to the challenge introduced by Darwin – “the elaboration of a purely natural history of the psyche”, Sullivan’s contra to psychology as “a purely scientific discipline that studied something that rested on something else”, a statement that is extensible to the fundamental difference between the current therapeutic jurisprudence and the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. With the two tributaries as basis, Sullivan details what separates the inheritance that begets each the mature normals and the unstable actors.

Mature normals: This is about reasonably healthy management of progression where the reference to ‘reasonable’ is a placeholder for the normal in-stream ups and downs of life. This is about the assimilation of experience as molded by euphoria, a state of utter well-being, and tension, the balancing of covert and overt anxiety. Here, Sullivan extends Freud’s specification of sublimation from a directed process to the more general “Sublimation is the unwitting substitution, for a behavior pattern which encounters anxiety or collides with the self-system, of a socially more acceptable activity pattern which satisfies part of a motivational system that caused trouble. In more fortunate circumstances, symbol processes occurring in sleep take care of the rest of the unsatisfied need” [Italics in original] (Ibid, p. 193). As an extension to Krafft-Ebing’s 1886 Preface (p. 11) – “The sudden loss of virile powers often produces melancholia, or is the cause of suicide when life without love is a blank” – Sullivan with an infant in focus – “My theorem is this: The observed activity of the infant arising from the tension of needs induces tension in the mothering one, which tension is experienced as tenderness and as an impulsion to activities toward the relief of the infant’s needs. In other words, however manifest the increasing tension of needs in an infant may be … the observation of those tensions or of the activity which manifests their presence calls out, in the mothering one, a certain tension, which may be described as tenderness, which is a potentiality for or an implosion to activities suited to … the relief of the infant’s needs. This, in its way, is a definition of tenderness – a very important conception, very different indeed from the miscellaneous and, in general, meaningless term ‘love’, which confuses so many issues in our current day and age” [Italics in original] (Ibid, pp. 39-40).

Unstable actors: Covered here is the “degree of distortion” and/or “degree of disengagement” of Figure 6 (Defenses, p. 47), “inadequate or inappropriate interpersonal relations which are ordinarily referred to as mental disorders, mild or severe” (Ibid, p. 313). This is about compensation, dissociation and other defense reactions, to be addressed when discussion turns to Haven, et.al. (p. 77).
**Edith Jacobson MD (1897-1978)**

The subject here is the development of the superego, with many entry points for seduction quite imaginable. The starting point is in the controversies initiated by Melanie Klein and Anna Freud.

“It seems advisable to begin the discussion of the special identifications to which the superego owes its existence by pointing to at least some essential factors which determine the different qualities of the infantile identification process. Their qualities depend on: (1) The limitations of the child’s own psychic organization; (2) the sex, the personality, the attitudes and behavior of the objects and the qualities of the object’s traits chosen for identification; (3) the vicissitudes of the self and object representations and to which extent the child discovers and discerns the reality of his love objects and of his own self; (4) hence, the degree to which the parental and other images serving for identification are close to the realistic models, become idealized, or may become removed from them or even reactively opposed to them; (5) the degree to which independence of these objects is brought about by the identifications; (6) the qualities and aims of the drives and fantasies, and the experiences and perceptions inducing the identifications; (7) the quality and vicissitudes of the underlying introjection and projection mechanisms; (8) the degree to which the identifications serve defensive (or even restitutive) purposes, or develop as the pathological outcome of a neurotic or psychotic conflict” (Jacobson, 1964, pp. 89-90).

These eight factors are quite simply not addressable by the current therapeutic jurisprudence even without a hint of seduction while it takes the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence and patience on the individual’s part to initiate an investigation.

However, there is a view that is addressable by the current therapeutic jurisprudence in the absence of the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence where the fundamental ploy is compliance versus a willingness to change (versus the lead-in to the second column of Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6)). This is identity formation with respect to the execution of ego function and is the net of four points. (Note, these four points are a repeat from the companion Standards paper.

The first is “Identity formation, finally, begins when the usefulness of identity ends” [Italics in original] (Erikson, 1956). The second is Glover’s progression as situated between Erikson’s “usefulness of identity” and his “Identity formation”. The third is Allport’s focus on “what I perceive as belonging intimately to my body [saliva] is warm and welcome” (Allport, 1955, p. 43), which allows success to share the stage with disappointment. The fourth is a flurry of activity spread across defenses, emotions, excuses and so forth - gender neutral harmful thinking versus the many investments in creativity. Again, progression is the pivot with both sides of Erikson’s statement accounted for by two views of an intellectual’s endeavors.

The first view of an intellectual’s endeavors, which accounts for Erikson’s “Identity formation is: “Let me describe what I mean with the aid of a practical example of a creative ego function, such as the writing of a book. First of all, the intention normally arises from a previous interest in and concern with the issue about which the author wishes to write. This issue is the object which must become enduringly vested first with libidinal, aggressive, and neutralized psychic energy to the point where the plan to write about it turns into action. Of course, the writing will never proceed if the writer does not have sufficient self-assurance at his disposal, self-assurance which must be based on an awareness and realistic evaluation of his abilities, and on a sufficient and sound cathexis of the function of writing. Even though his ego ideal and ambitious fantasies in general may be a further effective stimulus, his work will not be successful either if the main incentive for his writing is grandiose fantasies which surpass his abilities. As the author begins to write, he may ‘fall in love’ with his book. Since the book represents to him his own creation, his way of self-expression, this ‘love’ may be rather of a narcissistic type.
Moreover, the function as such – the acts of thinking and writing – may be a highly vested, preferred form of self-satisfaction. After his work is published, its praise by the public, the splendid sale of the book, the gain of money from it, all these gratifications may be the writer’s additional narcissistic rewards” (Jacobson, 1964, pp. 81-82).

The second view of an intellectual’s endeavors, which accounts for Erikson’s “usefulness of identity” is: “But all these manifold narcissistic elements involved in such creative ego activity are bound to interfere with the function of thinking and writing if the major aim of the book does not remain the writer’s true interest in the selected field [hence, compliance], in the special material he deals with, in the discoveries he has made, or the ideas which he wants to develop: in short, an ‘objective’ interest” (Ibid, p. 82).

**Carl Rogers PhD (1902-1987)**

From the ninth volume of the series *The history of psychology in autobiography*, “I assume the purpose of my autography is to reveal the person as he is to himself and, either directly or indirectly to reveal some of the factors and forces which entered in the making of his personality and his professional interests. So, perhaps, the first question to answer is Who am I? Who is this person whose life history is to be explored?

I am a psychologist; a clinical psychologist. I believe, a humanistically oriented psychologist certainly; a psychotherapist, deeply interested in the dynamics of personality change; a scientist, to the limit of my ability investigating such change; an educator, challenged by the possibility of facilitating learning; a philosopher in a limited way, especially in relation to the philosophy of science and the philosophy and psychology of human values. As a person I see myself as fundamentally positive in my approach to life; somewhat as a lone wolf in my professional activities; socially rather shy but enjoying close relationships capable of a deep sensitivity in human interaction though not always achieving this; often a poor judge of people, tending to overestimate them; possessed of a capacity for setting other people free, in a psychological sense; capable of a dogged determination in getting work done or in winning a fight; eager to have an influence on others but with very little desire to exercise power or authority over them.

These are some of the ways I would describe myself. Others, I am sure, often see me quite differently. How I became the person I am is something of which I am not sure. I believe the individual’s memory of his own dynamics is often decidedly inadequate. So, I shall try to give enough of the factual data for the reader to draw his own conclusions. Part of this data consist of the feelings and attitudes which I remember in various events and periods throughout my life to date. I will not hesitate to draw some of my own inferences from the data, with which the reader can compare his own” (Rogers, 1967, p. 343).

Rogers inadvertently extends the dynamics of Table 2 (Adaption, p. 14) to a centrist resolving of ‘sociality’ to ‘individualism’ of Figure 3 (Adaptation p. 21) on to what has become the fundamental deficiency of the current therapeutic jurisprudence. His entry with respect to the centrist resolving – “When I wrote *Counseling and Psychotherapy*, in 1942, neither my publisher nor I would have foreseen that the miniscule field of counseling would suddenly expand at the end of the war into an enormous field of great public interest. To have written one of the very few books on the subject was to boost me again into national visibility, and again the timing was simply lucky” (Ibid, p. 382). Unfortunately, a caveat appeared on the scene.

“The year 1956 was critical in the development of cognitive psychology. At a meeting at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chomsky gave a paper on his theory of language, George Miller presented a paper on the magic number seven in short-term memory, and Newell and Simon discussed their very influential computational model called the General Problem Solver. In addition, the first attempt to consider concept formation from a cognitive perspective was reported” (Eysenck, 2000, p. 1).
The caveat need not be as cognitive psychology, by construction, is in position to create a foundation for a better understanding of the realm of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34) that is outside of everyday life. An example of that need is “This is a lifeline to those who have not been convinced that their guilt is merely a cognitive stuck point” (Finlay, 2015). This reference to a ‘cognitive stuck point’ makes clear the need for the word ‘and’ to join the current therapeutic jurisprudence to the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. There is however a larger issue – life itself. Rogers’ starting point – Who am I? – is a clear but candidate antidote to Krafft-Ebing’s 1886 statement – “The sudden loss of virile powers often produces melancholia, or is the cause of suicide when life without love is a blank” (p. 11), again, ‘love’ is about self-worth.

Michael Balint MD (1886-1970)
This discussion is an extension of with Balint’s “mutual investment company” (p. 7) with focus directed to Ischemic heart disease, Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6). Specifically – In the physician-patient relationship the physician wears two ‘hats’. The first ‘hat’ is about being a doctor, a human biologist, whose focus is a clinical point-in-time with respect to the patient. The second ‘hat’ is about being engaged with the patient’s rationalizations with the goal to be humanism-based curative versus being an unintended enabler of anxiety – Balint’s focus as was reported in that discussion “It was essentially Balint’s way of translating into the medical context his theory that it was the relational aspect of interaction that was curative rather than the drugs that the physician dispensed” [Italics added] (Lipsitt, 1999).

This discussion extends curative to recognition that a patient at a point in time is the result of many, many influences with the family a factor as well as the undercurrents of unconscious phantasy, projective identification and symbolism. Thus, the direction here is to leverage Titchener’s “hope of a science” to Family Systems Medicine where the approach to curative is team based – the physician, the patient, a family systems therapist, and possibly family members. It is very possible to look at this approach as being about attachment. While it is, to focus on attachment per se is nothing more than a distraction. And, this discussion is clearly exclusive of the current therapeutic jurisprudence.

What follows is from a CME course. “The Family Systems Balint Group involves collaboration between a family physician and a family therapist acting as co-facilitators who have been trained in family therapy. The presenter of a difficult case initially draws a genogram of sociogram on a fill chart, which gives a family systems perspective of a patient’s interrelationships. The group discussion is not restricted to the doctor-patient relationship and can focus on any relationship affecting the doctor and patient” (Botelho, 1990).

As cumbersome as this approach might seem it is highly practical within the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence – and professionally with time. An individual person is exposed to the preceding narrative with the initial suggested task that they create a genogram of sociogram on a fill chart noting that they are free to include their favorite ‘judge’, ‘jury’ and ‘executioner’ – the subject of the sixth track (p. 59; p. 149).

John Bowlby MD (1907-1990)
The origin of attachment theory as constructed by John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth was rooted in personality development with their joint work an offshoot from the Kleinian orientation (Ainsworth, 1991). This discussion of attachment theory is essentially about personality re-development, has Carl Rogers as basis, and is oriented to the resolution of adaptation to sexuality of Figure 2 (Darwin v. Freud, p. 18) with sexuality void of deviations as targeted by Krafft-Ebing.
Rogers provides the outer envelope of the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence with his paper in which “is given of the change in the value orientation of the individual from infancy to average adulthood, and from this adult status to a greater degree of psychological maturity attained through psychotherapy or fortunate life circumstances [the likes of the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence]. ...the theory is advanced that there is an organismic basis for the valuing process within the human individual; that this valuing process is effective to the degree that the individual is open to his experiencing; that in persons relatively open to their experiencing there is an important commonality or universality of value directions; that these directions make for the constructive enhancement of the individual and his community, and for the survival and evolution of his species” (Rogers, 1964). What follows is organized as objection, wager, objective and process – a third view of the fundamental flaw of the DSM-5 (p. 91).

Objection: The current therapeutic jurisprudence is a reductionist subset of methodological behaviorism with mentalism an equal consideration, versus attachment as being about emotion, time, perception, thought, and the inner and outer realms of being. “Methodological behaviorism is generally held to be an attempt to explain behavior in terms of inter subjectively verifiable phenomena, whereas mentalism is generally held to be an attempt to explain behavior in terms of inner causes. The central issue is why does methodological behaviorism [or mentalism] adopt the position that observable data constitute the leverage by which to speak meaningfully and respectably of phenomena that are not publicly verifiable. The answer to this question deals with the epistemology of the scientist and will reveal at least three ways in which methodological behaviorism is mentalistic: its view of language, its conventional interpretation of operationism, and its view of logic” (Moore, 1989). The flaw which leads to the objection is the not-addressed outer realm of being which is about the theory of knowledge (Lovejoy, 1908) and is the superset of the inner realm and includes pragmatism with respect to knowledge that can be internalized, effectively mind, versus knowledge that cannot be knowable, effectively the birth-to-death body. Resolving the outer realm to the inner realm must be the objective, hence, attachment to self.

Wager: The call for an attachment to self sounds grand but leaves open to question the state of self – self-esteem is then the wager. This is about self-validation versus self-worth (Crocker, 2004).

Objective: Now, the distance between self-validation and self-worth, i.e., collective behavior and social interaction. Self-validation comports with the inner realm while self-worth comports with the outer realm. Thus, with respect to attachment, self-worth is the superset of self-validation where the former allows an individual to change versus the latter which is simply comply (Smith, 1944).

Process: “When we refer to psychic structure, we do not mean to imply that personality is composed of fixed or static attributes, properties, or foundations that adhere to a substance ontology; rather, structure should be conceived as unconscious organizational processes that provide functional semblances of continuity and self-cohesion. Structure is constituted via an agentic system of processes that provide organizational and adaptational functions to psychic experience, which are relatively enduring and invariant. But this does not mean that structure does not change; on the contrary, the self is always in a state of unrest and activity (even if such activity is inhibited, lulled, or pacified). Such structural invariance is always evolving and transforming through a variety of adaptational pressures and contingencies; therefore, psychic structure, like the ontogeny of the self, is a dialectical process of becoming continually plagued by conflict and negativity” [Italics in original] (Mills, 2004a). Personal investigation of conflict and negativity is then the process to be followed.
Amos Tversky PhD (1937-1996)

This is about decision making under risk and uncertainty in the macro sense – adaptation, and in the micro sense – attachment, Table 2 (Adaption, p. 14). And, this is not about placing the cart (attachment) in front of the horse (adaptation). The position here is based on the theory developed by each Wassily Leontief (1905-1999) and John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), effectively, supply-side economics versus demand-side economics, with probability common to each. The task now is to keep the horse in front of the cart, which also applies to the first two columns of Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6) – the first column (horse, adaptation) and the second column (cart, attachment).

To illustrate the difference between Leontief’s supply-side and Keynes demand-side, Leontief must be the starting point.

Leontief’s study of The Structure of the American Economy (Neisser, 1941), resulted in a discipline that is now known as input-output analysis. Essentially this is about a matrix with rows and columns where all entries in each row and each column are static except the single cell where a row and a column intersect which then becomes a time-based dynamic and is where Keynes enters the picture.

For example: A row can be a certain grade of steel with each of the columns listing the requirement of that grade of steel for each unit of output knowing all along that some columns (e.g., chewing gum) have no need for that grade of steel. This is about the matching of supply to usage and not to demand. Most important, this is about the level of demand that can be supported with no change in supply.

Now, Keynes...

“Tackling the problems of the economic conditions of his time [the post WW II rebuild of Europe], Keynes went on to consider that the characteristics of the universe of social phenomena were not reducible to the hypotheses of atomism and limited variety. He raised the methodological issue of dealing with a complex phenomenon – i.e., a phenomenon characterized by ‘problems of organic unity, of discreteness, of discontinuity’. ...Hence, Keynes's acknowledgement of the limits of formal logic goes well beyond the Treatise [The General Theory]. He turns his theory of human conduct into a more 'general' theory of human behavior, something that is able to take in the organic nature of social relations and human complex logic” (Marchionatti, 2010).

What this is about at the person level is the difference between the capacity to change versus to simply comply. If a person focuses on attachment without directing attention to the current configuration of adaptation, then attachment is to comply from a static adaptation. However, as a person devotes attention first to the current configuration of adaptation and then to incremental characteristics of adaptation and responds according to available resources and interest, then attachment will reflect the result of that person’s capacity to change.

Epilog:

The procedural subject matter of this paper is the current therapeutic jurisprudence versus the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence, with the objective to set the word ‘and’ between the two forms of jurisprudence as the operative approach. Therapeutic jurisprudence is about the consistent application of legal rules and procedures typically in the criminal justice system for the express
purpose of consistency and continuity (Wexler, 1990, pp. 3-20). Thus, an individual person is expected to fit a profile particularly in the here-and-now to insure the consistent application of legal rule with cookie-cutter versus profiling not implied. Recidivism data (e.g., Hanson, 1998) exposes the significant question – does the application of law encourage an individual to change or simply comply, recidivism data points to comply. In mathematics, there is a function known as the unit step function, Figure 7, a staircase function. What this function says is a solution exists at the lower step as well as the upper step while the demarcation between the two steps is undefined – such is the case with ‘comply’, with ‘usually’ – facts and ideas – not includable.

There is another issue that goes beyond recidivism and that is care for the psychiatric patient, effectively the issue that Krafft-Ebing raised in his *Psychopathia Sexualis*, the 238 cases, thus setting implied mental illness with alleged criminal conduct (p. 11). What follows is a survey of psychiatric care that concludes with three recommendations. This Epilog concludes with a fourth recommendation...

“The trend away from strictly custodian care of mental patients and the positive approach that has been evolving since 1917 are reflected in Hoch's 'Open Door Policy' and in Kris' studies of the effect of psychiatric after care clinics. The future course of psychiatry is charted in *Action for Mental Health*, the official report of Senator Hill, Kenneth Appel and a group of fifty leading psychiatric and neurological associations. William E. Lawrence sums it up in the science column of the *New York Times* (March 26, 1961) and calls attention to the main areas in which improvements are needed (Lawrence, 1961):

1) Elaborate basic research is needed to determine the causes of schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis, and many other forms of mental illness. These studies must be carried out in the laboratory, the hospital, and the community clinic.

2) Since 80 out of 100 mental patients in the U.S. are still kept under elementary custodial conditions, funds must be made available for constructing smaller clinics, cottages and psychiatric wards in general hospitals with good teaching facilities.

3) Simple psychotherapeutic work should be done by trained psychologists and social workers. Major problems in patient and family counseling should be handled by the more highly trained psychiatrist, neurologist and psychoanalyst” (Kraepelin, 1917|1962, p. 160).

Now, the fourth...

4) Dynamic psychotherapeutic work should be done by the individual with optional consultation and with the goal to encourage the individual to change while enjoying personal exposure to the theory of circumstances and ambiguity aversion. Even psychoanalysis alone is not enough as reaching a point where there is “nothing left to talk about” (Strachey, 1934) says nothing about changing circumstances in a person’s future, i.e., risk and uncertainty.

**Summary of this paper**

This paper is presented along eight tracks with the title of each track preceded by a keyword. And, the keywords alone present a story – **Dynamics, Method, Companion, Puzzle, Surface, Issue, Device and Objective**.

The first track presents **Dynamics: Baseline assumptions**. The second track presents **Method: Resistance to a contrarian investment** with the narrative focusing on communications in healthcare. The third track presents **Companion: Decision making and more selective attention** with the narrative relying on Ischemic heart disease as a baseline issue. The fourth track presents **Puzzle: Deduction and less selective awareness** with the narrative about developing circumstances (reality) and ambiguity (pleasure). The
fifth track presents *Surface: Reasoning and more selective anxiety* with the narrative about analysis of the current therapeutic jurisprudence. The sixth track presents *Issue: Perception and less selective inertia* with the narrative about developing the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. The seventh track presents *Device: Motivation and variable selectivity of value and choice* with the narrative centered on the CSAT-SAMHSA-DHHS data model. The eighth track presents *Objective: Professional responsibility versus life as the ultimate wager* with the narrative centered on the flattening of life, which, in turn, is a terse retort to Figure 7 (Unit Step Function, p. 53).

**Dynamics: Baseline assumptions**

This track includes eight topics: (1) Resistance is versatile, a defense mechanism or an offense mechanism, (2) Pleasure and reality principles as primary and secondary, function of clinical experience, (3) Transference, (4) Leveraging of opportunity, (5) Strategic focus of informational communications, (6) It is efficient to resolve the impetus to a reframing of Freud's seduction theory, (7) Leveraging of opportunity is aligned with life style and an intense narcissistic need, (8) Informational communications, is aligned with history and escapism. What follows are six summary discussions that cut across the eight topics.

**Controlling idea:** The controlling idea is David Hartley’s *Theory of the Human Mind* (Priestley, 1775) which includes two primary tracks. The Doctrine of Vibrations (Ibid, pp. 7-11) and the Doctrine of Association of Ideas (Ibid, pp. 12-28). This is a statement about dualism where Vibrations are about nerve sensations that can originate in the brain or be caused by a reaction to external stimuli, and where Ideas are about communications with the pluralistic world in that ideas build on experience and influence, hence, Association from the two perspectives that describe the all of life.

**Pursuit of maturity:** The basis for this is the Big Five – Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism. At issue is the risk of the square-peg-round-hole problem. Each therapeutic jurisprudence and the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence applies to an entire population without regard for inclusion of the many subsets of social roles. “Despite the comprehensive nature of this [meta-analysis], there are several glaring omissions in the longitudinal database and numerous questions that remain unanswered. It is clear from our review that many more studies performed on a wider variety of samples are needed before definitive statements can be made concerning the patterns of change for specific traits, such as social dominance and agreeableness. Also, a disproportionate number of longitudinal studies of personality have been based on highly educated, middle class or affluent samples. Studies of ethnic minorities, the poor, and the working class are still a rarity in the field of personality development. Moreover, more studies of middle-aged and older individuals would help clarify some of the patterns of personality development” (Roberts, 2006).

**Pursuit of isolation:** This is about isolation from life, about being caught up in idealism that applies to no one person, hence, ethics. Hartley’s Vibrations are no more static than his Ideas, with Associations the net of a multitude of variables that morph in character from realization to realization. Thus, the problem is the risk of looking at everyday life as in-isolation versus the balance of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34). In fact, the greater risk is looking at that portion of Figure 4 outside of everyday life while ignoring the varying realities that occur from day-to-day – “In view of the rapid progress made in recent years in Psychology, as evidenced by the continuous and ever-increasing output of books, monographs, articles and journals covering a wide range of subjects, it is worthy of note that practically nothing has been written upon our most common, everyday mental experiences, such as hope, disappointment, despair, modesty and shame, arrogance and pride, patience and endurance, friendship and loyalty, courage, ambition and very many others” (Morse, 1907) – as well as loneliness and aloneness.
Blindness to life as the wager: This is about a very dangerous hornet’s nest and its anti-thesis. On the ‘dangerous’ side is an “alarmingly high morbidity and mortality” in addiction specialty clinics or programs (Hser, 2017) while on the anti-thesis side is Harry Stack Sullivan and the Chestnut Lodge focus on psychoanalysis and occupational therapy (Stanton, 1961). Both sides of this blindness are about ‘aim’. The surface issue is Medication Assisted Therapy versus Recovery – “Recovery status is best defined by factors other than medication status. Neither medication-assisted treatment of opioid addiction nor the cessation of such treatment by itself constitutes recovery. Recovery status instead hinges on broader achievements in health and social functioning – with or without medication support” (SAMHSA, 2016). While this dialog sounds rather straight forward, it sits in between two legal issues. The first, the application of a pharmaceutical intervention opens the question “for how long” and if ‘too long’ then the Donaldson Decision is a consideration (Wolfe, 1975). The second, the non-application of a pharmaceutical intervention opens the door to a demand of recognition of dualism by the patient with the issue being the definition of effective treatment as in the case of Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge (Klerman, 1990). Sullivan’s position is a developmental approach with anxiety the concern (Sullivan, 1953, pp. 3-30). Setting initial focus on anxiety reduces the need to set life as a wager which of course assumes an initial detoxification has been completed successfully. From this it follows “no very simple explanation is adequate to communicate some of the instrumentalities that might be useful for improving one’s own life and the life of other” (Ibid, p. 5). However, given the experience with the non-pharmaceutical intervention, psychoanalysis and occupational therapy, and, successful recovery of schizophrenia as related with Fromm-Reichmann, with empathy the principle focus (Silver, 2015), this should be enough to justify pursuit of the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence with out-patient supervision at least initially, perhaps longer, and there is nothing wrong with expecting a person to be their own provider of empathy.

Biological basis: This is an extension of references to objectivity and the Research Domain Criteria (p. 33). The quest for a biological basis is quite stark – “Prominent psychiatrists have moved to rebrand psychiatry as clinical neuroscience and rechristen mental disorders as brain disorders. Recent shifts in research and funding priorities have followed suit, privileging neuroscience over psychological and behavioral research” (Olbert, 2015). If the rebranding and rechristening is decidedly successful, from which will follow greater justification for pharmaceuticals with psychotropic agents granted emphasis, will the professional emotion of empathy have any place in the delivery of services. Further, given the “alarmingly high morbidity and mortality”, how big of a pile of dead bodies do the proponents of the rebranding and rechristening consider to be acceptable. Better yet, do the proponents of rebranding and rechristening consider acceptable the inclusion of their very own friends and family members in the pile of dead bodies. Bottom line, this is about passing judgement on life with basis limited to observations of a limited percentage of the probable “despite the widespread quotes that the human brain contains 100 billion neurons and ten times more glial cells, the absolute number of neurons and glial cells in the human brain remains unknown” (Azevedo, 2009).

Mentalism: Continuing with passing judgement on life with limited basis, this is an extension of the heavily dated romanticism reported in the discussion of “Idealism is about drama” (p. 41). There is a quest to create standardized images of the human mental apparatus which in turn will allow for the cookie-cutter approach to the understanding of overall human conduct. “The choice of hypothetical constructs is a necessary and fateful step in one's approach in all of psychology, not just psychoanalysis. It is virtually an obligation of theorists with new propositions to commit to one or another mind map” (Wilson, 1995).
Method: Resistance to a contrarian investment (Communications in healthcare)

This track is about communications in healthcare and includes seven topics: (1) Reliance on seduction, (2) Libidinal energy-based distribution, (3) Success versus failure, (4) Fantasy versus phantasy, (5) Repression versus suppression, (6) Informational communications, (7) Affective mental disorders. What follows are two summary discussions that cut across the seven topics.

Spontaneous development: Included here are the likes of diary entries ranging from random thoughts to outline-based sequential statements, with the array presumed to be an investment in self, and if contrarian they are deliberately so. For this a reference point is needed – a person as a child and later as an adult, which advances to consideration childhood phantasies versus the concealment of comparable phantasies in adulthood (Freud, 1905|1957, pp. 142-153). Beyond the reference point there are sequential statements that tend to be organized in development though ideally spontaneous in origin (Freud, 1925|1961, pp. 225-232). The intent of the underlying investment in self is simply learning by anxiety – “The unwitting development, which is the pattern of sublimation, becomes an important element in learning to be human – that is, in learning to behave as one should in a given society” (Sullivan, 1953, pp. 151-154).

Professional development: Addressed here is the intended antithesis to an individual learning by anxiety, an individual must be willing to consider professional guidance as a contrarian investment on the strength of an expected array of professional ethics (Mac Iver, 1922).

Companion: Decision making and more selective attention (Ischemic heart disease as lifestyle)

This track has Ischemic heart disease as a baseline issue and includes three topics: (1) Immediate strategic interface, (2) Overt scope (goal activation), (3) Covert selectivity and filters (anti-social behavior). What follows are three summary discussions that cut across the three topics.

Generalizations: A cautionary note – “One common source of error in philosophy has been the principle of generalization wrongly applied. For the sake of explaining phenomena we must understand that a higher development produces new conditions which are absolutely absent in the lower strata of life. Now it happens that some philosophers take features typical of the highest and most complicated forms of existence and generalize them to explain the nature of lower forms. Others do the reverse. They generalize the lowest forms and explain all higher features as mere repetitions of simpler modes of activity” (Carus, 1913). This collapses to the suppression of logic, the distance between the first and second columns of Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6).

Personality: A second cautionary note – “in a general way alteration of personality is effected through the primary organization by experience and later coming into dominating activity of particular systems of ideas with their affects, on the one hand, and the displacement by dissociation or inhibition of other conflicting systems on the other. In slighter degrees and when transient this alteration may be regarded as a mood. When the alteration is more enduring and so marked by contrast with the preceding and normal condition as to obtrusively alter the character and behavior of the individual and his capacity for adjustment to his environment, we have a pathological condition” (Prince, 1919). By glossing over the potential for mood, there remains but one troublesome option, the discovery of a person’s very own ‘judge’, ‘jury’ and ‘executioner’.

Learning: Allowing the prior comments about Generalizations and Personality to merge into one idea results in the challenge – “the joint problems of learning to trust and trusting to learn” (Landrum, 2015).
Puzzle: *Deduction and less selective awareness (Circumstances (reality) and ambiguity (pleasure))*

This track has developing circumstances (reality) and ambiguity (pleasure) as a baseline issue and includes three topics: (1) Underlying tactical objective (life style and suppression), (2) Overt scope (cultural dependent), (3) Covert selectivity and filters (visual processing). What follows are two summary discussions that cut across the three topics.

Adaptation (centrist): This is about consistency in the conceptualization of the “retrieval from store of memory images” of Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43) without variation and without regard for consequences of what might be retrieved. The rationale for consistency is to expose the results of the presumed correctness of the underlying definition of psychological resilience in tandem with the component definitions, concepts and theories (Fletcher, 2013).

Adaptation (divergent): Covered here are delusions and continuity with respect to the input to deduction of Figure 5. Delusions versus reality are at the end of the framing of the components of psychological resilience with the final molding of delusions accomplished by the transference with respect to suppression (Karon, 1989). Continuity versus pleasure is about the interim framing of the components of psychological resilience (Goldberg, 1990).

Surface: *Reasoning and more selective anxiety (Therapeutic jurisprudence)*

This track is about analysis of the current therapeutic jurisprudence and includes two topics: (1) Editing of what is available to a person’s own internal world (anxiety and limitations of language), (2) Editing of what is allowed to a person’s working memory store and potentially on to their external world (loneliness/frustration and consciousness of abstracting). What follows are three summary discussions that cut across the two topics.

Reasoning: Logic in tandem with anxiety determines reasoning. It is assumed that each logic and anxiety are always operating in concert and with equal force and is driven by middle across (p. 43). Support for this statement follows with a third variable, hypnotism, as contributing support for the static equality (Binet, 1899, pp. 56–68). And, that supporting narrative which could include the Binet-Simon intelligence scale of 1911 but will not. “Hypnotic experiments on visual hallucinations have enabled us to penetrate in part into the mechanisms of our normal perceptions. The principle conclusion which is drawn from them follows: When an exterior object conveys an impression to our senses, the mind adds, upon its own initiative, a certain number of images to the sensations experiences” (Ibid, p. 68). For emphasis, “…Stuart Mill remarked that all psychological explanations, without exception, are subject to a general condition: that of being an application of the laws of association by resemblance and by contiguity” [Italics in original] (Ibid, p. 92).

Judgement: This is a continuation to logic in tandem with anxiety determines reasoning with focus restricted to in-the-moment, the normative execution of life as defined by folk psychology. Reasoning could easily imply the use of the scales of justice in deliberations about alternatives. Given that reasoning happens quite quick, spanning perhaps only a few picoseconds, folk psychology must be advanced to consideration. Thus, when reasoning is expected to deliver on alternatives it seems that the starting point is about distinguishing between praiseworthy or blameworthy and good or bad. Given the pressure of time, the assumed picoseconds, “available evidence seems to indicate that people’s application of [folk psychology] is influenced by judgments of goodness and badness without the mediation of judgments of praise and blame” (Knobe, 2004).
Selectivity: This is about reasoning by an individual person versus the application of therapeutic jurisprudence. A person is exposed to the application of therapeutic jurisprudence because of their violation of some statute with the result being the presumed static equality of the logic and anxiety of reasoning is reformed as a dynamic inequality with logic at the mercy of anxiety. This results from two competing assumptions – “First, forensic psychologists and the law have a common goal: the prevention and management of criminal behavior. ...the second assumption that must be accepted is that the legal system can indeed function as a therapeutic agent of change” (Dickie, 2007). Thus, the first sets focus on good or bad while the second sets focus on praise or blame, and, given the first and second are expected to be participative, the individual is faced with an inconclusive judgement that does not require their active ownership as their buy-in is an involuntary expectation, i.e., compliance.

Issue: Perceptions and less selective inertia (Psychoanalytic jurisprudence)

This track develops the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence and includes two topics: (1) Fixation on seduction without regard for its real versus imagined character (denial), (2) Frustration with anxiety that is countered by a circular manic-depressive diversion with the manic upside deployed as a covert offense mechanism against a person's own self (oscillation of preferences). What follows are three summary discussions that cut across the two topics.

Perception: The average person would probably prefer to stand on solid ground versus the alternatives such as quick sand – in psychology, the preference is the rigorous cannons of the natural sciences. Thus, “Perception is the conscious behavior through which are developed the meanings of objects and relations which operate in the adaptation of the individual to his surroundings and in the control of them. It is precisely in the process of perception that the individual, in direct contact with objects, develops reaction patterns enabling him to differentiate and distinguish the various objects affecting him” (Kantor, 1920). This line of thinking is parallel to Watson’s declaration that consciousness is an invention with no basis in fact, that it is the behavior of a person that determines consequences, only to be burdened with the campaign for Pebeco toothpaste which resulted in the production of a subliminal message, to which one must add Harlow Gale’s reliance on Wundt-molded his experimental psychology.

Imagination: “…perception is said to be an awareness of objects present to sense. Imagination is said to be awareness of objects not present to sense” (Gordon, 1935).

Object world: Here is where the monist is correct. The cartesian physical mind fails to acknowledge the abstractions of life that go well beyond praise-or-blame and good-or-bad and on to subliminal initiated relationships (Bem-Zeev, 1989).

Device: Motivation and variable selectivity of value and choice (CSAT-SAMHSA-DHHS data model)

This track’s narrative is centered on the CSAT-SAMHSA-DHHS data model and includes three topics: (1) Summary of mechanics of value and choice versus regression and fixation (and bias and individualism), (2) Soft costs and soft benefits of value and choice based on bias, (3) Resolving motivation, bias and individualism. What follows are two summary discussions that cut across the three topics.

Motivation: This is a counter to middle across (p. 43) and another instance of the unintended consequences of Freud’s writing in German versus in English but this time with Freud’s Instincts and their vicissitudes (Freud, 1915|1957, pp. 109-140) the reference. “This is not only a mistranslation, it inaccurately implies to the reader a set of propositions Freud neither intended to convey nor did he espouse – namely, that the human psyche, which Freud referred to as the soul (Seele), was composed of behaviorally hard-wired, physiologically determined instincts that formed the edifice for human
motivation and action. *Instinkt* was a word Freud rarely used in the context of the human subject, which he reserved for animal species, and loathed it for its simple equation to material reduction: this is precisely why he deliberately chose the word *Trieb* – more appropriately translated as drive, impulse, or urge – to characterize human motivation. Likewise, *Schicksale*, rendered as ‘victories’, is equally misleading because it implies a passionless, staid mechanism of change rather than the dynamic notion of mutability that belongs to the fate or destiny of life experience. This is what Freud had in mind when he envisioned the psyche as a temporal flux of dynamic events that arise from the most archaic fabric of our corporeal nature, which transforms over time through internal mediations we customarily refer to as ‘defense mechanisms’, itself another unfortunate and misleading aphorism. ‘Drives and their Fate’ comes much closer to capturing the implied meaning behind the transmogrification of inner forces, a process that extends to the most unrefined and immediate expression or derivative of a drive to the most sublimated aspects of human deed and desire” [Italics in original] (Mills, 2004b). Thus, while middle across (p. 43) applies to daily life and its challenges, Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43), the representation of life that is consistent with the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence has source-aim-object of Figure 5 enhanced to reflect the adaptation-attachment of Table 2 (Adaption, p. 14), with adaptation-source and attachment-object the linkage.

Vulnerabilities: This is about exclusion – self and social, with self the first topic, and, social as an extension of “cognitive stuck points” (Finlay, 2015). From time to time persons are confronted with economic opportunities that result in economic loss for any number of reasons with self-blame the candidate cognitive reaction (Vohs, 2007) which need not be if, e.g., opportunities are viewed from the perspective of adaptation-attachment, Table 2. Social exclusion is the opposite and implies the onus is on those persons who are implementing the exclusion (Molden, 2009) rather than the person taking the time to evaluate their adaptation-attachment perspective.

**Objective: Professional responsibility versus life as the ultimate wager (Flatten life)**

This track’s narrative is centered on the flattening of life and includes four topics: (1) Strategic/altruistic designs to initiate progress, (2) Tactical attempts to create progress, (3) Practical route to cause progress, (4) In the absence of progress, life, the ultimate wager. What follows are two summary discussions that cut across the four topics, and form a fourth view of the fundamental flaw of the DSM-5 (p. 91)

Conflict resolution: At the base of the entire problem of therapeutic jurisprudence – recidivism to be addressed later in this paper – stands the application of adjudication. “Adjudication is the process by which the values embodied in an authoritative legal text, such as the Constitution, are given concrete meaning and expression. ...this has always been the function of adjudication, clearly embraced and legitimated by Article III, and continuous with the role of courts under the common law, but within recent decades a new form of constitutional adjudication has emerged. This new form of adjudication is largely defined by two characteristics. The first is the awareness that the basic threat to our constitutional values is posed not by individuals, but by the operations of large-scale organizations, the bureaucracies of the modern state. Secondly, this new mode of litigation reflects the realization that, unless the organizations that threaten these values are restructured, these threats to constitutional values cannot and will not be eliminated” (Fiss, 1982). Thus, the social foundation, the Constitution, which should be the basis of therapeutic jurisprudence has fallen to a political foundation in the form of a cookie-cutter solution. This same politicization has permeated research in health psychology with a “shift from an emphasis on mental illness to an increasing emphasis on physical illness” (Evans, 1989).

Professionalism: When the logic of humanism gains in importance versus the science of behavior, progress will be real (Conway, 1991). This same line of reasoning applies to operant conditioning that
results from either the ever-changing environmental factors versus social engineering (Smith, 1992), with arguments against the existence of repression (Piper, 2008) a perfect example of highly politicized social engineering.
Dynamics: Baseline assumptions

To assert that a point does not make trend is quickly accomplished by setting initial focus on melancholia – major depressive disorder.

“Major depressive disorder is associated with high mortality, much of which is accounted for by suicide; however, it is not the only cause. For example, depressed individuals admitted to nursing homes have a markedly increased likelihood of death in the first year. Individuals frequently present with tearfulness, irritability, brooding, obsessive rumination, anxiety, phobias, excessive worry over physical health, and complaints of pain (e.g., headaches; joint, abdominal, or other pains). In children, separation anxiety may occur. Although an extensive literature exists describing neuroanatomical, neuroendocrinological, and neurophysiological correlates of major depressive disorder, no laboratory test has yielded results of sufficient sensitivity and specificity to be used as a diagnostic tool for this disorder. Until recently, hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis hyperactivity had been the most extensively investigated abnormality associated with major depressive episodes, and it appears to be associated with melancholia, psychotic features, and risks for eventual suicide. Molecular studies have also implicated peripheral factors, including genetic variants in neurotrophic factors and pro-inflammatory cytokines. Additionally, functional magnetic resonance imaging studies provide evidence for functional abnormalities in specific neural systems supporting emotion processing, reward seeking, and emotion regulation in adults with major depression” [Italics added] (DSM-5, 2013, pp. 164-165).

In contrast, there is the “compulsion to confess” (Arnold, 2006) which makes sense if one limits attention to seduction of Table 3 (Mental apparatus, p. 37) or allows to consideration the more relaxed childhood phantasies versus the concealment of comparable phantasies in adulthood. And, lest we forget, there is Krafft-Ebing’s 1886 statement – “The sudden loss of virile powers often produces melancholia, or is the cause of suicide when life without love is a blank” (p. 11) – beyond which we have the stubbornness of politics.

Given that no laboratory test has yielded results of sufficient sensitivity and specificity to be used as a diagnostic tool for this disorder funding of the Research Domain Criteria (p. 33) continues undaunted by the level of circular logic gained in the politicized pursuit of science only to be overtrumped by politicized dysfunction given competing budget priorities, e.g., CDC (Centers for Disease Control) avoids gun violence research but NIH (National Institutes of Health) funds it (Rubin, 2016). Discussion is now directed to influences that have led to the DSM.

With the reference to the Research Domain Criteria it was noted that the DSM-II with its basis in Freud was replaced with DSM-III and with its basis in Kraepelin. That transition began with Kraepelin’s focus on nosology (Kraepelin, 1904), well before the DSM-III study groups were formed. While nosology is important, it reduces the subject matter to a flat space thus defusing dynamic – and – with Table 1 (Evolution, p. 13) the reference, sets focus on Darwin at the expense of Lamarck and Freud.

To remain true to this paper’s advocacy of psychoanalytic jurisprudence, Lamarckian soft inheritance must be the major investigative tool. This makes sense for two reasons. First, melancholia seems to be a self-fulfilling prophesy, a comingle of Freud’s source-aim-object. Second, by the construction of Table 1, aim is the pivot, which in turn is the anchor for ‘middle across’ (p. 43). The task now is to resolve the entries in the tombstone (p. 29) to those associated with the formation of a mind science – Krafft-Ebing, James, Freud, Janet, Calkins and Titchener – all supportive of bottom-up (primary) and/or top-down (secondary), and to those associated with the migration of a mind science – Klein, Horney, Fromm-Reichmann, Jacobson, Rogers, Balint, Bowlby and Tversky – all supportive of middle-across. The method to be deployed has Hartley’s Doctrines of Vibrations (as the basis of neuroscience) and his
**Association of Ideas** (as the basis of cognition), which requires the merging of Table 1 (Evolution, p. 13) and Figure 3 (Adaptation p. 21), and which sets the current therapeutic jurisprudence in between Freud’s source and aim and the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence in between Freud’s aim and object thus enforcing the qualification that both forms of jurisprudence must be joined by ‘and’ as situational compliance can never be denied as an inflexible objective.

As with Table 1 (Evolution, p. 13) and Table 2 (Adaptation, p. 14), Freud’s theory of instincts or drives – source, aim, object – is the template that joins a topic to a common denominator. Here it is four sets of five characteristics with the fourth a compound configuration...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Top-down</th>
<th>Middle-across</th>
<th>Bottom-up</th>
<th>Common denominator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biological evolution</td>
<td>Charles Darwin (1809-1882)</td>
<td>Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829)</td>
<td>Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)</td>
<td>Propagation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Hartley (1705-1757)</td>
<td>Observable ‘sociality’</td>
<td>Experienced ‘individualism’</td>
<td>David Hartley (1705-1757)</td>
<td>Association of Ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Doctrine of Vibrations</td>
<td>Migration of a mind science</td>
<td>Formation of a mind science</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuroscience</td>
<td>Cognition</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 - Soft inheritance

The first set – top-down, middle-across, bottom-up – is to assert a link into the image of the mind thereby asserting that Lamarckian soft inheritance is synonymous with working memory of Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43) to which one must add the region of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34) that is below the ellipsoid depiction of everyday life but bounded by the boundaries of mature normals, the morality of neurosis (i.e., Karen Horney’s ‘aim’ as a self-fulfilling prophesy). Next is a repeat of Table 1 with the new material bounded by David Hartley.

With Hartley, the first layer is from Figure 3 (Adaptation p. 21) with the ‘vs’ of that Figure effectively replaced by ‘aim’, the proxy for the required ‘and’. Next are the above noted contributors to the knowledge base, Krafft-Ebing, et.al. with left-right alignment to be accounted for with discussion of neuroscience and cognition. The task now is to account for the entries in the tombstone (p. 29) with respect to Table 4.

Already accounted for with the tombstone is Aramiah Brigham (‘individualism’ as a priority that operates within ‘society’ provided boundaries) and John B. Watson (‘society’ provided boundaries constrain the behavior and development of ‘individualism’), an accounting that enables discussion of neuroscience versus cognition. Before moving on, while Brigham versus Watson is the basis, their work is separated by a considerable gap in time, 1889 versus 1925, 36 years, which does not seem like much but is considerable when one considers the gap in the knowledge base that was addressed during those years, effectively, the development of a new dualism, consciousness versus unconsciousness (versus Descartes and Spinoza). Having Watson in tandem with Descartes and Spinoza as the sole basis, neuroscience comports with Hartley’s Doctrine of Vibrations while being constrained by source and aim, and, Darwin and Lamarck, thus setting Lamarckian soft inheritance as a conceptual limitation.

Alternatively, with Brigham in tandem with consciousness-unconsciousness dualism the sole basis, cognition as an abstraction comports with Hartley’s Association of Ideas while being constrained by aim
and object, Lamarck and Freud, thus setting Lamarckian soft inheritance as the starting point. Now, the dispersion of the members of the tombstone...

The starting point is St. George Mivart (1889), *Origins of Human Reasoning: being an examination of recent hypothesis concerning it*. As a logical extension of Darwin while independent of Hartley, Mivart explores the evolution of thinking about the origin of thought with his primary reference George John Romanes (1888), *Mental Evolution in Man* — “…we have at last a Darwinian who, with great patience and thoroughness, applies himself to meet directly and point-blank the most formidable arguments of the anti-Darwinian school … and has devoted his energies to the task of showing that there is (as Mr. Darwin declared) no difference of kind, but only one of degree, between the highest human intellect and the psychical faculties of the lowest animals” (Mivart, 1889, p. 2), which distills to a statement about comparative psychology.

Attention now turns to tombstone entries that tend towards Hartley’s *Doctrines of Vibrations* (neuroscience), then those that tend towards Hartley’s *Association of Ideas* (cognition), then those that are oriented to what has become the DSM in the absence of Lamarckian soft inheritance.

**Hartley’s Doctrines of Vibrations (neuroscience)**

Baron Ernst von Feuchtersleben (1847), *The principles of medical psychology*: Setting this volume as a child of neuroscience is justified by the author’s own words – “The primary object contemplated by me has been to write a Compendium for a limited class of readers Medical Students in a state of transition from theory to practice” (von Feuchtersleben, 1847, p. 1). He presents a comprehensive survey of the formation of thought from Plato to his contemporaries in Vienna (Ibid, pp. 26-75). Of interest is his discussion of “Forensic (Judicial) Psychology” (Ibid, pp. 369-378), particularly his specification of responsibility where he clearly defines the want for the ‘and’ between the two forms of jurisprudence – “The question of psychological responsibility turns … as that of psychological freedom (or free agency) … medico-psychological freedom. He who is psychologically free, in a medical sense, is liable to responsibility, and vice versa. This definition is decisive and universally valid when the decision of the physician is required, for it is only that psychological freedom which is identical with health, that belongs to his province. It is on that alone that he has to give his opinion; there is here only one will which is not free, namely, that which is fettered by disease, no quarter-free or half-free will. Passion, bewilderment, want of education, enthusiasm, etc. may, indeed, impede self-government; but the will, in these cases, is only morally, not physically fettered; that is, it is free in a psychologico-medical sense. Neither passion, nor emotion, nor habit can exclude imputability; in the first case control is possible, in the second, the mind is affected; it is passive (in abeyance), and does not act (here responsibility does not necessarily attach); in the third case, the commencement of the habit was the imputable cause of its results; thus, the condition caused by repeated intoxication, which Claras calls *inhumanitas ebriosa*, is the consequence of a vice, and therefore imputable. This standard must be maintained, if we would avoid falling into the extreme of ultra-philanthropic tolerance, which now and then flatters the tendencies of our age. This extreme would, in science, neutralize the endeavor to lay down definite boundaries, and, in life, would aid vice and crime in their escape to a convenient city of refuge. Who can venture to say of himself, ‘I am free’; none but the best, and even they should add, ‘perhaps’. Who is there, whether man or woman, young or old, who is not subject to passions, to extraneous impressions? The law cannot here avoid a certain degree of harshness, from which fate itself does not exempt us. It punishes even our unintentional errors, our natural incapacity. We must even bear the consequences thence arising, of being what we are” [Italics in original] (Ibid, pp. 369-372).

John Bovee Dods (1886), *The philosophy of mesmerism and electrical psychology*: Dods writing is situated between Mivart and Spinoza with soft inheritance more a function of manipulation than of
natural development, as is the compliance of therapeutic jurisprudence versus the free associations of the advocate psychoanalytic jurisprudence, not to impair the want for the ‘and’ between the two forms of jurisprudence. Dods focus on now-abandoned animal magnetism (Dods, 1886, pp. 1-9) as inherited from Franz Anton Mesmer (1734-1815) gradually morphed to hypnotism (Freud, 1889|1956, p. 97). Dods focus on clairvoyance (Dods, 1886, pp. 30-42) as pseudoscience is peculiarly parallel to the recidivism associated with the current therapeutic jurisprudence.

George M. Beard (1889), *A Practical Treatise on Nervous exhaustion (Neurasthenia)*: Beard’s position is about the anti-thesis to responsibility along two lines – basis and consequence. First, “Neurasthenia is now almost a household word [akin to today’s bipolar], and, equally with the term malaria, affords to the profession a convenient refuge when perplexed at the recital of a multitude of symptoms seemingly without logical connection or adequate cause. The diagnosis of neurasthenia, moreover, is often as satisfactory to the patient as it is easy to the physician, and by no means helps to reduce the number who have been duly certified to as neurasthenic, and who ever after, with an air too conscious to be concealed, allude to themselves as the victims of nervous exhaustion. The doctrine to be taught and strongly enforced is that many of these patients are not neurasthenic, and under hardly any conceivable circumstance could they become neuroasthenic. They do not belong to the type out of which neurasthenia is born, either mentally or physically” (Beard, 1889, p. 3). Second, “Neurasthenia is an American disease in this, that it is very much more common here than in any other part of the civilized world, and here it first received its name and description; it could not be expected that European authorities would be the pioneers either in the study of its nature or treatment. ...The fallacy in them is this, that Americans need more doctoring than any other people; they have more illnesses of various kinds – major and minor – than any of the European nations. A hundred well-to-do families in our large cities would send for a doctor to treat them very many more times than a hundred equally conditioned families in England, France, or Germany. This fact, taken in connection with the fact that our population extends over a wide territory, makes it possible to support a larger number of physicians than in any other country of equal population. What is true of doctors is equally true of drug stores; the meagerness of the apothecary shops strikes one immediately on visiting Europe. The Americans take very much more medicine, both prescribed and unprescribed, than Europeans; they take a larger variety, they take finer quantities; hence it is that very many of our drug stores are palaces containing an immense quantity of medicinal preparations, including not only all that are used in Europe, but many that are peculiar to this country, or at least but very little known abroad” [Italics added] (Ibid, pp. 32-33).

And we wonder why the opioid crisis.

Edwin Lancelot Ash (1920), *The Problem of Nervous Breakdown*: Ash exposes the price of compliance, i.e., “efficiency is the key to success” (Ash, 1920, p. 5), which he extends through emotions (Ibid, pp. 17-37), temperament (Ibid, pp. 38-50), ...morbid fears and doubts (Ibid, pp. 107-123), ... and hysteria (Ibid, pp. 138-152 & 162-172). His analysis of hysteria spans Charcot’s influence on each Janet and Freud. His analysis also includes the price of repression (Ibid, pp. 173-187), more ‘meds’ such as nerve tonics, the price of introspection, and then on the influence of Descartes’, the cartesian physical mind.

**Hartley’s Association of Ideas (cognition)**

Henry Maudsley (1867), *The physiology and pathology of the mind*: Maudsley sets an early approach to the failure of mental health – the development of insanity from mild to severe (Maudsley, 1867, pp. 195-442). To reach that discussion he traverses the fragile character of emotion, volition, actuation, and, memory and imagination, thus accounting for Lamarckian soft inheritance. On emotion, “character of appetite or desire for agreeable stimulus, and repulsion or avoidance of a painful one, as motives of action, to include the assertion that intellectual life does not furnish the impulses to action, but the
desires do" (Ibid, pp. 129-148). On volition, "self-consciousness reveals the particular state of mind of the moment, but not the long series of causes on which it depends; hence the opinion of free-will ...madman, drunkard, etc. The design in the particular volition is a result of a gradually effected mental organization: a physical necessity, not transcending or anticipating, but conforming with, experience. Erroneous notions as to the autocratic power of will" (Ibid, pp. 146-166). On actuation, movements leave behind them residua in the motor centers, whence a repository of latent or abstract movements. Motor residua or intuitions intervene between motive and act and are related to conception on the reactive side as sensation is on the receptive side. ...Motor intuitions mostly innate in animals, acquired in man" (Ibid, pp. 167-181). On memory and imagination, memory exists in every organic element of the body – an organic registration of impressions. No memory of what we have not had experience, and no experience ever entirely forgotten. Physiological ideas of assimilation and differentiation necessary to the interpretation of its phenomena. Power of imagination built up by the assimilation not only of the like in ideas, but also of the relations of ideas. Its productive or creative power is, in its highest display, involuntary and unconscious: it is the supreme manifestation of organic evolution" (Ibid, pp. 182-194). As a prelude to the fragile inputs to soft inheritance, Maudsley covers the known neural anatomy (Ibid, pp. 63-128) after his coverage of the Mind as presented in different senses; in its scientific sense as a natural force; and in its popular sense as an abstraction made into a metaphysical entity" (Ibid, pp. 1-62).

Herbert Spencer (1873), *The principles of psychology*: Spencer’s approach is analytical and centrist versus Maudsley. Spencer begins with an accounting of the broad data of psychology (Spencer, 1873a, pp. 1-144), narrows his perspective to what can be deduced from observation (Ibid, pp. 145-290), creates a comprehensive synthesis (Ibid, pp. 291-628), with analysis of synthesis spanning the interplay of the Mind as presented in different senses (Spencer, 1873b, pp. 1-648) with presentation largely parallel to that of Maudsley but with greater detail reflecting post-Maudsley contributions to the knowledge base.


William James (1890), *Principles of Psychology*: Like Spencer, James’ approach is analytical and centrist versus Maudsley, parallel to that of Maudsley and Spencer but with greater detail reflecting post-Spencer contributions to the knowledge base. And, while it is impossible to discover shared influence between Wundt and James with respect to psychology and philosophy, parallel thinking is clearly the case. “The treatise which follows has in the main grown up in connection with the author’s class-room instruction in Psychology, although it is true that some of the chapters are more ‘metaphysical,’ and
others fuller of detail, than is suitable for students who are going over the subject for the first time. The consequence of this is that, in spite of the exclusion of the important subjects of pleasure and pain, and moral and feelings and judgments, the work has grown to a length which no one can regret more than the writer himself. ... Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) thoughts and feelings, and (2) a physical world in time and space with which they coexist and which (3) they know' [Italics in original] (James, 1890a, p. v-vi).

Freud, Sigmund (1900|1953), “The Interpretation of Dreams”: With dreams the basis, pluralism is the subject matter. At the heart of dreams and pluralism as a singularity there stands ‘latent’ versus ‘manifest’ (Freud, 1900|1953, p. 163). Thus, it can be asserted that Larmorckian soft inheritance is a function of dreams while pluralism is a function of Janet’s specification of the “complexity of the attentive act” (Mayo, 1951, pp. 47-65).

Eduard Hitschmann (1917), *Freud's theory of the neurosis*: In metaphorical anticipation of what was yet to come, for example, Edward Glover’s discussion of progression in 1936 and John B. Watson’s inadvertent 1926 exposure of subliminal messaging with the Pebeco campaign and its promotion of sex appeal. Hitschmann presents an overview of Freud’s work on an as-of-date, 1917, with Freud the editor. Now, a brief etiology of neurosis – “When Freud appeared on the scene, heredity constituted the most important presupposition of the neurosis. He could thus with justice apply himself at first to the exciting agencies; in this connection, he has not overlooked but repeatedly called attention to the fact that besides the agencies in the psychosexual field, the etiology of the neuroses may be conditioned both by inheritance and by a special constitution and that the neuroses, like all other diseases, have complex causes. Though more recently the theory of a hereditary predisposition has undergone a certain abridgment, still there is no doubt that there are neuropathic families in which a hereditary taint can be clearly traced. Freud thus assumes that the heredity finds expression in a peculiar psychosexual constitution of the individual which asserts itself in an abnormally strong and many-sided instinctive life and a consequent sexual precocity. This renders difficult the later desirable subjection of the sexual instinct to the higher mental powers, its adaptation to the prevailing cultural demands and strengthens the obsessional character which the psychic representation of this instinct lays claim to. ...Added to the hereditary and constitutional prerequisite conditions of the neurosis, there are many premature sexual experiences and activities which act as agencies favoring its outbreak; the importance of these could have been so long overlooked only because so much more attention has been directed to that long past period of the lifetimes of the ancestors, namely heredity, than to that long past period in the history of the individual, namely, early childhood” (Hitschmann, 1917, pp. 11-15).

Sigmund Freud (1920), *A general introduction to psychoanalysis*: The challenge to the referenced ‘and’ that is needed to merge the current therapeutic jurisprudence (compliance) with the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence (responsibility) is set forth in this reference. The reference is a collection of 28 lectures that were delivered to a lay audience with the location and date of delivery not discoverable. The lectures are in three groups – “The Psychology of Errors” (Lectures 1 to 4), “The Dream” (Lectures 5 to 15) and “General Theory of the Neuroses” (Lectures 16 to 28). What follows is the lead paragraph of the Preface as written by G. Stanley Hall. “Few, especially in this country, realize that while Freudian themes have rarely found a place on the programs of the American Psychological Association, they have attracted great and growing attention and found frequent elaboration by students of literature, history, biography, sociology, morals and aesthetics, anthropology, education, and religion. They have given the world a new conception of both infancy and adolescence, and shed much new light upon characterology; given us a new and clearer view of sleep, dreams, reveries, and revealed hitherto unknown mental mechanisms common to normal and pathological states and processes, showing that the law of causation extends to the most incoherent acts and even
verbigerations in insanity; gone far to clear up the terra incognita of hysteria; taught us to recognize morbid symptoms, often neurotic and psychotic in their germ; revealed the operations of the primitive mind so overlaid and repressed that we had almost lost sight of them; fashioned and used the key of symbolism to unlock many mysticisms of the past; and in addition to all this, affected thousands of cures, established a new prophylaxis, and suggested new tests for character, disposition, and ability, in all combining the practical and theoretic to a degree salutary as it is rare” (Freud, 1920, p. v).

The DSM in the absence of Lamarckian soft inheritance

What follows is lengthy material from each Joseph Haven (1816-1874), Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926), Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939) and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), with mindfulness the destination. Each presentation about Haven, Kraepelin and Bleuler is from the perspective of academia, is skewed to the ‘sociality’ of Table 5 (Haven’s intellect, p. 71), and, as such, each presentation is necessarily centric with respect to soft inheritance, with discussion of Freud to follow the same line of thinking but with emphasis to transition to ‘individualism’. Mindfulness, as an in-the-moment proxy for soft inheritance, allows the dialog from Haven to Freud to be a linear continuum about consciousness with discussion derived from the very dated philosophy of India (mindfulness) and China (otherness).

What is important about Haven, Kraepelin and Bleuler is that each paint a different view of the conceptual difficulties of today, while Freud paints a centrist picture that is as troublesome today as it was during his lifetime. Kraepelin’s 1904 material presented below tracks to what has become DSM-5, while Bleuler’s 1924 material, some 2,200 words and his entire discussion of Concerning the Theory of Cognition provides a summary retrace of philosophy that has resulted in the Cartesian physical mind. Each Kraepelin and Bleuler are supportive of the current therapeutic jurisprudence and have little application to the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. Freud’s theories are however necessary to the resolution of difficulties exposed by Kraepelin and Bleuler. At the core sits David Hartley’s Doctrines of Vibrations and Association of Ideas. The starting point is a survey of material from seven of Haven’s list of references – John Locke (1689), An essay concerning human understanding; Thomas Reid (1785), Essays on the intellectual powers of man, Vols. 1-3; Dugald Stewart (1792), Elements of the philosophy of the human mind, Vols. 1-3; Thomas Brown (1822), Lectures on the philosophy of the human mind, Vols. 1-3; James Mill (1829), Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind, Vols. 1-2; Joh Müller (1838), Elements of physiology, Vols. 1-2; and, William Thomson (1849), An outline of the necessary laws of thought.

(1) John Locke is the opposite of Descartes and Spinoza. He begins with an Epistle to the reader – “Every step the mind takes in its progress towards knowledge makes some discovery, which is not only new, but the best, too, for the time at least” (Locke, 1689, p. ix). These few words expose Locke’s position, that a person is born with a mind that is a clean slate, i.e., “No innate principles in the mind” (Ibid, pp. 12-42). Locke’s alignment of the conscious to experience in his discussion “of ideas” (Ibid, pp. 62-240) is sufficient to account for adaptation in Table 2 (Adaption, p. 14) as well as being consistent with the fact that each new day of a person’s life is a declining percentage of their entire life. While Locke makes no explicit reference to the unconscious he allows for such through his discussion “of words” (Ibid, pp. 321-423) and “of knowledge and opinion” (Ibid, pp. 424-650). In these last two discussions Locke allows for monism to seamlessly blend with dualism without prejudice to either, clearly, a mature recognition of the value of a person’s self-understanding of experience which is the essential difference between the current therapeutic jurisprudence and the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

(2) Thomas Reid begins with an accounting of the cartesian physical mind (Reid, 1785, pp. 1-80), which is followed by a person’s conscious relationship with their physical environment (Ibid, pp. 81-360). His next topic is memory (Ibid, pp. 361-424) with special consideration reserved for “Mr. Locke’s account of

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the origin of our ideas, and particularly the idea of duration” (Ibid, pp. 383-394), a discussion that includes an accounting of conscious and unconscious processes – “It was a very laudable attempt of Mr. Locke to enquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind, and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them. No man was better qualified for this investigation; and I believe no man ever engaged in it with a more-sincere love of truth. His success, though great, would, I apprehend, have been greater, if he had not too early formed a system or hypothesis upon this subject, without all the caution and patient induction, which is necessary in drawing general conclusions from facts. The sum of his doctrine I take to be this, that all our ideas or notions may be reduced to two classes, the simple and the complex: That the simple are purely the work of Nature, the understanding being merely passive in receiving them: That they are all suggested by two powers of the mind, to wit, sensation and reflection; and that they are the materials of all our knowledge. That the other class of complex ideas are formed by the understanding itself, which being once stored with simple ideas of sensation and reflection, has the power to repeat, to compare, and to combine them even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas: But that it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the two ways before mentioned. That as our power over the material world reaches only to the compounding, dividing, and putting together, in various forms, the matter which God has made, but reaches not to the production or annihilation of a single atom; so we may compound, compare, and abstract the original and simple ideas which Nature has given us; but are unable to fashion in our understanding any simple idea, not received in by our senses from external objects, or by reflection from the operations of our own mind about them. This account of the origin of all our ideas is adopted by Bishop Berkeley and Mr. Hume; but some very ingenious Philosophers, who have a high esteem of Locke’s Essay, are dissatisfied with it” (Ibid, pp. 383-384). In his second of three volumes Reid address conception (simple apprehension), abstraction, judgement, reasoning and taste, and in his third volume he addresses understanding and will to include an accounting of the views of Locke and Hume.

(3) Dugald Stewart’s three volumes qualify as a study driven by reflection. His first volume was published in 1792, his second in 1814, and his third in 1827. The three volumes address the impact of the unconscious without using that term with his opening paragraph his thesis – “The prejudice which is commonly entertained against metaphysical speculations seems to arise chiefly from two causes: First, from an apprehension that the subjects about which they are employed, are placed beyond the reach of the human faculties; and, secondly, from a belief that these subjects have no relation to the business of life” (Stewart, 1792, p. 1), with this thesis fully in line with Wundt’s warning about the divorce of philosophy from psychology. In Stewart’s discussion “of the powers of external perception” (Ibid, pp. 63-102) he describes the placement of perception in Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43) and in the process, sets seduction as dualism in a sense that is very private to a person with any relation to Descartes and/or Spinoza incidental only, and with this qualification accounting for time and uncertainty as allowed for by a person’s object world. With perception in place he then follows the elements of consciousness, first with focus set to attention (Ibid, pp. 103-131), then conception (Ibid, pp. 132-150) or awareness of Figure 5, then on to abstraction (Ibid, pp. 151-273) or working memory of Figure 5, then association of ideas (Ibid, pp. 274-398) or reasoning of Figure 5, with his reconnecting to perception via memory (Ibid, pp. 399-474) and imagination (Ibid, pp. 475-528). Stewart’s? second volume is an expansion of reasoning beginning with mathematical operations as the basis for a discussion of logic, with his third volume about language as the basis for imagination.
(4) Thomas Brown begins his first volume by aligning philosophy with the rules of thought spanning general (Brown, 1822, pp. 9-49), gradually narrowing his presentation to reasoning (Ibid, pp. 50-97), which covers the balance of the first volume (Ibid, pp. 98-536). Brown’s second and third volumes are about perception.


(6) Joh Müller begins his first volume with a most general statement – “Physiology is the science which treats of the properties of organic bodies, animal and vegetable, of the phenomena they present, and of the laws which govern their actions. Inorganic substances are the objects of other sciences, – physics and chemistry. In entering upon the study of physiology, the first point to be ascertained regards the distinctions between these two great classes of bodies—the organic and the inorganic – and the following questions suggest themselves for discussion: Do organic and inorganic substances differ in their material composition? and since the phenomena presented by these two classes are obviously so different, are the forces or principles on which they depend, also different; or are the forces which give rise to the phenomena of the organic kingdom merely modifications of those which produce physical and chemical actions?” (Müller, 1838, p. 1). Müller’s two volumes spans some 1800 pages with detail suggested by his opening paragraph. One might wonder why a medical school physiology would be given visibility and the reason is an organism’s anatomy is reactive to impulse as well as instinct. From this it follows that iterative changes to elements of physiology are candidates for study versus a candidate impulse or instinct, a line of thought to be explored when attention turns to Freud. Persons who are burdened with Type 1 diabetes know this phenomenon well.

(7) William Thomson’s preface begins with a terse statement – “Some account of the exact position which this work pretends to occupy amidst a crowd of valuable treatises on the same subject, may not be an unfitting introduction to its pages. The system of Pure Logic or Analytic that has been universally accepted for centuries past, is very defective as an instrument for the analysis of natural reasoning. Arguments that commend themselves to any untaught mind as valid and practically important, have no place in a system that professedly includes all reasoning whatever: and an attempt to reduce to its technical forms the first few pages of any scientific work, has generally ended in failure and disgust. The consequence has been that the more popular writers on Logic have begun to treat its strictly technical parts with a certain coyness and reserve. They have denied to the rules of the syllogism that prominent place once assigned to them, yet at the same time they have refrained from rejecting as cumbrous and unnecessary an instrument which did not subserve any practical end in their systems. The present work is an attempt to enlarge the science of Pure Logic, so that it may be adequate to the analysis of any act of reasoning” [Italics added] (Thomson, 1849, pp. v-vi). Thomson begins his text by defining logic’s relationship to everyday thought in a manner that frames a system of Pure Logic or Analytic that is an instrument for the analysis of natural reasoning (Ibid, pp. 1-40). With definition in place Thomson then concentrates on analytical logic as necessary to language (Ibid, pp. 41-100), conception (Ibid, pp. 101-142), judgement (Ibid, pp. 143-198), syllogism and reasoning (Ibid, pp. 199-227), mediate inference (Ibid, pp. 228-292), with Applied Logic the final discussion (Ibid, pp. 293-392). Attention now turns to Haven.

Haven begins his preface with a candidate apology – yep, just what we need, another textbook – only to correct his position to the needs of the students and not the needs of an author’s ego – “In none of
them [other texts] was the science of mind presented in its completeness and symmetry, in a manner at once simple, yet scientific; in none of them, moreover, was it brought down to the present time. ...Every year of subsequent experience as a teacher has but confirmed this impression and made the want of a book better adapted to the purposes of instruction, in our American Colleges, more deeply felt. The works on mental science, which have recently appeared in this country, while they are certainly a valuable contribution to the department of philosophy, seem to meet this deficiency in part, but only in part. They traverse usually but a portion of the ground which Psychology legitimately occupies, confining their attention, for the most part, to the Intellectual Faculties, to the exclusion of the Sensibilities, and the Will” [Italics in original] (Haven, 1862, p. iv).

Haven begins his narrative by expanding on his purpose, the science of mind in its completeness and symmetry (Ibid, pp. 15-28), a narrative that ties directly to Glover’s progression with respect to Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6) and discussions of the gap between the first and second columns of the Figure.

With his statement of purpose in place Haven then turns to what is effectively a macro accounting of everyday life of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34) by enumerating what one has a right to expect from a classification of the mental powers (Ibid, pp. 29-38) with his summary as Table 5.

Haven’s organization is limited to three divisions – Intellectual Facilities (Ibid, pp. 39-376), Sensibilities (Ibid, pp. 377-519), and Will (Ibid, pp. 520-583). His entire presentation is exceedingly centrist, the mature normals of Figure 4.

In his concluding chapter – “Historical Sketch – Outline of the controversy respecting freedom of the will” (Ibid, pp. 573-583), Haven enumerates the strengths and flaws of the various arguments beginning with the early Greeks. A person’s self-serving execution of the flattening of life to be addressed in the eighth track requires freedom of will in tandem with free-form imagination (Ibid, pp. 137-164), which is extensible to expecting a person to be their own provider of empathy with further discussion deferred to George M. Beard’s Nervous Exhaustion (Neurasthenia).

Attention now turns to Kraepelin – “The subject of the following course of lectures [thirty in total] will be the Science of Psychiatry, which, as its name implies, is that of the treatment of mental disease. It is true that, in the strictest terms, we cannot speak of the mind as becoming diseased, whether we regard it as a separate entity or as the sum total of our subjective experience. And, indeed, from the medical point of view, it is disturbances in the physical foundations of mental life which should occupy most of our attention. But the incidents of such diseases are generally seen in the sphere of psychical events, a department with which the art of medicine has dealt very little as yet. Here we are not so much concerned with physical changes in size, shape, firmness, and chemical composition, as with disturbances of comprehension, memory and judgment, illusions, hallucinations, depression, and morbid changes in the activity of the will. With the help of the ideas you have derived from general pathology, you will usually be able to find your way in a new department of medicine without any serious difficulty. But here you will be utterly perplexed at first by the essentially peculiar phenomena

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Table 5 - Haven’s summary of the intellect

Source: Haven, 1862, p. 35
of disease with which you will meet, until you have gradually learned to a certain extent to master the special symptomatology of mental disturbances” [Italics in original] (Kraepelin, 1904, p. 1).

He then turns to issues that remain so very real today, especially towards the end which is highlighted with italics – “For all these reasons, it is one of the physician's most important duties to make himself, as far as possible, acquainted with the nature and phenomena of insanity. Even though the limits of his power against this mighty adversary are very narrow, opportunity enough is afforded to every practical physician to contribute his share to the prevention and alleviation of the endless misery annually engendered by mental disease. Alcoholism and syphilis [HIV/AIDS] undoubtedly offer the most profitable points of attack, together with the abuse of morphia and cocaine [and opioids], which so clearly owes its fatal significance to the action of medical men” [Italics added] (Ibid, p.3).

But then he turns to the Cartesian physical mind by invoking dualism – “The most striking feature of this clinical picture is the apprehensive depression. At first sight, it resembles the anxieties of a healthy person, and the patient says that he was always rather apprehensive and has only grown worse. But there is not the least external cause for the apprehension, and yet it has lasted for months, with increasing severity. This is the diagnostic sign of its morbidity. It is true that the patient himself refers to the sins of his youth as the cause of the apprehension, but it is clear that, even if they were ever really committed, they did not particularly disturb him before his illness; his conscience has only awakened now. His actions now appear to him in an entirely different and fatal light, and those morbid symptoms become prominent which are known as 'delusions of sin'. The patient's ideas that the Evil One was in the room, that he would be carried off, and that he had fallen away from God, must be regarded as a result of his apprehension. There is no question of real hallucinations in these statements; it only seemed so to the patient. He also has a strong feeling that some great change has come over him, and that he is 'not the same as before'. He is certainly not in a condition to form a correct conception of the morbidity of his ideas of sin and of his fears in detail. We give the name of melancholia to this condition, in which we see the gradual development of a state of apprehensive depression, associated with more or less fully-developed delusions. The most common of these are ideas of sin, which generally have a religious coloring. Such are the ideas of having fallen away from God and being forsaken, or of being possessed by the devil. Hypochondriacal ideas — of never being well again, never having a stool again, etc. — are also far from uncommon. Together with these there is often apprehension of poverty, of having to starve, of being thrown into prison, of being brought before a court, or even of execution” (Ibid, pp. 5-6). Now, Bleuler, a lengthy quote that spans eleven paragraphs...

“Consciousness is said to differentiate psychic from physical occurrences. Two fundamentally different series of experiences have been assumed, those that refer to the ‘inner life,’ to that which ‘takes place merely in time’, the conscious or the psychic, and those experiences which refer to the outer world or to that which has extent, namely, the physical.

The relationship between these two forms of experiences is differently conceived. Most suitable for the naive mind is the conception of Dualism, which assumes a carrier of consciousness independent of the body. One sees the body remaining after death, while all psychic manifestations disappear with the cessation of life. The ‘soul’, used here according to the earlier views, representing not only the psychic, but a fusion with the term life, has separated itself from the body. That it has not simply been resolved into nothingness is shown by its reappearance in dreams, in waking hallucinations, and in the illusions of those who survived. And that the observer's own soul can free itself from his body is shown by his dream experiences, during which, regardless of time and space, he perceives things which are far removed from his motionless body.
Dualism is an essential constituent of religions; it has been attacked for thousands of years and is at present still rejected by most scientists. Its most important fundamental elements, the dream experiences, and the apparitions of spirits, have proven illusory, and what is more, it has been shown that the psychic functions of man are in all respects dependent upon the brain. On the other hand, it is self-evident, even if one does not always bear it in mind, that in reality the physical world cannot at all be as we perceive and imagine it, and finally, every certain proof is lacking that it even exists.

Thus, monistic views have been formed regarding the relationship of the two series. They can be divided approximately into three categories:

The first of these categories, of which Spinoza is the foremost representative, assumes a ‘substance’, whose two attributes are extension (physical series) and thought (psychic series). However, from the viewpoint of the cognitive theory, it is faulty. Substance, physical and psychic attributes (in modern terms matter, force and consciousness) cannot be placed side by side in this manner. For direct perception is possible only in regard to conscious (psychic) processes. From a part of these we form conclusions (with some probability) concerning external influences, which we call forces. From the grouping of forces we construct the idea of matter, which needs not necessarily have a corresponding reality. But there is still another difficulty in this theory: It has to conceive everything as conscious whereas we observe consciousness only in beings similar to us and cannot conceive of an elementary consciousness without content, which is really connected with a nervous center. To be sure, nowhere in evolution do we see a point where consciousness may be said to have appeared in man? in the amoeba? or in the atom? And the ubiquity of consciousness is so readily accepted just because one cannot conceive of something principally new suddenly appearing in evolution. There is really no basis whatsoever for the assumption that the psychic and the physical are so very different. We neither know what the psychic nor what the physical processes are, and consequently nothing about their relationship or difference. To be sure, for the being endowed with feeling, consciousness is something very special and the only thing of importance. It is a matter of entire indifference to us whether the world exists, the only thing of importance being whether that which is conscious, our ego, is happy or unhappy.

The second form of monism starts from the idea that all proofs for the existence of an external world are false conclusions, and that consequently the physical world exists only in our ideas (Idealism) or, in so far as we conceive it (‘esse = percipi’). Even if this view could be carried through with logical consistency, it would not be able to acquire a more general acceptance. For in the first place, it is incorrect to deny the outer world simply because it is impossible to prove its existence. Anyhow one is always forced to act as if it exists. The philosopher who claims to believe in the existence only of ideas would have no reason for disseminating his views if his pupils were only creations of his own imagination. No matter how certain it were that a rock in the road had existence only in my imagination, I would still have to go out of its way if I wished to avoid something unpleasant. If I wish to get rid of the feeling of hunger, there is nothing for me to do except to eat, whether food has reality or not. Practically therefore, idealism will lead to an impossibility. Theoretically, however, it leads to a conclusion which no one likes to accept, to Solipsism. For our fellow beings are part only of the outer world, and if the outer world exists only in my ideas, then there are no other beings beside myself. I am not only the whole world but also the only human being. This conclusion is unavoidable. The attempt to escape solipsism through the assumption of an absolute ego is a sophism. Even if an absolute ego were to imagine the world, it would not be my world, the world which I imagine, not to mention the fact that such an absolute ego cannot be imagined and that the whole assumption is entirely without foundation.
Much more common than the idealistic monism is the materialistic monism, the materialistic theory of cognition. It starts from the fact that we always see psychic functions bound to matter, in particular to nervous centers, that they change with this matter, and that the laws of the central nervous processes, so far as they come into consideration, are also the psychic laws. From this it concludes that the psyche is a function of the brain. At present this is the only view which can be carried out theoretically and practically without contradictions, in the form of the so-called hypothesis of identity, which assumes that central nervous functions are ‘seen from within’ and become ‘conscious’ if they occur in definite relationships. This view is almost the only one which modern science, and in particular psychiatry, takes into consideration, in fact it is even accepted by those who theoretically advance another view. Of course, this theory, too, is impossible to prove, but the hypothesis that the psychic functions are brain functions has a better foundation than most assumptions which are accepted as self-evident in the sciences. But it is by no means necessary as a basis for any mental science, including psychiatry, in so far as we are not concerned with studying the psychic functions in connection with the brain. This theory, too, is being zealously attacked, primarily on religious grounds. Perhaps with the exception of its earlier periods Christian thought has been altogether dualistic. But the essential content of the Christian doctrine could be just as easily reconciled with materialism as with dualism; as a matter of fact the more favored idealism would encounter more difficulties. Our confession of faith contains the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. If the theory of materialism is correct, then with the resurrection of the body the soul must also eo ipso be resurrected at the final judgment. Difficulties arise only in connection with secondary doctrines like those of purgatory, the existence of bodiless souls, etc. Moreover, partly as a result of unclear thinking and partly from rancor, the materialism of the cognitive theory is usually identified with ethical materialism, which, regardless of morality and consideration for other people, egoistically strives merely for "material" goods, by which is meant money, position, good food, drink, and women. But the materialism of the cognitive theory has nothing in common with such ideas except its name. One may accept any view of the cognitive theory and still be either good or bad. But on the basis of the materialistic view, one can deduce a utilitarian ethics by strict logical reasoning, which is superior to all other, which professes to have originated from revelation or the categorical imperative, or from other incomprehensible eternal laws, and which at the same time can be fashioned by everyone according to his own desire.

Many modern scientists hold to the theory of psycho-physical parallelism. This theory starts from the idea that both series are so heterogeneous in principle that one cannot act upon the other. To explain this relationship nevertheless, Ceulincex assumed that if the psyche wished to perform a physical movement, it was accomplished in each case by an interposition of divine power, and that every time a stimulus strikes the sensory organs the corresponding sensation is produced in the psyche (Occasionalism). Leibniz, as is well known, held the view that these two series (which were complicated by his theory of monads) were so arranged by pre-established harmony, since the beginning of creation, that they run an entirely uniform course like two ideal watches, so that every act of the will has a corresponding equivalent movement, and every stimulus on the senses a corresponding equivalent sensation. But this theory of psycho-physical parallelism contains one great error: For if the physical series cannot react upon the psychic then it can reveal neither its existence nor its nature to our psyche. It is then quite useless to assume that the outer world exists, at any rate it surely does not exist as we think we perceive it, and then there is no perception, but only hallucination.

The concept of parallelism could still have some meaning within monistic conceptions (Spinoza) in as much as the conscious side of the substance has knowledge of the physical part which is really substantially identical with it.
Many view psycho-physical parallelism simply as a confirmation of our ignorance regarding the relationship which undeniably exists between the psychic and physical; sometimes, – and this is particularly true of experimental psychology, – with the secondary thought that we must examine what processes correspond to each other in the two series. This view is also possible, but the name, which is otherwise used quite differently, easily leads to confusion. Some clinicians, without realizing it, get still further away from the original idea, when, for instance, they consider hysteria as a disturbance of the psycho-physical parallelism, because the psychic reaction to the experiences becomes too strong or too weak. Here, of course, the physical ‘parallel processes’ in the brain certainly correspond to the psychic phenomena. In this case therefore the expression is highly misleading.

Wundt has assumed a peculiar view concerning the psycho-physical parallelism. Like many others, he does not only limit the psychic series to the brain functions, but also makes the psychic go beyond the physical, by assuming that certain synthetic functions of our mind take place in the brain without parallel processes. This is an inconsistency which is not only impossible to prove, but which, among other things, is opposed by the fact that we have an analogous synthesis in the physical sphere. Many reflex processes are the result of a whole group of stimuli, which act only as a unit. Likewise, the performance of a complicated machine is not equal to the simple sum of the effect of the individual constituents, at least if sum and constituents have the same meaning as in Wundt’s synthesis.

In the dispute between idealism and materialism one senses an uncertainty regarding the value of reality of these two series. But if one only follows up the thought, this question can be very easily settled. Only its own psychic processes have absolute reality for every psyche (it is not in their ‘contents’, i.e. we perceive the light or the rose, but not the light, the rose). If I feel a pain, I feel the pain. This is so certain that it can only be expressed tautologically. Since there are also hallucinated pains, this pain need not necessarily have a corresponding process in the aching part of the body. But if a skeptic does not wish to believe that I feel pain, it will be impossible for me to prove it. The psychic series therefore has absolute, or better, indisputable reality, but only for the psyche in question. This reality is therefore subjective. But for the existence of the external world there are no proofs. That the table which we see has existence is only an assumption, even if of practical necessity. But if I once take for granted the existence of the table, and that of other people, and the external world, then this table can be shown to these other people. Like myself they can perceive it with their senses. The reality of the physical world is therefore uncertain and relative, that is, it is not possible to prove it, but on the other hand, it is objectively demonstrable” [Italics in original] (Bleuler, 1924, pp. 3-8). Now, Freud...

In the discussion of Pierre Janet it was noted that both he and Freud as students of Charcot became acquainted with hypnosis and hysteria. That however was not Freud’s true first acquaintance with what became psychoanalysis. “Granted that it is a merit to have created psychoanalysis, it is not my merit. I was a student, busy with the passing of my last examinations, when another physician, Dr. Joseph Breuer, made the first application of this method to the case of a hysterical girl (1880-82) [Anna O to be discussed below (p. 196)]. We must now examine the history of this case and its treatment, which can be found in detail in ‘Studien über Hysterie’, later published by Dr. Breuer and myself” (Freud, 1914, pp. 7-8). There are three issues here. First, Freud’s orientation to what became his career began with his studies with Charcot. Second, Freud’s post-Charcot relationship with Breuer was the birth of psychoanalysis with the 1880-82 approach by Breuer essentially empathy and patience entirely in line with the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. Third, all persons of Freud’s immediate era – James, Janet, Krafft-Ebing, Kraepelin, Bleuler and Breuer – entered the mental realm as medical scientists, as human biologists versus human philosophers.
The material attributed to Kraepelin and Bleuler is from textbooks, which are always static presentations about a survey of a discipline with some academic scope the limited focus at the time of the writing of the textbook. While Kraepelin’s and Bleuler’s copyright dates were 1904 and 1924 respectively, they had a common focus, the affective mental disorders only of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 43) as a subset of psychiatry. What Freud did was to orient affective mental disorders to the repression versus suppression realms of Figure 4 with reduced emphasis on the mature normals of that Figure. The same holds true with James, Janet and Breuer as well as many others but not with the depth that Freud relentlessly pursued, and that difference is important to the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

Freud entered the mental realm as a fence-sitter, meaning, his rationale was neurology, hence, a human biologist while his experience with Charcot challenged that position as well as his work with Breuer. The transition from being a human biologist to a human philosopher was extensive both with respect to time and writing. He communicated heavily with Wilhelm Fliess (1858-1928) with the correspondence that has survived spanning the years 1892-1999 (Freud, 1892|1966, pp. 175-282), with Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1895|1966, pp. 283-398) held separate from that correspondence. No replies from Fliess, if there were any, have survived. While that correspondence was quite diverse, the bridge between Freud as a human biologist and a human philosopher was established – “A word on the relation of this theory of consciousness to others. According to an advanced mechanist theory, consciousness is a mere appendage to physiologic-psychical processes and its omission would make no alteration in the psychical passage of events. According to another theory, consciousness is the subjective side of all psychical events and is thus inseparable from the physiological mental process. The theory developed here lies between these two. Here consciousness is the subjective side of one part of the physical processes in the nervous system, namely the \( \omega \) processes; and the omission of consciousness does not leave psychical events unaltered but involves the omission of the contribution from \( \omega \)” [Italics added] (Ibid, p. 311). While there is a hint of dualism, the “advanced mechanistic theory”, versus monism, the “subjective side”, in this paragraph, the reference to “psychical passage of events” suggests a different dualism – the conscious and the unconscious.

To resolve the conscious to the unconscious, and, monism to dualism, discussion need go no further than taking as the anchor the experience with the Pebeco toothpaste campaign (p. 31) and its subliminal message. From this there are two conclusions which will be held constant for the rest of this paper unless qualified, with pluralism and personality the endgame.

First, conscious and unconscious are comingled and act in concert if for no other reason than the middle across qualification to Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43). While the Kraepelin and Bleuler textbooks support this claim, two earlier texts dated 1847 (Feuchtersleben, 1847) and 1875 (Carpenter, 1875) call for a separation of labor and expertness. (1) With emphasis on separation of labor – “If we consider the science of medicine in general, and especially its present state, there is perhaps nothing so essential to its advancement as psychology, carefully adapted to medical purposes. The study of psychology in itself, both the rational and the empirical, forms a portion of the study of philosophy, in which no regard is, or can be had to the special requirements of the physician. In the study of medicine, the psychical element is almost obscured by the abundance and prominence of the somatic portion, and its claims to attention are more imperatively felt, when we come to the study of psychiatrics proper the doctrine of the diseases of the mind, to the treatment of which few young physicians turn their attention; and one of the principal objects of these lectures is to encourage and qualify them for this branch of their profession. It is owing to this preponderance of the somatic, that such an important, fundamental doctrine of medical study has been far less attended to than its importance demands. According to [Eduard von] Hartmann (1842-1906), who was indisputably the most learned of medical psychologists, and whose memory it will ever be the pride of our University to cherish, the reason of this neglect, is the
fact that philosophers by profession are no physicians, and on the other hand that physicians are seldom enough of philosophers to handle this subject successfully” [Italics added] (Feuchtersleben, 1847, p. 7).

(2) With emphasis on separation of expertness – “Thus we see that the Materialistic and the Spiritualistic doctrines alike recognize, and alike ignore, certain great truths of Human Nature; and the question returns upon us, whether any general expression can be framed, which may be in harmony alike with the results of Scientific inquiry into the relation of Mental to Physiological action, and with those simple teachings of our own Consciousness, which must be recognized as affording the ultimate test of the truth of all Psychological doctrines. Towards such an expression we may make a step, as it appears to the Writer, in strict accordance with true Philosophy, by withdrawing ourselves entirely from the futile attempt to bring Matter and Mind into the same category, and by fixing our attention exclusively on the relation between Mind and Force. Although far from thinking that the views here offered express the whole truth, or solve all the difficulties of the subject (the originating power of the Human Will, – i.e. its independence of Physical Causation, – being the essential difficulty of every system which recognizes it), he ventures to think that they deserve the attention of such as feel, with him, the importance of fearlessly pushing the inquiry to its utmost practicable limits, and of attaining such definite conceptions as the present state of Scientific knowledge may justify” [Italics in original] (Carpenter, 1875, pp. 10-11).

Second, purity of each monism and dualism: “According to Plato's theory of knowledge man may know being either through sense-perception produced by the material manifestations of being, or through immediate intuition of unmanifested being. This thought reconciles monism and dualism. And the fact that it does so would seem to be good reason for accepting it. Through sense-perception we know the material world. This world is so constituted that it generally leads us to a dualistic point of view. Only those who confine their attention to the physical side of nature come to look on the world as the manifestation of a single principle. Supersensible experience, on the other hand, may contain no duality, and therefore may lead naturally to a monistic point of view. If thus sense-perception and supersensible experience constitute two distinct spheres of experience which never combine in human consciousness, and which are separated by a gulf impassable by thought, it is quite proper that one of these spheres of experience be interpreted dualistically while the other demands a monistic point of view. The student of nature may be right in seeing the world as a manifestation of two principles. The monist, for whom perhaps the world does not exist while he sees being from the supersensible point of view, may also be right in seeing all as one” (Jonson, 1918). Now, pluralism and personality...

Allowing monism, dualism and social interaction to blend begets pluralism, and, allowing pluralism, time and uncertainty to blend begets personality. Freud facilitated each blending given his deliberate transition from neurology to psychoanalysis (Stengel, 1956).

Mindfulness, Otherness

To this point three dualisms have been presented – Descartes’ body-soul, Spinoza’s body-mind and Freud’s consciousness-unconsciousness. This discussion presents a philosophical based duality of unconsciousness-consciousness where mindfulness aligns with consciousness while otherness aligns with unconsciousness, hence, otherness-mindfulness is the alternative philosophical duality. Discussion spans time and uncertainty versus knowledge and reality with melancholia as driven by seduction the undercurrent as there is no ‘law’ that declares that reality and/or knowledge descends from reason, with the starting point an annotated poetic summary of the task...
Burton’s metaphorical accounting of time, uncertainty, knowledge and reality is timeless. The notation of interest, *folly* to *Melancholy*, is the character of each folly and melancholy that can oscillate between disposition (disappointment) and habit (depression) with insight gained by resolving the four annotations to the dated philosophy of India (mindfulness) and China (otherness). The fundamental issue is the human penchant for meaning and precession, which digresses quite quickly to folly thereby affirming that there is no ‘law’ that declares that reality and/or knowledge descends from reason. That the bulk of living is explained by middle-across (p. 43).

Our appreciation of time is by necessity a child of the immediate thought pattern with that thought a subset of some thinking process which in turn encompasses time as an abstraction that clouds over uncertainty. This is about perception with in-stream seduction resolving reality and knowledge to some semblance of certainty.

Time is a continuum that is experienced as a normal distribution with immediate focus set at the median with the entire distribution the immediate invocation of working memory of Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43) the result being that objective experience is merged with subjective interpretation with a new invocation of knowledge the result. “Let me sum up, now, by saying that we are constantly conscious of a certain duration – the specious present – varying in length from a few seconds to probably not more than a minute, and that this duration (with its content perceived as having one part earlier and the other part later) is the original intuition of time. Longer times are conceived by adding, shorter ones by dividing, portions of this vaguely bounded unit, and are habitually thought by us symbolically. Kant’s notion of an *intuition* of objective time as an infinite necessary continuum has nothing to support it. The cause of the intuition which we really have cannot be the *duration* of our brain-processes or our mental changes; for the intuition is realized at every moment of such duration and must be due to a permanently present cause. This cause – probably the simultaneous presence of brain-processes of different phase – fluctuates; and hence a certain range of variation in the amount of the intuition, and in its sub-divisibility, accrues” [Italics in original] (James, 1886).

Alternatively, uncertainty is a continuum that is resolved to hypothesis based on accumulated experience as delivered by working memory of Figure 5 with that experience some mix of subjective and objective that in turn form expectations as to cause and effect with the result that uncertainty is merged with expectations in a manner parallel with time where objective experience is merged with subjective interpretation. Having expectations as a logical mask then allows expectations about cause and effect to

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Table 6 - Burton’s emergence of melancholy

| When I go musing all alone, |
| Thinking of divers things fore-known, |
| When I build Castles in the air, |
| Void of sorrow and void of fear, |
| Pleasing myself with phantasms sweet, |
| Methinks the time runs very fleet. |
| All my joys to this are folly, |
| Naught so sweet as Melancholy. |

Source: Burton, 1621|1903, p. 9
form a new invocation of knowledge. That “we typically judge that hasteners are causes of what they hasten, while delayers are not causes of what they delay” (Touborg, 2017).

Turning attention to the unconscious and with consideration limited to time and uncertainty opens the door to rationalizations that in turn are morphed to precision by semantics, a further invocation of hasteners and delayers. In a sense this is about philosophizing, but only in a limited sense as time is balanced by subjective interpretation while uncertainty is balanced by objective expectations. The alternative to philosophizing is moralizing rationalizations with semantics the means, thus, stimuli from the space-time world are resolved to confirmation of interpretation and expectations (Winchell, 1950). This sets the need for a renewed focus on Wundt’s concern about psychology in the absence of philosophy and Glover’s progression argument, thus, diverting focus from the unconscious to the conscious.

Progression within psychiatry and psychology needs to be guided by philosophy versus Burton’s folly, the human penchant for meaning and precession as unconditional resolution of time and uncertainty. Hence, a mind versus brain issue. Thus, what is needed is recognition that “1) psychiatry and psychology are irrevocably grounded in mental, first-person experiences; 2) Cartesian substance dualism is false; 3) epiphenomenalism is false; 4) both brain-to-mind and mind-to-brain causality are real; 5) [mental aberrations] are etiologically complex, and no more ‘spirochete-like’ discoveries will be made that explain their origins in simple terms; 6) explanatory pluralism is preferable to monistic explanatory approaches, especially biological reductionism; 7) [the approach to mental health] must move beyond a prescientific ‘battle of paradigms’ to embrace complexity and support empirically rigorous and pluralistic explanatory models; and, 8) [the approach to study of mental health] should strive for ‘patchy reductionism’ with the goal of ‘piecemeal integration’ in trying to explain complex etiological pathways to [mental aberrations] bit by bit” (Kendler, 2005). Thus, the terse requirement is that we need to settle on the problem we wish to solve when we try to construct a rational order (Hayek, 1945).

Attention now turns to the nature of reality and knowledge and the iterative rationality due to judgement of each.

Reality is either experienced as objective or subjective. Objective reality – “A fundamental fact of consciousness is the distinction between subject and object. Everyone is immediately aware that he is different from the object which he knows. Now, the earliest form in which this distinction is recognized is spatial separation. But this primitive form of the distinction between subject and object is taken by many as essential, and the knower and the known are then both regarded as objects in space. They stand over against each other and take their respective places in the phenomenal system” (Robins, 1898). Subjective reality, the enabler of judgement that leads to interpretation and expectations, has the capacity to present itself as Burton’s notion of folly to Melancholy where the character of each can oscillate between disposition (disappointment) and habit (depression), the mechanics of the risk of the unwelcome is related to judgement about a noun’s adjective.

“In every judgment, a quality or idea is predicated of reality. But it cannot be an idea 'in my head', because this idea is a 'fact' (noun), and an adjective is wanted. The psychical idea is an image, a concrete particular, and we need a universal. It is itself an object of knowledge and has existence and content. In order to be able to know reality, the image must sacrifice itself, and attain, through self-denial, the dignity of meaning. But the image itself cannot have a meaning or be used to qualify reality. To receive a meaning, it must be torn to pieces, and a common element fixed by the mind taken for an adjective. Since, now, the image is dismembered, it is no longer an individual, and being only an element or abstract, it can qualify many things, and so is universal. And this universal is not a fact or event, but a logical idea. The logical idea, however, cannot stand alone since it is an adjective, and,
further, it can work only through the image. First, it is derived from the image by abstracting a part of the image and fixing it in the mind. Secondly, it depends for its use on the image, for it is only through the image that the mind is called to think the logical idea” (Ibid).

This necessarily leads to the question what is the justification and rationality of knowledge?

Knowledge implies a purity of presence when it is fundamentally the undercurrent of the unconscious-conscious duality. In addition, the justification and rationality of knowledge implies the lapse of time between creation and application is inconsequential. “Knowledge implies a reference to that which is known, and which is therefore to be distinguished from the knowledge itself considered subjectively as an act or process of the being who knows. What is known, the object of knowledge, may be styled most generally Reality. Knowledge bears in its heart, in its very notion, this reference to a reality distinct from itself. No idealist will deny, at all events, that knowledge seems to us to carry this reference with it. ... Knowledge as knowledge points beyond itself to a reality whose representation or symbol it is. This holds true, as a careful analysis would show, even in what is called self-knowledge, the reflective knowledge of one’s own states, in which the act of knowledge and the object known might seem to fall together. But, without insisting at the outset on this refinement, let us take the general or typical case, in which the knowledge is knowledge of beings other than ourselves, a knowledge of the facts of the world around us. Here the very function of knowledge, as ordinarily understood, is to disclose to one being the nature of beings and things with which he is in relation, but which are different; i.e., numerically and existentially distinct from himself. ... Knowledge is necessarily subjective, so far as it is state or process of the knowing being; but it as necessarily involves an objective reference. If it is not an illusion altogether, it is a knowledge of realities which are trans-subjective or extra-conscious; i.e., which exist beyond and independently of the consciousness of the individual knowing them. But all through the modern period philosophers have been turning the subjectivity of knowledge against its objectivity, and in the last resort converting the very notion of knowledge into an argument against the possibility of knowledge” (Seth, 1892). Attention now turns to the creation and application of knowledge as being other than inconsequential given the express or implied character of the adjective.

Fundamentally a noun is inert until it is an element of context. Once in context negation and direction becomes the issue where each negation and direction impart action to the noun. “Logically and practically negation can never be merely and absolutely negative, as so often assumed; on the contrary, in general it does and must lead somewhere and, what is more, in a pertinent and orderly way. Indeed, there can be no real negation without direction, and even this: direction can be significant in the life of anything positive only through negation. In support and explanation of this thesis I begin with certain very simple and familiar principles. Thus, for the first of these, whenever there is definite assertion or ‘position’, then is also, in tendency if not in fulfilment, generalization, and the outcome of generalization is always negation, transcendence of the positive. ... Secondly, then, among the familiar principles referred to, nothing positive may be negated or say transcended by reason of its generalization, without assertion, open or implied, of the principle, the general principle, of that for which in particular form the positive thing negated has been standing. ... Nor can negation, thirdly, he said to inherit only the general principle of the positive which it negates. ... But, fourthly, and not so simply, now that the negative, born of position and generalization, has been shown to inherit both the general principle and the specific context, described above also as the manifest traits or characters, of the positive, there is some danger that the negative itself will be taken for a mere shell, an empty fiction, quite lacking in real meaning and effect; in other words, that, inheriting so much, it will seem to offer nothing really new; and this danger must be quickly removed, although the sheer absurdity of such a conclusion might be counted on to take care of it. ... But, fifthly, now to reach an important conclusion from what has so far been
presented, negation, having such origin and such inheritance, brings difference or change of a sort which I think can best be described as dimensional” [Italics in original] (Lloyd, 1916).

With Burton’s time, uncertainty, knowledge and reality (p. 78) expanded to interpretation, expectations, subjective, objective, negation and direction, discussion of mindfulness and otherness changes to self-known as a precursor to life as the ultimate wager, the subject of the last track of this paper. The starting point is compliance as metaphor and not as behavior.

With compliance as a centrist approximation of the character of each folly and Melancholy that can oscillate between disposition (disappointment) and habit (depression), focus returns to dynamic of defenses against anxiety, Figure 6 (Defenses, p. 47), with anxiety having the capacity to expand to some combination of latent schizophrenia and narcissism, with each fundamentally dreaming while awake. This is about three views of self-known – the self, the world and the future (Mendelson, 1974, p. 89). From this it follows that a person’s world sets between two poles – the already formed self and the to be formed self. What is left – as an adventure – is an anxiety-avoidant observation of the self-world as having two ‘departments’, a healthy part and a psychotic part (Kafka, 2011), with each anchored in the already formed self yet without prejudice as to which part would survive to the to be formed self, thus setting as a diversion from personality development any focus on a “cognitive stuck point” (Finlay, 2015). Now, to address the ‘as an adventure’ qualifier.

With the expansion of Burton’s four annotations to interpretations and so forth, it is fair to conclude that none of that expansion implies certainty to any degree. Hence, there is no reason to attempt to advance ‘as an adventure’ to any semblance of rules other than natural intuition thus leaving to the dictates of time and a best guess conception of the healthy and psychotic parts as a homogeneous mixture. “Everyone knows from ordinary life experience how extremely hard it is to give an account of how we happen to think as we do. This can be set against the relative facility with which we are able to repeat a formed opinion and give reasons for an expressed statement. The same holds true, perhaps even more strongly, for an ‘intuitive’ acquisition of knowledge; for the ‘intuitive’ understanding is characterized by its sudden appearance and is felt most of the time (certainly at first) as a forethought. The ‘intuitive’ understanding is frequently accompanied by a troubled feeling; it is often followed by a sensation that thoughts are overflowing the mind - ‘taking it over.’ ... No wonder primitive man felt that answers to problems were revealed to him in supernatural ways, rather than that they were thought out by himself. Our modern explanation for this would be that the answer came to him from the unconscious, from that part of himself which he did not know. Primitive man lacked also the capacity for objectivization through deductive and inductive logical scrutiny. ‘Intuitive’ knowledge differs from other forms of knowledge in that it enters the conscious mind in a ready-to-use form; perhaps it would be more exact to say that it erupts into the conscious mind rather than enters it. This is a short cut as compared with a person’s ordinary thinking habits” (Szalita-Pemow, 1955).

Before resolving Burton’s four annotations to the dated philosophy of India (mindfulness) and China (otherness), it is necessary to establish a truism versus the opening claim that there is no ‘law’ that declares that reality and/or knowledge descends from reason without resorting to the human penchant for meaning and precession. The prior discussion of intuitive in tandem with reliance on middle-across satisfies the needed truism. What’s left is to set closure to the creation of the unconsciousness-consciousness duality by relying on the alternative otherness-mindfulness philosophical duality – to create a basis for self-known by starting with a basis for a self-not-known.

Freud attempted to explain a person’s two poles, the already formed self and the to be formed, in tandem with the current self in his “Fleiss papers” (Freud, 1892|1966) and his “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (Freud, 1895|1966) in neurological terms only to settle on the dynamics of the already
formed self with his subsequent writings. With melancholia “The most remarkable characteristic of melancholia, and the one in most need of explanation, is its tendency to change round into mania – a state which is opposite of it in its symptoms” (Freud, 1917|1957, p. 253). This leaves melancholia as driven by seduction to a later discussion (p. 87). Now, the dated philosophy with discussion limited to the Hindu-Yoga System (mindfulness), and Zhuangzi and Confucianism (otherness).

The Hindu-Yoga System (mindfulness)

“Onesikritos, the companion of Alexander the Great, is the first notable foreigner to give us an account of the Yogins of India. Himself a disciple of Diogenes the Cynic, we need not wonder that Alexander selected him as the man most fit to talk with the Hindu ascetic sages and to inquire about their teachings. His report of that memorable interview of 396 BCE has been preserved for us by Strabo in his Geography. Despite the difficulty of conversing through interpreters, Onesikritos was in fact remarkably successful in getting at some of the very fundamentals of Indian belief. The drift of the talk, he said, came to this, that that is the best doctrine, which rids the spirit grief but also of joy; and again, that that dwelling place is the best, for which the scantiest or outfit is needed. ...

Of these two points, one is of prime significance for the spiritual side of Yoga, just as the other is so for its practical aspects. The one suggests the 'undisturbed calm' of Patanjali, the 'mindfulness made perfect through balance' of Buddhaghosa; and the other is a concrete instance of the doctrine of emancipation from the slavery to things. This latter is a part of the fundamental morality (specifically, neither Brahmanical nor Jainistic nor Buddhist) which is an essential preliminary for any system of ascetic religious training, and is accordingly taught again and again, now with a touch of gentle humor, now sternly, and always cogently, by Brahmans and Jains and Buddhists alike. ...

Thus, to instance some of the more striking known coincidences between the Bhashya and Buddhism, we may begin with the Four Eminent Truths. The most significant achievement of modern medicine is the finding out of the cause of disease. This is the indispensable foundation for the whole structure of preventive medicine. It was precisely this problem in the world of spirit to which Buddha addressed himself, the etiology of human misery. His solution he publicly announced in his first sermon, the gist of which was destined to become known to untold millions, the sermon of the Deerpark at Benares or sermon about the Four Truths. These concern suffering, its cause, its surcease, and the way thereto, and they coincide with the four cardinal topics of Hindu medical science, disease, health, and remedies. Now these Four Truths are set forth by the author of the Bhashya, and not without explicit reference to the fact that this Yoga-system has four divisions coincident with those of the system of medicine. It may be added that a part of the Rule to which this is the Comment, reads: To the discriminating, all is nothing but pain; and that this again is one of the three fundamental axioms of Buddhism, All is transitory, All is pain, All is without substantive reality. ...the five means to the higher concentration, namely faith and energy and mindfulness and concentration and insight" (Lanman, 1918).

Zhuangzi (otherness)

“Zhuangzi uses the metaphors of the heart-mind as a mirror and 'goblet words' to 'empty' the heart-mind of any distinctions. The paradoxical nature of these words teaches one to be open to multivalence, and not to be attached to specific views. This use of metaphor seems to be explained by Donald Davidson's view of metaphor as having no cognitive content beyond its literal meaning; while a metaphor may intimate certain thoughts, these are not contained within the metaphor itself. What is significant about a metaphor is its imaginative use to intimate any number of things. Thus, it might be said, a la Davidson, that it is precisely this nature of metaphor that explains how Zhuangzi is able to stay free of (being attached to) any distinctions. ...
A generally recognized feature of a metaphor is that it cannot be paraphrased without remainder. In other words, something is lost in the attempt to paraphrase the metaphor. However, there are at least two different views about what this signifies. One view is that there is a special cognitive content that is lost in the attempt at paraphrase. Another is that apart from its literal meaning there is no such special content to a metaphor” (Chong, 2006).

Confucianism (otherness)

“The moral life can be said to have been the only philosophical subject which has seriously interested the Chinese and has been considered worthy of their earnest speculation, from their earliest stage of culture down to the present day. It has been their inmost conviction that the universe is the manifestation of a moral principle, and that every existence has some mission in its way to teach humanity a moral lesson. They did not, however, conceive the world to be the creation of a personal god who superintends and directs its course. Their Heaven, or Heavenly way, or Heavenly Ordeal, is a sort of natural law, that is not personal but somewhat deterministic. When we do not follow its regulations, we suffer the consequence merely because we violated it, and not because we incurred the displeasure of some august being. The Heavenly Way is thoroughly moral and would not tolerate anything that contradicts it, but no religious significance seems to have been attached to their conception. Man is a moral being pure and simple, there is no intimate relation between morality and religion, as the latter is generally understood by Christians. Throughout the writings of Confucius, we are unable to find any religious appeal made either by him or by his followers to a power supernatural or transcendental. If they had a clear conscience they had everything that they desired, and there was nothing outside that would disturb their peace of mind. They were thoroughly moral, they were thoroughly human. Therefore, Confucius made humanism the first principle of his ethics, and that is the very reason why the Chinese honor Confucianism in preference to all other doctrines as their national teaching. Therefore, it is necessary first of all to understand what makes up the principle of humanism in order to arrive at the central and vital point of Confucianism” (Suzuki, 1908).

Attention now turns to this track's eight topics: (1) Resistance is versatile, a defense mechanism or an offense mechanism, (2) Pleasure and reality principles as primary and secondary, function of clinical experience, (3) Transference, (4) Leveraging of opportunity, (5) Strategic focus of informational communications, (6) It is efficient to resolve the impetus to a reframing of Freud's seduction theory, (7) Leveraging of opportunity is aligned with life style and an intense narcissistic need, (8) Informational communications, is aligned with history and escapism.

Resistance is versatile, a defense mechanism or an offense mechanism

The focus here is life as an economic event with resistance, not to be taken as a component of either repression or suppression, but taken as a steady-state coping mechanism – (1) The knowns and unknowns, (2) the mental fabric necessary to enable mature resistance, (3) the mature interpretation of the surrounding environment, (4) enablers of mature non-mechanistic resistance, (5) inertia imposed on mature non-mechanistic resistance, (6) diversions from understanding maturity.

(1) The knowns of life include conscious schedules while the unknowns are largely unconscious habit, both of which are mechanisms that guide a person through in-the-moment issues. The knowns also include ‘reminders’ from prior experiences (Rickman, 1937) and include those elements of everyday life that reach into anxiety and frustration as depicted in Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34) but fall short of fixation and regression. The unknowns are largely failures of cognition ranging from unrecognized to ignored. That which is unrecognized reflects experience as a poor teacher while that which is ignored is commonly referred to as ‘should have known better’.
(2) The mental fabric necessary to enable mature resistance, is the self-application of the tenants of the Big Five (Tupes, 1961). The full specification of each member follows where ‘loading’ refers to the strength of a characteristic. Included in the array of traits associated with each Factor of the Big Five is evidence that there is no purity of invocation of a defense mechanism versus an offense mechanism, that there is a little of each in the other, and that a trait that might be taken as dominant just might be a mask versus an underlying trait – mischief just might be the norm.

Factor I – Surgency – appears to be that labeled by Cattell and French as Surgency and by many other investigators as Extroversion. It is best defined by the traits Talkativeness, Frankness, Adventurousness, Assertiveness, Sociability, Energetic, Composed, Interest in Opposite Sex, and Cheerfulness. It appears to be a true bipolar factor with negative loadings obtained for the traits of Emotional Maturity, Mildness, Kindliness, Conventionality, and Calmness.

Factor II – Agreeableness – this factor corresponds quite closely to that called Agreeableness by French. It, too, is a bipolar factor, defined on the positive end by the variables Good natured, Not Jealous, Emotionally Mature, Mildness. Cooperativeness, Trustfulness, Adaptability, Kindliness, Attentiveness to People, and Self-sufficiency (as opposed to Attention-Getting). Traits loaded negatively on Factor II include Assertiveness and to a lesser extent Talkativeness and Orderliness.

Factor III – Dependability – the primary definers of this factor are Orderliness, Responsibility, Conscientiousness, Perseverance, and Conventionality, with several other variables (Cooperativeness, Mildness, and Emotional Stability) having positive loading above 3. Practically all definers of Factor I are loaded negatively on this factor, as are Trustfulness, and Imaginative. The factor in many respects is like that labeled by French as Dependability or by Fiske as Conformity. It appears to be quite similar to the old “w” or Will factor found by Webb.

Factor IV – Emotional Stability – the inverse of this factor seems to be that listed by French as Emotionality. It is loaded highest by Not Neurotic, Placid, Poised, Not Hypochondriacal, Calm, Emotionally Stable, and Self-sufficient (as opposed to Dependent). Secondary definers of the factor cite Lack of Jealousy, Emotional Maturity, Cooperativeness, Trustfulness, Adaptability, Responsibility, Perseverance, and Independent-Mindedness. Kindliness has a significant negative loading on this factor.

Factor V – Culture – is the least clear of the five factors identified by the eight analyses. It appears to be similar to the factor labeled by French as Culture and by Fiske as the Inquiring Intellect. It is defined by the variables, Cultured, Esthetically Fastidious, Imaginative, Socially Polished, and Independent-Minded, with secondary loadings by Energetic, Poise, Emotional Stability, and all the variables in Factor II. It will be noted that loadings for two factors are shown under Column F. This is the analysis of the female college students, and in this sample only, Factor V split into two quite distinct sub factors. The first of these has a pattern of loadings quite similar to the Factor V found recurring throughout the studies. The second of these is defined by the variables Esthetically Fastidious, Socially Polished, and Interest in the Opposite Sex.

(3) The mature interpretation of the surrounding environment begins with pleasure and happiness where each is fluid with respect to emotional versus economic security with basis in Chinese thought, only to be followed by two levels of generalization.

Emotional security: “Pleasure does not need any reason. …Happiness is not possible without pleasure. The difference is that there are different levels of pleasure; it may be segmental or transitory experiences, sometimes even conflicting. Happiness is the coordination of different levels of pleasure, an overall feeling or remark. The view on pleasure is the view on happiness” (Chen, 2010).
Economic security: “...the scientific definition of human nature. Instead of a firm and clear-headed control of our actions, we seem to have only the controls emergent from the group of complicated psycho-physical mechanisms sometimes called the instincts; at once the power plants of action and the determiners of its direction. The part of reason in this whole process is much less important than the old common-sense view supposed. It seems to be merely a selective part. We do not act in response to reason; we only, through reasoning, decide upon the repression of certain undesirable modes of action and thus clear the way for acceptable responses, which, we perceive, will yield us in the long run the satisfactions we are driven to seek – those of instinct gratification – and the added satisfactions of social approval as well. ...These desirable responses are not originally referable to reason and reflection; responses are caused by the innate impulses, the instincts” (Tugwell, 1922).

First level: “[First], the process of choice can be an important concern, and so can be the necessity of choice even when the alternatives are not fully ordered and the conflicting considerations not fully resolved. ...Second, the process of choice—and in particular the act of choice—can make substantial difference to what is chosen. ...Third, it is necessary to distinguish between menu-independence of preferences and menu-independence of choice functions, since there is, in general, no one-to-one correspondence between preference relations and choice functions. ...Fourth, the role of the choice act can be particularly significant in decisions made on behalf of others—a feature of economic policymaking on which Ragnar Frisch himself had put much emphasis. ...Finally, the accountability and obligation to others may take the form of self-imposed choice constraints (as formulated by Immanuel Kant and Adam Smith) rather than being incorporated within reflective preferences in the binary form” (Sen, 1997).

Second level: This is an extension of the discussion of Amos Tversky and is about decision making under the presumed absence of risk and uncertainty in the macro sense—adaptation, and in the micro sense—attachment, Table 2 (Adaption, p. 14), with the net result likely the cart in front of the horse. “Tversky’s work challenges the assumption that consumers are perfectly rational, seemingly encouraging paternalists and challenging economists’ beliefs in the normative merit of consumer sovereignty. However, behavioral economics does not pose a threat to the principle of free choice (though it may make us less sanguine about the results); Tversky’s work leads one to be no less skeptical of the rationality of the bureaucrat (or legislature) assigned to safeguard the consumer’s interest, than of the consumer himself. And there is no argument of which we are aware that governmental processes will serve as a corrective to the quasi-rational behavior of governmental actors. Moreover, if one believes that government actors are more rational than consumers, that rationality differential should raise other red flags. If the government actors are rational and not benevolent, empowering them may only make things worse for the quasi-rational consumer” (Laibson, 1998).

(4) The enablers of mature non-mechanistic resistance, versus “cognitive stuck points” (Finlay, 2015), radiate from Victor Frankl’s specification of Logotherapy as an extension of Chinese thought about pleasure and happiness.

“The name Logotherapy indicates Frankl’s emphasis upon the spiritual and value-oriented aspects of human beings, as contrasted to Freud’s biological orientation.

1. Frankl states that neuroses are caused by repression of the patient’s sense of responsibility and that it is the function of psychotherapy to bring this repressed sense of responsibility back into the patient’s awareness. Phobias, for example, are seen as caused by a displacement to irrelevant stimuli of the qualms and fears of a repressed conscience. Similarly, realistic and socially adapted conscientiousness, when repressed, will manifest itself in the bizarre pseudo conscientiousness of the compulsive neurotic.
2. Frankl expresses himself more generally about the etiology of emotional disorders. He states that neurosis constitutes a repression of the spiritual needs of the individual. This repression results in 'spiritual starvation': because the neurotic's spiritual needs are repressed, he cannot find adequate satisfaction for these needs. His repression prevents him from developing a sense of meaning in life.

3. Happiness and well-being, Frankl postulates, do not give life a meaning by themselves. Instead, they are by-products of a realization of other values.

4. Fear of death, of aging, and discomfort caused by the passing of time, are among the most important sources of anxiety among humans. Frankl's philosophy attempts to find one at least partial antidote against these threats. The future, he says, consists of non-materialized possibilities; the past, however, consists of materialized possibilities, of things that we have brought into existence and that are stored there, safely and immutably. Thus, 'having-been' is the most effective way of overcoming transiency and of achieving eternity. Such considerations tend to change people's attitude towards the passing of time from negative to positive" (Weisskopf-Joelson, 1955).

(5) Inertia imposed on mature non-mechanistic resistance, has discussion radiating from Freud’s Civilization and its discontents and Buhle’s Feminism and its discontents (p. 10), with discontents presented as the alternative to discontents. There are two issues – sexuality as a skewed topic and the handling of sex-differences in analysis.

Sexuality as a skewed topic is highlighted with a repeat of material above (p. 10) – from a prior paper – “The position in this paper is three terse points – (1) girls have it easy, they know that they are not boys; (2) boys have it hard, they are clueless; (3) girls pay the price. Resolution of these points must occur in reverse order – (3) eliminate the burden placed on girls; (2) inspire boys to gain firm identity; (1) inspire girls to be girls” (Cook, 2015a). The resolution advocated, the ‘reverse order’, has precedent in the history of female dependency with current comments limited to the work of Karen Horney. And, do keep in mind the direction of these comments will leave one to wonder what holds precedent – discontents or discontents. Rather than looking at female dependency as a societal issue the position being taken here is the personal, emotional versus economic security, with basis in pleasure and happiness of Chinese thought. Summary data from the prior paper puts the discontents or discontents question in perspective.

Horney’s position is “The caring and nurturing characteristics often associated with female personality are frequently compounded with dependency and repressed anger” (Westcott, 1986), with the resultant sense-of-self exposed by Figure 9 (Esteem, p. 87) where the drop in mean self-esteem implies a vacuum for emotion. This position however offers no insight into discontents or discontents, instead, it’s the middle across of Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43) previously attributed to Horney. To gain insight requires two steps – the first is to discount sexuality as the all-encompassing factor with the second to focus on the impact of subliminal messages with the Pebeco campaign above (p. 31).

To discount sexuality (Wetherington, 2007) as the all-encompassing factor is not fair play given the nature of the data in Figure 8 (Distribution, p. 87). However, the emphasis on the peaking of data with respect to both binge alcohol abuse and non-fatal self-harm in Figure 8 suggests that sexuality is a diversion from an economic issue. While there are differences in male versus female in each binge alcohol use and self-harm in the data used to build Figure 8, what remains is the pattern for each gender in that source data is the same. Now, a caveat...

With the dramatic peaking of binge alcohol and self-harm one could hypothesize that the age of peaking is also the age when persons are suddenly faced with personal economic decisions such as shelter and so forth. This implies that self-responsibility becomes a (versus ‘the’) priority which is probably true to
some extent but, yet, cannot be the entire motive given the corresponding drop in mean self-esteem in Figure 9. This allows the setting of discomforts as a proxy for economic security. To align discontents with emotional security requires attention to be directed to suicides in Figure 8 with Figure 8 left as a side discussion. If one were to take the Figure 10 suicide data for the ages of 20 to 70 and turn the resultant curve upside down, the patter would then fit the pattern for mean self-esteem of Figure 9. This in turn opens to consideration the basis for thought.

(6) Diversions from understanding maturity, the first, the obvious, is Krafft-Ebing’s “The sudden loss of virile powers often produces melancholia, or is the cause of suicide when life without love is a blank” (p. 11). The second, and not so obvious, is history repeats itself – melancholia versus each – itself, hysteria, bipolar disorder and transference – to be addressed as four independent points.

(1) The etiology of melancholia alone is quite direct – “the patients’ deeply depressed mood, lack of self-confidence and strong self-reproaches, sleeplessness, refusal to eat, fear of impoverishment, and suicidal tendencies” (Fromm-Reichmann, 1941, p. 280). This statement of etiology is entirely in line with the description quoted from the DSM-5 (p. 62) and reaffirms Freud’s call for an accounting for melancholia’s “tendency to change round into mania” (p. 82).

(2) The etiology of melancholia has at its base a sequence of “delusional convictions” (Jacobson, 1964, p. 46) that lead to a sense of terminal uniqueness thus accounting for its likeness with hysteria while leaving open to question the impetus that emerges as melancholy.

(3) The etiology of melancholia does not have at its base the capacity to morph to mania. The net result of the observed melancholia-mania coupling, bipolar disorder, which is given so much attention in the two recent editions of the DSM (DSM-IV-TR, 2000, pp. 382-400; DSM-5, 2013, pp. 123-154), has no support in the World Health
Organization’s investigation DALY (Disability Adjusted Life Year Lost) due to bipolar disorder (WHO, 2009b, WHO, 2017). To pursue the bipolar extension to melancholia requires attention to be diverted to prescription drugs in general which a diversion from the jurisprudence-based purpose of this paper. The issue is Beard’s assessment that “Americans need more doctoring” (p. 65)

(4) The etiology of melancholia then is to be viewed as the middle member of a three-step sequence – seduction, melancholia, transference. This makes sense as it allows melancholia to be viewed as an overt reaction to an impetus seduction, with the transference to be viewed as a covert reaction to an impetus melancholia. To view melancholia, bipolar included, as a function of neurological anchored – true given the human body is a closed system – is reductionist given, e.g., “…a functional analysis of our linguistic capacities would fix the level of abstraction at too specific a level; to expect neural correlates for the functional units is to expect too much” (Richardson, 1980). For emphasis, “Craving is a core feature of all addictive disorders, exemplified by its inclusion in the new DSM-5 [quite the discovery]. However, investigating the neurobiology of craving is fraught with ambiguity. Craving is an inherently subjective human experience, replete with cognitive, emotional, interoceptive, metacognitive and physiological components that are difficult, if not impossible, to capture fully in animal studies. Thus, the neurobiology of craving has been examined principally via human neuroimaging studies. These studies have revealed that a diffuse network of brain regions is reliably engaged by drug-related cues" (Moeller, 2015). Thus, it is time to pay attention the warnings about ‘Intellectual idealism’ as crafted by Comte, (Stewart) Mill and Spencer (p. 19), that life without experience is psychology, while life in tandem with experience is philosophy.

This discussion of Diversions from understanding maturity concludes with a survey of the sense of being overwhelmed, nervousness, as the prime seduction that begets melancholia. This is an extension of "In 1887, Vincent Van Gogh tentatively predicted that 'perhaps someday everyone will be neurotic’” (p. 9), is less about “delusional convictions” while placing emphasis on terminal uniqueness that in turn pits the Pursuit of maturity (p. 55) against the Pursuit of isolation (p. 55). This pitting result from failure to account for Glover’s progression with respect to the execution of life. Two examples follow with the first about specific behavior and the second about general conduct. Specific behavior – “Current theories of drug addiction tend to be moralistic rather than scientific. Any satisfactory theory must attempt to account for the fact that the repeated administration of opiates sometimes is followed by addiction and sometimes is not. The factor which accounts for this differential effect appears to be the person's knowledge or belief, supplied him by his cultural milieu, concerning the nature of the distress that accompanies the sudden cessation of the opiate. If he fails to realize the connection between this distress and the opiate he escapes addiction, whereas if he attributes the discomfort to the opiate and thereafter uses the opiate to alleviate it he invariably becomes addicted. Addiction is generated in the process of using the drug consciously to alleviate withdrawal distress” (Lindesmith, 1938). General conduct – “Many admirable works have been written purporting to furnish analyses of mind; but almost all of them, in common with other works on psychology, proceed at once to the examination of special facts, such as Sensations, their authors apparently considering it unnecessary to discuss at any length the relation of the several elements of mind to each other. While cognitions are under discussion, emotions are out of view, and volitions in their turn are treated regardless of both; so that though the special analyses and descriptions are excellent, the total ensemble of mind is never exhibited at all: we lose sight of the wood among the trees. The reason of this is not far to seek. First, in most states of mind as we know them some one aspect or element is prominent, the rest being obscure or of secondary interest. ...Secondly, the reference of these apparently distinct facts to distinct faculties diverted attention still more from their common connections. And, lastly, the obscurity of the term consciousness rendered any attempt at a general analysis of mind almost hopeless. For consciousness
seemed at one time something outside those obvious facts of mind which the psychologist could describe; at another those facts seemed themselves the sum total of consciousness” (Ward, 1882).

Nervousness is nothing more than varying degrees of being overwhelmed versus the execution of life and appears in two forms – exhaustion and complete breakdown.

Exhaustion – “The study of neurasthenia, from its very nature, requires an acquaintance, not only with the forms of functional and structural diseases of the nervous system in general, but with disorders of special organs, as the eye, the ear, the throat, of the digestive and reproductive systems, as well as of psychology, and the phenomena of the involuntary life in health and disease. In the evolution of recent science and art, a complete knowledge of these several departments is not possible to a single human mind; specialties are built upon other specialties; experts must lean on other experts; we cannot walk a single step alone. The task of excluding organic disease – the chief fact in making the differential diagnosis – demands in some cases diagnostic skill of the very highest order, since it is far easier to see a coarse lesion when it exists than to make sure that there is no lesion or objective condition within the range of the aided or unaided senses” (Beard, 1889, p.17). “First of all, the symptoms of neurasthenia are largely of a subjective character, and to one who does not suffer them, appear trifling and unreal; many of them do not appeal directly to the senses of the scientific observer: the physician can only know of their existence through the statements of the patient, or through his conduct. …A second cause for the neglect of this disease is, that a successful study of it requires an exercise of the reasoning as well as of the observing powers. …The third cause of the neglect of neurasthenia and allied affections is, that we have depended too exclusively in the investigation of disease, on the material found in hospitals, dispensaries, and other institutions of charity. …A fourth cause of the neglect of neurasthenia and allied diseases is, that we, in this country, where the disease most abounds, have depended so exclusively on European precedence and experience. Until quite lately, the majority of our text-books were of European origin; not only for original studies, but for compilation and text-books, we have looked to England and France and Germany. In Europe these functional nervous diseases, although they exist, yet are so rare that even specialists in diseases of the nervous system do not see them constantly, and when they see them, do not, with very few exceptions, recognize or treat them. …Neurasthenia is an American disease in this, that it is very much more common here than in any other part of the civilized world, and here it first received its name and description; it could not be expected that European authorities would be the pioneers either in the study of its nature or treatment” (Ibid, pp. 26-31).

Complete breakdown – “There is a particular type of neurasthenic state which requires special consideration in that it is characterized by special mental difficulties. In addition to the mental fatigue and depression common in neurasthenia the form of disorder in view always exhibits obsessions; that is thoughts and ideas which continually recur and will not be dismissed. Of such a kind as by their nature or persistence seriously to disquiet those bothered with them, they end by dominating every other interest. Their victim thereby becomes preoccupied, is unable to work properly, and wastes a vast amount of nerve-energy in combating his obsessions” (Ash, 1920, p. 107). “…opens the way to a splitting – dissociation – of personality that may have a very serious bearing on future mental health” (Ibid, p. 161).

Melancholia is addressable through the advocate psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

**Pleasure and reality principles as primary and secondary, function of clinical experience**

The focus here is the obverse of the prior discussion with focus on life as a philosophical event with distortion an unfortunate and largely unintended accomplice – (1) the historical basis, (2) implications of
that basis, (3) application of that basis, (4) overt misapplication of that basis, (5) covert misapplication of that basis.

(1) The historical basis, is about life as a flat space with that space accounting for the distance between Descartes and neuroscience. This distance emerges as a wager with respect to what extent a single person is a closed system with respect to three philosophical labels – monism, dualism and pluralism. The starting point is Descartes’ formula: “I doubt, I think: therefore, I exist” (Mercier, 1918, p. 4). The first reference alone – ‘doubt’ – presents the challenge to neuroscience leaving Descartes unchallenged until the last reference alone – ‘exist’ – is addressed.

If a single person is viewed as a closed system with the philosophical label set at monism, then ‘doubt’ is inconsistent with the claims of neuroscience about functionality of the human mental apparatus which is examined at a point in time from which only pro forma statements can be crafted. This in turn affirms Hartley’s Doctrine of Vibrations at a point in time but fails to contribute to his Doctrine of Association of Ideas. Alternatively, ...

If a single person is viewed as a closed system with the philosophical label set at dualism – body and soul, then doubt is part of the dynamic (Ibid, pp. 3-8), neuroscience is ruled out given the reference to dynamic, Hartley’s Doctrine of Vibrations remains acknowledged, with his Doctrine of Association of Ideas equally acknowledged given Descartes’ “I doubt, I think”, which technically affirms ‘exist’, but also sets the problem as “the subject-matter of psychology ... is not man, body and soul, with his threefold life, vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual; it is the mind and its thoughts, just that, and that only” (Ibid, p. 8). Having the subject matter of psychology limited to the mind and its thoughts is the stance taken by the current therapeutic jurisprudence which digresses to ‘exist’ in a static sense only. To move focus to a dynamic ‘exist’ requires attention to be moved to Freud’s conscious-unconscious as a factor in neurosis, which, in turn, advances pluralism to consideration to include the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

(2) Implications of that basis, pluralism is not a simplistic philosophical notion or idea. Pluralism embodies the crux of life and is dynamic from two perspectives.

The narrow perspective – “What is the meaning and worth of personality? Are persons ultimately real, or are they only parts of some larger reality? Is reality one or many?” (Bakewell, 1898).

The global perspective – “The world must be conceived as altogether coherent and interdependent in so far as free individuals do not freely act in it. Such individuals must, however, be conceived as capable of so acting, capable of interrupting sequences, of changing the history of the world – at least to some extent. We have the same ground for demanding the latter that we have for demanding the former. Both demands rest, in the last analysis, on native biases, on deep-rooted prejudices; and both find their sanction in the same motive, namely, in the possibility of a sociable or sane world. And it is a pitiful confession of impotence to make persons who are the bases of these social relations mere parts of the appearance world, in order to fit some preconceived notion of the kind of unity which is demanded. ...

We can escape from this catastrophe, however, only by insisting upon the limitations of the attitude of the natural scientist, and the kind of unity of which he is in search. Such a unity will never be sufficient for any science which regards man, in part at least, in the light of his higher activity, and, least of all, for philosophy. Here the essential factor is human freedom. In the former case, we stand face to face with a world of facts, which from the first we are determined to consider as forming one inexorably coherent world, because it must be reliable: otherwise we cannot make it so. In the latter, we confront, in addition, a world of persons, of self-activities, of beings who choose, and who, in so far, direct the course of events in the light of certain ends. And if any unity is to be allowed here, if this world is to be
made reliable, this must be done in such a way as not to involve our returning again to the block-world of natural science” (Ibid).

The core of pluralism in this regard is personality. Personality, however, is not a ‘thing’ that is open to study by the likes of neuroscience, nor does personality satisfy Descartes ‘exist’ declaration. Instead, to gain sense of the character of personality it takes the above global perspective to expose the narrow perspective which in turn encapsulates many past and present dynamics, and many time-dependent interpretations of each past and present (Rosenzweig, 1944).

(3) Application of that basis, as an extension of pluralism, psychology is a subset of humanities, psychiatry is a subset of medicine, and there is much of each psychology and psychiatry in the other. The goal is for each psychology and psychiatry to complement each other (Menninger, 1947), a goal that was technically achieved when Freud, a physician-neurologist, introduced psychoanalysis, the analysis of free associations by the patient, with the result the application of the method of psychology from two perspectives.

The narrow perspective – with melancholia versus Descartes' formula: "I doubt, I think: therefore, I exist" the reference, the pursuit of safe-harbor by each psychology and psychiatry with safe-harbor only a centrist approximation with respect to anxiety versus accomplishment, idealism versus emotional investment, and, happiness versus optimism.

The global perspective – with respect to reality a single person is a closed, contained system until they take a breath of air at which point they are in communion with their environment, albeit biologically. That air is necessary to life in the same respect as that single person having contact with other single persons in the social world (Bracken, 2002). From this it follows that Descartes reference to ‘exist’ is a reference to an unbounded phenomenon with substance akin to that of air. Regarding psychiatry versus psychology there is no doubt there must be demarcation between the two given the medicine versus humanities basis. However, no beyond-blurred demarcation exists between the neurobiology and psychosocial dimensions of opioid abuse (Kosten, 2002).

(4) Covert misapplication of that basis is about the minute-to-minute demands of daily life which clouds over on a subjective basis the undercurrent of immediate detail. Freud made clear that psychic reality held greater importance than material reality (Caper, 1988, pp. 10-14, pp. 234-235). Thus, presumed priorities overtrump what an uninvolved observer might cite as practical expectations versus some array of immediate circumstances. This has carried into the fundamental flaw of the DSM-5. The narrative begins with study groups that led to the release of the DSM-III in 1975 with the proposed anchor statement – “A medical disorder is a relatively distinct condition resulting from organismic dysfunction which in its fully developed or extreme form is directly and intrinsically associated with distress, disability, or certain other types of disadvantage. The disadvantage may be of a physical, perceptual, sexual, or interpersonal nature. Implicitly there is a call for action on the part of the person who has the condition, the medical or allied professions, and society. A mental disorder is a medical disorder whose manifestations are primarily signs or symptoms of a psychological (behavioral) nature, or if physical, can be understood only using psychological concepts” (Kinghorn, 2013). Coupled with the demands of publishing a series of definitive statements, the DSM-III, this statement digresses to a psychology without psychic energy, a realization that led to Freud abandoning his “Psychology for Neurologists” commonly known as his “Project for a Scientific Psychology” which was his attempt to explain psychic energy from the neuro-physiology perspective (Caper, 1988, pp. 17-39).

(5) Overt misapplication of that basis, which leads to assessments of life on the strength of recorded history, with comments limited to the Drug Abuse Treatment Outcome Study (DATOS), which has its
roots in the "War on Drugs" announced by President Nixon in June 1971. This initiative included the creation, by unanimous congressional vote, of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, the function of which was to coordinate federal resources for drug abuse treatment, prevention, and research. “The goal of DATOS, as with earlier federally sponsored evaluative research, is to advance scientific knowledge about the effectiveness of drug abuse treatment as it is typically delivered. This study continues an almost unparalleled effort by National Institute on Drug Abuse to evaluate drug abuse treatment outcomes within a historical context spanning more than 30 years of shifting public concern and expectations for treatment; changes in the resources, financing, and organization of treatment; significant advances in research on the neurobiological bases of addiction; and research designed to improve treatment. To continue this work, DATOS researchers will study a wide range of questions of scientific and policy relevance. These will include studies of contemporary treatment outcomes, examinations of the evolving drug abuse treatment system, research on factors related to engagement and retention, and research on long-term outcomes for a treatment sample, with particular attention given to the use of drug abuse treatment and other health resources over time” (Fletcher, 1997). As comprehensive as the DATOS is, it fails to offer insight into psychic phenomenon – anxiety versus accomplishment, idealism versus emotional investment, and, happiness versus optimism.

Transference to include introjection and projection

This is a continuation of the reference to DATOS with emphasis on anxiety versus accomplishment, idealism versus emotional investment, and, happiness versus optimism – essentially different views of psychic reality (subjective) being matched to companion views of material reality (objective). Before moving into discussion three reference points are needed.

The first reference point includes the three core dynamics of the therapist-patient dyad as written by Freud – “transference (the real and the irrational aspects of the patient’s relationship to the therapist), resistance (the dynamic repetition of the patient’s reluctance to recover anxiety-evoking experiences), and countertransference (the real and irrational aspects of the therapist’s relationship to the patient)” (Fromm-Reichmann, 1959, p. 28).

The second reference point is the enactment, a post-Freud dynamic. “It is related to the concept of acting out in that some conflict that has been activated or intensified by the analytic process is expressed in behavior rather than in words. It differs from acting out, however, by avoiding the negative connotations usually associated with the latter concept. Another important difference refers to the point of initiation. Whereas acting out was seen as something the patient did, enactments are seen as interactive phenomena that can be initiated by either member of the analytic dyad. Enactments represent the dramatization of a wish or ‘an interpersonal happening’ in which each of the participants attributes what is happening to the behavior of the other and each of the participants tries to force the other into a reciprocal action or a particular role that is related to unconscious wishes, conflicts, and fantasies in the transference-countertransference matrix” (Frosch, 2002).

The third reference point is about knowledge and is an extension of material presented above in Philosophers (mental) (p. 22). This is a retort to Descartes and spans two paragraphs.

“The fault of Dogmatic Idealism is not that it gives too much importance to thought, but that it gives too little to the world. And this injustice rebounds upon itself by making real knowledge an impossibility. The first position of the Dogmatic Idealist is that thought is an abstract universal, having in itself its own immediate evidence. Thought is identical with being but thought has no concrete reality within itself, and therefore being is the antithesis of real existence. Sensation is competent only to a knowledge of the particular, and the particular as self-contradictory is the negation of reality. Thought and sensation
are thus absolutely opposed in their nature, not only as higher and lower, but as truth and error. By no possibility can sensation be converted into thought, because the one is the abstract opposite of the other. But when the relation of the two is conceived in this abstract way, not only is sensation reduced to a chaos of independent particulars that cannot possibly constitute a coherent whole, but thought is emptied of all concreteness, and becomes simply the pure abstraction of universality, while the objective world is cast out of thought as that which is inherently inharmonious with it. From a pure universality no definiteness can be extracted, and hence the only reality is that of the abstract self. ...

That this doctrine is a scepticism in disguise, it should not take many words to show. It has but to be pointed out that to the unconditioned cannot be applied even the predicate of ‘being’, except by relation to consciousness, to prove that a purely indeterminate thinking is a chimera. Distinction or relativity is the necessary condition of consciousness, and the unconditioned as assumed to be out of all relation is absolutely unknowable, and therefore cannot be even known to exist. That which is defined as the absolute negation of consciousness must be rejected as absolutely unreal. What remains? The salvation of knowledge has been staked upon the one cast of the unconditioned, and the hazard of the die must be accepted. The unconditioned is the non-existent because the unknowable, and no other refuge is prepared for a theory which has denied the reality of all determinate objects of thought. There is no real knowledge of anything whatever, and we must either give up the presupposition of the abstract identity of thought or accept the inevitable corollary of absolute scepticism” (Watson, 1877).

These three reference points with DATOS and psychic versus material reality the basis describe fully the distance between the therapeutic jurisprudence and the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

DATOS is about what happened while therapeutic jurisprudence is about what is hoped to happen. While DATOS is a recording of history and has nothing to do with expected outcomes, therapeutic jurisprudence takes the position that an expected outcome can be crafted, that “therapeutic jurisprudence is a perspective that regards the law as a social force that produces behaviors and consequences ... does not support paternalism, coercion, and so on. It is simply a way of looking at the law in a richer way, and then bringing to the table some of these areas and issues that previously have gone unnoticed. Therapeutic jurisprudence simply suggests that we think about these issues and see if they can be factored into our law-making, lawyering, or judging” (Wexler, 2000). This description sounds well and good, it is the basis for environmental expectations such as vehicle traffic control. The flaw is the implied emphasis on objective material reality such as accomplishment, emotional investment and optimism at the expense of subjective psychic reality such as anxiety, idealism and happiness.

DATOS by construction does not measure dynamics that lead up to formal measurable treatment. This begins with the simplest forms of introjection and projection, the raw material of ‘real’ knowledge that goes well beyond Descartes’ ‘exist’. With psychic reality a subset of material reality as implied by therapeutic jurisprudence the result has transference and capitulate as synonyms as are countertransference and capitulate leaving as the sole factor to be addressed. It has already been stated with the discussion attached to Figure 7 (Unit Step Function, p. 53).

Transference as a subset of melancholia is addressable through the advocate psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

**Leveraging of opportunity**

Opportunity is about the accepting of transference as a subset of melancholia while treating each psychic and material reality as coexisting within each iterative execution of personality with the upfront requirement that resistance applies to events that do not define life but are elements of life. This
discussion covers the method of the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence and spans ego structure, innate aptitude, conscious confidence, deliberate resilience and the flattening of life.

Ego structure is a function of two views of balance. The first is the resolution of resistance versus entrenchment in anxiety-evoking experiences (Davids, 1955). The second is the nature of emphasis on the subjective anxiety, idealism and happiness versus the objective accomplishment, emotional investment and optimism.

Innate aptitude goes beyond motor skills and accumulated experience. It is the largely unconscious application of accumulated experience that allows the average person to make good inferences, estimations and judgments (Marewski, 2010). Being that persons are more capable than they believe the task then is to apply that ability to life’s decisions particularly with respect to the intent if therapeutic jurisprudence with that intent carried into the execution of the advocated psychoanalytic variant.

Conscious confidence in other-directed psychoanalytic guidance is necessary. "For constructive personality change to occur, it is necessary that these conditions exist and continue over a period of time: (1) Two persons are in psychological contact. (2) The first, whom we shall term the client, is in a state of incongruence, being vulnerable or anxious. (3) The second person, whom we shall term the therapist, is congruent or integrated in the relationship. (4) The therapist experiences unconditional positive regard for the client. (5) The therapist experiences an empathic understanding of the client's internal frame of reference and endeavors to communicate this experience to the client. (6) The communication to the client of the therapist's empathic understanding and unconditional positive regard is to a minimal degree achieved” (Rogers, 1957).

Deliberate resilience is just another view of conscious confidence as a continuum, the result of which with respect to therapy is “a person functioning freely in all the fullness of his organismic potentialities; a person who is dependable in being realistic, self-enhancing, socialized and appropriate in his behavior; a creative person, whose specific formings of behavior are not easily predictable; a person who is ever-changing, ever developing, always discovering himself and the newness in himself in each succeeding moment of time. This is the person who in an imperfect way actually emerges from the experience of safety and freedom in a therapeutic experience” (Rogers, 1963).

Flattening of life, as noted above (p. 55), is a terse retort to Figure 7 (Unit Step Function, p. 53). The idea of flattening is to ensure that a person recognizes that life includes many elements and that no one element defines life. Successes occur as do tragedies, however, life is a longitudinal event. The idea of flattening is more than an extension of conscious confidence and deliberate resilience (Brodley, 2006), it is a person taken factual ownership of material reality that has been molded by psychic reality.

**Strategic focus of informational communications**

The purpose of informal communications is to enforce, from this paper’s title, a point does not make trend, where informal is any manner that is appropriate to a person’s circumstances. The purpose is also to craft information that is global to the three subjective-objective pairs – anxiety versus accomplishment, idealism versus emotional investment, and, happiness versus optimism. This discussion spans attachment theory, transference, material reality at the expense of psychic reality, psychic reality at the expense of material reality, and communications to bridge psychic and material reality.

Attachment theory is a placeholder for relevance and trust. Relevance implies supportive, a fair expectation. Relevance also implies that the receiver’s judgement will be activated with respect to the
in-the-moment conscious appreciation of their subjective-objective pairs. “Judgment is never without presuppositions and logical universes are products of logical processes. There are two types of judgments: Existential and relational. Affirmation and negation are coordinate and inconvertible modes of assertion, and the discourse advances through both denial and affirmation. Double negation is not affirmation. The negative can be conceived of either as the subject or as a relation. Denial contradicts affirmation to remove it completely. The meaning of denial and the implications of the judgment in which it is incorporated must be distinguished. Denial has various degrees of selective value in the activity of knowing, and its implications, in most cases, is positive” (Ormond, 1897). Attachment as crafted by John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth allows communications to be the development of the proxy for an intimate relationship (Obegi, 2008).

Transference (onto self) as used here is from the perspective of the self and the object world with intersubjectivity and projective identification active components to include “allusions to the unconscious with metaphors that create a sense of self” (Morton, 2003).

Material reality at the expense of psychic reality acknowledges the practical realities of life – reactions to immediate circumstances with happiness, or at least satisfaction, the objective. “According to the hedonic treadmill model, good and bad events temporarily affect happiness, but people quickly adapt back to hedonic neutrality. …implies that individual and societal efforts to increase happiness are doomed to failure. …First, individuals' set points are not hedonically neutral. Second, people have different set points, which are partly dependent on their temperaments. Third, a single person may have multiple happiness set points: Different components of well-being such as pleasant emotions, unpleasant emotions, and life satisfaction can move in different directions. Fourth, and perhaps most important, well-being set points can change under some conditions. Finally, individuals differ in their adaptation to events, with some individuals changing their set point and others not changing in reaction to some external event” (Diener, 2006). In short, “Life is either a problem or a play; which, will be decided by temperament rather than by circumstance” (Phelps, 1884).

Psychic reality at the expense of material reality is about the three heavily comingled rationalizations of dissociation, introspection and the transference (p. 6) versus language and the application of inflection within language (Summers, 1999).

Communications to bridge psychic and material reality is about balancing wants (material) and desires (psychic). This need for balancing descends from “…difficulties in formulating [everyday] psychological theories based on psychoanalysis. Concepts of wish, symbolism, and sexuality as given in psychoanalysis are the major obstacles. Wish is universally interpreted as a process of high mental level. To wish for something is to desire for it consciously. However, psychoanalysis refers to an unconscious wish, wish unacceptable to the main body of personality, which are contradictions in terms, leading to confusion. There is an insufficient distinction between two kinds of symbolism in psychoanalysis. It assumes that not only does an idea have grounds for association by similarity with the other, but that it is a genetic representation of the other. This is not established by the fact of contiguity in free association. The term sexuality has been reduced to the level of an effective expression, deprived of connotation, depriving it of a distinctive place in realistic thinking” (Wells, 1913).

**It is efficient to resolve the impetus to a reframing of Freud's seduction theory**

In the discussion of Define seduction (with progression to safe harbor) (p. 12) was at the person level. This discussion is at the environmental level and is oriented to adaptation that leads to order in society on the strength of the contribution of all individuals. Discussion spans environmental reality, symbolic reality, altruistic reality and adaptation.
Environmental reality is a phenomenon that each person has the option to adapt to. The alternative is to be the maverick and hope for the best though many persons do succeed. Given the subject matter is jurisprudence, any focus on the maverick must be centrist. Thus, radiating from centrist we have “The ‘riddle of the universe’ is: What are we here for? ...Many besides Kidd have admitted that ‘there is no rational sanction for the conditions of progress’. The fact that we are here, and the fact that we constantly make sacrifices to secure our remaining here, become, therefore, to the thoughtful, troublesome puzzles. The great mass of mankind gives no thought to the subject. Even the intelligent are for the most part content to feel that there is something within them that makes them cling to life irrespective of whether life is a gain or a loss. ...society presents us with two very different kinds of economy – a pain economy and a pleasure economy” (Ward, 1898). The point here is the idea of “clinging to life” is a poor proxy for proactive about self, irrespective of the overall environment – a pain economy and a pleasure economy.

Symbolic reality is about the balance between resolution of pleasure and pain (psychic reality) and the duty of consciousness. Psychic reality as a subset of symbolic reality is unbounded – “The demands of reality are stern and care little about our sentiments. The problem of life does not center in what we feel, but in what we do. The idea of adapting our actions to suit our sentiments is a wrong policy; for, on the contrary, we must adapt our sentiments to the needs of life, which prescribe upon the whole a pretty definite line of conduct called duty. Man can become a higher being only when he ceases to be swayed by his feelings and becomes master of pleasure and pain. The mastery over pleasure and pain is the basis of any permanent and well-deserved success in life; it is the stamp of dignity that moral actions bear; it is the indispensable condition of a great man’s greatness” (Carus, 1896). Likewise, material reality as a subset of symbolic reality is equally unbounded and encompasses the ethics of the means to an end (Mezes, 1896).

Altruistic reality is an expansion of psychic reality which goes well beyond the psyche per se to include three issues – mental, emotional and phobic evolution. Mental evolution is as recognized by Darwin – “adhered strictly to Cartesian dualism in its explanation of the relation of mind and body. ...Upon this foundation Darwin now builds a new structure. One group of phenomena had early assumed an immense importance to him – the phenomena of inheritance. The thought of hereditary transmission, perhaps always foremost in his biological studies, had deeply imbued him with the idea of life as expressed in an organic series, as well as in a single form. He saw that living beings were not only maintaining their individual interactions of brain and mind, but that these interactions were changing and progressing – progressing in a definite direction, moving onward, under the laws of inheritance, from the lower to the higher, from the simpler to the more complex. To the facts of the given moment he added the facts of a period of time; to the laws governing the individual, the laws governing the species; and to the concept of the mere existence of a living being, the concept of the development of that being, and the evolution of the series of which it forms, by inheritance, a causally related link” (Carter, 1898). Emotional evolution is a corollary to Darwin but without the implicit guidance of inheritance, it is circumstance appropriate strength and sympathy (Hutchinson, 1898). Phobic evolution is also a corollary to Darwin and descends from the immediacy of envy which is independent of inheritance (Gesell, 1906).

Adaptation with respect to seduction is about consequences of knowledge as a child of evolution with comments limited to logic and moral education.

This reference to logic is about “Implicit or Potential” that has been advanced to a discourse about “Thought and Things, or Genetic Logic” by James Mark Baldwin, “an essential and valuable philosophical idea since the time of Aristotle. ...these conceptions do not render unnecessary a detailed account of the
development of knowledge. They are intended to apply only to the question regarding the terms in which the account of its development is to be written. No one can doubt that the mind in its early stages of development is almost entirely immersed in practice, and that its functions appear to be directed only to the satisfaction of practical desires. But, if the genetic viewpoint is to be retained, it is necessary to maintain that the cognitive mind was never merely practical, but that, even in its first beginnings, logical functions and logical meanings were not entirely lacking though for the time overshadowed by more pressing interests. Genetic logic is then the story of the gradual emancipation of the logical mind from the direct control of the practical through the working out of the principles which constitute its own essential nature” (Creighton, 1910).

As an extension to “the principles which constitute its own essential nature”, “moral education in its broader sense should become what some persons would call dangerously radical. Less stress must be laid upon motives and virtues, and more stress upon facts and results. Man must learn to worry more about his ignorance than his badness of motives. The herd instincts we have always with us, and the great ideal is that they be brought to co-operate with reason instead of to oppose it. This can be accomplished only by thorough enlightenment, including instruction as to the nature of these instincts themselves, and warning against the delusions and fallacies resulting from them” (Folsom, 1918).
Method: Resistance to a contrarian investment

This discussion of a person’s contrarian investment is the basis for communications in healthcare and is transparent to therapeutic versus psychoanalytic jurisprudence. The thesis is that mental life is molded by a subjective interpretation of the environment. The immediate task is an examination of ‘subjective’ across five topics – (1) Logic versus psychology, (2) logic applied to psychology, (3) functional psychology, (4) spontaneous adaptation and (5) functional psychology and logic.

Logic versus psychology

The issue with logic versus psychology is the containment of uncertainty as each approaches uncertainty from a proposition that is assumed to hold merit. Two complimentary views – “Logic has become more and more a psychology of judgment and reasoning, while psychology in the exact sense is more and more restricted to the less complete processes of mind” (Stratton, 1896); and, “Every psychologist and every logician would agree that, whereas logic, even in its widest sense, has to do only with knowledge, and not with feeling and will, psychology has to do with all mental phenomena” (Ritchie, 1896).

Logic and psychology, however, are pliable and independent of each other. While a narrative can be written that highlights Locke’s “Every step the mind takes in its progress towards knowledge makes some discovery, which is not only new, but the best, too, for the time at least” (Locke, 1689, p. ix) as the basis for objective research and theorizing for each logic and psychology, such an approach fails to address subjective. Instead, attention must recognize presumption that is driven by ‘should’ (Horney, 1950, pp. 64-85) as the ego ideal of the narcissistic (Jacobson, 1964, p. 96).

Logic applied to psychology

With accumulated knowledge the basis for further investigations of the human mental apparatus, logic is a necessity. To guard against rash decisions, logical thinking is a must. As an example, “Introversion and extraversion are not characters at all, but mechanisms, which can, as it were, be inserted or disconnected at will. Only from their habitual predominance do the corresponding characters develop. There is an undoubted predilection depending upon a certain inborn disposition, which however, is not always absolutely decisive for one or other mechanism” (Downey, 1924).

Functional psychology

Functional psychology (p. 38) allows for ‘self-being-conscious’ that is molded and continually remolded by the social and physical environment. This statement alone accounts for experience and opens to consideration Locke’s “but the best, too, for the time at least” as an aesthetic statement about ‘self-being-conscious’. This distinction is important if a contrarian investment versus a subjective interpretation of the environment is to have an impact on a person’s personal philosophy about life and, perhaps, their subsequent execution of life.

“Functional psychology as a method for the reformulation in terms of concrete experience of both psychologic and philosophic problems has hitherto been focused on those types of conscious experience the reconstructive character and bearings of which are most obvious. In the field of psychology proper it has dealt with the act of attention; in logic, with the judgment process; in ethics, with the winning of new ends for conduct; in metaphysics, with problems of epistemology rather than with problems of ontology. …Conspicuous among these last is the aesthetic experience, a mental attitude as distinct and luminous in actual life as it is baffling and opaque for theory” (Adams, 1906, p. 5).

“Of late a more scientific and evolutionary view of play has greatly modified this theory both for play and for aesthetics. On the positive side writers on aesthetics have accounted for the independence, the
'inclosedness', of the experience on the score of its fulness of content, its high conscious value; it floods and captures consciousness. Here again they have compared it to play with respect to its freedom, spontaneity, and ease. Aesthetic pleasure has, indeed, been said to be passive as opposed to the pleasures of play, which are active. But recent psychology points out that no type of conscious experience is truly passive. The distinction is at most a distinction between gross outward movements and delicate organic reactions, and accordingly furnishes no real criterion. The tendency at present, on the contrary, is to bring into prominence the activity side of the aesthetic experience. Its extraordinary life-enhancing qualities are dwelt upon, its power of arousing a feeling of full but harmonious interplay of both organic and mental processes” (Ibid, p. 21).

These statements about functional psychology imply linearity which is not so. At issue is an accounting of the transference, resistance and countertransference with references to psychic and material reality replaced by the three views of reality that are addressed by psychoanalysis – “factual reality, psychic reality, and coconstructed reality” (Rosegrant, 2010). While the two references to psychic reality must be assumed as congruent and to account for transference as being synonymous with communications. Regarding material reality, on the strength of aesthetics given ‘subjective’ remains the issue, it is comprised of both factual reality and coconstructed reality where, by construction, factual comports with countertransference and coconstructed comports with resistance. At this point the recovered memory debate could be addressed but is instead deferred to the sixth track Issue: Perception and less selective inertia (p. 59; p. 149). For now, the factual, psychic and coconstructed realities are the focus with the endgame set at the flattening of life.

Given that time and uncertainty are elusive discussion points, that problem is solved by approaching the various elements of life – trauma, success, happiness, etc. – as akin to ‘bus stops’ within the longitudinal event known as life. A personal functional psychology allows the factual, psychic and coconstructed realities to be approached as an aesthetic experience. “The history of clinical psychoanalytic thinking about trauma [, etc.] demonstrates that these realities are often in conflict with each other and that they have cycled in use without any consensus developing about which is most correct. These three realities have also been used without consensus by the broader mental health field and in the study of myths, indicating that these realities are fundamental ways of understanding ambiguous psychological data. The uncertainty as to which reality is most correct is resolved by recognizing that it is part of the human condition to be constantly differentiating and integrating these realities, and so we best help our patients by engaging with them in the process of applying all three, rather than by making definite static decisions about which is most applicable” (Ibid).

Spontaneous adaptation

This is about differentiation versus uncertainty with respect to conscious resolution of frustration, threat, anxiety and aggression during everyday life. With Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43) the reference, this is about bottom up mental processing as influenced by the immediate environment with respect to only decision making, alternatively, more selective attention. Given the by-construction reference to bottom up in tandem with decision making, this implies the impact of the balance of the mental apparatus is not a consideration – not so – the balance of the mental apparatus determines the nature of interpretation by decision making relative to environmental influences, which effectively reduces uncertainty to differentiation. With uncertainty molded into differentiation the task now is to address each frustration, threat, anxiety and aggression.

Frustration results from either not attaining a goal or satisfying a need where the difference between ‘goal’ and ‘need’ is the extent of psychological investment (Maslow, 1943a). Given the spontaneity of frustration it is fair to equate frustration with free associations (Fromm-Reichmann, 1941|1959, pp. 95-
96) in that the expression of each is typically not under conscious control. However, frustration unlike free associations is supportive of the relational and structural models of Balint’s “Mutual Investment Company” and Bowlby’s (with Ainsworth) attachment theory (Greenberg, 1983, pp. 181-187).

Threat due to conflict but independent of frustration takes four forms: sheer choice, choice between two paths to the same (vital, important) goal, threatening conflicts, and, catastrophic conflict – “when we speak about a feeling of conflict as an originator of symptoms we should do better to speak rather about threat or threatening conflict since there are types of conflict which do not create symptoms” (Maslow, 1943a).

Anxiety, the study of which “as developed in the various schools of psychoanalytic thinking is of the greatest importance for any student and practitioner in the field, since the understanding and adequate handling of the patient’s anxiety plays a crucial role in all psychotherapy and hence in all psychoanalytic psychotherapy. ... Where the is anxiety, there is insecurity; where the is insecurity, there is a lack of self-respect; where there is a lack of self-respect, there is a lack of respect for others. Anxiety causes impairment of relatedness to others, fear of friendliness in giving and taking, loneliness and hostility – all well-known symptoms in mental patients” (Fromm-Reichmann, 1941|1959, pp. 92-93).

Aggression as referenced here is not about the narcissistic personality (Horney, 1950, pp. 187-213) but is as a reaction to frustration. “Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of response, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression. ... Instigation to aggression may occupy any one of a number of positions in the hierarchy of instigations aroused by a specific situation which is frustrating. If the instigation to aggression is the strongest member of this hierarchy, then acts of aggression will be the first response to occur. If the instigations to other responses incompatible with aggression are stronger than the instigation to aggression, then these other responses will occur at first and prevent, at least temporarily, the occurrence of acts of aggression. This opens up two further possibilities. If these other responses lead to a reduction in the instigation to the originally frustrated response, then the strength of the instigation to aggression is also reduced so that acts of aggression may not occur at all in the situation in question. If, on the other hand, the first responses do not lead to a reduction in the original instigation, then the instigations to them will tend to become weakened through extinction so that the next most dominant responses, which may or may not be aggression, will tend to occur. From this analysis it follows that the more successive responses of non-aggression are extinguished by continued frustration, the greater is the probability that the instigation to aggression eventually will become dominant so that some response of aggression actually will occur” (Miller, 1941).

*Functional psychology and logic*

To be developed in this discussion is the assertion that psychoanalysis adheres to the scientific method, and, is both a historical science and a natural science – that psychoanalysis is not pseudo-science. Specifically, with the calculus the reference, psychoanalysis is the second derivative and is logically aligned with perception and reasoning in Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43), while the first derivative is logically aligned with deduction and decision in that Figure. This leaves working memory in that figure to be accounted for by gestalt and aesthetics, followed by defense of alignment of psychoanalysis to the scientific method as both a historical science and a natural science. The balance of this discussion has the calculus as the basis for a retrace of material already presented – bottom up, top down (p. 39) and middle across (p. 43); transference, resistance and countertransference (p. 6); melancholia (p. 78) and introspection (p. 6); frustration (p. 98) and aggression (p. 99); and, nature (p. 31) versus nurture (p. 31).

**Gestalt and aesthetics:** In 1932, Erika Fromm, a student of Max Wertheimer, the Father of Gestalt Theory, responded to Wertheimer’s challenge to write a paper about productive thinking. Fromm
crafted a letter which she sent to 100 scientists and famous philosophers (such as Albert Einstein, Max Planck, Ernst Kretschmer, Kurt Koffka, Kurt Goldstein, Kurt Lewin, Sigmund Freud, Sandor Ferenczi, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger), asking them to reflect on the process that occurred when they had their most productive thought; she made it very clear that she was only a student. Einstein’s response:

“I will describe for you, as example, the situation which led to the construction of the special theory of relativity.

In mechanics, all inertial frames are equivalent. Experience shows that this equivalence also extends to optics, and thus to electrodynamics. In the theory of the latter, this equivalence appeared to be unachievable. I had earlier become convinced that this was rooted in a profound defect of the theoretical framework. The desire to discover and remove it led to a state of psychic tension in me, which after seven years of fruitless search was released through the relativization of the concept of time and distance. It was similar for the general theory of relativity. Here it was the empirically known relationship between inertial and gravitational mass that required a meaningful interpretation.

It was always the search for a logically simple meaning of empirically established relationships, propelled by the conviction that there existed a simple logical meaning.

The psychological situation is comparable with the attitude of somebody who wants to solve a puzzle or a chess problem, who is convinced that the solution exists, because the creator of the problem possesses the solution. The only difference lies in that the psychic energy arises from the generality of the problem [gestalt], and from its root in the relationship to reality [aesthetics]” [Italics added] (Fromm, 1998).

The foregoing simplistic dismissal of the generality of the problem to gestalt and the relationship to reality to aesthetics is sufficient to account for working memory of Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43). First, working memory is a result of configurational data, precepts, as delivered by reasoning and perception, with the latter driven by seductions (external influences). From this it follows that working memory is a reality that is independent of its influences and is not the result of the addition of influences (Heider, 1977). And, second, working memory is dynamic and very personal – “We feel that there exists a peculiar intimacy between us and the aesthetic object. We enter into it and possess it; it enters into and possesses us. More truly, perhaps, we and the object are fused, blended in a single pulse of experience. Such a state of mind is obviously strongly emotional; it is suffused with an affective coloring. These characteristics, however, are implicit and latent in the consciousness of the subject of the aesthetic thrill. They can be marshaled and described only by the sympathetic observer, or, by the participator after the experience has passed; and the experience is fleeting and notoriously difficult to confine in words. It has been the theme of poets, the subject of an array of eloquent descriptions. But it still eludes” (Adams, 1906, p.20).

Historical and natural science: To set the stage, the opening reference to the first and second derivatives of the calculus must be restated in simple metaphor using a motor vehicle traveling on a road. There are four issues here – three are describable, the fourth is not. The first is the distance traveled by the vehicle. The second is the vehicle’s speed (first derivative) that can range from zero to some positive number. The third is change in the vehicle’s speed (second derivative) that can range from some negative number, deceleration, to some positive number, acceleration. The fourth is truly variable and not describable – resistance between the vehicle’s tires and the road surface, variable elevation of the road surface (gravity), and, variable environmental conditions such as wind. These four issues place in doubt the strength of the scientific method as well as the idea of empirical where each the method and
empirical are reliant on observable phenomena, thus, the result is that each the scientific method and empirical are static. To extend the current application of the calculus two references to history are required.

First is Freud’s prediction in his *Project for a Scientific Psychology* that at some future date “we shall have to find a contact point with biology” (Schore, 1997). There are two sides to that prediction. The first is the “contact point” was realized with his authoring of the *Project*. The second is the realization of the “contact point” is deferred until after there is less emphasis on point-in-time studies such as neuroimaging as such studies bypass both the ‘why’ and ‘what’ of human behavior (Goldberg, 1993).

Second is the assessment about discovery of the five characteristics of personality, the Big Five — “In many ways it seems remarkable that such stability should be found in an area which to date has granted anything but consistent results. Undoubtedly the consistency has always been there, but it has been hidden by inconsistency of factorial techniques and philosophies, the lack of replication using identical variables, and disagreement among analysts as to factor titles” (Tupes, 1961).

These two references make clear that biology as the given basis supports narratives that can be described but not measured by some standard physical-oriented measure. John Bowlby’s position is psychoanalysis is both a historical science and a natural science provided the starting point is developmental psychology as the general application of the Bowlby-Ainsworth attachment theory. Specifically, ...

“Finally, let us consider the issues raised by those who maintain that psychoanalysis is not and never can be a natural science. Their argument, we find, stems from the belief that scientific method is inseparable from logical positivism [empiricism] and reductionism. Although confidently and often dogmatically held earlier this century, this model of science is now discarded, and its place taken by a philosophy of evolutionary epistemology. This holds that all knowledge is conjectural, and that science progresses through new theories coming to replace older ones when it becomes clear that a new theory is able to make sense of a greater circle of phenomena than are comprehended and explained by an older one. This same method is held to be applicable in all theoretical or generalizing sciences whether they deal with physical, biological or social phenomena. Furthermore, since to understand phenomena at any one level of complexity demands concepts appropriate to that level, the notion that complex phenomena must be explained in terms of concepts appropriate to a lower level of complexity, namely reductionism, is now recognized as fallacious. ... Invaluable though scientific method is as a way of obtaining relatively reliable knowledge, resolving differences of opinion, and making useful predictions, its limitations are nonetheless considerable. One is that science deals in generalities but has little to say about singular specific events. ...In certain of the human sciences, moreover, the individual example is the very essence of the case. History, for instance, whether it deals with societies, persons, or ideas, is always concerned with an appallingly complex sequence of highly specific interacting events, which no amount of science can enable us to explain adequately let alone predict. Thus, the distinction between the natural sciences and the historical sciences is not that they use a different method of obtaining knowledge but that the problems that they strive to understand and the criteria they adopt are quite different. One is concerned to formulate general laws in terms of probabilities, the other to understand singular specific events in as much detail as possible. The distinction is central to the whole argument. ...

Under the label ‘psychoanalysis’, it is clear, two complementary disciplines are striving to live and develop. In so far as we are trying to understand the general principles accounting for personality development and psychopathology, necessary for example if we are to know what forms of child care
tend to produce what sorts of personality formation, we adopt the criteria of the natural sciences. And we do the same when we are trying to understand the essential features of effective therapy. In these fields we are dealing with statistical probabilities. In so far as we are concerned to understand the personal problems of a given individual, and what events may have contributed to their development, necessary if we are to help him (though far from sufficient), we adopt the criteria of the historical sciences. Each approach contributes to our understanding; ...only if we are clear-headed about what belongs to each shall we be able to make progress” (Bowlby, 1984).

**Bottom up, top down and middle across:** Discussion requires resorting to the movement of a motor vehicle above. Each bottom up and top down are either a change in position or a change in velocity, while middle across is either a change in velocity or a change in acceleration. Thus, bottom up (change in position) is aligned with suppression (velocity) while top down (change in position) is aligned with repression (velocity), which leaves acceleration to be addressed. Regarding the fundamental structure of psychology, Calkins (p. 38) aligned psychology with the fundamentals of logic versus information. From this it follows, in the absence of cause, bottom up information is aligned with the logic of suppression, while top down information is aligned with the logic of repression. Where cause enters the picture is middle across is nothing more than the management of anxiety as depicted in Figure 6 (Defenses against anxiety, p. 47).

In summary and with attention directed to therapeutic and psychoanalytic jurisprudence, “Perhaps this confusion is based on a a limited understanding of how extraspective causality is generally demonstrated in psychology. To demonstrate causality, one only needs to show that change in one event regularly and systematically relates to change in the probability of the occurrence of a following event. At bottom then, causality is an empirical rather than theoretical issue. If changes in therapist behavior can be shown to relate to changes in client behavior (outcome), then there is a causal relationship. The causal relationship is believed to exist regardless of whether or not there is evidence of a causal mechanism. More important, the causal relationship is believed to exist regardless of the theoretical perspective of the therapist, whether the therapist hypothesizes causality or claims only to be developing awareness. Conversely, it is also true that if the therapist hypothesizes causality, and no such causal relationship can be shown empirically, the therapist's theories do not make it so. In fact, it is this issue that traditionally has been the bone of contention between psychotherapists and the rest of the psychological community” (Peterson, 1977).

**Transference, resistance and countertransference:** The countertransference likely (but not exclusively) comports with the suppression component of bottom up (change in position) being aligned with suppression (velocity), while the transference likely (but not exclusively) comports with the repression component of top down (change in position) being aligned with repression (velocity). This leaves resistance as synonymous with middle across, thus presenting anxiety as the source of change in velocity (deceleration versus acceleration).

**Melancholia and introspection:** Melancholia is a limited invocation of either bottom up or top down, thus setting introspection as a special invocation of anxiety.

**Frustration and aggression:** Frustration emerges either from poor alignment between bottom up information and the logic of suppression, or from poor alignment between top down information and the logic of repression. Aggression is nothing more than the intended management of anxiety.

**Nature versus nurture:** Focus on nature is limited to either bottom up or top down while focus on nurture is limited to anxiety with the result any number of issues such as the opioid problem with narcissism the placeholder for all such problems.
One assessment—“In fact, the concept of narcissism has provided a theme for many forms cultural criticism in the 20th century. Erich Fromm used the term to describe pathological forms of selfishness that destroy the individual's commitment to others. On the level of the individual as well as the group, Fromm categorized narcissistic traits that he considered anti-social and self-destructive, such as prejudice, bigotry, and vanity based on an over-inflated, unrealistic sense of self. For Fromm, the history of Western civilization from the Renaissance to the present has been a struggle between the polarities of narcissism and 'humanism'—between narrow 'self-love' and the broader awareness of the interdependency of all of mankind. Following Fromm's lead, other cultural analysts have invoked narcissism as a synonym for evil itself. Grace Stuart, for example, identifies narcissism as 'a major spiritual aberration' that has made its presence throughout the history of the human race. Shirley Sugerman similarly refers to myth of Narcissus as a timeless 'metaphor for the human situation', manifesting itself in pervasive forms of self-deception, self-hatred, and the possible annihilation of the entire human community. ... 'Constant inhibition, restraining normal feelings, keeping back, holding in check atomic forces of the mind and body', argued George Beard at the end of the 19th century, 'is an exhausting process'...an incapacitating form [of] nervous tension he labelled neurasthenia” (Battan, 1983).

Attention now turns to this track's seven topics: (1) Reliance on seduction, (2) Libidinal energy based distribution, (3) Success versus failure, (4) Fantasy versus phantasy, (5) Repression versus suppression, (6) Informational communications, (7) Affective mental disorders.

Reliance on seduction

The reference to seduction has two roots in this paper with a third to be introduced in this discussion. The first is from above (p. 12)—Simply stated seduction is the application of Influence and expectations. Typically, at least in the contemporary sense, influence is implemented by advertising [the impetus to progression] in the commercial world, while expectations [of safe harbor], also in a contemporary sense, are implemented by the immediate social structure. The second is from John B. Watson's Pebeco campaign, the application of a subliminal message (p. 31). The first was an active form of seduction while the second was a passive form. The third is personality with emphasis on mood, Figure 11.

An example of active is provided by Pierre Janet in the abstract leading to his assessment of his life as published in the first volume of the nine-volume series The history of psychology in autobiography most deserving of a smile: “The editor of this collection had a very unique idea when he asked psychologists to write their own intellectual histories and criticisms, to transform themselves into philosophical historians, and treat themselves as though they had been dead for a long time. This hardly seems right since we are too active and too close to our own work to judge it with independence and to understand the influences which have unknowingly drawn us in certain directions. I have always protested against subjective psychology, and here I am asked for a most personal and subjective psychological analysis. It will necessarily be very poor, and the historians of the future, if by chance they should concern
themselves with me, will find this autobiography very ridiculous. I beg to be excused in advance and I blame the initiators of this Project and their powers of seduction” (Janet, 1930|1961, p. 123).

An example of passive is what life – and this discussion – is about and is explored from the perspective of the prior calculus-based discussion, spanning middle across, bottom up and top down to be followed by mood.

**Middle across**

Working memory of Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43) is a storehouse of interpreted history, that, in turn, defines not only the person’s relationship with their object world but also the character of that world. This includes the seductions or influences that have formed perception over time, in tandem with the rules for reasoning or interpretation that have developed independently.

“We have found that such ideas, conscious or unconscious, may exert an inhibiting influence upon the mind and it has been shown that there exists various automatic mechanisms or tendencies, or whatever we may call them, which tend to bring about a certain adjustment to our difficulties. We shall see, however, that these tendencies are not without their dangers and that it is in this direction that pathological deviations may develop. The essential means which the normal individual uses to get square with conflicts are of a different sort. I refer to the many healthy mind habits and reactions such as the formation of healthy interests which allow us to turn away from our own difficulties, or a sense of correct values, or the habit of clear thinking and clear feeling, or an aggressiveness which shapes conditions around us to a certain extent, or a wholesome unburdening, and many others; in a word, all those healthy mind habits in which the normal personality asserts itself and counterbalances the formation, growth and accumulation of undercurrents. If we now turn to the pathological conditions we find the same principles at work, only in much exaggerated form. Freud has shown what a great role the mechanism of displacement, that is, of forgetting or suppressing unpleasant memories, plays in both hysteria and obsessions, and how the suppressed undercurrents influence the mental activities in a great variety of ways. Although the disturbing memory may be wholly forgotten so far as the facts are concerned, the affect, the fear, or the depression or the uneasiness may persist or crop up and be then associated with ideas and happenings, the content of which is curiously incongruous with the disturbing emotions. Or peculiar substitutive activities may be instinctively chosen either as a result of suppressed or conscious disturbing factors. All this may be comparatively transparent, or it may be covered up under the guise of symbolisms. Such activities are then apt to occur with imperative force” (Hoch, 1907).

While this entire process has the capacity to put in place an alienation from self (Horney, 1950, pp. 155-175), given the character of influences ranging from healthy adjustments to disturbing emotions, the alignment of middle across with the second derivative, deceleration versus acceleration, is confirmed.

**Bottom up**

Processing that is directly influenced by environmental stimuli leaves open to question – by what standards. There are many issues here that are best described as crosscurrents versus suppression which was previously aligned with velocity versus bottom up (p. 102). Candidate crosscurrents include ‘can’ (Heider, 1958, pp. 84-100) and ‘should’ (Horney, 1950, pp. 64-85) neither of which imply resilience versus suppression. In fact, each ‘can’ and ‘should’ insure that suppression is a self-fulfilling prophesy that, in turn, feeds frustration and anxiety. The task now is to examine projective identification, ego versus self, and, self-concept versus self-esteem, as enablers of each ‘can’ and ‘should’.
Projective identification is some mix of “transference (the real and the irrational aspects of the patient’s relationship to the therapist), resistance (the dynamic repetition of the patient’s reluctance to recover anxiety-evoking experiences), and countertransference (the real and irrational aspects of the therapist’s relationship to the patient)” (Fromm-Reichmann, 1959, p. 28), where the percent distribution of mental energy devoted to each is determined less by suppression, somewhat by personality, but more by mood. A solid vote against therapeutic jurisprudence but for the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence comes from “All humans, therefore, all analysts, have unacceptable aspects of self. The dissociation of the dismissed self can be maintained if projective identification allows the illusion that it is the other’s (patient’s) self which is being projected onto us, rather than our own which is being contacted. This also maintains the illusion that our own analysis has been complete, if not perfect” (Knapp, 1989). From this it follows that the flattening of life allows the potential for progress without prejudice towards a person being engaged in self-directed analysis versus a professional engagement, particularly with natural conflict resolution (p. 60) relaxed to ‘can’ versus ‘should’.

Ego versus self, on the surface seems to be much about not too much in that interchangeability seems natural. There is a difference that goes well beyond semantics—“The terms ego and self at present are used interchangeably. I contend that in the current use of these terms are to be found two meanings at once so distinct and so fundamental that it would be a great advantage to retain and limit to one of these meanings the term ego, and reserve to the other the term self. By self I would indicate always an idea present in the self-consciousness of any individual; by ego, the individual who is or can be self-conscious, who has or may have the sense of self and not-self” (Hughes, 1906). From this it follows that the reasonable alignment has ‘self’ descending from bottom up with suppression firmly as the determinant (velocity), ‘ego’ is a function of what is received from working memory, and ‘can’ versus ‘should’ as a function of mood.

Self-concept versus self-esteem, on the surface, seem to be extensions of ‘ego’ and ‘self’ respectively, and they are, and on a very personal basis for each individual person. The issue being raised here is the fundamental objection to therapeutic jurisprudence as an implied cookie-cutter mask. For reference to insure clarity with respect to intent, a repeat of a prior comment (p. 101)—the assessment about discovery of the five characteristics of personality—“In many ways it seems remarkable that such stability should be found in an area which to date has granted anything but consistent results. Undoubtedly the consistency has always been there, but it has been hidden by inconsistency of factorial techniques and philosophies, the lack of replication using identical variables, and disagreement among analysts as to factor titles” (Tupes, 1961).

There is an enormous difference between the characteristics of personality and the execution of those characteristics as evidence by ego versus self with the in-the-moment force of mood the proof as mood is a micro issue that cannot be advanced to a macro issue. “For most of the past century, a deeply behavioristic field of psychology consigned theory and research on the self-concept and self-esteem to the backwaters of the discipline. Then, in the late 1970s, articles by Kuiper and Rogers (1979), Markus (1977), and others demonstrated that self-views had properties similar to schemas and beliefs—constructs that had recently been championed by cognitive psychologists. In so doing, these researchers legitimized the self-concept as a viable scientific construct. The result was a steep increase in research on the self during the 1980s. At about the same time, an independent wave of enthusiasm within the lay community thrust the construct of self-esteem into the national limelight. On the basis of precious little evidence, the California Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility (1989) characterized self-esteem as a panacea whose cultivation would protect people from a host of ills, including welfare dependency, teenage pregnancy, dropping out of high school, and so on. Thousands of laypersons across America were smitten with the hope that in self-esteem they had
found a modern-day Holy Grail. No longer. With ample justification, members of the academic community pointed out that the extravagant claims of the self-esteem movement were nothing more than that. Yet, in very recent years, the pendulum has swung even further, both reflecting—and inspiring—deep doubts about the viability of the self-esteem construct. Several authors have questioned the utility of self-esteem in predicting important social outcomes, asserting that the effect sizes linking self-esteem to important outcome variables are small and inconsequential. Although some authors have championed more sophisticated strategies for using self-views to predict outcome variables of interest, others have thrown up their hands, concluding that the evidentiary basis of self-esteem research is so fundamentally flawed that the entire enterprise should be reexamined. Recently, some of the original critics of self-esteem research have added that because self-esteem appears to be inconsequential, ‘efforts to boost people’s self-esteem are of little value in fostering academic achievement or preventing undesirable behavior’ [or gaining compliance]" [Italics added] (Swann, 2007).

It is necessary to point out that studies of each self-concept and self-esteem as proxies for schemas and beliefs are important inputs to predicting important social outcomes, once self-concept and self-esteem are admitted as extensions of ‘ego’ and ‘self’ respectively and on the strength of extensive and varied work within experimental psychology. Schemas and beliefs will be discussed under the heading Mood below.

Top down

This is about self-punishing versus self-enhancing without prejudice for ‘ego’ versus ‘self’ — personal experience and its deployment is the issue. The fundamental characteristic of personal experience in the absence of self-punishing and self-enhancing is its resilience. Once personal experience is recognized as being influenced by repression, then self-punishing and self-enhancing become operative with priority of one versus the other a function of repression as velocity. The task now is to examine purpose, intuition and stigma with self-punishing and self-enhancing the basis.

Purpose versus a reason to act has precedent in either experience alone or in experience as influenced by repression, and, this is without regard for self-punishing and self-enhancing. “From this point of view, an intelligent person is one who is able to transpose one situation into another. But in any case, one has to fall back upon his past experience and transpose some relevant situation into that presented by the problem. But as thus stated, this is nothing more than reasoning by analogy. ...Probably no two things in nature (not even two electrons) are ever exactly alike in all respects, but the relatively insignificant differences among objects of the same class can be ignored. 'Identity' is really the limiting case of analogy as two things become more and more alike. The comparison of the elements of an analogy presupposes a process of ‘matching’, and if, as the matching proceeds, it becomes evident that the assemblage of properties of the new situation corresponds point for point with the assemblage of properties of the old situation in significant respects, the analogy increases in validity or probable truth. Theoretically we never reach absolute certainty in this type of reasoning, but, at best, secure a high degree of probability” (Reiser, 1931). From this we have two possible relationships – one:one and one:many.

The one:one is simply new problem : old problem : : new solution : old solution. While this relationship is likely very common in everyday life it fails to expose the dynamics of purpose.

Purpose is assumed to be comprised of three comingled dynamics – experience, emotional investment and frustration. Emotional investment alone accounts for self-enhancing which may be modified by repression, while frustration alone accounts for self-punishing which may be emphasized by repression. These three comingled dynamics opens discussion to harmonic balance as asserted by the Fourier
Integral (Kreyszig, 1967, pp. 465-472). That Integral is comprised of three component coefficients known as Euler Formulas (Ibid, p. 435) as shown in Figure 12. Now to align the Integral and component Formulas to purpose. The \( a_0 \) coefficient accounts for experience; the \( a_n \) coefficient accounts for emotional investment (self-enhancing); and, the \( b_n \) coefficient accounts for frustration (self-punishing). The ’n’ of each the \( a_n \) and \( b_n \) coefficients represents periodicity, effectively, the rhythms of the longitudinal event known as life. Finally, given the reliance on the \( \cos \) (cosine) and \( \sin \) (sine) functions which are 180° apart in the cartesian coordinate system, the Integral insures no comingling of attributes of emotional investment with attributes of frustration.

Intuition has basis in the rhythms of life, the superset of biorhythms, and, all too often, is a mask over the three heavily comingled rationalizations of dissociation, introspection and the transference. This is not about seduction in a negative sense but in a very neutral, in-stream across life, as an extension of Hartley’s Association of Ideas where the impetus is a superset of introspection, effectively auto-pilot. The fundamental issue is the stimulus – is it truly a stimulus or is it a sensation that is interpreted – “The dethronement of sensation has been due to a variety of causes. The Introspectionist today recognizes that even our most elementary data are complex. Every actual conscious experience includes a variety of constituents, which are juxtaposed, fused, and modified by the residual of earlier experiences. Analysis of an experience into simple sensations is accordingly not a matter of direct observation. It can only be made indirectly, by reference to the external sources of the experience; and this involves the so-called stimulus error. Much the same conclusion is reached by the study of behavior or by examining the neural aspect of the receptive process. The significance of any single stimulus or any single nerve impulse is lost in the composite activity of the organism as a whole” (Warren, 1931).

...they [the writers of the 1880’s] were at one in upholding the introspective method of investigation, and in limiting psychology to the treatment of conscious experiences. Bain followed the traditional view of Hartley and James Mill, which attributed complex experiences to the association of ideas. McCosh favored the Scottish intuitionism of Thomas Reid. Both schools agreed in assigning a prominent role to sensation and volition. And there was a general disposition to classify mental phenomena into three groups, *variously known as cognition, affection, and conation, or as intellect, feeling, and will* [Italics added]. ...Now it seems to me that we have carried too far this concept of the organism acting as a whole. Not but that it is extremely important to emphasize the unitary character of organic processes. Organs, members, cells, interact. Physiological functions work together, sometimes simultaneously, sometimes serially, as part of a single organic operation. In the domain of psychological interest, stimulation of the receptors is of value to the creature only as it is related to the response process. What I question is the usefulness of attempting to link the activity of each specific physiological operation to every part of the organism. ...The real value of the organismic conception of activity lies in its unitary character, rather than in its pervasiveness. We must treat the organism as an interacting system. The cooperation of its functions is far more important than the separate functions themselves. But to insist that every organic function is concerned in the working of each specific physiological activity, or that the entire nervous system takes part in each stimulus-response operation, seems an
unprofitable and unwarranted assumption. ...The psychologist is interested only incidentally in the separate functions of stimulation, conduction, muscular contraction, and the like. He is concerned, rather, with the operation of the whole group as a system. ...For the concept of the organism as a system points to a treatment of the major problem of psychology which is quite analogous to that of the earlier writers [of the 1880's]. We can view the organism – the creature – as receiving sensory data or impressions through the receptors, and as acting responsively upon these data. Now this is virtually the standpoint of the traditional psychology, except that these impressions were supposed to operate upon a hypothetical soul-substance [dualism], and the individual's responsive expressions were attributed to the initiative or will of this entity. Apart from that metaphysical assumption, the traditional view harmonizes with present knowledge. ...The term sensation is therefore ambiguous. It may mean either the elementary unit of consciousness, or the elementary excitation of the sense organ. This confusion is avoided if we substitute the term impression for the elementary effect on the receptor [Italics added] (Ibid). From this it follows the Fourier Integral is equally applicable to intuition.

**Stigma** is the opposite of intuition. Stigma as a form of persuasion generates one of three reactions acceptance, compliant or defensive where each result in an emotional bias that is a distortion in cognition and decision making. Acceptance tends to the dramatization of the stigma, compliant tends to the acting of the role, and defensive tends to a counter stigma. Of concern here is defensive, essentially, “Feeling good, but not thinking straight: The impact of positive mood on persuasion” (Dowling, 2005).

This discussion of Stigma is an extension of the above discussion of Purpose but with the representations accounted for by the Euler Formulas reversed. The $a_0$ coefficient continues to account for experience; the $a_n$ coefficient accounts for emotional investment (self-punishing); and, the $b_n$ coefficient accounts for frustration (self-enhancing). Thus, with stigma, intuition becomes “the active self-protective and self-esteem-maintaining strategies that are widely characteristic of the stigmatized and nonstigmatized alike, and the special opportunities for self-protection and self-enhancement afforded by membership in a stigmatized group” (Crocker, 1989).

**Mood**

Mood is the superset of personality Figure 11 (Mood, p. 104), and is the enabler of purpose, intuition and stigma. Mood begets self-concept and self-esteem where either can emerge, via schemas and beliefs, as self-enhancing or self-punishing. The following covers gestalt (Hartley’s Association of Ideas), discounting (purpose), self-regulation (intuition) and social risk (stigma).

**Gestalt (Hartley’s Association of Ideas):** The construction of Figure 11 implies the percent distribution of the members of the Big Five will always add to 100%. As previously stated (p. 105), there is an enormous difference between the characteristics of personality and the execution of those characteristics as evidence by ego versus self with the in-the-moment force of mood the proof as mood is a micro issue that cannot be advanced to a macro issue. Mood is formed by the characteristics of personality while a micro invocation of mood is an ego-determined emphasis of an elementary characteristic of personality, a statement that conforms to aesthetics versus absolute, “...the feeling of sublimity arises in us even when the object as perceived has no definite limits, though it is always conceived as a whole” (Watson, 1877, p. 297).

“Speaking summarily, one may say the [gestalt] theory is a plea for insistence on wholes and whole processes. This insistence, one may add as a final remark, is not confined in more recent thinking to psychology. In his essay on atomic theories, Professor Bragg, speaking of matter, electricity and energy, states that ‘Nature herself has already chosen units for them. The natural unit does not, of course, bear any exact connection with our own . . . Nature has chosen to speak in a certain language; we must get to
know that language’. These sentences might be taken as the text of the gestalt movement. The gestalt theory sets up exactly such a new psychological unit, one which is not, indeed, indivisible but which satisfies the condition for a real natural unit that it cannot be further subdivided without suffering an alteration of its essential nature” (Humphrey, 1924).

**Discounting (purpose):** Mood is not consistent with the Figure 7 (Unit Step Function, p. 53). While mood is likely spontaneous, that spontaneity has precedent in personality as the source of either a proactive or reactive disposition of some impetus. The nature of the reaction conforms to the subjective expected utility theory of decision making under uncertainty of modern economic theory (Ghirardato, 2002). That theory applies to mood – discomfort (economic) versus discontent (emotional) – with resolution resolved through discounting. “Delay discounting is the process by which the value of an expected reward decreases as the delay to obtaining that reward increases” (Hirsh, 2010).

**Self-regulation (intuition):** Self-regulation is accounted for by the gap in Figure 7 where mood influences action and effort – (1) decision making (Hartley’s Association of ideas) and (2) resource mobilization (discounting, purpose). Specifically, people’s interest in behaviors that facilitate hedonic experiences depends on their momentary need for well-being and the perceived instrumentality of potential acts for satisfying this need. Resource mobilization is influenced by the use of moods as diagnostic information for demand appraisals, which in turn determine the intensity of effort and the persistence of behavior” (Gendolla, 2005).

**Social risk (stigma):** Social risk is accompanied by some combination of three reactions acceptance, compliant or defensive where each result in an emotional bias that is a distortion in cognition and decision making with depressed states the risk. “Many features of depressed states can be understood in relation to mechanisms that reduce social risk in such circumstances, including (a) hypersensitivity to signals of social threat from others, (b) sending signals to others that reduce social risks, and (c) inhibiting risk-seeking (e.g., confident, acquisitive) behaviors” (Allen, 2003).

**Libidinal energy-based distribution**

This discussion of libido is not about sexuality but is about ‘instinct’ or ‘drives’ – source, aim, object. Hence, the self and the object world. Discussion spans six topics – (1) purpose of the object world, (2) extension of the object world, (3) basis of the object world, (4) extension of self, (5) metaphysics of self, (6) emergence of self.

**Purpose of the object world**

While this paper is about two forms of jurisprudence – therapeutic and psychoanalytic – it is also about an individual’s centrist expectations from society with those expectations founded in parallels between the basis of each psychoanalysis and jurisprudence. “Psychoanalysis endeavors to provide a systematic theory of human behavior. Law, both as a body of substantive decisions and as a process for decision making, has been created by man to regulate the behavior of man. Psychoanalysis seeks to understand the workings of the mind. Law is mind-of-man-made. There is in law, as psychoanalysis teaches that there is in individual man, a rich residue which each generation preserves from the past, modifies for the present, and leaves for the future. An initial, though tentative assumption that one discipline is relevant to the other seems therefore warranted. The congruence of their concern for man, his mind, his behavior, and his environment may justify this assertion of mutual relevance. But it does nothing to demarcate the potential use and potential limits of psychoanalysis as an aid to understanding the meaning and function of law” (Goldstein, 1968).
Extension of the object world

This is about community as the host of the intent of each psychoanalysis and jurisprudence from which follows the notion of generalities with respect to ‘instinct’ or ‘drives’. The noted generalities then become the common denominator of the community (Baldwin, 1907).

Basis of the object world

Necessary to a coexistence of psychoanalysis and jurisprudence is a common basis that recognizes each ‘instinct’ and ‘drives’ separately and jointly. On an either-or basis ‘instinct’ implies biology while ‘drives’ imply ethics. Thus, “Biology is the science of the vital properties of organic beings. Ethics is the science of the right conduct of rational beings. Or, let us rather say, it is the attempted formulation of what constitutes right conduct for thinking, social beings, whereby they become truly rational” (Montgomery, 1894). The centrist resolution of “attempted formulation” is the purpose of psychoanalysis and jurisprudence operating in concert.

Extension of self

This is the opposite of basis of the object world and is about how the object world corresponds to self. On an either-or basis ‘instinct’ implies somato-psyche while ‘drives’ imply libido. This requires Hartley’s Doctrine of Vibrations to be the superset of his Doctrine of Association of Ideas.

The issue is an attempted antithesis to loneliness and aloneness by invoking a dualism where Vibrations are about somato-psyche, the superset of psychosomatic, and Ideas are about the resolution of libido.

“Many psychologists think that we know very much about our own body and they feel that this knowledge of our own body is the surest we have. But this is not so. We know very little about ourselves. When we close our eyes we even don’t know where the borderlines of our own body are. We do not have a correct representation of our face, otherwise mirrors would be unnecessary. We are curious about ourselves because we actually do not know very much about our bodily ego. The image we have of our body, or, as it is also called the body schema or postural model of the body, is partially based on sensations and partially on representations and thoughts. It is in many respects different from our actual body. ...Every disturbance in the emotional life will therefore immediately react on the body image and libidinous disturbances will provoke changes in the schema of the body. ...We do not have a fixed picture of ourselves. We are not sure of our body image. We have to gain and to construct the body image. We have to build it up with the help of an integrated personality and an integrated sexuality. Disintegration of sexuality disintegrates the body image. ...The body image changes continually according to the libidinous situation of the individual. ...The body image belongs to the community. Whatever we may do the body images are never isolated. There is a continual interchange between our own body image and the body images of others. We want to know about them. We want to project parts of our own bodies into others. We are never completely contented with our own body image. It is in a continual flux, it is always changing. We change it by dancing. The limbs change their gravity, the circular movement makes the parts of the body fly away. Clothes change our body image. They make us appear larger. They help us to expand beyond ourselves. We put on masks, we walk on stilts, we may even become a part of a horse and in carnival festivities we may grow immense noses and immense heads. Sometimes we want to contract. Sometimes we tie the bodice tight and wear narrow clothes. We do not respect our physical borderlines. The clothes very often emphasize the erogenic zones. The transposition of parts of the body image reflects in the clothing. ...The space around the body has a specific psychological meaning. It is different from the space of physics. When one is wounded everything is psychologically nearer to this wound. An approaching car or approaching person seem almost to touch this wound. Whenever there is an erogenic zone in the foreground the objects
come nearer to this organ. ...Bodies are after all not isolated entities. The body and the body image are always the body and the body image of a personality which expresses itself in the body. The body image is never an isolated part of our existence, but it is a part of every experience. The human personality is a personality with a body which expresses itself in the body image and only on the basis of the understanding of the body image can we understand the personality fully. But the personality is more than the body and the body image” (Schilder, 1934).

**Metaphysics of self**

This discussion has substance as the superset of libido, which, in turn, is the superset of ‘instinct’ or ‘drives’ – source, aim, object. Specifically, substance presents itself as ego yet is largely undefined; libido is perception; and, the ‘drives’ or ‘instinct’ is the execution of substance.

“The psychological 'moment' which underlies all effort at metaphysical speculation is the distinction of perception and conception, and the possibility of a metaphysic has always turned on the completeness and thoroughness of this distinction. For example, in Plato's doctrine of the three grades of thought, the first is occupied with the cognition of isolated, individual objects present in sense-perception; the second with 'ideas' in the sense of permanent relations among these objects; whilst the third is concerned with reason, or the self-relation of knowledge as a totality of the visible and invisible worlds, viewed as the revelation of an absolute idea. In this doctrine (probably the most remarkable ever made in psychology) there is a clear recognition of the distinction referred to: a doctrine which has so far remained uncontradicted. Aristotle imparted greater definiteness to it, but he did not add to its content. He showed more clearly than Plato the indissoluble connection of the third and the first stages; he took the Platonic dialectic and made it a logic of perception, the main effort of which was to discover the primary categories of our empirical knowledge of things. He taught that this process could become a strict and technical science, that perception, though dealing with individual facts, necessarily advances, according to certain primary forms, and is methodically ascertained by means of the syllogism. Aristotle, therefore, considered certain parts of the mind's activity as moribund or passive reason, in which he includes memory, imagination, and the discursive intellect. His meaning seems to be (and herein he is more definite than Plato) that our knowledge does not result from an exhaustive inventory of details; but mere facts tend to perish, as it were, as the mind undertakes the search for causes, for permanent and continuous relations, which search is the task: facts are regarded mechanical stimulus to categorical knowledge. It will be observed that Plato left the universal somewhat isolated: the real is the class concept, sense-perception is the realm of becoming. Aristotle, not believing less, as Professor Watson has recently pointed out,' that sense gave us access to the real, nevertheless endeavored to penetrate the living reality and out of this empirical foundation erect a conceptual view of the real, in short, a metaphysic. 

To sum up: The concept of substantiality is involved in the following psychological experiences; (I) In the experience described as ‘awareness of an object’: substance here presenting itself as the object of sense-perception, active in producing effects on our consciousness, and vitally related thereto, and in the mind's active participation in and with the object; (2) In the experience wherein the mind actively discriminates itself as the ego, and real subject of states not contained in the objective order of things; (3) In the sense of a transcendent activity applying the logical function on a basis of essential and mutual activity between the two orders of our experience. A valid inference, qualifying reality, implies possibility of this interaction, and culminates in the conception of substance as an absolute form-concept, the absolute self-determining activity, and self-identical, throughout the universe” (Davies, 1899).
Emergence of self

This is an extension of substance with emphasis on illusion that has the capacity to spawn loneliness when aloneness should be the objective. There three references for this discussion: (1) The core text of Erika Fromm’s letter to the 100 scientists and philosophers above (p. 100). (2) The last paragraph of Einstein’s letter also above. (3) Freud’s response which was saved for now. These three statements address Emergence of self as a middle across (p. 43) phenomenon.

Fromm’s letter – “Let me reformulate my question. Theoretically, it seems to me that there are three possibilities which could cause an intellectual discovery:

1. The initiative lies in the thing itself; the ‘thing’ cries for a solution, for the closing of a gap which demands closure, closure of a very specific sort, which makes it become a ‘good gestalt’ closure. That would mean the dynamics of the productive thinking stem from the ‘thing’ itself. The ‘thing’ through its inner logic determines the origin and the course of the thought processes.

2. The task comes to pass through the free decision or interest of the thinker, the initiative of the thinker himself. The ‘thing’ itself does not have any goal-directedness nor any demands.

3. The dynamic comes from both sides, from the ‘thing’ as well as from the thinker” (Fromm, 1998).

Einstein’s response – “The psychological situation is comparable with the attitude of somebody who wants to solve a puzzle or a chess problem, who is convinced that the solution exists, because the creator of the problem possesses the solution. The only difference lies in that the psychic energy arises from the generality of the problem [gestalt], and from its root in the relationship to reality [aesthetics]” [Italics added] (Ibid).

Freud’s response – “Philosophical thinking and ways of expression are unfortunately so unfamiliar to me that I am not even able in my own thoughts to distinguish from each other the possibilities you describe in your questions. Therefore, I really cannot give you an answer” (Ibid).

Freud’s response reflects he as a medical scientist – “Freud's boldness in exploring territories so new that he had to invent his own navigational equipment as he went along was laced through with a determination to claim sightings of the homeland, and so end his explorations by making a premature closure between his current position and the relative safety of physical science. This tendency toward premature closure with what is familiar is most evident in his theory of the libido. Freud's sexual theory, as expressed in 'Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality', was really two distinct theories. The first was a psychological one, his theory of infantile sexuality proper, which held that sexual life begins before adolescence, and that there is a genetic continuity between infantile (childhood) sexuality on one hand and adult perversions and normal adult sexuality on the other. His theory of neurosis rested in part on infantile sexuality, which provided the motives, in the form of persistent infantile sexual wishes, necessary to drive one side of the conflict of which the neurosis was an expression. Freud's theory of infantile sexuality was based on first-hand clinical observations, such as Lindner's (1879) of children's sexual activities, and on fantasies that he himself uncovered in the consulting room” (Caper, 1988, pp. 75-76).

The prior discussion of substance, Metaphysics of self, is a natural extension through Freud’s consulting room to the everyday life invocations of self-enhancing and self-punishing behavior with Glover’s specification of progression the conceptual descriptor with the result as shown in Figure 6 (Defenses against anxiety, p. 47), Einstein’s “the creator of the problem possesses the solution” is affirmation.

The Emergence of self reduces to loneliness versus aloneness.
Loneliness is accounted for by self-punishing behavior that results from a “fragmentation of self” (Sass, 1987) while aloneness is accounted for by self-enhancing behavior – Einstein’s “the generality of the problem [gestalt]”.

It takes a healthy acceptance of the relationship between the self and the object world to account for Einstein’s “the relationship to reality [aesthetics].

Success versus failure

This discussion is about the valuing process with basis in emotion as it radiates from a person’s surrounding socio-economic environment as the superset of a person’s self and their object world, then on to the formation of experience. This discussion is an extension of substance which results in Metaphysics of self being bounded by the objective ‘should’ (Horney, 1950, pp. 64-85) and the subjective ‘ought’ (Heider, 1958, pp. 218-243). The following establishes a link between libido and emotion then traverses a sample of the development of understanding about emotion covering the following writers – John Dewey (1894) ; J. Mark Baldwin (1908); J. W. Bridges (1924); Harry F. Harlow and Ross Stagner (1932-1933); and, Abraham Maslow (1943).

Libido versus emotion: “What difference does it make if libido is understood to be object-seeking rather than pleasure-seeking, if impulses are understood to be constitutive of ego structures rather than separate from them?” (Greenberg, 1983, p. 155). Without recognition of emotion there probably would be no basis for the cinema, how boring, Hamlet portrayed by Shakespeare as a lawyer in London’s financial district.

Beyond the possibility of a sterile persona, emotion provides a person with protection. Imagine a person not reacting to crisis such as a burning building – “an emotion is more than just a particular pattern of objective changes that reflect a diagnostic body state or a physical action – its reality derives from the way that perception works in a human mind, in conjunction with other human minds” (Barrett, 2012).

To dissect into component words such as anger, hate, love, and so forth is not enough as such implies that emotion is much like an appendage. Instead, emotion needs to be recognized as dynamic, as having changing character that depends upon which of the Big Five is most pronounced at any moment.

John Dewey: There are four issues here – (1) Hartley’s Doctrines of Vibrations and Association of Ideas. (2) Freud’s focus on physiology in his Project for a Scientific Psychology. (3) Darwin’s principles as to the explanation of emotional attitudes, aesthetic experience that is not point-in-time. (4) James-Lange theory of the nature of emotion, the fundamental if-then puzzle. Given that both Hartley’s and Freud’s positions have been discussed, and given that both positions are static, focus here will be limited to the formation of each aesthetic experience and if-then experience.

Given the information available to Dewey in 1894, it is not possible to resolve Darwin to James-Lange except through compromise. If Darwin is unequivocally true, then James-Lange is false, with the opposite equally the case. Thus, “Summing up, we may say that all so-called expressions of emotions are, in reality, the reduction of movements and stimulations originally useful into attitudes. But we note a difference in the form and nature of the reduction, and in the resulting attitudes, which explain the apparent diversity of the four principles of ‘serviceable associated habits’ [Darwin], of ‘analogous stimuli’ [James-Lange], of ‘antithesis’ [Darwin], and of ‘direct nervous discharge’ [James-Lange]” (Dewey, 1894).

J. Mark Baldwin: The positions presented by each Darwin and James-Lange constitute justified belief but not true knowledge with the formation of aesthetic versus if-then experience the issue. “We apprehend reality perceptually, we realize it emotionally, we postulate it ethically and religiously, we live it
mystically, we contemplate it aesthetically – all these must have the same thorough criticism and estimation that we accord to the true and the useful, which are the rationalist's and voluntarist's special modes. And the problem of Real Logic becomes that of finding the 'logic' of the adjustments of these modes of the real, each having its own place and meaning, in the final 'real' significance of experience. As Epistemology – that is a theory of the objective reference of knowledge – has its logic in the machinery of discursive thinking, and Worth-theory has its logic in the adjustment of means to ends, so each of the other modes of finding the real has a 'logic' of its operation in the economy of experience as a whole” [italics in original] (Baldwin, 1908a).

J. W. Bridges: *Metaphysics of self* as being bounded by the objective ‘should’ and the subjective ‘ought’ is far too fluid to be reduced to a single idea. Thus, the positions presented by introspectionist, the behaviorist, the functionalist, the structuralist, the psychoanalyst, and others need to be reconciled to a composite statement from which each of the advocates can start anew — “If we know something about ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’, we know next to nothing about ‘feeling’” (Bridges, 1924).

Harry F. Harlow and Ross Stagner: Staying with the *Metaphysics of self* as being bounded by the objective ‘should’ and the subjective ‘ought’, ‘feeling’, as modified by ‘emotion’, is presented as that which separates ‘should’ from ‘ought’ in two in-sequence respects.

First, “Four differentiable feelings are recognized: pain-unpleasantness, pleasure-pleasantness, excitement, and depression. In accord with the Cannon theory [versus James-Lange], the anatomical seat of these processes is assumed to be projection areas of the thalamus. Pain and unpleasantness are assumed to differ only in degree, as are also pleasure and pleasantness” (Harlow, 1932).

Second, “A theory of emotions ... holds that they are derived by conditioning and hence are not innate, but have their elementary basis in the four affective states of pleasantness, unpleasantness, excitement and depression. These are conscious feelings induced by activation of sensory thalamic projection centers and have reflex connections with various sub-cortical motor centers. In the emotion there is added to this the cognizance of the stimulating situation. Hence differentiation of specific emotions is not a matter of different motor components, but of differences in the conscious attitude taken toward the stimulus” (Harlow, 1933).

The first point addresses if-then experience while allowing for emotional investment. The second point addresses aesthetic experience while also allowing for emotional investment.

Abraham Maslow: Here the *Metaphysics of self* is advanced to a five-point smooth continuum – (1) the objective ‘should’, (2) the less objective ‘feeling’, (3) the aesthetics of personality, (4) the less subjective ‘emotion’, (5) the subjective ‘ought’. Aesthetics alone is the central issue in two respects, personality as a syndrome and hierarchies of importance across members of the syndrome.

Syndrome – “The characteristics of personality as a syndrome are “(1) interchangeability, (2) circular determination, (3) tendency of the well-organized syndrome to resist change or to maintain itself, (4) tendency of the well-organized syndrome to reestablish itself after change, (5) tendency of the syndrome to change as a whole (6) the tendency to internal consistency, (7) the tendency to extremeness of the syndrome level, (8) tendency of the syndrome to change under external pressures, (9) syndrome variables, and (10) cultural determination of syndrome expression” (Maslow, 1943b).

Hierarchies – The hierarchies are about importance and clusterings rather than homogeneity. This makes it possible to classify within the syndrome. The following analogies are ... aids in a holistic technique of classification: levels of magnification in which parts are seen in relation to the whole,
concept of syndrome concentration in which correlational data may be used, and the extent of interrelatedness within the organism” (Maslow, 1943c).

Thus, it is the unbounded dynamics of aesthetics that enables emotional investment to emerge as a result.

**Fantasy versus phantasy**

This discussion is an extension of the valuing process with emphasis placed on the formation of experience from middle across. Discussion spans a centrist view of affections, Locke’s position, James-Lange, the self and the object world, and, everyday life.

**Centrist affections:** This is about Plato versus Aristotle – Plato as the end of an era and its focus on biological based feelings, Aristotle as the start of an era and its focus on affective based emotion.

“[Plato's] point of departure [from prior writers] is the discussion concerning the relation of pleasure to good in contemporary ethics, but his views concerning the nature of pleasure and the affective life generally are greatly influenced by earlier opinion, which in its main trend was biological or physiological. ...A notable advance in the biological theory, one destined to exert great influence on subsequent thinking even down to modern times, appears in the writings of Hippocrates and his school. ...Hippocrates is the first writer definitely to connect the whole conscious life, including the emotions, with the brain. When the brain is overheated, terrors and fears arise; when it is unduly cold, grief and anxiety” (Gardiner, 1918). Thus, what might be the earliest mention of the four differentiable feelings of pain-unpleasantness, pleasure-pleasantness, excitement, and depression.

Aristotle extends Plato’s biological based feelings through affective based emotion and on to passion. “Anger is 'an impulse attended with pain to avenge openly an undeserved slight openly manifested towards ourselves or our friends'. The pain, however, which arises from the consciousness of frustrated desire, is only the predominant affection; there is besides an element of pleasure in the expectation of revenge. The objects of anger are individuals; the slight may be contempt, spite or insolence. Seasons, times, temperaments and periods of life condition the passion. Gentleness or placability is 'a settling or quiescence of anger', arising, e.g., from lapse of time, or from the mood induced by mirth or prosperity, or from pity on seeing the object of our anger suffer greater injury than the anger itself would have inflicted. Love or friendliness consists in 'wishing a person all the things you consider good, not for your sake, but for his, and readiness, so far as in you lies, to bring them about'. Hate or enmity is the opposite. Hate differs from anger in several respects. In anger we are moved by personal offences; we may hate a man solely for his character. Anger is concerned with individuals; hatred may be directed towards a class. Anger seeks to make the evil it inflicts manifest; to hate the exhibition of the evil is indifferent. Anger is necessarily painful, not so hate. Anger, finally, is not inconsistent with compassion; but if you hate a man, you aim at his destruction” (Gardiner, 1919). Thus, what might be the earliest mention of the four affective states of pleasantness, unpleasantness, excitement and depression.

**Locke’s position:** Given Locke’s position that a person is born with a mind that is a clean slate, it follows that the four differentiable feelings of pain-unpleasantness, pleasure-pleasantness, excitement, and depression, and, the four affective states of pleasantness, unpleasantness, excitement and depression are formed and molded during the longitudinal event known as life and as a basis for psychoanalysis.

Freud took that basis to the social impact on a person, that “the unconscious is created by early interactions, beginning already on a purely organismic level in utero and thus is structured under the influence of society and culture. The concepts of symbolization, de-symbolization, sensual-symbolic interactionform and speech-symbolic interactionform are introduced in order to illuminate three
meanings of phantasy: organismic interactionforms, pictorial phantasies in day-dreams and verbal phantasies or concepts” (Lorenzer, 2002).

**James-Lange:** Gustav Fechner introduced his psycho-physics in 1860, which was rooted in “Each sense is independent of the other, has its own specific energy and may be imagined as acting in isolation from all others, but consciousness and the brain associate and compound their data” (Hall, 1912, p.150). In subsequent years work with respect to consciousness and the brain centered on the thalamus region of the brain stem with William James in 1884 and Carl Lange in 1885 developing similar ideas which defined emotion as a feeling of physiological changes due to a stimulus — “In 1884, James made an appeal to asylum physicians and neurologists. He admitted that if the hypothesis which he suggested 'is ever to be definitely confirmed or disproved it seems as if it must be by them, for they alone have the data in their hands'” (Cannon, 1931). In 1920 Walter Cannon and Philip Bard delivered their counter to James-Lange, physiological changes follow emotions, the opposite of James-Lange. In a narrow sense, static versus dynamic, the current therapeutic jurisprudence operates from the James-Lange perspective while the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence operates from the Cannon-Bard perspective. 

"In 1910, [Titchener] was saying that the data of introspection are 'the sum-total of human experience considered as dependent upon the experiencing person',...introspection is the having of clear experience under the psychological point of view and the reporting upon it also under the psychological point of view. Substitute physical for psychological, and you have the formula for physics. The stock example for introspection is the illusion, the case where perception differs from stimulus-object in some respect. For perception experience is regarded just as it comes, dependent upon the perceiving of the perceiving person and thus the action of his nervous system. For the physical account of the object, however, the perceiver must be abstracted from and the physicist has resort to measurement and other physical technics" (Boring, 1953).

Seduction is infallible and very personal to each individual human being. Seduction is based on affect and its interpretation of stimuli.

**Self and the object world:** The objective here is to advance Titchener’s statement that the data of introspection are 'the sum-total of human experience considered as dependent upon the experiencing person' to a general statement about seduction. The starting point is Metaphysics of self and the metaphysics of the object world are being bounded by experience as molded by the objective ‘should’ as well as experience as molded by the subjective ‘ought’. From this it follows that seduction and metaphysics are synonyms with a common-sense view of reality the necessary result.

The fundamentals of this common-sense view descend from the character of knowledge – is knowledge belief or is knowledge speculation. Certain elements of experience such as the labeling of a red apple are the results of convention, of Locke’s position that a person is born with a mind that is a clean slate and this is not the issue. The issue is affect (Colvin, 1902).

**Everyday life:** For a person to successfully navigate each everyday of their personal longitudinal event known as life, the ability to recognize the difference between experience as molded by the objective ‘should’ from experience as molded by the subjective ‘ought’ is most useful, with the understanding that ‘should’ and ‘ought’ are not mutually exclusive, there is a certain amount of each in the other (e.g., Schneider, 2001).
Repression versus suppression

This discussion is an extension of the valuing process with emphasis placed on the formation of experience from each bottom up and top down. Discussion spans the basis of each bottom up and top down, views on inherited inertia as formulated by Freud, and, competing dynamics.

**Common basis:** The subject is affect and its relationship to ‘should’ and ‘ought’, where repression is the antithesis to ‘should’ while suppression is the antithesis to ‘ought’, with induction the determinant.

“Now, how does this hypothesis, if we must call it so, permit us to render account in particular, of the principle of induction? We believe that we should resolve this principle into two distinct laws: one, according to which all phenomena are contained in a series, where the existence of each term determines that which follows it; the other according to which all phenomena is comprised in a system, where the idea of the whole, determines the existence of the parts. These are the two laws which it is needful to establish by showing that if they do not exist, human thought would be impossible: We shall begin with the first of these. The first condition of the possibility of thought is evidently the existence of a subject which distinguishes itself from each of our sensations: For if these sensations existed alone, they would entirely confound themselves with the phenomena, so that there would remain nothing that we might be able to call ourselves or our thought. The second is the unity of the subject in the diversity of our sensations, as well simultaneous as successive: because a thought which was born, and which perished with each phenomenon, would be for us only a phenomenon itself, and we should have need of another subject in order to gather all these scattered and ephemeral thoughts into the unity of a real thought” (Lachelier, 1876a).

**Practical basis:** The practical basis is to apply the benefit of doubt to the preceding common basis, meaning, repression just might be logical versus the uncertainty that may accompany ‘should’ with the same idea applying to suppression. This is about the hedonist paradox, "He that seeks pleasure shall lose it" (Arnold, 1906c). which need not be so as the construction of Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43) applies. All that is needed is to cause source-aim-object to conform to a goal.

**Inertia:** With Titchener’s statement that the data of introspection are ‘the sum-total of human experience considered as dependent upon the experiencing person’ the reference, inertia is about resistance as in contrast to each repression and suppression. More to the point, resistance is the hurdle that psychoanalysis was designed to conquer (Knafo, 2009).

Resistance is likely an input to working memory of Figure 5 with self-defeating actions the unfortunate operative motive (Mills, 2006).

**Competing dynamics**

This is an extension of self-defeating and covers narcissism (terminal uniqueness) and schizophrenia (remorse management). The issue is how the self resolves anxiety to its object world.

Narcissism is generally thought of as a psychopathology (Freyberg, 1984) when it should be viewed as that which both defines and protects a person in a covert sense versus the overt implications of extrapunitive (p. 47). Thus, given the ever-present issues of time and uncertainty, narcissism should be viewed as a defense that in turn allows each ‘should’ and ‘ought’ to conform to both self-identity and experience. The same holds true for schizophrenia as a practical covert defense versus the overt implications of intrapunitive (p. 47).

Attention now turns from self-defeating to self-promoting, popularly known as positive psychology with the understanding that entry into positive psychology is only achieved upon the resolution of Titchener’s
statement 'the sum-total of human experience considered as dependent upon the experiencing person'.

“Positive psychology has helped develop a variety of intervention strategies that can reliably boost individual happiness. An important next step is to research important questions of what interventions work for whom, under what circumstances, and in what contexts to ensure that when interventions are provided as self-help, people will receive the most effective and relevant techniques. Some research has begun to address these questions, but much additional work is needed to fully disentangle these issues. In order to do so, however, studies should evaluate the effectiveness of these methods when provided in real-world settings and the complications and nuances that arise when doing so” (Schueller, 2014). Thus, self-promoting is about a very personal safe-harbor for each person. Further discussion is deferred to the CSAT-SAMHSA-DHHS data model, the seventh track below (p. 59; p. 161).

Informational communications

This discussion focuses on the characteristics of communications that influence the valuing process. This discussion spans the characteristics of the undercurrents of communications – the naïve focus, and, elements of concept and style.

Naïve: Clear thinking at the clinical level is required to achieve both the intent of positive psychology and resolution of Titchener’s ‘the sum-total of human experience considered as dependent upon the experiencing person’. This means that clear thinking and common sense are synonymous. This also means that the likes of evidence based need to be jettisoned in favor of spontaneity (Klein, 1942).

Concept: This is about the deliberate mechanics of clear thinking in tandem with the alternative metaphysics-based cost.

The deliberate mechanics – “Reason is a bourgeois gentleman, with proper desires; security and success, not insight as such, is the aim of reason. It is an admonition to childish minds: 'But, my dear child, be reasonable'. Reason is chiefly prudent, the cautionary voice of experience, a method of mastery. The 'why' questions are transformed into 'how' questions; for, to ask where we are going and what we are to do is eliminated as unscientific, as archaic teleologists of a religious past, when reason was still somehow compatible with revelation. Psychoanalysis, like politics, is an empiric art of successfully grasping those opportunities that nature, out of its richness, has to present. Freud’s genetic theory of morality has, of course, to be distinguished from his moral ideal. From a genetic perspective he locates morality as the superego and devalues it as specifically irrational, like the other passions. But without the moral criterion of balance smuggled in with the idea of neutral reason, the psychoanalytic education would be neither needful nor possible. Only with the value of balance in mind could Freud have declared that the ‘juridical alternative’ – yes or no, guilty or not guilty – could not properly apply to the assessment and control of personality. The psychological expert, whom Freud proposed as the ego of the world outside, rather defines from case to case that point at which the dangerous variousness of drives and impulses can be combined in a workman-like balance. Freud is for the undisturbed inner life as a mode of self-defense, not for some inner aim; outer life is sufficiently disturbing, and the inner risks too great by failing to balance. Most people are in any case incapable of the achievements that sometimes occur in an unbalanced psyche. For the majority Freud recommended balancing as the highest achievement to which they ought to strive. It was the goal of a man who felt how dangerous living was and how high above an abyss we walk, like amateur dancers on a tightrope designed only for a superb aerial artist” (Rieff, 1957).

The alternative cost – This is about not incorporating Einstein’s “the generality of the problem [gestalt]”. It is about allowing prejudices and other preconceived notions to be advanced to consideration. Instead, “We have no power of Introspection, but all knowledge of the internal world is derived by
hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts. We have no power of Intuition, but every
cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions. We have no power of thinking without signs.
We have no conception of the absolutely incognizable” (Peirce, 1868).

**Style:** This is about a careful balance between the deliberate mechanics of clear thinking in tandem with
the alternative metaphysics-based cost. To focus only on mechanics is to tantamount to delivering a
lecture while focus on the alternative is effectively an insult to any person’s intelligence. Thus, the call is
for Rogers’ empathy to be the preamble to deliberate mechanics and for Freud’s views on interpretation
to be the preamble to the alternative metaphysics-based cost (Staines, 1969).

**Affective mental disorders**

This discussion focuses on the seduction-avoidant intent of informal communications, and spans
emotion, affect, and antithesis.

**Emotion:** This is about behavior that is self-damaging that may also be self-defeating. The principal issue
is a level of dissociation between the self and the object world. “Mind under ordinary conditions is a
unity, which it may cease to be under abnormal conditions” (Prince, 1905). Resolution of dissociation is
targeted to re-adapting the person to their environment as well as re-education to healthy reactions
with emphasis on the formation of each aesthetic and if-then experience (Prince, 1909).

**Affect:** Healthy mental representations become affect – “(1) affects are ideas, (2) affects are always
attached to ideas, (3) consciousness is perception of internal mental states, and (4) affects are
perceptions of internal bodily processes” (Wakefield, 1992).

**Antithesis:** As a starting point only, reference is made to Freud – “Unconscious processes of mind are a
fact of life, both as phenomenon and as explanatory concept and were recognized before Freud. But it
was Freud who not only put ‘the unconscious’ on the map but also operationalized it in a new way – as a
dynamic unconscious, laying down the foundation of a science of the unconscious, his Copernican
revolution. The new science first provided a dual-purpose method: investigating the emotional and
ideational manifestations of disordered human behavior and psychological conflict and healing those
disorders” (Lothane, 2006). Beyond Freud there is Einstein’s “the generality of the problem [gestalt]” to
be followed by an adaptive focus on positive emotions (Fitzpatrick, 2008).
Interim Synopsis

At this point the character of discussion changes from development and analysis to application.

In this paper’s Introduction a challenge to the construction of Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6) was posed with that challenge limited to a missing reference to a ‘why’ between the first two columns of that Figure. That ‘why’ set the tone for development of this paper to this point, as being comprised of many dynamics, and with those dynamics investigated on an incremental basis.

The balance of the Introduction focused on relevant contributions to the knowledge base by various persons resulting in a conceptual foundation. Then, the first track Dynamics: Baseline assumptions was a topical analysis of the conceptual foundation, while the second track, Method: Resistance to a contrarian investment, was about contra dynamics imbedded in the topical analysis.

Application of the conceptual foundation across tracks three through seven has Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43) as the primary reference with allocation of those five tracks in synch with the construction of Figure 5.

The titles of tracks three through six explicitly account for the left side of Figure 5 – (third track) Companion: Decision making and more selective attention, (fourth track) Puzzle: Deduction and less selective awareness, (fifth track) Surface: Reasoning and more selective anxiety, and, (sixth track) Issue: Perception and less selective inertia.

The seventh track, Device: Motivation and variable selectivity of value and choice, accounts for working memory of Figure 5, and serves as an introduction to a final accounting of the ominous nature of the ‘why’.

The eighth track, Objective: Professional responsibility versus life as the ultimate wager, is the final accounting of the ‘why’.
Companion: Decision making and more selective attention

This track is effectively the bridge between a person’s object world and their self with that bridge the execution of a person’s constitution, which is likely static but should be taken as dynamic.

Given the nature of the minute-by-minute claims on a person’s attention during an average day of life, the unfortunate assumption is that the ‘die is cast’ with respect to normal living, hence, a static constitution.

To address the many invocations of the ‘why’ in life such as Ischemic heart disease as the result of an elected lifestyle, emphasis on the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence is intended to create an atmosphere that results in a dynamic constitution. To support this claim, the typical if-then construction is replaced by an if-what-then construction which is comprised of basis, method and opportunity. These topics are preliminary to this track’s three topics: (1) Immediate strategic interface, (2) Overt scope (goal activation), (3) Covert selectivity and filters (anti-social behavior).

**Basis:** This is about the risks that accompany a static constitution with attention limited to three attributes – loneliness (Hawkley, 2003), and, anger and anxiety (Suinn, 2001). For reference this is about the unstable actors versus the mature normals of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p.34), where the three attributes – loneliness, anger, anxiety – imply alignment with unstable actors. The path to a dynamic constitution requires a re-focus of each decision making and more selective attention where the former is about a person’s object world and the latter about their self. Assuming a person understands the character of each the three attributes – loneliness, anger and anxiety – they are then able to postulate the alternative of aloneness with respect to each of the attributes. Alternatively, for those persons who do not understand or at least do not recognize the character of each of the three attributes, perhaps one day a health need will pique their thinking as the last defense to becoming a mortality statistic.

**Method:** This is about the joining of assumptions about generalizations, personality and learning (p. 57) into a single template to be taken as a template constitution with response to that template addressed from two perspectives – clinical and personal. On the clinical side there is experience in the reconfiguration of primary care settings to include the base physician and mental health practitioners given “Mental health problems are common in primary care, representing 30%–50% of visits. Family physicians are often frustrated by their lack of training and by the difficulties of obtaining a timely referral for this group of patients. A collaborative approach to mental health care has been developed by a group, Calgary, in a traditional fee-for-service system for physician payment. Consultation can be obtained quickly, and the primary care physician can be involved in the assessment by the specialist so that he or she will learn by observing the interview process and the subsequent discussion, thus facilitating ongoing care by the family physician. This approach is a model for similar collaborative arrangements that could be developed between primary care physicians and specialists in many medical disciplines” (McElheran, 2004). On the personal side experience needs to be cultivated that enables a person to recognize the difference between mood and personality (p. 104), no easy task, but achievable if a person learns to recognize the whole – gestalt – picture versus incremental irritants.

**Opportunity:** In principle this is about positive affect (Pressman, 2005) and positive thinking (Seligman, 2000) with Locke’s “Every step the mind takes in its progress towards knowledge makes some discovery, which is not only new, but the best, too, for the time at least” the reference. With detail to follow, positive affect is principled focus while positive thinking is deliberate focus with each focus about that which separates mature normals from unstable actors in Figure 4.
Attention now turns to this track’s three topics: (1) Immediate strategic interface, (2) Overt scope (goal activation), (3) Covert selectivity and filters (anti-social behavior).

**Immediate strategic interface**

This discussion is about the basis of a static constitution and covers the recognized social reality as the base understanding of a person’s object world, in tandem with the recognized attributes of knowledge, value, interest and rationalizations as the base understanding of a person’s self.

**Social reality:** A person’s immediate social reality – properly, socio-economic reality – is an approximation versus any person as well as a result that has developed over time and independent of any one person. To suggest that said reality and personal frustrations are synonymous is an understatement. However, a given-is-a-given and must be incorporated into a person’s constitution, an achievable task, provided a person executes an objective analysis of their understanding of the overall socio-economic reality (Sen, 1995), and the what-might-be attributes of their constitution. There is absolutely no reason for pessimistic conclusions given a person’s pre-existing knowledge and imagination leaving only the fundamentals of mood to be addressed.

An approximation of mood – “We find through the course of mental development a growing mass of assimilating and acknowledging and intending process, calling itself the ego or self, over against a fairly stable, presented, recognized, body of objective stuff. This latter is found from the first to have marks that make it objective and in certain senses ‘foreign’. The whole movement is seen to be one of constant redistribution, with the relative dominance for consciousness itself of one or other of these two factors, called inner and outer ‘controls’. At one time and in certain modes, the inner assimilating factor seems to be held to the mere recognition of the external as an objective, common, confirmable, and convertible ‘thing’, to which thought must be correct or true; at another time and in other modes the inner control factor seems to get the upper hand, and its selections, manipulations, constructions seem so free that little limitation of a foreign sort appears” (Baldwin, 1908b).

Mood is the undeniable determinant of value, interest, rationalizations and affect as the base understanding of a person’s self.

**Value:** Mood is the determinant of the description of value on a subjective basis, and the determinant of the application of value on an objective basis.

The subjective description of value – “Worth predicates have been defined as the selective funded affective-volitional meanings of objects. They are subjective or objective. Worth or value is the meaning of the object for the subject in different attitudes, or as predetermined by different dispositions and interests. The psychological equivalents for the worth moment include both concepts, of feeling and conation. An object has worth in so far as it has desirability. Among the feelings of value include only much feelings as have reality meanings and include two attitudes of presumption and assumption. It is maintained that all feelings of value are feelings of personality. Feeling of value is the feeling aspect of the conative process. The conative process is the total process of development by which affective-volitional meaning is acquired, the total process including actual and dispositional moments” (Urban, 1907a).

The objective application of value – “Worth and value are the funded affective-volitional meaning of the object for the subject. The funded meaning is acquired through actualization of conative dispositions by acts of presumption, judgement and assumption, and this actualization results in feeling which undergoes certain modification, with change in presumptions and with repetition. This feeling with its modifications, reflects the funded meaning of the object. Worth predication has a quantitative and
qualitative side. Since the worth of the object is a function of the capacity of the subject for feeling as determined by the processes of accommodation in judgment and assumption, the analysis and formulation of these factors constitute the laws of valuation” (Urban, 1907b).

**Interest:** The relation of interest to expectation, desire, curiosity, and the like is a function of mood.

“Interest is distinct from, but closely connected to feelings of pleasure and pain, as well as attention. The meaning or felt worth of an object is the consciousness of the attitude aroused by such an object. There is a tendency serially to realize reactions which will arise when a future condition is reached and to which the present situation is a means. This tendency is felt as interest. However, unless some cognitive element is present no future reference is possible and no interest can exist. Interest is, therefore, a body attitude pointing to the future. ...Interest has also been related to apperception. Interest is not merely a physiological sensation, it is a manner of interpretation and reaction” (Arnold, 1906b).

**Rationalizations:** The relation of rationalizations to mood must be accepted as having two sides with the Fourier integral the reference. Here the $a_0$ coefficient accounts for preexisting configuration of mood; the $a_n$ coefficient accounts for the emotional investment side of the coin (self-enhancing); and, the $b_n$ coefficient accounts for frustration side of the coin (self-punishing). It must be noted that each emotional investment and frustrations can either be implicit or explicit.

The implicit variant is likely a function of feeling versus mood while the explicit variant is likely of invention that in turn over-emphasizes self-enhancing or self-punishing (Jones, 1908).

**Overt scope (goal activation)**

This discussion is about the fundamentals to be resolved in the construction of a dynamic constitution and covers the relationships between a person and their fundament belief about self; their understanding of a what-might-be future to include their commitment to that future; and, their understanding of conceptual duty to their self with respect to their object world.

**Belief about self:** Necessary to the transition from a static constitution to a dynamic constitution is an understanding of the fundamentals that support the recognized attributes of knowledge, value, interest and rationalizations, with those fundamentals driven by self-enhancing emotional investment in tandem with self-punishing frustration in the absence of mood.

This is about a person’s ability to answer three questions with respect to the linkage between their self and their object world: (1) What are the fundamental facts that support than linkage. (2) What is the basis for those facts. (3) What gives basis validity (Gordy, 1894).

**What-might-be future:** This is about the prior three questions in reverse – basis, facts and then linkage, with resolution of self-enhancing emotional investment versus self-punishing frustration addressed in-stream.

Basis is about character as expressed through attitude versus mood (Latham, 1934). Facts are about an objective evaluation of what is practical (Erikson, 2007). Linkage is about grit and passion (Duckworth, 2007). Resolution is about belief, not in self, but in the worth of a future self, given just how much of the journey to the future self will be in the absence of the safety of experience (Rothbaum, 2009).

**The self and object world:** This is an extension of resolution of self-enhancing emotional investment versus self-punishing frustration and spans the objective and subjective cultivation of experience.

The objective route to future experience is about the adaption of style that is appropriate to the task, with six choices identified in experiments:
(1) Cathexes, “connections or attachments of specific types of final positive goal-object, or of final negative 'disturbance-object' to basic drives. ...That is, the learning of cathexes is the acquisition by the organism of positive dispositions for certain types of food, drink, sex-object, etc. or of negative dispositions against certain types of disturbance-object”.

(2) Equivalence Beliefs, “a connection between a positively cathexed type of goal and a type of subgoal or between a negatively cathexed type of disturbance-object and a type of what may be called a sub-disturbance object or foyer. ...During any period in which such an equivalence belief holds, the organism will tend to approach such a type of subgoal or to avoid such a type of foyer with almost the same readiness with which it will approach a final goal or avoid a final disturbance-object”.

(3) Field Expectancies, “when an organism is repeatedly presented on successive occasions with an environmental set-up, through which he moves and relative to which he is sensitive, he usually tends to acquire an apprehension not only of each group of immediate stimuli as it impinges upon him but he also tends to acquire a 'set' such that, upon the apprehension of the first group of stimuli in the field, he becomes prepared for the further 'to come' groups of stimuli and also for some of the interconnections or field relationships between such groups of stimuli. It is such sets (or field expectancies) which make it possible for the organism, human or animal, to exhibit appropriate short-cuts and roundabout routes. It is also the acquisition of such sets which make possible the phenomenon of latent learning when (and if) it occurs”.

(4) Field-Cognition Modes, “A careful analysis of the processes involved in the appearance of field expectancies indicates, ...that the final form and range of any such expectancy is a function not only of repetition, i.e., of 'memory' in the strict sense, but also of 'perception' and of 'inference'. That is, any given field expectancy which appears in a given experimental set-up is a function of the interacting processes of perception, memory and inference”.

(5) Drive Discriminations, “two drives – hunger and thirst – were discriminated. It appears that this alternation of thirst and hunger and the different locations of the two corresponding rewards throughout the training trials may have been the crucial factor which in these experiments favored such drive discriminations. But there are undoubtedly other ways of inducing drive discriminations, the laws of which a complete psychology of learning must investigate”.

(6) Motor Patterns, “Cathexes, equivalence beliefs, field expectancies, field-cognition modes and drive discriminations are not ... stimulus-response connections. They are central phenomena, each of which may be expressed by a variety of responses. The actual nature of these final responses is, however, also determined by the character of the motor patterns at the organism’s command” (Tolman, 1949).

The subjective route to future experience is about hope (Korner, 1970), and there is nothing wrong with that.

Covert selectivity and filters (anti-social behavior)

This focus on anti-social behavior is not about the likes of criminal activity but is about entrenchment in remorse management, the price one must pay to protect their safe-harbor terminal uniqueness, effectively, self-imposed constraints that are comprised of assumptions about the environmental reality, and, adaptation.

Environmental reality: This is about the process of attention and its limitations.

First attention is a definitive process that exists between the self and the object world. This does not mean that attention is synonymous with either the self or the object world, nor does it mean that
attention is synonymous with the will. “We must accept first the statement that attention is coextensive with consciousness. Stated positively, this means that every conscious state is in some degree attended to. Stated negatively, it means that attention is impossible until the object of attention is present in consciousness. The object of attention may enter consciousness in two ways: it may come from without through sensory excitation, or from within through representation in some associated train of thought. No other methods of entrance are possible. In the absence of any superior authority, it is evident that our attention-objects are selected for us; in the field of sensorial presentation by ‘chance’; in the field of representation by the law of association operating upon prior sense experience. Once within consciousness, every attention-object tends to be unfolded or to unfold itself – spontaneously through intrinsic reasons, voluntarily through extrinsic reasons. In the primary sense experience, we attend because the object has an interest for us, because it excites either an agreeable, or a disagreeable, or a mixed psychic state. To strike deeper, it has an interest for us because of its harmony or discord with preformed and present existing tendencies, and the hedonic tone of the experience, its agreeable or disagreeable quality, is but the surface indication of the deeper lying relation” (Blanchard, 1899).

Second, emphasis on sensory excitation at the expense of some associated train of thought implies that it is conformity that extend basis to remorse management. Thus, a second claim, that attention is a driven process that exists in service to the self and the object world, which, in turn, allows attention to be viewed as a servant to the economic construct known as utility. Utility for its part is the result of many psychological influences (Samuelson, 1938). For evidence, one needs to go no farther than John B. Watson’s Pebeco campaign (p. 31).

Third, emphasis on either sensory excitation or some associated train of thought diverts focus from “the scientific study of human behavior to the study of feelings, introspection, a supposed or real inner life, and the self as an agent or creator”, thus failing to account for the “environment in behavior, especially social environments called cultures” (Skinner, 1975).

Adaptation: The opening reference to terminal uniqueness is in a negative tone. Given that terminal uniqueness is synonymous with a static invocation of personality as accompanied by mood as depicted in Figure 11 (Mood, p. 104), the task now is to reframe terminal uniqueness as a dynamic that is situation responsive to the social environment. This requires recognizing that an idealistic response results from a what-is leading influence (attention) and what-might-be lagging influence (expression).

An idealistic response is about the ability to identify trends and actions in the engaged culture, an anthropological issue. Hence, this is about “the ideal pattern in society (what people think should or should not be done) and real behavior (what actually is done)”, versus, the real “presumed behavior, or what people think is being done in the society” (Richards, 1969).

Attention as a what-is leading influence recognizes the lack of purity of each sensory excitation and some associated train of thought. Accumulated experience as driven by conditioning guarantees that lack of purity, with cognition the result of that experience (Posner, 1982). At this point it is appropriate to repeat Einstein’s response to Erika Fromm (p. 113) – “The psychological situation is comparable with the attitude of somebody who wants to solve a puzzle or a chess problem, who is convinced that the solution exists, because the creator of the problem possesses the solution. The only difference lies in that the psychic energy arises from the generality of the problem [gestalt], and from its root in the relationship to reality [aesthetics].”

Expression as a what-might-be lagging influence also recognizes the lack of purity of each sensory excitation and some associated train of thought if for no other reason than mood. “A distinction can be
made between expressive and coping components of behavior. Coping is purposive, motivated, more determined by environmental variables, more often learned, more easily controlled, and designed to cause changes in the environment. Expression is more often unmotivated, determined by the state of the organism, more often unlearned, often uncontrolled, not designed to do anything, and an end in itself. Character structure is better revealed in expressive behavior. Neurotic symptoms are characteristically coping, while in catastrophic breakdown behavior has no particular function” (Maslow, 1949).
Puzzle: Deduction and less selective awareness

This track is about evaluation that drives an elected lifestyle, with emphasis on a ‘die is cast’ awareness that in turn sets a person’s constitution as static with respect to developing circumstances (reality) and ambiguity (pleasure).

To support this claim, the above-noted typical if-then construction, with emphasis on what versus why, is replaced by an if-why-then construction which is comprised of three classes of issues – surface, underlying and dynamic. These topics are preliminary to this track’s three topics: (1) Underlying tactical objective, (2) Overt scope (cultural dependent), (3) Covert selectivity and filters (visual processing).

Surface issues: The observable person is a result much like the tip of an iceberg while failing to account for drift by the iceberg in some vast – at least large – ocean. We take the iceberg because of its mass and slow speed as being static and measurable – all because of an innate smartness that is shared by both the iceberg and the observer. This results in thinking that is stuck due to focus on two counts.

First is the manner of assessment of substance abusers which includes two issues, one positive and one negative. On the positive side is the design of the assessment versus the conscious, preconscious and unconscious, with questionnaires, interviews and projective tests corresponding examples. On the negative side is the assessment is a point-in-time image of a person’s life, a well-understood constraint that fails to recognize a reactive and immediate dynamic constitution as an unintended consequence. Substance abusers will react in some combination of four manipulations: “(1) the drug interferes with personality, (2) the duration of detoxification before drug abusers are tested and interviewed is usually insufficient, (3) drug abusers generally suffer from ‘dysfunctional personality resources’ such as deficiency in memory, incapacity for psychological reflections, and lack of verbal and preverbal affect differentiation (alexithymia), (4) the conditions drug abusers must accept to receive clinical care, activate manipulative behavior and latent defense mechanisms during interviews” (Aleman, 2007). These four manipulative techniques can be extended to other interviewees.

The defense of an assessment is the process provides a reference that reflects the point-in-time state of the person being assessed that may be extended to insight into that person’s developing circumstances (reality) and ambiguity (pleasure). From the point-in-time state the process of therapy joins the objective assessment to subsequent subjective development which may include inductive versus objective probabilities. This exposes one more difference between the current therapeutic jurisprudence (objective) and the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence (subjective), where objective comports with pleasure and subjective with reality.

“The extraction of objective probability from the subjective, as it is known today, developed with the rise of associationism, where belief and reason were seen to follow from the objective observation of nature rather than participation in it. The ‘methodical man’ as an epistemological model thus replaces the ‘reasonable man’. Hume, it will be remembered, contested against Locke that inductive inference was separate from reason. Logically, the future is under no obligation to mimic the past. Inference was supported only by the habit of seeing something always associated with something else. The justification of a belief lay not in its reasonableness to the percipient but existed in certain habits of the mind. For the probabilists and later social scientists, the extraction of reason from belief, or knowledge, rendered knowledge less subjective. Current confidence in science as a different and superior method of justification is at the expense of insight, not to mention clinical wisdom. Of course, it is arguable whether psychological science is an accurate recorder of the orderly world, humans not being generally known for their intrinsic orderliness. On a currently popular view, such order as might be found is less a
feature of human nature than of social forces; the person as social artifact or ‘construction’” (Cusworth, 2000).

Second is about a decision point between two icebergs one of which is big while the other is small – at least the infamous observer thinks big versus small to be true as the tip of each iceberg seems to be the same size. One iceberg is understood to be schizophrenia while the other iceberg is understood to be manic-depressive with emphasis on unipolar depression. Now, which iceberg is one malady versus the other. William Allison White (Cohen, 1961, pp. 46-47 & 55) maintains “that more of general value can come to psychiatry from the study of schizophrenia than with preoccupation with any other of the mental disorders ...Under these circumstances, the relative neglect of the schizophrenic in favor of the manic-depressive is not only to be regretted but, if possible, to be rectified” (Sullivan, 1962, p. 26). As a parallel to the prior discussion, the manner of assessment of substance abusers, objective (schizophrenia) versus subjective (manic-depressive, et.al.) is the issue.

Sullivan’s Species Identity Theorem is "Everyone and anyone is much more simply human than otherwise, more like everyone else than different" (Sullivan, 1962, frontispiece) is a challenge to objective and subjective as being mutually exclusive as are developing circumstances (reality) and ambiguity (pleasure). The issue then becomes goal-directedness (objective, developing circumstances) must be balanced with interpersonal forces (subjective, ambiguity) (Shahar, 2011) given Sullivan’s Theorem, which, in fact, reflects reality as well as reasoning that downplays the preference given to manic-depressive.

Underlying issues: Continuing with the iceberg as introduced in Surface issues above, focus here is on the under-the-water mass, to include the historical basis of centrist-tainted recognition of impressions received from working memory of Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43). That historical basis includes comment on inertia in knowledge and philosophy, and, the undercurrents of behavior.

Fundamentally, there is no inertia in knowledge and philosophy. However, given the lack of obvious progress in the development of each knowledge and philosophy as evidenced by Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Hume and others are still referenced in currency terms, inertia seems a logical conclusion. But there is another kind of development and it is called ‘trial and error’, a method that is wholly consistent with Darwin’s observations: “Darwin gave the death-blow to uncritical vitalism in biology, to occultism in psychology, and to mysticism and dogmatism in philosophy. Each of these, alike progeny of the obscurantism of dogmatic thought, has in turn yielded before the conception of natural law and order embodied by Darwin in the theory of natural selection. This theory turns out to be not merely a law of biology as such, but a principle of the natural world, which finds appropriate application in all the sciences of life and mind” (Baldwin, 1909). This entire Darwin-oriented line of thinking applies to operant behavior (Skinner, 1963), addiction (Adler, 1986), and mechanistic versus functional behaviorism (Moxley, 1992).

Dynamic Issues: Continuing with the iceberg as introduced in Surface issues above, focus here is on the movement of the iceberg, slow as it may be, but, it still moves. The same idea of slow but steady movement applies equally to the formation of objective schemas and subjective preferences.

Schemas are plans, outlines, even models of what-might-be and apply equally well to goal-directedness (objective, developing circumstances) being balanced with interpersonal forces (subjective, ambiguity). Schemas are if-then expectances (Baldwin, 1997) that likely include trial and error as experienced in everyday life.

Taking schemas out of everyday life and allowing time to expansive much like Plato’s writings as a topic of current interest gives rise to a distinction between the current therapeutic jurisprudence and the
advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. Therapeutic jurisprudence is not a firm if-then construct but of the two – therapeutic versus psychoanalytic – it has an in-the-now taint. No person is an island in time, any person has many interrelationships with many other persons – Sullivan’s "Everyone and anyone is much more simply human than otherwise, more like everyone else than different”.

“In simple, slow-moving situations, where the actor has a single, operational goal, the assumption of maximization relieves us of any need to construct a detailed picture of economic man or his processes of adaptation. As the complexity of the environment increases, or its speed of change, we need to know more and more about the mechanisms and processes that economic man uses to relate himself to that environment and achieve his goals” (Simon, 1959).

Attention now turns to this track’s three topics: (1) Underlying tactical objective, (2) Overt scope (cultural dependent), (3) Covert selectivity and filters (visual processing).

**Underlying tactical objective**

This discussion spans the centrist what-can-be economic person, the centrist social person, the centrist psychological person, and, the non-centrist unstable actors of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34).

**Centrist what-can-be economic person:** This is about determination that may morph to creativity, is an extension of Darwin’s trial and error, and certainly reflects the durability of Plato and others. This is also about the average person who decides to be a janitor or even a dishwasher, the kind of thinking that applies to the entire issue of therapeutic versus psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

For the moment attention is limited to Linus Pauling who is only one of two persons who won Nobel Prizes in different fields – Chemistry in 1954 and Peace in 1962. The other person is Marie Curie – Physics in 1903 and Chemistry in 1911. For the moment attention is limited to highly recognized evidence of creativity. “Pauling’s case [as well as Curie] illustrates well what is true of creativity in general. The phenomena we agree to call ‘creative’ cannot be observed, measured, evaluated, or reported independently of the judgments of a field of experts whose opinion has currency in a particular society at a specific point in time. The field not only constitutes a given phenomenon as ‘creative’ by giving it legitimacy but also helps to bring it about by setting the agenda for the creative individual and by providing the necessary knowledge, incentives, and critical evaluation. The creative individual, in turn, as a member of the field helps peers and the next generation of practitioners to actualize their own creative potential” (Nakamura, 2001). Now, the average person without Sullivan’s thinking the guide...

On the surface one finds it difficult to compare internationally acclaimed scholars to a janitor or dishwasher. But if one stops to realize which person has an impact on society at any moment in time, then a sense of equality does emerge. Consider the alternatives. With a janitor who is not attentive to their responsibilities, personal safety of other persons is the risk. With a dishwasher who is equally not attentive, personal safety of other persons is the risk with that risk extensible to death due to the presence of killer bacteria on dishes that look clean. From this it follows that life style is what determines the result with creativity only a member of the result set.

**Centrist social person:** “We have seen how, by means of sanctions, legal, social, and supernatural, the stubborn will is bent to right action. We have now to consider how society without the use of any sanction can attain the same result. This calls for a study of suggestion. …Under 'Suggestion', as an independent topic, we are called upon to consider only the direct shaping of conduct by social inclination, *i.e., vis-a-vis* modification of the will” [Italics in original] (Ross, 1896).
This idea of 'suggestion' assumes that 'creative potential' will bloom under the guidance of therapeutic jurisprudence 'by social inclination' while failing to consider the 'attentive to their responsibilities' that just might bloom under the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

Centrist psychological person: Independent of therapeutic versus psychoanalytic jurisprudence is the comingle of life style and suppression. Thus, ego boundaries versus the philosophy of behavior as basis for further consideration of ‘creative potential’ versus ‘attentive to their responsibilities’

Ego boundaries as a concept is a Plato type of problem with respect to the notion of current – Plato’s writings are read and searched through via technologies that were not available in Plato’s time. This is about a playing field that is not very level. The development of gestalt theory by Max Wertheimer (p. 100) to include subsequent development by Rudolf Arnheim (below) includes two gaps in time – the gap between Freud and Wertheimer as static with the gap between Wertheimer and Arnheim as dynamic.

Freud’s development of ego boundaries and then on to responsibility was a work in progress with basis in neurology with distribution of his writings slow by today's standards, hence, the use of static. “It is recognized that many believe that the analytic impetus was a rather negative one and that, in this respect, gestalt theory grew out of a rather barren, infertile soil. However, we believe that rather than evolving in direct contrast to Freudian theory, gestalt theory evolved through a dialectic process – one which questions, retains, and opposes” (Lewis, 1978). Focus now is limited to the above comment ‘analytic impetus was a rather negative one’.

Freud’s work was not static nor was criticism of he, as generated in-stream. Jung’s handling of sex (p. 8), and the objections of Horney, et.al., to Freud’s theory of instincts (drives) (p. 45) that introduced much debate, comprise only a small portion of criticism of Freud. However, Freud implied static beginning with the term psychoanalysis where analysis in isolation has little to say about the wholeness emphasis of gestalt. Freud himself made that distinction quite clear with his response to Erika Fromm’s request for comment (p. 112) – “Philosophical thinking and ways of expression are unfortunately so unfamiliar to me that I am not even able in my own thoughts to distinguish from each other the possibilities you describe in your questions. Therefore, I really cannot give you an answer”.

Attention now turns to Zen as an extension of mindfulness and otherness (p. 77). “In the process of redefinition [of Freud] we find fragments of psychoanalytic theory in the conceptualization of ego boundary as the integrator which more or less defines the ‘self’, separates inside from outside, and assimilates and rejects environmental stimuli. At the same time, this Freudian ingredient was modified and softened through the addition of a component of Zen. In accordance with Zen philosophy, we find ego boundary redefined as a function or process as opposed to a reified object. There is no recognized stable structure or mechanism known as the ego which is surrounded by its boundaries. Rather there is a more elusive process, the ego boundary. Thus, ego boundary is best conceptualized as a verb rather than a noun, as an active function rather than an existing state. It is to be seen in continuous ebb and flux and not statically defined. This ebb and flux establishes a mutuality, a continuous exchange with the environment. Rather than the isolated causes and events which so frequently characterized the determinism of psychoanalysis, we find a continuity and flow which characterized the functional position of Eastern philosophy” (Lewis, 1978).

With this expanded orientation it is clear the distinction is dynamic. On one side of the dynamic are ego boundaries and ‘creative potential’, while on the other side are philosophy of behavior and ‘attentive to their responsibilities’ – ego boundaries then philosophy of behavior.

“While this amalgamation of Zen and psychoanalytic thinking clearly rectified some of the pitfalls of the analytic position, it simultaneously created some contradictions of its own. These contradictions
exemplify the essence of the problems of internal inconsistency which are encountered in gestalt theory. Illustrative of this inconsistency are the following paradoxes. Gestalt theory simultaneously views the ego boundary as separating internal from external while blurring this very distinction. The ego boundary is seen as defining the contour of the self (reminiscent of the skin encapsulated ego) and itself being defined by its interface with the environment, by its continuous contact and exchange with the field. It is one with environment in that the form of one determines the form of the other, and both are constantly, concurrently changing as what was once outside becomes inside. Thus, the ego boundary is seen as simultaneously and paradoxically the point of separation of internal from external and the point at which inside and outside become so indistinguishably intermixed that it is futile to try to maintain the distinction in any clear sense. This contradiction is based in part on the misunion of the philosophy that life is a process with the often-contradictory analytic view of life as an extended sequence of causes and events” (Ibid). Thus, it takes the philosophical mindfulness and otherness to enables a connection between Freud and gestalt which in turn allows an accounting of ‘why’ versus ‘what’ to be addressed with the philosophy of behavior following this postscript.

“A careful study of these inconsistencies has revealed a potential resolution which consists of essentially two theoretical considerations. The first deals primarily with the definition of self in the world. It is believed that self or ego boundary is best viewed as the interface between the individual and the environmental field (which usually involves other individuals). This interface is in constant motion. Through various actions and movements, what was once other becomes self and vice versa. The second consideration focuses on this process of movement. By definition, it cannot be considered a static phenomenon, but rather a dynamic one extending across time and space. As each of these dimensions is by nature continuous, to render them discrete through a causal analysis is capricious and in error. Thus, to arbitrarily determine a beginning (or cause) as residing in the action of one individual and leading to a change (or effect) in another is to ignore the ongoing process and flux of their individual and mutual lives. To assign responsibility for the action to the first individual and for the change to the second further violates the interaction and the interdependency of their ego boundaries” (Ibid).

The philosophy of behavior is about observations that effectively reduce to if-why-then versus if-what-then, which has considerable impact on the nature of insight into each life style and suppression. To understand the difference between the two if- constructions a survey of history is necessary.

According to Skinner the philosophy of behavior spans about 2,500 years and is marked by two periods of thought with 1960 the line of separation, and with 1960 largely coincident with the birth of the cognitive psychology revolution (p. 50). Thus, according to Skinner, 1960 has delivered three Obstacles that impact on the philosophy of behavior with if-why-then being overtrumped by if-what-then, from which follows the failings of the current therapeutic jurisprudence. First the historical basis then the three Obstacles.

Early Behaviorism – “The theory of evolution raised a different question about those internal causes. Nonhuman animals had reflexes and organs, but did they have minds? Darwin, committed to the continuity of species, said yes, and he and his contemporaries could cite examples that seemed to prove him right. It was Lloyd Morgan who objected that the examples could be explained in other ways and [John B.] Watson who took the inevitable next step and contended that the same thing could be said of human animals. An early form of behaviorism was born” (Skinner, 1987). Now the Obstacles…

Obstacle 1: Humanistic Psychology – “Many people find the implications of a behavioral analysis disturbing. The traditional direction of action of organism and environment seems to be reversed. Instead of saying that the organism sees, attends to, perceives, ‘processes’, or otherwise acts upon stimuli, an operant analysis holds that stimuli acquire control of behavior through the part they play in
contingencies of reinforcement. Instead of saying that an organism stores copies of the contingencies to which it is exposed and later retrieves and responds to them again, it says that the organism is changed by the contingencies and later responds as a changed organism, the contingencies having passed into history. The environment takes over the control formerly assigned to an internal, originating agent” (Ibid).

Obstacle 2: Psychotherapy – “Certain exigencies of the helping professions are another obstacle in the path of a scientific analysis of behavior. Psychotherapists must talk with their clients and, with rare exceptions, do so in everyday English, which is heavy laden with references to internal causes – ‘I ate because I was hungry’, ‘I could do it because I knew how to do It’, and so on. All fields of science tend to have two languages, of course. Scientists speak one with casual acquaintances and the other with colleagues. In a relatively young science, such as psychology, the use of the vernacular may be challenged. How often have behaviorists heard, ‘You just said – It crossed my mind! – I thought there wasn’t supposed to be any mind’. It has been a long time since anyone challenged a physicist who said, ‘That desk is made of solid oak’, by protesting, ‘But I thought you said that matter was mostly empty space”” (Ibid).

Obstacle 3: Cognitive Psychology – “A curve showing the appearance of the word cognitive in the psychological literature would be interesting. A first rise could probably be seen around 1960; the subsequent acceleration would be exponential. Is there any field of psychology today in which something does not seem to be gained by adding that charming adjective to the occasional noun? The popularity may not be hard to explain. When we became psychologists, we learned new ways of talking about human behavior. If they were ‘behavioristic’, they were not very much like the old ways. The old terms were taboo, and eyebrows were raised when we used them. But when certain developments seemed to show that the old ways might be right after all, everyone could relax. Mind was back. Information theory was one of those developments, computer technology another. Troublesome problems seemed to vanish like magic. A detailed study of sensation and perception was no longer needed; one could simply speak of processing information. It was no longer necessary to construct settings in which to observe behavior; one could simply describe them. Rather than observe what people actually did, one could simply ask them what they would probably do” (Ibid).

Now the benefits delivered by the three Obstacles...

Non-centrist unstable actors: The line of thinking that could be followed here is Edward Glover’s assessment of addiction – his emphasis on progression at the expense of focus on regression (p. 6) – with that line of thinking part of the analysis of Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6) where focus was on ‘why’ with ‘what’ the implied purpose of the analysis. And, that analysis could be enhanced by folding in William Allison White’s (p. 129) call for emphasis on the study of schizophrenia at the expense of focus on the likes of the manic-depressive.

Instead, the line of thinking to be followed here has a ‘what’ based assumption being applied to analysis with focus on the unstable actors of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34) accompanied by a ‘why’ based assumption being applied to attempts to resolve with focus on the mature normals of Figure 4. In short, post 1960 thinking has progression accounting for the path from unstable actors to mature normals. The starting point is Behavior Pharmacology which extends an objective overview of if-what-then, from which follows analysis of what in isolation.

The etiology of addiction is clearly biological as is asserted in the Editorial of a special issue of Behavioural Pharmacology with a summary of largely findings – “organismic variables in the etiology of different types of drug addiction ... genetic factors in cocaine reward ... role of conditioned
reinforcement in drug-seeking behavior but also the complex – and not well understood – interactions of sex and drug-related reinforcement ... role of impulsivity by measuring the delay discounting of opioid reward; their findings are consistent with the idea that delays in the delivery of a large-magnitude reinforcer may enhance the value of a reinforcer of lesser value and, in this way, contribute toward drug abuse and addiction ... although there are definite opioid effects on the discounting of food reward, the direction of these effects is highly individual and complexly determined ... a novel cognitive task in which human participants are presented with several categories of stimuli and are asked to estimate the percentage of appetitive stimuli during the session. Here, the authors provide intriguing data showing that the results of this test correlate well with attentional bias and, perhaps, can be used to identify vulnerability to drug addiction” (Bergman, 2016).

With etiology anchored in biology, resolution is then a conditioning of the unstable actor to the mature normal with any evidence of an unstable actor completely jettisoned as surmised in a meta-analysis (which absolves the abuser of responsibility), with recommendations about public policy (which burdens the social environment with the problem) the conclusion of this discussion.

“Results: A small but growing literature on the misuse and abuse of antidepressants consists largely of case reports. Most cases of antidepressant abuse have occurred in individuals with comorbid substance use and mood disorders. The most commonly reported motivation for abuse is to achieve a psychostimulant-like effect. Antidepressants are abused at high doses and via a variety of routes of administration (e.g., intranasal, intravenous). Negative consequences vary based upon antidepressant class and pharmacology, but these have included seizures, confusion, and psychotic-like symptoms. The majority of individuals prescribed antidepressants do not misuse the medication. However, certain classes of antidepressants do carry abuse potential. Vulnerable patient populations include those with a history of substance abuse and those in controlled environments. Warning signs include the presence of aberrant behaviors. Physicians should include antidepressants when screening for risky prescription medication use. When antidepressant misuse is detected, a thoughtful treatment plan, including referral to an addiction specialist, should be developed and implemented” (Evans, 2014).

Recommendations about public policy (which burdens the social environment with the problem):

“Although much has been learned about prescription drug abuse in recent years, this research remains in early stages, particularly with respect to understanding effective treatments for this population. Future research priorities include studies on the interaction of prescription drugs with other licit and illicit substances, the impact of prescription drug abuse across the lifespan, the optimal treatment for prescription drug abuse and co-occurring conditions, and effective public policy initiatives for reducing prescription drug abuse” (McHugh, 2015). In the meantime, the pile of dead bodies simply gets bigger.

Overt scope (cultural dependent)

Focus here is on pre-1960 thinking and is limited to comments about cultural anthropology and social phobia.

Cultural anthropology is about the group which a person is a member of. That group could be small, could be big, perhaps is a neighborhood, a faith community, or just an amateur sports league. Regardless, the group is a community that extends basis to an individual’s personality, hence, a ‘what’, with basis in the community’s traditions, hence, a ‘why’. “Before we try to establish a more intimate relation between the problems of cultural anthropology and those of psychiatry than is generally recognized, it will be well to emphasize the apparent differences of subject matter and purpose which seem to separate them as disciplines concerned with human behavior. In the main, cultural anthropology has emphasized the group and its traditions in contradistinction to individual variations of
behavior. It aims to discover the generalized forms of action, thought and feeling which, in their complex interrelatedness, constitute the culture of a community. Whether the ultimate aim of such a study is to establish a typical sequence of institutional forms in the history of man, or to work out a complete distributional survey of patterns and cultural types over the globe, or to make an exhaustive descriptive analysis of as many cultures as possible in order that fundamental sociological laws may be arrived at, is important, indeed, for the spirit and method of actual research in the field of human culture. But all these approaches agree in thinking of the individual as a more or less passive carrier of tradition or, to speak more dynamically, as the infinitely variable actualizer of ideas and of modes of behavior which are implicit in the structure and tradition of a given society. It is what all the individuals of a society have in common in their mutual relations which is supposed to constitute the true subject matter of cultural anthropology and sociology. If the testimony of an individual is set down as such, as often happens in our anthropological monographs, it is not because of an interest in the individual himself as a matured and single organism of ideas but in his assumed typicality for the community as a whole” (Sapir, 1932).

Social phobia is the opposite of culture with the two sides of 1960 presented here.

Pre-1960 – Included here is Sullivan’s Species Identity Theorem as symbolism and Frankl’s analysis as observation. Sullivan’s Species Identity Theorem, "Everyone and anyone is much more simply human than otherwise, more like everyone else than different" (Sullivan, 1962, frontispiece). Frankl states that neuroses are caused by repression of the patient’s sense of responsibility and that it is the function of psychotherapy to bring this repressed sense of responsibility back into the patient’s awareness. Phobias, for example, are seen as caused by a displacement to irrelevant stimuli of the qualms and fears of a repressed conscience. Similarly, realistic and socially adapted conscientiousness, when repressed, will manifest itself in the bizarre pseudo conscientiousness of the compulsive neurotic.

1960 and beyond – Included here is analysis that implies all pre-1960 work is inconsequential. “Social phobia is a serious condition that can be disabling. It is often comorbid with other disorders, causing a significant deterioration in the quality of life of those who have this condition. Fortunately, both behavioral and pharmacological treatments have proven effective in treating this condition; nevertheless, further research [and more dead bodies] is needed to examine the efficacy of using a combination of pharmacology with Cognitive Behavioral Group Therapy (CBGT). Furthermore, longitudinal studies are needed to determine if the treatment of children and adolescents with social phobia produces lasting effects or if it thwarts some of the more severe symptoms that they may experience later in their lives. At the very least, based on the favorable treatment results, it is important for counselors who work with children and adolescents to identify and treat those who exhibit symptoms of social phobia. Finally, counselors need to increase the general publics’ awareness of this disorder and to adjust their counseling styles to best meet the needs of those who have social phobia” (Curtis, 2004).

Covert selectivity and filters (visual processing)

The concluding task of this track is to address the timewise gap between Wertheimer and Arnheim as dynamic, with the timewise gap between Freud and Wertheimer as static as already discussed.

According to Skinner, 1960 has delivered three Obstacles that impact on the philosophy of behavior with if-why-then being overtrumped by if-what-then.

The position here is covert selectivity, as the determinant of if-why-then, is an in-isolation phenomenon if not paired with filters (visual processing), as the determinant of if-what-then.
The reference to ‘covert’ implies the tip of the iceberg is about the size of a drop of water while the portion of the iceberg below the water line is massive thus accounting for the historicity of many views of culture. The reference to filters (visual processing) implies the entire less-selective-awareness transition from that which is made available by working memory in Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43) to that which is absorbed by the more-selective-attention aspect of decision making, with an essential part of that transition not visual processing per se but what is implied by visual thinking.

Like Erika Fromm, Arnheim was a student of Max Wertheimer though the years and involvement were quite different. Fromm reports her association with Wertheimer as an undergraduate in 1932, Arnheim’s dissertation was submitted to Wertheimer in 1928. The importance of this notice is timewise continuity of impact by Wertheimer, which, through Fromm, reached Freud and Einstein as well as others.

Arnheim’s contributed to understanding of covert selectivity and filters from the perspective of aesthetics.

Cover selectivity – Implicit focus on aesthetics was about the “gestalt phenomenological question ‘why the world looks as it does’ with comments that, happily, are also a solution to the Realist question ‘how perception lets us know about the world’. Like Renaissance writers, Arnheim recognized that perspective had strict limits” (Kennedy, 2007).

Filters – Explicit focus on aesthetics was about recognition of “(1) perceptual abstraction and visual thinking, (2) perceptual dynamics and expression, and (3) perceptual ‘goodness’ and beauty (Verstegen, 2007).
Surface: Reasoning and more selective anxiety

This discussion is a retort to the fundamental premise of therapeutic jurisprudence, that under the guidance of discipline, individuals reasoning will adopt the characteristics of the mature normals of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. 34) at the expense of the characteristics of the unstable actors as depicted in that Figure. Further, that the discipline that individuals are exposed to will be guided by some combination of top down (past experiences and expectations) and bottom up (environmental stimuli) mental processing leaving middle across not addressed.

The fundamental issue is the post-1960 environment as identified by Skinner – Early Behaviorism versus the three Obstacles of Humanistic Psychology, Psychotherapy and Cognitive Psychology. These Obstacles then emerge as circular reasoning that drives the Achilles heel of therapeutic jurisprudence – logic in tandem with anxiety determines reasoning; judgement with focus restricted to in-the-moment; and, compliance driven by a presumed static equality of logic and anxiety. The task now is to examine five invocations of circular reasoning which include four views of the Achilles heel – global, human, economic and institutional, with unaddressed prophesy the fifth topic. These topics are preliminary to this track’s two topics: (1) Editing of what is available to a person's own internal world (anxiety and limitations of language), (2) Editing of what is allowed to a person's working memory store and potentially on to their external world (loneliness/frustration and consciousness of abstracting).

Global Achilles heel: This is about the approach known as the ‘carrot and stick’ to include sociology’s contribution to the association between the ‘carrot’ and the ‘stick’, with that contribution unique to each side of the 1960 benchmark.

By the time a person is enrolled in the process known as therapeutic jurisprudence roles have been defined with each role burdened with pre-assigned identity. Now, the nature of that identity...

“Malice in morals [the 'carrot'] and malice in law [the 'stick'] are essentially distinct; yet a knowledge of the nature and practical effects of the one will prove of singular service in the investigation of the other. Malice (from Latin malitia, signifying wickedness, ill-will, spite) is a special manifestation of malevolence, and is, therefore, a mental condition requiring some exciting cause for its production. It is composed of two elements; the one negative, the other positive. There is a negative of love, and there is, furthermore, present, positive ill-will, or design to compass the infliction of pain upon the displeasing object. ...

Anger, envy, hatred, may, most generally do, coexist with malice but it is always as concomitants and not as elements. Such are the results at which we arrive by introspection and observation – the only sources of psychological knowledge. They are important in morals; for the moral quality neither does nor can abide in the act. ...

When we turn from morals to law, the field of vision is changed. The attention must be directed to the outer world, to actions in their origin and results. Here a diligent collation of the authorities will afford us this comprehensive definition of malice: It is the intentional doing of a wrongful act, with knowledge of its character, and without just cause or excuse. The use of the word 'intentional' seemingly considers the mental state as still an element, but it is in seeming only, for the word has a technical meaning distinct from any reference to mind. The legal differs materially from moral import of malice. It signifies not merely hatred or ill-will, but any wicked or mischievous intention of the mind, or inexcusable recklessness. This signification was ignored by Pres. Nott, when he said, in speaking of the death of Hamilton, 'There may be murder in reason and in fact where there is no malice'. Many writers, literary
and legal, have fallen into the same error, which has tended to increase the confused ideas entertained upon the subject” [Italics in original] (Anonymous, 1858).

Now, the science of sociology, first as it evolved over the centuries, then as it is approached now.

“If it is true that human knowledge has evolved out of practical necessities, because knowledge of the true is a weapon in the struggle for existence, both as opposed to extra-human existence, and in the competition of human beings with one another” (Simmel, 1909). Where the problem enters the picture is in the recognition of knowledge – the observable dynamics separate from factors that influence change in what can be observed. Since 1960, the manner of study of social phenomenon has dynamics and influence replaced by hypothesis (Silverman, 1977).

**Human Achilles heel:** This is an extension of malice, dynamics and influence, and, hypothesis.

Malice as recognized here is about a two-way process, meaning, morals->law and law->morals, hence, the countertransference. While jurisprudence under any rule of application implies defense and prosecution, there is no guarantee that either party has total command of their core persona, with shame of either party in a therapeutic arrangement (Hahn, 2000) just one example.

Dynamics and influence is approached with the multiple personality the example. Multiple personality is regarded as detachment between two alter-selves where each self holds true to a self-unique reality. This contrasts with a normal home situation that has suffered a catastrophe such as a death in the family where one reality is very real while a second reality is a substitute for the loss (Lovinger, 1983). The home situation serves as an example where both dynamics and influence are recognizable as well as describable, which does not seem to be true with multiple personality. However, if time is taken to investigate the characteristics of a particular case, it is possible that one may ‘connect the dots’ as evidenced by the following reconstruction: “By an exhaustive reconstruction, the real, life identity of Sally Beauchamp, the classic case of multiple personality investigated by Morton Prince and reported in his 1906 book, has been established. On that new basis, important biographical events previously unrecognized have been discovered and related to the dissociation process. The split appears to have begun as a defensive substitute for a conscious recognition of a death in the family toward which the patient had a sense of guilty complicity. This supplementary article adds further evidence for the reconstruction. The new aspect concerns the kind of weather that appears invariably to have occurred at the time of the patient’s major dissociation crises. It is shown that an overcast sky, followed by rain, prevailed at the time of her first crisis on the occasion of the death of an infant brother, on June 7, 1880, when she was seven years old. The same type of weather occurred during the two subsequent dissociation crises: June 7, 1893, and June 7, 1899. This gloomy weather was apparently a vital aspect of the imprinting” (Rosenzweig, 1988).

Now to address hypothesis with attention limited to investigations into personality that were conducted before 1960. This task is to summarize two investigations that in turn provided basis to the reporting out of the Big Five (p. 28 & 84).

The first investigation by Raymond Cattell was parallel to, but independent of constructs presented by Abraham Maslow (p. 114). Cattell’s investigation allowed the creation of a continuum of unities that extended from a hypothetical static constitution to a hypothetical dynamic constitution with the investigation spanning six components.

“I. **Dynamic (teleological, teleonomic, motivational) unities.** – This form of unity is Allport's and Stern's directive unity, in which the parts are integrated by the fact that they all lie on the path to some one goal of the organism. They have a common purpose.
2. **Social mould (environmental demand) unities**. – Many trait terms point to a unity from the standpoint of society's needs or as occasioned by the pressure of the environment rather than from that of the individual's ergic goals.

3. **Constitutional, non-dynamic (temperamental) unities**. – There exist behavior elements united in a common variation and common fate because they spring from some unitary constitutional endowment of the organism, which, however, is not of a dynamic teleological nature.

4. **Co-nascent (developmental, emergent) unities**. – A basis for classification which naturally occurs to one in thinking over the principal grounds for the classification of living objects and their characters is that of age and development.

5. **Logical (stylistic, evaluative, semantic) unities**. – This category is suggested by Allport's stylistic trait but extends much more widely. He contrasted such traits with dynamic traits, for the former describe the individual's characteristic way of working toward some goal whereas the latter are labelled by the goal itself.

6. **Miscellaneous forms of trait unity**. – The kinds of unity according to which trait elements could be grouped in unitary traits are presumably unlimited” [italics in original] (Cattell, 1943a).

The second investigation was a tedious word-by-word allocation of members of each of the six unities into trait spheres. “As a preliminary step toward factor analysis the complete personality trait vocabulary of the language was condensed to some 60 variables in two successive steps. The first condensation, to a personality comprehensive list of 171 variables, was carried out semantically, by grouping synonyms. The process of condensing further was made dependent on the verdict of correlations. One hundred adults, sampled as evenly as possible from the general population, were rated on 171 traits. On the basis of tetrachoric correlations these variables were grouped into clusters. At present no attempt is made to interpret these clusters or relate them to ‘types’ arrived at speculatively or clinically. Interpretation is deferred to an ensuing article [16 Personality Factors] in which the cluster analysis data will have been augmented by the findings of a superimposed factor analysis” (Cattell, 1943b).

**Economic Achilles heel**: Concern here is how the transition across 1960 has impaired delivery of jurisprudence in general. There are two guides to this task – Cattell’s six unities above and Skinner’s philosophy of behavior with if-why-then being overtrumped by if-what-then, with each guide applied separately – Cattell’s unities will be applied to subjective experience of individuals while Skinner’s philosophy will be applied to the disenfranchised, with as common references Figure 6 (Defenses, p. 47) and Figure 11 (Mood, p. 104).

Each of Cattell’s unities is a subjective continuum and together they are chameleon in nature, perhaps by the minute for any one individual. Two driving forces are acknowledged – latent schizophrenia (intrapunitive) versus narcissism (extrapunitive) of Figure 6, and mood as the superset of personality of Figure 11. From this it follows that individuals influence the amount of control they subjectively experience by means of their own actions, with control belief variability reactive to lifespan circumstances. An individual’s actions are not absolute but probabilistic in three respects – objective control conditions, control beliefs, and subjective control experience.

“Objective control conditions refer to the extent of actual control present as represented by some normatively appropriate assessment of the action-outcome relationship. …

The second concept, control beliefs, refers to the amount of control perceived by the individual either in a specific situation or on the aggregate (generalized) level. Because, at this point, one can measure...
objective contingency only at the situation-specific level, the control beliefs emphasized here are situation-specific control judgments. ...

The third concept, subjective control experience, refers to the selection and integration of those aspects of objective control conditions that are relevant for control beliefs. In the case of control judgments, this usually consists of the integration of action-outcome episodes or of confirming and disconfirming cases. Subjective control experience, which falls conceptually between objective control conditions and control beliefs, is interesting because it may be regarded as having both objective and subjective features. It is objective in that the action-outcome episodes produced by objective control conditions can be described reliably; it is subjective in that the specification of which data compose it, instead of requiring knowledge about what information is necessary and sufficient for an objectively correct control judgment, requires knowledge about which episodes are considered relevant for which causal questions and how they are weighted, integrated, or ignored under certain conditions. This conceptual distinction provides a useful background for the examination of how probability of action influences control beliefs” (Skinner, 1985).

Skinner’s philosophy of behavior with respect to the utilization of psychoanalysis by the disenfranchised, particularly poverty, is about the resolution of a collision between with if-why-then and if-what-then, with 1960 not a factor. This is about cultural collisions between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ that is principally driven by the three heavily comingled rationalizations of dissociation, introspection and the transference with supportive and subjective experience of all participants molded by defensive postures that in turn span latent schizophrenia (intrapunitive) versus narcissism (extrapunitive) of Figure 6 (Defenses, p. 47), and mood as the superset of personality of Figure 11 (Mood, p. 104). Thus, lifespan circumstances of those burdened with poverty become the non-probabilistic determinant of any commitment to psychoanalysis (Javier, 2002).

Continuing with the disenfranchised with attention directed to comingling versus collision the reality, Skinner’s philosophy of behavior with respect to the utilization of psychoanalysis by the disenfranchised, particularly poverty, is about the resolution of the comingling of if-why-then and if-what-then, with 1960 also not a factor. All and any focus on rationalizations and defensive postures fails to recognize the difference between neurotic insecurity and economic insecurity. Neurotic insecurity is the plight of an individual while economic insecurity is the plight of a recognizable segment of society (Wachtel, 2002).

**Institutional Achilles heel:** This discussion is a retreat from the abstract in favor of the disenfranchised as it must be understood that the reference to disenfranchised is not about economic poverty but is about socioeconomic poverty, hence, impaired social sophistication as influenced by some combination of ‘what’ and ‘why’.

To add emphasis to abstract versus disenfranchised this discussion’s title is now countered by an alternate – recovery-disenfranchised-appreciation. For additional emphasis the three words can be represented as three pairs where the first two are mutually exclusive while the third is mutually inclusive or complimentary. A final dose of emphasis is gained when each pair – recovery-disenfranchised, recovery-appreciation and disenfranchised-appreciation – is viewed from the perspective of a static constitution versus a dynamic constitution. The task now is to address each of the three pairs to be followed by a survey of institutional intent and performance.

The recovery-disenfranchised pair: Recovery alone suggests a return to some centrist state, while disenfranchised alone suggests being denied access to some centrist state. A broader view has “Recovery is a process by which an individual recovers their self-esteem, dreams, self-worth, pride, choice, dignity and meaning” (Townsend, 2003). With this view the basis for extending the notion of
recovery from a static constitution to a dynamic constitution, recovery advances to privileged and disenfranchised advances to stigmatized on a pre-1960 basis.

Skinner’s three Obstacles which assert a non-static philosophy of behavior – Humanistic Psychology, Psychotherapy and Cognitive Psychology – creates a new dynamic constitution scenario. Recovery is at risk of advancing to a self-serving invocation of the three heavily comingled rationalizations of dissociation, introspection and the transference, with disenfranchised advancing to some combination of latent schizophrenia and narcissism.

The recovery-appreciation pair: Continuing with recovery as suggestive of a return to some centrist state, a broader view has “Recovery is about treating the whole person, identifying their strengths, instilling hope, and helping them to function at an optimal level by allowing them to take responsibility for their life” (Ibid). Appreciation in the context of jurisprudence is taken to imply a measure of reality-based recognition (Slobogin, 1996) on a pre-1960 basis.

The disenfranchised-appreciation pair: Regarding a static versus a dynamic constitution, recovery advances to privileged and appreciation advances to questionable sincerity on a pre-1960 basis. Otherwise, recovery is at risk of advancing to a self-serving invocation of the three heavily comingled rationalizations of dissociation, introspection and the transference, with appreciation advancing to some combination of latent schizophrenia and narcissism.

Given the route from recovery through each disenfranchised and appreciation to a dynamic constitution results in the same (self-serving, etc.) dynamics, it then follows that each disenfranchised and appreciation are different invocations of impaired social sophistication thus satisfying the claim of being mutually inclusive or complimentary.

Now, institutional intent and performance – therapeutic jurisprudence as a construct and in action, followed by findings from a competence study.

Therapeutic jurisprudence is about the necessary point-in-time approach to a level playing field with respect to non-criminal anti-social conduct. It advances the disenfranchised to a person of social sophistication while relaxing assessment of appreciation for the benefit of social sophistication.

An objective statement has “Mental health law needs new directions. We have suggested one reflecting the assumption that mental health law should serve rather than disserve the mental health of those it affects. Substantive rules, and the practices and procedures that implement them, should be analyzed to determine their impact on therapeutic values. This frequently ignored dimension should be systematically examined with the tools of the behavioral sciences and the results should factor into the policy analysis that must precede sensible law reform efforts. Mental health law has much to contribute to improving the condition and well-being of patients. To reach its full potential, it must become more empirical and truly interdisciplinary. We propose an approach in which behavioral scientists and legal analysts join together to forge a new generation of mental health law scholarship that can better serve the aims of mental health law” (Wexler, 1990).

This point-in-time approach reflects closed-loop thinking, that, while evidence should be expected to reach into representations about that past while allowing estimates about the future, the entire application of procedure has Skinner’s philosophy of behavior reduced to a static representation.

Therapeutic jurisprudence as a construct and in action is through the Drug Court, with the formal definition of the Drug Court as published by the Bureau of Justice Assistance which operates from within the U. S. Dept. of Justice – concept (BJA, 1997) then application (SAMHSA, 2015) – with attainment of social sophistication via compliance the tone.
Concept is presented as ten Key Components:

#1: Drug courts integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with justice system case processing.

#2: Using a nonadversarial approach, prosecution and defense counsel promote public safety while protecting participants’ due process rights.

#3: Eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed in the drug court program.

#4: Drug courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, and other related treatment and rehabilitation services.

#5: Abstinence is monitored by frequent alcohol and other drug testing.

#6: A coordinated strategy governs drug court responses to participants’ compliance.

#7: Ongoing judicial interaction with each drug court participant is essential.

#8: Monitoring and evaluation measure the achievement of program goals and gauge effectiveness.

#9: Continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective drug court planning, implementation, and operations.

#10: Forging partnerships among drug courts, public agencies, and community-based organizations generates local support and enhances drug court program effectiveness.

Application of the Concept is where the Achilles heel enters the picture.

Referenced here is the TI-15-002 Federal Funding Opportunity titled “SAMHSA Treatment Drug Courts”, with the Executive Summary – “The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT) is accepting applications for fiscal year (FY) 2015 Grants to Expand Substance Abuse Treatment Capacity in Adult and Family Treatment Drug Courts. The purpose of this program is to expand and/or enhance substance abuse treatment services in existing adult and family 'problem solving' courts, which use the treatment drug court model in order to provide alcohol and drug treatment (including recovery support services supporting substance abuse treatment, screening, assessment, case management, and program coordination as well as family-focused services in the case of Family Treatment Drug Courts) to defendants/offenders. Grantees will be expected to provide a coordinated, multi-system approach designed to combine the sanctioning power of treatment drug courts with effective treatment services to break the cycle of criminal behavior, child abuse and neglect, alcohol and/or drug use, and incarceration or other penalties. Grant funds must be used to serve people diagnosed with a substance use disorder as their primary condition, particularly high-risk/high-need populations diagnosed with substance dependence or addiction to alcohol/other drugs and identified as needing immediate treatment. Grant funds must be used to address gaps in the continuum of treatment for those individuals in these drug courts who have substance abuse and/or co-occurring disorders treatment needs. Grant funds may be used to provide services for co-morbid conditions, such as mental health problems, as long as expenditures remain consistent with the drug court model which is designed to serve individuals needing treatment for substance dependence or addiction to alcohol/other drugs. SAMHSA will use discretion in allocating funding for these awards, taking into consideration the specific drug court models (adult and family treatment drug courts) as appropriate, and the number of applications received per model type”.

The key comment in this Executive Summary is “the number of applications received per model type” which translates into individual compliance upon the strength of experimental psychology. The true key however is the economics – a maximum of 35 awards with each award limited to $325,000.
Regarding the explicit population served no data is available. However, the available census for alcohol alone is extensive. The NSDUH data for Alcohol Use, Binge Alcohol Use, and Heavy Alcohol Use in the Past Month among Persons Aged 12 or Older for the year 2015 (000’s) – Alcohol Use 138,322, Binge Alcohol Use 66,690, Heavy Alcohol Use 17,326 (NSDUH, 2016, Table 2.46A). Note: Binge Alcohol Use is defined as drinking five or more drinks (for males) or four or more drinks (for females) on the same occasion (i.e., at the same time or within a couple of hours of each other) on at least 1 day in the past 30 days. Heavy Alcohol Use is defined as binge drinking on the same occasion on each of 5 or more days in the past 30 days.

Findings from a competence study expose further application of therapeutic jurisprudence. The entire study was targeted to “Four legal standards for determining decision-making competence are described: the abilities to communicate a choice, understand relevant information, appreciate the nature of the situation and its likely consequences, and rationally manipulate information” (Appelbaum, 1995).

Unaddressed prophecy: This discussion is an extension of the Economic Achilles heel. The fundamental issue is seduction, or, more properly, the ghost(s) of seduction. Two sides of the ghost(s) will be presented. The first is presence must be proven, the second is presence in its resilience. Basis for comment is Cattell’s Constitutional, non-dynamic (temperamental) unities (p. 138) and Skinner’s philosophy of behavior (p. 132).

The first is about allegations of child sexual abuse and the rights of the defendant versus the welfare of the victim in the court setting with the validity of each disenfranchised and appreciation the issue. The starting point is preamble-type of analysis.

“Both psychology and law are concerned with human behavior. Law depends upon what everyone knows and believes about human behavior, upon common knowledge. In contrast, psychology distrusts common knowledge and substitutes knowledge based on empirical data systematically gathered and rationally analyzed. This conflict may cause misunderstanding between law and psychology. However, a common ground of both law and psychology is the goal to reduce error. Neither discipline can claim complete validity and reliability, but both continuously seek to improve procedures and the understanding of human behavior. ...

The only reason for the law to pay attention to psychology is the expectation that it may improve the accuracy and effectiveness of the legal system. However, within psychology there are differences in the level of scientific status or credibility. Meehl draws a distinction between psychological theories, techniques, and procedures with high and clear validity and those with low and doubtful validity. Testimony in court by psychologists should be limited to high and clear validity material, or at the very least the limits and qualifications of low and doubtful validity statements must be described. ...

The Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, prepared by Division 41 of the American Psychological Association and the American Board of Forensic Psychology, contain the principle that psychologists who ‘provide professional psychological expertise to the judicial system … have an obligation to provide services in a manner consistent with the highest standards of their profession’. When the science of psychology is represented to the U.S. Supreme Court in an amicus curiae brief by the largest professional organization of psychologists, the American Psychological Association, it is reasonable to expect adherence to the highest standards of the profession and the highest level of competence. Anything less is poor psychology. If such a representation is, in fact, poor psychology, the best prediction is that the interaction will produce poor law” [Italics in original] (Underwager, 1992).

On the strength of Skinner’s philosophy of behavior and the three Obstacles, psychology has advanced from deliberate analysis to maverick analysis with the result being the disenfranchised party is placed at
a disadvantage at the expense of appreciation. Thus, Cattell’s “behavior elements united in a common variation and common fate because they spring from some unitary constitutional endowment of the organism, which, however, is not of a dynamic teleological nature” (Cattell, 1943a) – his ghost(s) from the past – affirm as prophesy that poor psychology will produce poor law.

Transitioning to the second, presence in its resilience of the ghost(s) of seduction: The principle issue is seduction begets distortions in attachment bonds which later emerge as post-traumatic stress. The preceding Cattell-Skinner analysis applies.

“Trauma can be repeated on behavioral, emotional, physiologic, and neuroendocrinioologic levels. Repetition on these different levels causes a large variety of individual and social suffering. Anger directed against the self or others is always a central problem in the lives of people who have been violated and this is itself a repetitive re-enactment of real events from the past. ...

People need a 'safe base' for normal social and biologic development. Traumatization occurs when both internal and external resources are inadequate to cope with external threat. Uncontrollable disruptions or distortions of attachment bonds precede the development of post-traumatic stress syndromes. People seek increased attachment in the face of danger. Adults, as well as children, may develop strong emotional ties with people who intermittently harass, beat, and, threaten them. The persistence of these attachment bonds leads to confusion of pain and love. Assaults lead to hyperarousal states for which the memory can be state-dependent or dissociated, and this memory only returns fully during renewed terror. This interferes with good judgment about these relationships and allows longing for attachment to overcome realistic fears. ...

All primates subjected to early abuse and deprivation are vulnerable to engage in violent relationships with peers as adults. Males tend to be hyperaggressive, and females fail to protect themselves and their offspring against danger. Chronic physiologic hyperarousal persists, particularly to stimuli reminiscent of the trauma. Later stresses tend to be experienced as somatic states, rather than as specific events that require specific means of coping. Thus, victims of trauma may respond to contemporary stimuli as a return of the trauma, without conscious awareness that past injury rather than current stress is the basis of their physiologic emergency responses. Hyperarousal interferes with the ability to make rational assessments and prevents resolution and integration of the trauma. Disturbances in the catecholamine, serotonin, and endogenous opioid systems have been implicated in this persistence of all-or-nothing responses. ...

People who have been exposed to highly stressful stimuli develop long-term potentiation of memory tracts that are reactivated at times of subsequent arousal. This activation explains how current stress is experienced as a return of the trauma; it causes a return to earlier behavior patterns. Ordinarily, people will choose the most pleasant of two alternatives. High arousal causes people to engage in familiar behavior, regardless of the rewards. As novel stimuli are anxiety provoking, under stress, previously traumatized people tend return to familiar patterns, even if they cause pain. ...

The 'opponent process theory of acquired motivation' explains how fear may become a pleasurable sensation and that 'the laws of social attachment may be identical to those of drug addiction'. Victims can become addicted to their victimizers; social contact may activate endogenous opioid systems, alleviating separation distress and strengthening social bonds. High levels of social stress activate opioid systems as well. Vietnam veterans with PTSD show opioid-mediated reduction in pain perception after re-exposure to a traumatic stimulus. Thus, re-exposure to stress can have the same effect as taking exogenous opioids, providing a similar relief from stress. ...
Childhood abuse and neglect enhance long-term hyperarousal and decreased modulation of strong affect states. Abused children may require much higher external stimulation to affect the endogenous opioid system for soothing than when the biologic concomitants of comfort are easily activated by conditioned responses based on good early caregiving experiences. Victimized people may neutralize their hyperarousal by a variety of addictive behaviors, including compulsive re-exposure to victimization of self and others. Gaining control over one's current life, rather than repeating trauma in action, mood, or somatic states, is the goal of treatment. The only reason to uncover traumatic material is to gain conscious control over unbidden re-experiences or re-enactments. The presence of strong attachments provides people with the security necessary to explore their life experiences and to interrupt the inner or social isolation that keeps them stuck in repetitive patterns. In contrast with victimized children, adults can learn to protect themselves and make conscious choices about not engaging in relationships or behaviors that are harmful” (Van der Kolk, 1989).

Attention now turns to this track’s two topics: (1) Editing of what is available to a person's own internal world (anxiety and limitations of language), (2) Editing of what is allowed to a person's working memory store and potentially on to their external world (loneliness/frustration and consciousness of abstracting).

**Editing of what is available to a person's own internal world**

This is about recognition of distortions in attachment bonds and the resolution of those distortions. Basis for comment continues to be Cattell’s *Constitutional, non-dynamic (temperamental) unities* (p. 138) and Skinner’s philosophy of behavior (p. 132).

The starting point is projection (versus progression). A simple example that is found in communities across the world, the traffic signal – red, yellow, green. Red is understood to mean stop, green is understood to mean go, yellow is understood variously by jurisdiction – simple enough. However, in what-why terms, red begets anger, green begets happiness, yellow begets frustration, all on the strength of morbid anger, hence, the what. Now the ‘why’ – the seemingly invisible morbid anxiety that has been created by seduction, with morbid anxiety synonymous with distortions in attachment bonds.

“In the mental manifestations the emotional element is naturally the most prominent. It consists in a curious admixture of dread, panic, terror, anguish, and apprehension. It varies greatly from, on the one extreme, a slight abashment, awkwardness, embarrassment, or confusion to, on the other, a degree of indescribable dread that may even rob the sufferer of consciousness. Common to all degrees is a sense of something impending, of anxious expectation of something harmful or awful. One needs an artist to portray the higher grades of dread. ...”

The anxious expectation may become especially linked to certain ideas or occasions, usually loosely, so that it readily passes from one to another; the commonest of these are hypochondriac ideas, ideas of moral scrupulosity, fears of loss of property or of professional capacity, etc. Freud speaks of there being in this stage a quantity of ‘free, floating anxiety’ which becomes attached to one idea after another. We here have the beginning of the passage of the condition into a true phobia, where the fear is, so to speak, precipitated on to a given idea, and becomes localized. The general mental effect shows an alternation or a combination of over-excitation and inhibition; as a rule, the former is found with slighter grades, the latter with higher grades of anxiety. For instance, the thought processes may be either hurried and agitated, one idea rapidly chasing the other, with very superficial associations between them, or there may be a blocking of them, an inhibition, so that the mind may even ‘become a blank’. ...
Those who trace morbid anxiety to early religious ideas, however, are guilty of a curiously simple error of logic. Because the two stand in a certain relation to each other it is inferred that one must be the cause of the other, the truth being that they are both manifestations of a common cause. To hold that an over-religious training is the cause of anxiety is like holding that the smoke of a fire is the cause of the heat it gives out” (Jones, 1911).

Now to extend morbid anxiety to the general psychoneuroses and then on to normal mental processes with the deployment of memory the concern versus the contents of memory.

“One of the most fundamental of normal processes is associative memory, by which not only the distinctly conscious experiences of life are conserved and made use of by the individual for the purposes of adaptation to the environment, but unconscious sensory-motor experiences, particularly (but not solely) in the lower animals, are similarly made use of for the same purpose. Incidentally I may say in this connection that there is a general tendency of modern students of animal psychology to interpret many actions in the lower animals which were formerly regarded as evidence of conscious reasoning, as nothing more than unconscious reactions or associative memory of a purely psychological character. ...

In psychopathology it will be generally conceded, I think, that memory as a process is the principal, if not the sole mechanism in certain psychoneurotic phenomena. In such phenomena the mechanism is perverted, to be sure, in that it misadapts the individual to his environment, but it is memory none the less. The mechanism is perverted in the sense that through the memory process certain psychophysiological functions become associated with and react to stimuli which ordinarily have no such effect, and, in doing so, produce undesirable results. ...

We may begin by laying it down as an axiom that, as memory considered as a process consists in registration, conservation, and reproduction of experiences, any process which can be resolved into these three factors is memory. Further, experiment and observation have shown that memory as thus defined may not be confined to the reproduction of conscious experiences but may include those that never had a conscious equivalent, i.e., physiological experiences. ...

We must accept the principle that every fact in the psychical and physical world is related to an antecedent fact, and the only question is what antecedent facts determine particular mental phenomena, and by what mechanism” (Prince, 1911).

From this it follows that a good seduction deserves to have companion seductions. Candidates include empathy, self as the direct object of language versus the subject, and, language as an objective counter to subjective mood (Villela-Minnerly, 1991). With language from the perspective of empathy and self the key considerations are language acquisition (Meissner, 2008a), thoughts and words (Meissner, 2008b) and the significance of pronouns (Meissner, 2008c).

Editing of what is allowed to a person's working memory store

The idea that pre-existing seductions are most deserving of newly acquired companion seductions is fundamental to the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence – the flattening of life is the necessary consequence of seductions by the crowd. More to the point, the flattening of life is a beneficiary of a re-deployment of reasoning due to an overt focus on identity and learning, with identity molded by empathy and self, and with learning driven less by experience and more by language. Discussion follows multiple seductions, flattening of life, reasoning, identity and learning.

**Multiple seductions:** This discussion is an extension of the Unaddressed prophesy (p. 143) and the Economic Achilles heel (p. 139).
In the discussion of the Unaddressed prophesy two ghost(s) of seduction were presented. The first was presence must be proven, the second was presence in its resilience. Basis for comment was Cattell’s *Constitutional, non-dynamic (temperamental) unities* and Skinner’s philosophy of behavior. To be addressed now is both repression and resistance as the root of seduction — “It is from the socialization experiences of the child (the modification of instinctual impulses) that repression is experienced and thus the process of confession is an attempt to quell (unconsciously) feelings of guilt and need for self-punishment” (Israel, 2006).

In the discussion of the Economic Achilles heel the concern was the transition across 1960 with focus set at *if-why-then* being overtrumped by *if-what-then*. The alternative to repression and resistance, separately and jointly, is conscious deliberation about what benefits from immediate focus, i.e., the management of *if-what-then*. A person’s everyday life is based on either spontaneous reactions or simply remembering to do what was previously planned, a process known as prospective memory. Its companion process known as retrospective memory is what drives the retaining of experiences (Graf, 2012), i.e., *if-why-then*.

The idea behind multiple seductions is with prospective memory, to edit what enters conscious with a controlled resistance the result. With retrospective memory, to edit what experience enters consciousness with a controlled repression the result. The two edits taken together are functions of the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

**Flattening of life:** In the discussion of the Economic Achilles heel the concern was the transition across 1960 with focus set at *if-why-then* being overtrumped by *if-what-then*. This discussion is not an extension of Skinner’s philosophy of behavior, but a companion and is about Erik Erikson’s concept of identity which includes the comingling of *if-why-then* and *if-what-then*.

Erik Erikson having developed a distaste for his concept of identity because it was so frequently misused. He held that identity development is not at an ‘achievement’ or an unalterable accomplishment but that identity results from the reconciling of three essential dimensions – the unconscious, negatives, and society (Hoare, 2012).

The resolution of each the unconscious, negatives, and society require focus limited to middle across with balance between prospective memory and retrospective memory the norm.

With the unconscious, logic and anxiety need to be approached from a centrist perspective. With negatives, judgement must reflect the ‘wearing of life like a loose garment’. With society, selective application of the consciousness must be elevated to habit.

**Reasoning:** This is an extension of two prior associations – gestalt and aesthetics (p. 100) and gestalt and Hartley’s Association of Ideas (p. 109). The concern here is about the effect of varying external conditions on learning, retention, and recall.

“Is it advantageous to have external conditions as constant as possible during the learning, retention, and reproduction process? Which is least to be desired, change during the learning period, during retention, or during recall? Just how specific is learning? If it takes place against a varied external background, will the removal of any outstanding part of this background cause disturbance? …

These results support both the gestalt theory (which insists on the importance of the total stimulating situation in determining the response) and the simple-machine theory (which speaks rather of point-to-point connections in the sensory-motor system). The kinaesthetic cues may be changed and not affect the learning arc. The same holds true for the form of response to the stimulus words. If the sense
modality used for presenting the stimulus words is changed, the efficiency of recall will be affected” (Maslow, 1934).

Identity: With Skinner’s three Obstacles the reference, it is fair to question understanding of the state of the unconscious. There are three choices with only one suggesting common sense.

The first choice is from within the monism versus dualism debate where the goal is to discover continuity and unity in the universe where those proponents “have postulated the unconscious as the absolute principle”.

The second choice is as crafted by mainly physicians – Freud, James, Janet, Prince, Sidis and others of their era, and non-physicians – the Allport’s, Rogers, Maslow, and others of more recent times. While much disagreement exists between the various contributions to the knowledgebase, what remains is practical life is the common basis. The only infraction to be recognized is Freud’s focus on s-e-x.

The third choice are persons from the current era, who are loyal to Skinner’s three Obstacles, and who are entrenched in maverick psychology.

Of the three choices it is only the second than endeavors to connect life to thought (Feingold, 1917).

Learning: The conscious, preconscious and unconscious are factors in learning but with emphasis on the ability to learn.

As a starting point we have “consciousness as an ultimate fact, undefinable, identical with awareness. Unconsciousness denotes for us its opposite – entire absence of awareness, that which is entirely outside of our experience at any moment of time. Subconsciousness, for which we prefer to substitute ‘perceptual’ factors, gives focal consciousness its qualitative character. Subconsciousness is consciousness of a less distinct degree. Divided consciousness, such as is present in cases of multiple personality, is best called ‘co-consciousness’. …that in learning of any sort both conscious and unconscious factors exist. Unconscious factors are those involved in the fixing of the association by practice, and the cropping out of modifications of behavior subsequently utilized by consciousness. …

The more intellectual and highly conscious the material to be learned, the more direct and immediate the effect of conscious control [i.e., emotional investment]. Practice results in a standing out of common features of the process; these are focalized, and generalized into rules for new and better procedure, which immediately takes place. …

Learning can progress, however, without consciousness of the end or of the fact that one is learning, but even here a high degree of attention to one’s task brings more marked results than work under distraction” (Ordahl, 1911).
Issue: Perception and less selective inertia

This discussion has the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence as dependent upon perception and less selective inertia as a starting point, from which analysis of instinct, knowledge, thought and behavior will be developed. The essence of this discussion is the dynamics of the interplay between the self and the object world.

Perception: A casualty of Cattell’s *Constitutional, non-dynamic (temperamental) unities* and Skinner’s philosophy of behavior is the array of suppositions about human memory and its dubious reliability. There are two sides to this story – everyday life and the longitudinal event known as life. The starting point is a generic supposition followed by three conditional answers to its dubious reliability – ‘yes’, ‘maybe’ and ‘no’.

“The net result of [retrieval] studies is a strong suspicion that substitution has occurred – that the misleading information has irrevocably replaced the original information in the subject’s brain. The suggestion is that some aspects of the original representation of a complex event are fragile indeed. When the memory of an event is called to consciousness, there appears to be a potential for substitution to occur. It is reasonable to suppose that memory is not necessarily permanent. ...The implication of the notion of nonpermanent memory is that it should give pause to all who rely on obtaining a ‘truthful’ version of an event from someone who experienced that event in the past. ...It is important to realize that the statements made during [various] interviews may not be particularly accurate as reports of prior events. The contents of an interview may not reflect a person’s earlier experiences and attitudes so much as his or her current picture of the past. It may not be possible, in some instances, to ever discover from interviewing someone what actually happened in that person’s past. Not only might the originally acquired memory have departed from reality in some systematic way, but the memory may have been continually subject to change after it was initially stored” (Loftus, 1980).

The conditional answer of ‘yes’ – To paint a picture that supports the prior supposition one only need to think of some specific person going to a grocery store with the intent to purchase everything that will be needed for the next month with that period including some major celebration – without a shopping list. Now, what is the probability that that specific person will return with everything they previously determined to be needed, without substitution or addition. And, as previously reported (p. 33), the capacity for we frail folks to shoot ourselves in the foot and include “slips of the tongue” (Freud, 1901/1960, pp. 53-105), “misreadings and slips of the pen” (Ibid, pp. 106-133), and on to “combined parapraxes” (Ibid, pp. 230-238), and, lest we forget, “determinism, belief in chance and superstition” (Ibid, pp. 239-279) to include, “those who do not use drugs and yet have difficult lives”.

The conditional answer of ‘maybe’ – The starting point is a previous reference – “intelligence is a slippery customer” (Langer, 1942, p. 86). Topics include examples of conscious plagiarism, unconscious plagiarism, unconscious doubt and conscious doubt.

Conscious plagiarism is about the process of scholarly publishing and the difficulties faced by editors – “editorial policy of the Journal of Educational Psychology with respect to substantive, procedural, and ethical issues. Research should make substantive contributions and conceptually integrate recent developments bearing on the topic. Procedural concerns involve terminological clarity, confounding and controlled factors, the effects of a laboratory orientation on classroom research, and the appropriateness of a statistical analysis. Ethical issues include piecemeal and duplicate publications, plagiarism, and falsification/fabrication of data” (Levin, 1993).
Unconscious plagiarism is effectively “I think that…”, unconscious plagiarism either due to impairment of source information or a mistaken sense of ownership all occurring in a verbal exercise (Perfect, 2009).

Unconscious doubt is about the ability “to detect ignorance, inaccuracy, incompetence, deception, and distortion” (Mills, 2012), particularly with children though the entire idea applies to adults as well. In it important to note that with children, this is about current experience in a verbal setting and is completely apart from allegations of child sexual abuse (p. 143) as well as the recovered memory debate (Perception above).

Conscious doubt is about progression in tandem with unintended consequences, hence, addiction as but one example. “When an unconditioned stimulus, a reinforcer, or an innate releaser is repeatedly presented to human or animal subjects, three major affective phenomena are often observed. First, one often sees affective or hedonic contrast. Second, frequent repetition of the unconditioned stimulus, reinforcer, or innate releaser often gives rise to affective or hedonic habituation (tolerance). Finally, after frequent repetition of these stimuli, a withdrawal or abstinence syndrome often emerges directly following stimulus termination. These affective dynamics of organismically important stimuli generate new motives, new opportunities for reinforcing and energizing operant behaviors, based on the hedonic attributes of withdrawal or abstinence syndromes” (Solomon, 1980). What this means is logic is overtrumped by reward, that operant conditioning is a process that is independent of rationale.

The conditional answer of ‘no’ – Two examples are offered with both from everyday life. The first is about persons who enter licensed professions – law, medicine, etc. – who are required to take professional exams. An excellent memory is a must. The second is about an unavoidable memory, the core of psychoanalytic theory.

“The field of affects and emotions--in other words non-sensory and non-intellective processes – has been generally an isolated field within the sphere of general psychology. The exploration of them has remained unsatisfactory, and in the main has attempted to reduce them to physiological, sensory, or at best intellective processes. ...the influence of emotions on memory phenomena has remained insufficiently attacked and elucidated by general psychology. In view of this situation, the psychoanalytic contributions to the knowledge of this influence appear to be of great importance. In psychoanalytic theory, affects and emotions are not an isolated terrain; no concept is more central to it than that of emotion, affect, drive. The importance of the psychoanalytic contributions to our topic is increased by another feature of this theory: its underlying postulate of strict psychic determinism. Psychic determinism signifies that the present is determined by the past. Psychic phenomena of the present can be determined by the past only to the degree that the past survives; the survival of psychic events is, however, the phenomenon usually subsumed under the concept memory. In the psychoanalytic theory of the etiology and therapy of psychic disturbances, the central significance of forgetting and remembering is a basic tenet. ...The survey of the pertinent psychoanalytic literature has shown us the fallacy of the widespread notion that Freud taught the forgetting of the disagreeable. What Freud discovered was the function preventing the emergence into consciousness of an unconscious idea which, if it became conscious, would give rise to a conflict. This function, called repression, proved to be a specific and variable one, hardly amenable to the statistical treatment adopted by experimentalists. Forgetting has appeared to be one of the many ‘inadequacies of our psychic functioning’ which are the result of the conflict between the ‘censor’ and the prohibited unconscious tendencies which strive to assert themselves. The mechanisms encountered in analyzing these inadequacies – mechanisms which produce screen memories in the place of amnesized infantile experiences, mechanisms which underlie the dynamic flow of free associations, mechanisms of dream work – have been found to be specific memory functions. These functions are displacement,
condensation, substitution, symbolization, and secondary elaboration. Remembering as emergence into consciousness, and forgetting as non-emergence, have been recognized as expressions of memory dynamics, in which instinctual strivings use individual memories – deposited in strata according to their connection with other deposited material – for their representation. This representation may come about on various levels, the mechanisms described being the forms of memory organization on these levels. The dream is an extreme example in which the instinctual component – the wish – organizes memories to represent itself on a primitive perceptual level” (Rapaport, 1942).

This survey across ‘yes’, ‘maybe’ and ‘no’ demonstrates the importance of avoiding maverick psychology, especially with respect to memory, while protecting the challenge(s) presented by Cattell’s Constitutional, non-dynamic (temperamental) unities and Skinner’s philosophy of behavior. The extending of Cattell’s and Skinner’s positions to progression in tandem, in a positive sense, with unconscious doubt and conscious doubt is then the precursor to ‘potential space’ as a dynamic as postulated by Donald Winnicott (Summers, 2005) with respect to the interplay between the self and the object world. (Winnicott was a member of the pro-Klein faction in the Freud-Klein controversy (p. 45).

The idea being in a self-oriented approach to psychoanalysis is that recognition of doubt becomes an enabler of insight.

Inertia: With drives the reference, inertia is comprised of suggestion and collaboration as static, and emotion as dynamic, with object relations an envelope about drives. Hence, suggestion as source, emotion as aim, and, collaboration as object. The task now is to account for this alignment with the prior discussion of Unaddressed prophesy (p. 143), the ghost(s) of seduction, with Figure 3 (Adaptation p. 21) the reference, thus, ‘sociality’ versus ‘individualism’.

The prior discussion to Unaddressed prophesy was constrained by the fifth track’s title – Surface: Reasoning and more selective anxiety. This discussion is constrained by this sixth track’s title – Issue: Perception and less selective inertia. Hence, the prior discussion tended to dynamic – more selective anxiety, while this discussion tends to static – less selective inertia, where each anxiety and inertia are about the intersection of emotion and memory. And, by construction, the prior addressed allegations of child sexual abuse and the rights of the defendant versus the welfare of the victim in the court setting with the validity of each disenfranchised and appreciation the issue, while, by construction, the setting has child sexual abuse versus the intersection of emotion and memory in later life.

The core of the reference utilized with respect to rights (p. 143) – “The only reason for the law to pay attention to psychology is the expectation that it may improve the accuracy and effectiveness of the legal system. However, within psychology there are differences in the level of scientific status or credibility. Meehl draws a distinction between psychological theories, techniques, and procedures with high and clear validity and those with low and doubtful validity. Testimony in court by psychologists should be limited to high and clear validity material, or at the very least the limits and qualifications of low and doubtful validity statements must be described. If such a representation is, in fact, poor psychology, the best prediction is that the interaction will produce poor law” [Italics in original] (Underwager, 1992).

The focus here is about the individual person apart from child sexual abuse and age-appropriate with respect to the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. With repression the common theme, discussion follows this sequence – comments on abuse versus maverick psychology, Freud’s conditional assessment, and, a generic assessment.

Abuse versus maverick psychology requires much care in focus. First, “[A number of] anecdotal reports constitute the clinical evidence that clients do indeed manage later to remember some earlier
inaccessible painful experience. The reports constitute evidence for the core ideas inherent in the theory of repression. Several respected scholars once made the point that, from a clinical standpoint, ‘the evidence for repression is overwhelming and obvious’. ...

On the other hand, the clinical anecdotes and the loose theory used to explain them remain unconvincing to some psychotherapists and to many laboratory researchers. One psychiatrist who has seen more than 200 severely dissociative patients explicitly referred to such anecdotes as ‘empirical observations lacking in scientific underpinnings’. ...

There is little doubt that actual childhood sexual abuse is tragically common. Even those who claim that the statistics are exaggerated still agree that child abuse constitutes a serious social problem. I do not question the commonness of childhood sexual abuse itself but ask here about how the abuse is recalled in the minds of adults. Specifically, how common is it to repress memories of childhood sexual abuse? Claims about the commonness of repressed memories are freely made: It is typical to read estimates such as ‘most incest survivors have limited recall about their abuse’ or ‘half of all incest survivors do not remember that the abuse occurred’. One psychotherapist with 18 years of experience has claimed that ‘millions of people have blocked out frightening episodes of abuse, years of their life, or their entire childhood’. Later, she reported that ‘sexual abuse is particularly susceptible to memory repression’” (Loftus, 1993).

Second, the risk of low and doubtful validity, which begets poor psychology, with maverick psychology – Skinner’s Obstacles – the ‘fuel that feeds the fire’, we have uncertainty – “Repressed memories of abuse often return in therapy, sometimes after suggestive probing. Today, popular writings have been so fully absorbed by the culture that these too can serve as a source of suggestion that can greatly influence what happens in therapy and outside of it. The result is memories that are often detailed and confidently held. Despite lack of corroboration, some of these recollections could be authentic. Others might not be” (Ibid).

Freud’s conditional assessment is anchored in uncertainty – his preamble then his assessment.

The preamble – “I find myself for a moment in the interesting position of not knowing weather what I have to say should be regarded as something long familiar and obvious or as something entirely new and puzzling. But I am inclined to think the latter” [Italics added] (Freud, 1938b|1964, p. 275).

The assessment – “Let us suppose, then, that a child’s ego is under the sway of a powerful instinctual demand which it is accustomed to satisfy and that it is suddenly frightened by an experience which teaches it that the continuance of this satisfaction will result in an almost intolerable real danger. It must now decide either to recognize the real danger, give way to it and renounce the instinctual satisfaction, or to disavow reality and make itself believe that there is no reason for fear, so that it may be able to retain the satisfaction. Thus, there is a conflict between the demand by the instinct and the prohibition by reality. But in fact, the child takes neither course, or rather he takes both simultaneously, which comes to the same thing. He replies to the conflict with two contrary reactions, both of which are valid and effective. On the one hand, with the help of certain mechanisms he rejects reality and refuses to accept any prohibition; on the other hand, in the same breath he recognizes the danger of reality, takes over the fear of that danger as a pathological symptom and tries subsequently to divest himself of the fear. It must be confessed that this is a very ingenious solution of the difficulty. Both of the parties to the dispute obtain their share: the instinct is allowed to retain its satisfaction and proper respect is shown to reality. But everything has to be paid for in one way or another, and this success is achieved at the price of a rift in the ego which never heals but which increases as time goes on. The two contrary reactions to the conflict persist as the centre-point of a splitting of the ego. The whole process seems so
strange to us because we take for granted the synthetic nature of the process of the ego. But we are clearly at fault in this. The synthetic function of the ego, though it is of such extraordinarily importance, is subject to particular conditions and is liable to a whole number of disturbances” [Italics added] (Ibid, p. 275). Thus, with child sexual abuse investigations it might be worth searching memory for emotion and feelings rather than events.

Generic assessment requires the separating of childhood memories from adult level concepts with respect to events, while at the same time the merging of childhood memories with adult level concepts. The logic behind the merging is the opening assertion that object relations envelope the drives, with suggestion as source, emotion as aim, and, collaboration as object. Going one step deeper we have suggestion derived from childhood memories with focus limited to emotion and feelings rather than events, emotion accounted for by Figure 6 (Defenses, p. 47), and, collaboration accounted for by an understanding of reality that does not emulate Figure 7 (Unit Step Function, p. 53).

Instinct: This is an extension of suggestion derived from childhood memories with focus limited to emotion and feelings rather than events.

Forget Cattell, forget Skinner, for, as professional as each are, they are an afterthought versus reality. It is the likes of the Pebeco advertising (p. 31) that cause we frail folk to be quite confused with that confusion beginning when a baby first recognizes their own feet and/or other biological possession such as a thumb.

“The soul of man has commonly been regarded as the battle ground of two opposing influences. These have been often conceived as extrinsic, namely, angels and demons, Evil and Good; but more frequently as intrinsic and inherent, as elevating impulses upon the one hand, against degrading on the other; soul against body, immortal against mortal. The latter views fall mainly into two great classes, one in which both conflicting forces are regarded as equally immanent and indigenous; the other, in which the higher or spiritual contestant is regarded as acquired or imported at comparatively late stages of development, – ‘breathed in’, as its name implies, by some super human power. According to the former view, the nobler impulses of man's nature are proofs of his fall from a higher estate – remains of an Edenic condition of purity; traces of a lost innocence and holiness. ...

Morality is the flower born of all the struggling impulses of lowly but warm-hearted human nature, just as the violet is of the leaf-mold, the sunlight, and the dew. Any of the influences which had a share in its creation, alone would blight it, did not the others come to its aid. Gentle as it is, it is irresistible and will flourish with equal placity within our bosoms or among our ashes. Beautiful, fragrant, and delicate though it be, it only asks the free air and sunlight of heaven, to defy alike the storm, the flood, and the tooth of time, and glorify the woodlands every spring until the sun grows cold” (Hutchinson, 1896).

Knowledge: This is an extension of emotion accounted for by Figure 6 (Defenses, p. 47). Interest here is not in subjective behavior with Glover’s specification of progression the conceptual descriptor that in turn enables defenses against anxiety or more generally contra-accommodation. Instead, interest here is in the objective enabler of feeling that become knowledge – sensation, perception, conception and intuition.

Sensation – “Psychologists have said of sensation, as the first stage of knowledge, that it is of the material or the physical, of the visible and the tangible and the audible and the like, being a consciousness of what the self is supposed distinctly not to be. They have said that it has for its content only the here and the now and the this, or, in other words, some particular thing in some particular place at some particular time. But the purely passive experience required by this idea of sensation, whereby, to use an old-time distinction, sensation has contained no thought, no universalizing or
generalizing tendency, would have to be in unconsciousness; it would be, after all is said, only a hypothetical stage of conscious experience; as soon as it were realized, the account of it would cease to be adequate. So true is this that more recently we have found sensation commonly referred to, not as consciousness or an element of consciousness at all, but merely as an antecedent of actual consciousness, that is, either the external stimulus or the internal possibility. Sensation has come to play the part of a sort of zero of knowledge, a lower ‘limit’ in the evolitional scale” (Lloyd, 1897).

Perception – “In environment, or object, as now present to our thinking, we have of course the ‘perceived world’. The study of positive or conscious sensation has brought us to a comprehension of what psychology knows as perception, the second stage of knowledge. The law of relativity, as also a law of objectivity and of organic self-expression, under which a sensuous consciousness develops into a consciousness of an ordered outer world present to a self-controlled self, under which the world of experience becomes in the technical sense a ‘perceived’ world, carries with it, as we have found, three things: (i) the persistence of the past, or of past experience, in any present consciousness, (2) a differential, or negative, qualification of consciousness, by which the objective reference springs up, and (3) an organic activity, whereby consciousness, becoming objective, gets what is commonly called symbolic character, being symbolic of the activity itself. Perception, then, is a process by which the past may be said to move over into the object and to abide there as an important phase of the present, and the percept, the self so present to itself, is the original unity of the self as an organism differentiated and in the differentiation projected as not-self. The percept, accordingly, is not-self, but very much as the band of prismatic colors is the not-self of unresolved light, or as tools and shop and materials are the not-self of the tool-using mechanic, or finally as a social community, in which labor is divided, is not-self to each one of its members. The percept is not-self, but also the incarnate self. What else can its tendency to symbolic character signify? Now perception, as the perceived image evolves into mere symbol, becomes conception and intuition. This is technical and abstract. But the meaning of images becoming mere symbols is not far to seek” (Ibid).

Conception – “The identity of motive and stimulus, above suggested as the first law of knowledge, very materially modifies a current idea of ‘reaction’, as but just now hinted, and gives a notion of environment, heretofore styled the not-self, that has far-reaching consequences alike in psychological and in ethical theory. To add a few words upon the first point, that of the proper conception of reaction, it is evident that identifying stimulus and motive reduces reaction wholly to a process of the self-acting upon itself or within itself, or even of environment acting upon itself or within itself, and not to what has been so often assumed, a process of self or mind, as something essentially distinct in nature, acting or reacting in its own peculiar way upon not-self or matter. Indeed, ‘reaction’ is a term imbued altogether too much with the spirit of dualism to be at all safe in self-controlled discourse. ‘Self-activity’ is far better, and with the conception of environment here required, whether one means self-activity of environment or self-activity of self is of no importance. ‘Environment did it’ equals ‘self did it’ in all cases of action, since the stimulating quality by reason of its determining relations is environment as a whole and the organically qualified environment as a stimulating whole is one and the same with the organic self and its impulse to complete self-expression” (Ibid).

Intuition – “is but the perfect freedom of using language, or of adaptation to environment. It is a stage of knowledge very much as sensation was a stage of knowledge. Thus, the used mechanism is, as it were, the limit that the sensuously qualified symbol approaches, and intuition as stage of knowledge is a limit too, being such a limit as we have seen sensation to be and giving evidence of the same law of knowledge. Intuition comes with the completion of the process of mediation; with it consciousness ripens into fluent action; with at thought is set free. If in sensation stimulus and motive are one, in intuition at the other end of the scale developed mechanism as the stimulus and free agent as the
motive, in short, language and thought, are one. The mechanism is nothing more nor less than stimulus to tint the free agent's will” (Ibid).

**Thought:** This is an extension of collaboration accounted for by an understanding of reality that does not emulate Figure 7 (Unit Step Function, p. 53). Covered here is the structure of thought – logical, psychological and physiological.

Logical – “Traditional definitions of logic usually state that it is the science of correct thinking. In the past logicians have tended to assume that all the principles by means of which thought arrives at valid conclusions have already been formulated. But it is now generally recognized that many of the logical principles governing inference are still in the process of formulation. Therefore, any definition of logic which suggest that it is static and complete is premature. Furthermore, that modern logic has gone beyond its original scope is evinced by the recent inclusion of mathematical logic within the confines of necessary inference” (Reiser, 1924).

Psychological – “The conceptual process is possible because, by an act of attention, we are able to abstract from the totality of experience single items and consider them independently of their total setting. ...People understand each other because they have a common background of 'sensible muchness' and because we have minds or nervous systems of the same order. Intercommunication of ideas is thus possible. ...We communicate our ideas by means of language, which signifies that words or terms are now substituted for the original experiences. We can now react to words, whether the original feature of the environment to which the concept-word applies be present or not. The question as to whether or not an image of the original experience must be present is not so easily decided” (Ibid)

Physiological – “Thinking as a process of associating ideas lends itself readily to physiological explanation. This, at any rate, has been the contention of the association school of psychology. We are not concerned with an exposition of association psychology, as such, but with setting forth modern ideas of the physiology of thought, which have expanded the older system of associationism. One of the properties of neural tissue is that of being modified by experience, i.e. the transmission, by nerve fibres, of nervous excitations (waves of ionization or chemical decomposition) leave them in a modified condition. This alteration of the resistance ('permeability') of neural tissue is retained, so that the same stimulus at some future time, in the case of a simple reaction, calls forth the same response, which is thus more quickly and efficiently elicited than it was the first time. Reactions which are thus preserved may be called engrams or neurograms. Acquired reactions or conditioned reflexes differ from inherited reactions by the fact that new stimuli are attached to old responses or old stimuli are attached to new responses. This constitutes the process of learning, and intelligence depends upon the ability to learn by experience. Thinking is largely the process of delaying immediate responses (thinking, like consciousness, arises at the points where instinctive and habitual modes of reaction break down, is the older way of putting it), and bringing to bear upon a novel stimulus relevant past experiences preserved as neurological residua. Similarly, images offer no insuperable difficulties to physiological explanation. All images and ideas were once perceptions, and the having of an image is, neurologically, the re-excitation of the neurones originally involved in the perception, by only a part of the original stimulating condition” (Ibid).

**Behavior:** This is also an extension of collaboration accounted for by an understanding of reality that does not emulate Figure 7 (Unit Step Function, p. 53). The focus here is driven by child abuse in general as well as abuse in any manner, thus, focus is limited to dominance – status, feeling and behavior.

Status – Applies to one person in a group of two or more persons who holds by some soft or hard decree the unconditional power to make decisions that are typically global.
Feeling – Is the assumption of authority and may include criminal intent.

Behavior – Is the emulation of authority through aggressiveness or extreme ambition (Maslow, 1937).

Attention now turns to this track’s two topics: (1) Fixation on seduction without regard for its real versus imagined character (denial), (2) Frustration with anxiety that is counteracted by a circular manic-depressive diversion with the manic upside deployed as a covert offense mechanism against a person’s own self (oscillation of preferences).

**Fixation on seduction without regard for its real versus imagined character**

Seduction alone need not be regarded as unconditionally negative as there are two sides to the notion of negative – self-inflicted punishment and self-inflicted learning.

Taking seduction as a container that encloses punishment, which, in turn, encloses learning, enables an environmental-self that presupposes a dynamic that spans Freud’s entire structural model – id, ego and superego – with only the superego afforded modification. The ego continues as the active psyche. The id continues as the host of the inertia that extends basis to seduction.

Freud’s original specification has the superego the result of the influence of other people. The modification has the superego the result of the influence of self, as host to curiosity with the impact on Table 3 (Mental apparatus, p. 37) equally limited. The reference to seduction as ‘static only’ is changed to ‘variable’ versus the alternatives of ‘dynamic and static’ and ‘dynamic only’. In line with the superego as ‘variable’ the following addresses psychological understanding, self-worth, self-inflicted punishment and self-inflicted learning.

**Psychological understanding:** Included in the complexities of psychoanalysis is the speed in which Freud developed constructs to include his insertions of the likes of “But I am inclined to think the latter” as reflective of in-stream creativity, which, in turn, served as a container for observations of human dynamics being presented in static written words. Consider his discovery of seduction – how quickly he created the specification, was criticized, and was countered (p. 12) – only to enable subsequent discovery of more intricate dynamics such as the polarities of “memory and fantasy, early experience and libidinal fixations, historical truth and psychic reality, and interpersonal and intrapsychic representations” (Gediman, 1991).

The various polarities, however, have basis in delusions, which, in turn, provide basis to self-punishment. To enable a transition to self-learning requires focus on historical basis to be relaxed and with all energy directed to recognition of the dynamic that exists, or at least, seems to exist. This is symbolic creation in reverse with Jung’s assessment spanning seven paragraphs:

“...the investigator whose method is purely reductive finds the final meaning in those ultimate human things and he demands nothing else from an explanation than that it should reduce the Unknown to the Known and Simple.

I should like to designate this kind of understanding as **retrospective understanding.**

But there is still another way of understanding, that is not of an analytical or reductive, but of an essentially **synthetic** or **constructive** nature. I propose to call this kind of understanding **prospective understanding** and the corresponding method a **constructive method.**

It is generally recognized that the modern scientific method of explanation is founded entirely on the principle of causality. Scientific explanation is causal explanation. So, we believe we have understood and explained a thing, if it is analytically reduced to its cause and its general principle. In so far, **Freud’s method of explaining** is based upon a strictly scientific principle.
...As through Analysis and reduction the causal method finally brings back the individual fact to the fundamental and universal principles of human psychology, so through the synthesis of individual trends the constructive method aims at universal goals.

Psyche is transition, hence necessarily to be defined under two aspects. On the one hand the psyche gives a picture of the remnants and traces of the entire past, and, on the other, but expressed in the same picture, the outlines of the future, inasmuch as the psyche creates its own future.

The psyche at any given moment is at one and the same time result and summit of the past and a symbolic formula of the future. The future is only similar to the past, but in its essence always new and unique; thus, the actual formula is incomplete, germlike, as it were, as regards the future. We may say: the formula or the picture of the future is symbolic, in so far as it expresses the future by way of an analogy. The future can be predicated only to a certain extent, in so far as things of the future are but partially expressible in things of the past. But if we conceive the actual content of the psyche as a symbolic expression for future happenings, we have to apply a constructive interest to it” [Italics in original] (Jung, 1915).

Symbolic creation in reverse is then the matching of tentative futures to the best-guess past.

Self-worth: There is a risk in symbolic creation and that is the cross-linking of time – the matching of a tentative past to self-punishment. The cross-linking can be initiated from any direction with the Pebeco campaign (p. 31) an example given the power of the commercial world. There is no need to turn to the self as the source.

The result of such linkage is the possible creation of a sense of artificial wrongness that does not function in isolation but feeds on a pre-existing self-doubt, with as an example the impostor phenomenon, “an experience of feeling incompetent and of having deceived others about one's abilities ... associated with such characteristics as introversion, trait anxiety, a need to look smart to others, a propensity to shame ... impostor phenomenon seen as a result of seeking self-esteem by trying to live up to an idealized image to compensate for feelings of insecurity and self-doubt” (Langford, 1993).

The alternative to a sense of wrongness, artificial or otherwise, is a sense of self-worth that is based on a change in overt thinking to include avoiding messages that leave a person other than challenged. This includes the framing of constructive in tandem with contrarian self-views (Pelham, 1989).

Self-inflicted punishment: To focus on self-worth in isolation is much like guessing in the dark – determination to ‘move forward’ without basis. Thus, a retrace of basis requires investigation into repression and its opposites as well as repression and its companions.

Repression is the lead member of a three-part sequence where the remaining two are release and normality (Mursell, 1923). Repression alone is tantamount to dissociation, mental operations that are outside of the consciousness but nevertheless mold behavior and the interpretation of experience. Release then is void of dissociation, mental operations that were outside of consciousness become the operation of consciousness. Allowing repression and release to blend begets normality in that the recognition of each behavior and the formation of experience is the subject of self-observation, the rudiments of self-directed psychoanalysis. Now the three components of normality.

Normality is not a factual state of mind in isolation but is a continuum that has everyday life spanning the mature normal and unstable actors as depicted in Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. Error! Bookmark not defined.). The issue is ‘continuum’ with discussion contingent on two observations – (1) “Both repression and suppression are said to involve removing mental content from awareness. However, repression is generally said to be unconscious, whereas suppression is said to be conscious. The
meanings of the terms unconscious and 'conscious', though, are open to a variety of interpretations and so the validity of this distinction is uncertain”.

(2) Basis for awareness requires resolving 'knowing' and 'resistance' (Boag, 2010).

Given that repression and suppression can assume contrarian roles – repression is conscious while suppression is unconscious, the pivot then is knowing – conscious or not versus resistance – conscious or not, with resolution only through deliberate learning.

Self-inflicted learning: For deliberate learning to survive to conclusion there must first be a decision which is then followed by action. To be presented now is excerpts from the Introduction to a book on Self-Help, a book that was published in 1860 but with the Introduction dated September 1859 – at a point in time when Freud was not yet four years old (his date of birth was May 6, 1856) and two months before the publishing of Darwin’s *Origin of Species*, November 1859.

The entire Introduction is presented for two reasons. First, the writing style is conversational rather than instructive. Second, the described formation of a decision is quite removed from the current therapeutic jurisprudence while having the potential to be very much within the fabric of the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

“The origin of this book may be briefly told.

Some fifteen years since, the author was requested to deliver an address before the members of some evening classes, which had been formed in a northern town for mutual improvement, under the following circumstances: Two or three young men of the humblest rank resolved to meet in the winter evenings, for the purpose of improving themselves by exchanging knowledge with each other. Their first meetings were held in the room of a cottage in which one of the members lived; and, as others shortly joined them, the place soon became inconveniently filled. When summer set in, they adjourned to the cottage garden outside; and the classes were then held in the open air, round a little boarded hut used as a garden house, in which those who officiated as teachers set the sums and gave forth the lessons of the evening. When the weather was fine, the youths might be seen, until a late hour, hanging round the door of the hut like a cluster of bees; but sometimes a sudden shower of rain would dash the sums from their slates, and disperse them for the evening unsatisfied.

Winter, with its cold nights, was drawing near, and what were they to do for shelter? Their numbers had by this time so increased, that no room of an ordinary cottage could accommodate them. Though they were for the most part young men earning comparatively small weekly wages, they resolved to incur the risk of hiring a room; and, on making inquiry, they found a large dingy apartment to let, which had been used as a temporary Cholera Hospital. No tenant could be found for the place, which was avoided as if a plague still clung to it. But the mutual improvement youths, nothing daunted, hired the cholera room at so much a week, lit it up, placed a few benches and a deal table in it, and began their winter classes. The place soon presented a busy and cheerful appearance in the evenings. The teaching may have been, as no doubt it was, of a very rude and imperfect sort; but it was done with a will. Those who knew a little taught those who knew less—improving themselves while they improved the others; and, at all events, setting before them a good working example. Thus, these youths—and there were also grown men amongst them—proceeded to teach themselves and each other, reading and writing, arithmetic and geography; and even mathematics, chemistry, and some of the modern languages.

About a hundred young men had thus come together, when, growing ambitious, they desired to have lectures delivered to them; and then it was that the author became acquainted with their proceedings. A party of them waited on him, for the purpose of inviting him to deliver an introductory address, or, as they expressed it, ‘to talk to them a bit’; prefacing the request by a modest statement of what they had
done and what they were doing. He could not fail to be touched by the admirable self-helping spirit which they had displayed; and, though entertaining but slight faith in popular lecturing, he felt that a few words of encouragement, honestly and sincerely uttered, might not be without some good effect. And in this spirit he addressed them on more than one occasion, citing examples of what other men had done, as illustrations of what each might, in a greater or less degree, do for himself; and pointing out that their happiness and well-being as individuals in after life, must necessarily depend mainly upon themselves – upon their own diligent self-culture, self-discipline, and self-control – and, above all, on that honest and upright performance of individual duty, which is the glory of manly character.

There was nothing in the slightest degree new or original in this counsel, which was as old as the Proverbs of Solomon, and possibly quite as familiar. But old-fashioned though the advice may have been, it was welcomed. The youths went forward in their course; worked on with energy and resolution; and, reaching manhood, they went forth in various directions into the world, where many of them now occupy positions of trust and usefulness. Several years after the incidents referred to, the subject was unexpectedly recalled to the author's recollection by an evening visit from a young man – apparently fresh from the work of a foundry – who explained that he was now an employer of labour and a thriving man; and he was pleased to remember with gratitude the words spoken in all honesty to him and to his fellow-pupils years before, and even to attribute some measure of his success in life to the endeavours which he had made to work up to their spirit.

The author's personal interest having in this way been attracted to the subject of Self-Help, he was accustomed to add to the memoranda from which he had addressed these young men; and to note down occasionally in his leisure evening moments, after the hours of business, the results of such reading, observation, and experience of life, as he conceived to bear upon it. One of the most prominent illustrations cited in his earlier addresses, was that of George Stephenson, the engineer; and the original interest of the subject, as well as the special facilities and opportunities which the author possessed for illustrating Mr. Stephenson's life and career, induced him to prosecute it at his leisure, and eventually to publish his biography. The present volume is written in a similar spirit, as it has been similar in its origin. The illustrative sketches of character introduced, are, however, necessarily less elaborately treated – being busts rather than full-length portraits, and, in many of the cases, only some striking feature has been noted; the lives of individuals, as indeed of nations, often concentrating their lustre and interest in a few passages. Such as the book is, the author now leaves it in the hands of the reader; in the hope that the lessons of industry, perseverance, and self-culture, which it contains, will be found useful and instructive, as well as generally interesting” (Smiles, 1860, pp. iii-vi). Now, action...

Self-inflicted learning is “self-directed learning in terms of context, activation, and universality [is] a natural tendency of humans to seek knowledge that is sometimes blunted by the constraints of institutionalized learning” (Guglielmino, 2008).

Frustration with anxiety that is countered by a circular manic-depressive diversion

Taking self-inflicted punishment and self-inflicted learning as a dynamic that serves as a proxy for resistance versus knowing sets seduction as counter to the oscillation of preferences – perception versus imagination – with the relationship between the self and the object world the wager.

This sixth track – Issue: Perception and less selective inertia (Psychoanalytic jurisprudence) – concludes with a survey of inertia, the container of some number of seductions with census or membership in real life quite variable from day to day.

Inertia is based on helplessness and burnout with either qualifying at any given moment as either knowing or resistance.
Helplessness can easily be attributed to societal factors (e.g., Abramson, 1978), while the position being taken here is that helplessness is an integral component of a person’s self-belief system with that component – and other components – oscillating between knowing or resistance. Momentary dissociation is a suitable description.

Burnout can also easily be attributed to societal factors (e.g., Lee, 1990), while the position being taken here is that burnout is also an integral component of a person’s self-belief system with all components oscillating between the contrarian relationship(s) that exist with repression and suppression.
Device: Motivation and variable selectivity of value and choice

This discussion accounts for working memory of Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43), and serves as an introduction to a final accounting of the ominous nature of the ‘why’ of Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6), the subject of the next and final track, **Objective: Professional responsibility versus life as the ultimate wager (Flatten life).**

The character of working memory is quite direct – memory images are received from the unconscious and then released to the preconscious as appropriate to the momentary in-stream execution of life.

This discussion traverses seven topics: (1) Retrace of history, (2) Re-framing of intra processes, (3) Skinner’s philosophy of behavior, (4) Cattell’s *Constitutional, non-dynamic unities*, (5) Unconscious, (6) Preconscious, (7) Rejoinder to the Retrace. These topics are preliminary to this track’s three supporting discussions: (1) Summary of mechanics of value and choice versus regression and fixation (and bias and individualism), (2) Soft costs and soft benefits of value and choice based on bias, (3) Resolving motivation, bias and individualism.

The starting point is the return to the iceberg.

**Retrace of history:** With the question set as a query about what is the most important part of the iceberg – that which is visible versus that which is not, William James set the record straight in the first paragraph of his Volume 1 Preface – “The treatise which follows has in the main grown up in connection with the author’s class-room instruction in Psychology, although it is true that some of the chapters are more ‘metaphysical’, and others fuller of detail, than is suitable for students who are going over the subject for the first time. The consequence of this is that, in spite of the exclusion of the important subjects of pleasure and pain, and moral and aesthetic feelings and judgments, the work has grown to a length which no one can regret more than the writer himself. The man must indeed be sanguine who, in this crowded age, can hope to have many readers for fourteen hundred continuous pages from his pen” [Italics added] (James, 1890a, p. v). James focus on the below-the-water-line fourteen hundred continuous pages at the expense of the above-the-water-line drama reflects the reality of life as was known at the time.

As an echo to James with emphasis on “at the time” is Gilbert Ryle’s 1949 treatise, *The Concept of Mind*, with him asserting in his Introduction – “This book offers what may with reservations be described as a theory of the mind. But it does not give new information about minds. We possess already a wealth of information about minds, information which is neither derived from, nor upset by, the arguments of philosophers. The philosophical arguments which constitute this book are intended not to increase what we know about minds, but to rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess” (Ryle, 1949, p.7).

Continuing from the emphasis that each James and Ryle placed on existing knowledge, more properly the inertia in existing knowledge, is a longitudinal investigation into the properties of the Big Five over life (Lucas, 2011). The average as shown in Figure 13 reflects mean levels of the average of the Big Five with specifics as follows: Each Extraversion, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness rose from youth to a high point at about age 60

![Figure 13 - Big Five](source: Lucas, 2011)
and then dropped off. Neuroticism rose from a considerable low in youth, wavered across a high to about age 60 and then dropped off slightly. Openness was effectively flat across the ages from 16 to 80. This data is about the dynamics of personality of Figure 11 (Mood, p. 104) with mood not a consideration. Stated differently, therapeutic jurisprudence allows mood to consideration while the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence – and life – is limited to personality.

In support of the longitudinal investigation James in his two volumes traversed the scope of psychology in general, then the brain as the situs of psychological function, and then on through a survey of psychological topics that were anchored in static with dynamic the final interest. Ryle took an opposite approach. He traversed the scope of psychology in the last chapter with discussion anchored in dynamic with static presented for emphasis. Of interest to this paper is Ryle’s discussion of Descartes (Ryle, 1949, pp. 11-24), followed by “Knowing How and Knowing That” (Ibid, pp. 25-61). He dismisses Descartes as myth while setting ‘knowing’ as synonymous with intellect, which follows Locke’s position (p. 68) that a person’s mind is a clean slate at birth.

The contrarian position which we deal with today is the Cartesian physical mind which each James and Ryle dismissed as puffery as each place much emphasis on ‘knowing’. For example, “Let us now consider explanations in subpersonal psychology. Much of contemporary psychology offers functional analyses and explanations for given capacities, where the object of explanation is a cognitive capacity, such as detecting edges, recognizing faces, remembering names, and drawing valid conclusions (Wilson, 1995, p. 205). Calkin’s retort to behaviorism (p. 15) about a biologist who is concentrating on human behavior applies equally well to the Cartesian physical mind. Freud, hampered by prejudice that was loyal to the mind-body dichotomy nevertheless pursued his belief regarding unconscious motivation as being critical to human conduct (Yule, 1952), with motivation of some sort recognized in post-1960 thinking, e.g., “...even doctrinal homeopathy involves the recognition of disorders” (Ryle, 1949, p. 330).

Re-framing of intra processes: The position taken by both James and Ryle imply the job is done with respect to the study of the human mental apparatus, yet, the longitudinal study of the presence of the Big Five implies there remains mystery behind the notion of ‘knowing’. From this it follows that more work needs to be done and with the additional work initiated from the broadest scientific perspective possible.

“Scientific understanding means (1) having a model or theory of the phenomena to be understood yet lacking detail and apparent contradiction of reality, and (2) seeing the incompleteness and defects of the theory. Exploration of new theory should challenge and guide us. Effect on whole range of behavior must be questioned. Important area for theory construction is thought, especially its motivation” (Hebb, 1953). This call for scientific understanding in turn “Poses several challenges to the science and profession of psychology. These include (a) the development of an authentic science of man rather than the outdated Newtonian type of scientism; (b) the development of a future-oriented, preventive social planning function; (c) the elimination of the system of credentials and licensing, since they fail to protect the public and create evils of bureaucracy and rigidity; (d) the development of the whole person, feelings as well as intellect, to overcome the dehumanization of education; and (e) the exploration of other possible realities not open to the five senses” (Rogers, 1973).

The alternative to not pursuing a scientific understanding opens the door to potentially preposterous objectives. “Most patients come for analysis as for any other form of treatment with the concrete aim of getting rid of some definite symptom. Although their rational ideas are bound up with unconscious fantasies (‘getting rid of a symptom’, ‘cure’, etc., possess sexual symbolic meanings whether it is a question of mental or physical treatment), they have on the whole a reasonable idea of what they can expect from analysis. But there is another type of patient for whom psychoanalysis has become the new
religion whether or not he comes for analysis because of some distressing symptom, he will never be satisfied with a mere alleviation of symptoms or any other simple tangible result. He expects that after being ‘fully analyzed’ he will never have any more difficulties or disappointments in life, and never under any circumstances experience guilt or anxiety; that he will develop remarkable intellectual or aesthetic powers, perhaps even prove to be a genius, be blissfully happy, perfectly balanced, superhumanly unbiased and absolutely free from the slightest neurotic symptom, caprice of mood or bad habit. I have actually heard the view expressed that a ‘fully analyzed person’ will be free from aggression and pregenital interests, have no polygamous tendencies and never make a slip of the tongue or any other kind of mistake. Analysis is sometimes regarded as a panacea for all evil and the best or only solution for every individual or social problem. In a community where every member had been analyzed there would be no crime, war, unemployment, hatred, misery, sexual entanglement or divorce” (Schmideberg, 2009).

The longitudinal event known as life is not a point in time, a qualification that requires emphasis. From this it follows that James’ exclusion of the important subjects of pleasure and pain, and moral and aesthetic feelings and judgments must be reversed, and though Freud was hampered by prejudice that was loyal to the mind-body dichotomy, that prejudice is at the base of the Cartesian physical mind.

“On the one hand, a physicalist worldview motivates a philosophical psychology that allows one to understand psychological agents as physical beings, highlighting what agents have in common with the rest of the physical world. Stated as the view that psychological states must supervene on intrinsic physical states, individualism can be seen as the application to psychology of a general physicalist constraint on individualism and ontology. This sort of motivation for individualism corresponds to viewing an individual as physically and causally integrated, for it is this property that individual agents share with other material entities. ...

On the other hand, individualism is also motivated by the idea that it is how an agent herself conceives of the world rather than the nature of the physical world itself that explains her actions. The ability of agents to conceive of the world at all is a feature that distinguishes them from other physical things in the world. In the Cartesian epistemological tradition, foundations for knowledge are indubitable posits, grasped or known in some way by the individual, whether such posits are clear and distinct ideas, as for Descartes himself, or the incorrigible sense data of the empiricists; the justificatory primitives to which the first person has privileged access are mental facts about an individual. It is this type of fact that the individualist thinks of as explanatorily primitive in psychology: Psychology should be concerned with identifying the cognitive contribution that an agent herself makes to her own behavior, whether her contribution is distinct from that which the individual’s environment makes. This distinction between an individual’s mental life and her physical and social worlds is also at the core of the conception of individuals as psychologically independent; it is agents so conceived who are the units of action” [Italics in original] (Wilson, 1995, p. 20).

To address both James’ exclusion and the continuance of the Cartesian physical mind, emotion must be addressed, with respect to each affect, apathy and mood, with special attention reserved for each affect and apathy after these four general comments. First, mood holds much influence over the surface condition of personality of Figure 11 (Mood, p. 104), which results in personality as static and mood as dynamic. Second, emotion is the experience a person has with the interchange between the self and the object world. Third, affect describes the experience of the feeling of an emotion. Fourth, apathy describes the discounting of the feeling of an emotion. Hence, each affect and apathy are contrarian to mood, with emotion separating each affect and apathy from mood, which reflects the likely timewise durability of each – affect (shortest), emotion (middle), mood (longer), apathy (longest). It is time to
revisit the transference, not as a neurosis but as an interpretation (Singer, 1985), with two views of affect, with a summary the starting point, followed by discussion of the two views of apathy.

To approach affect requires discussion of the tripartite character of mental items. “Cognitive considerations must be dealt with before the conative and affective aspects of mental situations can be elucidated. At the same time, it is unduly easy to lose appreciation of the artificial abstraction by which we come to speak of cognition as if it were in itself some independent ‘faculty’ of ‘the mind’. Emphasis must be laid on the tripartite character: (1) the affective element – unique aspects, which, if slight, can be subsumed as pleasantness and unpleasantness, but which, if they are the accentuated aspect of the symbol situation, appear as the principal ingredient of what are called 'the emotions'; (2) the more or less representative aspect, the cognitive element, unique but in generic analysis, elaborations from elementary 'items' of sentience; (3) the conative element, that aspect which when itself cognized, is referred to as 'impulse', and which underlies the phenomenon of desire. Since the 'knowing' process stresses the cognitive aspects, a comprehensive reference to the generic elementary matter is, so far, feasible on this side [of schizophrenia] only" [Italics in original] (Sullivan, 1962, p. 28). The affective element requires additional attention as well as pleasantness and unpleasantness to be summarized as economic theory.

“Over the course of his career, Freud offered three distinct affect theories. First, affect, equated with the quantity of psychic energy, became dammed up in psychoneurotic disorders and was discharged in therapeutic cathartic experiences (The neuro-psychoses of defense 1894). Second, with the advent of the topographic model and the theory of instinctual drive, affect was understood as the nonideational component of the mental representation of drive forces (Instincts and their vicissitudes 1915; Repression 1915). In his final reworking of affect theory, with the introduction of the structural model Freud located the anxiety affect, and affect in general, within the system ego. The ego was credited with the ability to use anxiety as a signal in dangerous situations, which were instigated by external events but ultimately explained by the potential build-up of instinctual tension (Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety 1926). Ambiguities remained in this third approach because Freud never entirely discarded the second, 'toxic' theory of anxiety, nor did he make clear just how far he wished to generalize the signal function of anxiety to include other affects" (Greenberg, 1983, p. 317).

These two views of affect – (1) the cognitive ‘knowing’ in the absence of schizophrenia and (2) a ‘toxic’ theory of anxiety, the conclusion is the point of reference for a reference to affect to make sense must be the psychoanalytic pleasure-unpleasure where pleasure is associated with discharge while unpleasantness is associated with tension. Going one step further, “the pleasure principle operates within the boundaries set by the economic laws, but is not reducible to them” (Ibid, pp. 317-320). Thus, the attachment-adaptation scenario (p. 52) defines the transference as interpretation with focus set on the management of anxiety. Now, two views of apathy...

“Apathy may be defined phenomenologically as a state of affectlessness. ...It has been observed as a psychological sequel to organic disease of long duration, and it is known to occur in otherwise healthy human beings as a concomitant of boredom” (Greenson, 1949). Thus, from the psychoanalytic pleasure-unpleasure perspective, apathy comports with pleasure as discharge in the absence of unpleasantness as tension. Now, the transference as interpretation...

The human animal is an economic animal, and, as such, makes economic decisions that may be emotion based. As an animal the human will hoard for survival purposes. In fancy speak such hoarding could be called savings. Not so. Hoarding is for the express purpose of protecting the level of current consumption. In economics “The concepts of utility and value are commonly used in two distinct senses: (a) experience value, the degree of pleasure or pain, satisfaction or anguish in the actual
experience of an outcome; and (b) decision value, the contribution of an anticipated outcome to the overall attractiveness or aversiveness of an option in a choice” (Kahneman, 1984). Thus, hoarding by the human animal conforms to utility if usefulness is the basis (i.e., pleasure), otherwise hoarding is about value (i.e., displeasure). But then there is the opening reference to the human animal “will hoard for survival purposes”. This advances hoarding to utility with value set at unconditional (i.e., apathy). There is no reason why affect, emotion and mood in the absence of apathy cannot be viewed from the perspective of economics with the transference held constant at interpretation.

Initially, “Emotions are identified as limited cross-culturally to about six basic affects in humans. These are measurable along three dimensions: (a) self-reports; (b) facial expression; (c) psychophysiological correlates in facial myography, cardiovascular patterning, and brain hemispheric excitation variations. They include excitement-interest and joy as positive emotions, which, when invoked, are inherently rewarding. Fear-terror, distress-sadness, anger, and shame-guilt-humiliation are the negative affects that are inherently punishing experiences. ...we are motivated not by biological drives, but by the four possibilities of emotion: We seek to maximize experiences that we have found to generate positive emotions, to avoid or limit experiences that have aroused negative emotions, but we also need to express emotions as fully as possible yet also learn to control such expression. The specific tie of emotions to information-processing has been hypothesized to relate to the suddenness with which we must process new information (e.g., a startle response), or to the novelty and complexity of the information (e.g., the demands made on established schemata for matching the new with the stored material), the elaborate associative networks aroused by new material, and the persistence over time of unresolved novel material that cannot readily be assimilated into previous schemata” [Italics in original] (Singer, 1985). Now, to relax emotions from ‘initially’ to ‘generally’.

The notion of in-general is a child of the Metaphysics of self as being bounded by the objective ‘should’ and the subjective ‘ought’, hence, ‘feeling’ as modified by ‘emotion’ (p. 115). Somewhere between ‘should’ and ‘ought’ there lies intended consequences that are consistently overtrumped by unintended consequences. And in between the two forms of consequences lies the infallibility of seduction, which is very personal to each individual human being’s emotional investment.

The intended consequences: “The concepts of utility and value are commonly used in two distinct senses: (a) experience value, the degree of pleasure or pain, satisfaction or anguish in the actual experience of an outcome; and (b) decision value, the contribution of an anticipated outcome to the overall attractiveness or aversiveness of an option in a choice. The distinction is rarely explicit in decision theory because it is tacitly assumed that decision values and experience values coincide. This assumption is part of the conception of an idealized decision maker who is able to predict future experiences with perfect accuracy and evaluate options accordingly. For ordinary decision makers, however, the correspondence of decision values between experience values is far from perfect. Some factors that affect experience are not easily anticipated, and some factors that affect decisions do not have a comparable impact on the experience of outcomes” (Kahneman, 1984).

The unintended consequences: “Three conceptual models of self-defeating behavior can be distinguished on the basis of intentionality (desiring and foreseeing harm). In primary self-destruction, the person foresees and desires harm to self; in tradeoffs, the harm is foreseen but not desired; and in counterproductive strategies, the harm is neither foreseen nor desired. ...Several tradeoff patterns have been shown: Typically, the individual favors short-term benefits despite long-term costs and risks, especially under the influence of aversive emotional states and high self-awareness. Counterproductive strategies have also been found, usually based on misjudging self or misjudging contingencies. It is concluded that normal people do harm themselves and defeat their projects by means of poor
judgments, by maladaptive responses, through unforeseen consequences of nonoptimal methods, and by disregarding costs and risks in favor of immediate pleasure or relief; however, there is no clear evidence of intentional, deliberate self-destructiveness among normal (nonclinical) individuals” [Italics in original] (Baumeister, 1988).

It is the very personal emotional investment that gives the transference it’s interpretative character, a factor that is fundamental to each therapeutic jurisprudence and the advocated psychoanalytic variant.

“Transference is interpreted as an inherent feature of the perspective of the human being as an information-seeking, information-processing organism whose experience and expression of emotions is tied to the novelty and complexity [mood] of such a continuing cognitive process [affect/apathy]. ...three particular features of information-processing that highlight the link between basic cognition and the phenomenon of transference:

Expectancy – Anticipatory or expectancy processes are intrinsic to the way we deal with the information in our environment. That is, we draw on previously stored, more or less organized information in deciding what attracts us, where to look, how to explore a new situation, what to reverberate of that information in the shift from short- to long-term memory, and in what forms to encode the information for later retrieval. The extent and complexity of our previous knowledge, its accessibility at the moment, and our personal style of processing (e.g., emphasizing the most recent match versus a more extended search process), all lead to differences in what we notice, retain, and, eventually, in how we reshape our organized bodies of beliefs and knowledge we call schemata.

Emotions and Incongruities – Our emotional system is closely linked to our cognitive system so that it is almost impossible to identify situations in which information-processing does not evoke the experience of an affect or of a valuing response.

Ongoing Thought and the Stream of Consciousness – A third feature of the cognitive sequence that merits special attention is the fact that human experience involves processing information from at least two other sources of stimulation besides the physical or social environment. These sources are the continuous activity of our stream of thought and memory system and the concurrent activity of the body, which sends us often incomprehensible signals. In a sense, we are in a perpetual state of choosing which stimulus source we wish to assign priority, the external physical or social milieu, our own private interior monologue and flow of images and anticipations, or to the temperature shifts, momentary aches and pains, muscle strains, stomach gurglings, and so forth, that are part of our body's working machinery” (Singer, 1985).

Skinner's philosophy of behavior – ‘what' versus ‘why': This is a source-aim-object issue where object is the Cartesian physical mind, affect is aim, with source to be specified once ‘what’ is separated from ‘why’. The preliminary accounting for ‘what’ versus ‘why’ is Skinner’s assertion (p. 132) about the three Obstacles – Humanistic Psychology, Psychotherapy and Cognitive Psychology. The common thread between the three is the limited focus on the here-and-now. Even when hoarding the human animal is operating from experience.

Given that the human animal’s experience is based on something other than survival even if survival is the immediate goal, there is at least one higher-level motive – life itself. With life itself a motive and in the absence of any other motive the question is then limited to ‘why is life important at all’. This is where basis for personality fits. Before moving on, affect as aim needs some emphasis. Thus, “(a) affects are ideas, (b) affects are always attached to ideas, (c) consciousness is perception of internal mental states, and (d) affects are perceptions of internal bodily processes” (Wakefield, 1992). This
emphasis allows ‘what’ and ‘why’ to be treated as joint in operation, probably true, but not in line with the objective, which is to separate the two.

When attempting to specify ‘what’ for any human animal it is too easy to resort to stereotypes and on an a la carte basis. A human animal is a whole animal whose personality is based on traits where the entire array as a single dynamic is just as important that the traits one at a time. A human animal is an integrated animal (Allport, 1924). Beyond the idea of a whole person is survival as one component of purpose in tandem with experience (Herrick, 1925), which, in turn, transcends the mechanisms of behavior and both James’ exclusions and the continuance of the Cartesian physical mind.

James was correct to step aside from the important subjects of pleasure and pain, and moral and aesthetic feelings and judgments as well as the prejudice that is loyal to the mind-body dichotomy, the Cartesian physical mind. James’ focus was analysis of the whole human on a perspective-by-perspective basis as was the focus of Freud, Janet and others. To equate the human mind to be equal to computer software that is wholly explained by top down versus bottom up fails to account for, at the minimum, culture. “The outstanding malady of our time is the inability of man's moral sense to assimilate his technology. ... is that now if ever we need to test our preferred model (of the fundamental models of research available to psychologists) ‘for its capacity to yield discoveries that have some sure relevance to moral nature and to social skills’. The designs that have been used in studies of motivation, of symbol and hence of the foundations of moral behavior, are not sufficiently iconic with our subject matter. Addiction to machines, rats, or infants leads us to overplay those features of human behavior that are peripheral, signal-oriented, of genetic. Correspondingly, it causes us to underplay those features that are central, future-oriented, and symbolic” (Allport, 1947).

Cattell’s Constitutional, non-dynamic (temperamental) unities: This is about the nature of mentalism that exists between motivation and vulnerabilities, where vulnerabilities are formed then driven by Cattell’s Constitutional, non-dynamic (temperamental) unities with supporting actions provided by his Dynamic (teleological, teleonomic, motivational), Social mould (environmental demand] and Co-nascent (developmental, emergent) unities (p. 138).

There is a difference between James stepping aside from pleasure and pain and more, and, the Cartesian physical mind. The Cartesian approach has the body as biological only while the mind is a philosophical entity that is both mystic and physical (Wilson, 1995, pp. 76-78). The reality is an individual person is the child of a wholly dynamic bio-psycho-social continuum that presents itself as culture while its basis is heredity beginning with the gene pool. “A psychology without heredity is a psychology which proposes to do away with not only the concepts of heredity and instinct but also all their related concepts such as habit, trial and error, imitation, insight and purpose. It proposes to study behavior as concrete actualities and refuses to be muddled up with any abstract and teleological concepts. Its view is essentially passivistic in that it considers every action as a ‘forced’ response to be described solely in terms of the functioning of the environmental stimulation” (Kuo, 1929).

Continuing with James stepping aside from pleasure and pain and the Cartesian physical mind serves as basis for comparing the current therapeutic jurisprudence to the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. This is about psychology and ethics with middle across (p. 43) the reference. The claim with middle across is a person will be less focused on drives and more focused on their understanding of economic utility versus value (p. 126). With an emotional circumstance at hand – a therapeutic jurisprudence session – utility advances to the pride system (p. 46). The advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence is expected to absorb such a diversion via the flatten life objective. Given the advance of utility to pride which is exceedingly personal, centrist ethical standards that are scientific and open to scrutiny must be the vantage point from which therapeutic jurisprudence operates. “In order that a set
of ethical values may be scientific, it is necessary: (1) to admit their postulate-like qualities, (2) to admit them to the criticism of scientific logic, with a view to eliminating all those which can be derived from more general propositions, in favor of the latter; and retaining only those whose derivates are best suited to the conditions in which the person or his group is living” (Liber, 1929).

**Unconscious:** The position taken here is that anxiety is synonymous with affect and apathy paired as synonyms. Hence, the unconscious is both the repository of anxiety as well as a defense against anxiety. More to the point, the unconscious is the net of affect and apathy paired. If one thinks of the unconscious as both a person’s autobiography as well as that same person’s biography as if it were written by an anonymous third person, the result is the autobiography is an expression of affect while the biography is an expression of apathy, with a further extension equally reasonable – pleasure is associated with discharge as described within the autobiography while unpleasure is associated with tension as described within the biography.

The effects of alcohol on personality is an excellent example – “(a) Alcohol makes social behaviors more extreme by blocking a form of response conflict. (b) The same process can inflate self-evaluations. (c) Alcohol myopia [versus pharmacology], in combination with distracting activity, can reliably reduce anxiety and depression in all drinkers by making it difficult to allocate attention to the thoughts that provoke these states” (Steele, 1990). The phobia, then, is a logical extension (Thomas, 1922).

The phobia alone is amorphous given its accounting is duly recorded in a person’s autobiography versus their biography – perhaps both. A phobia can attach itself to any object or idea in the form of an abnormal fear (Worcester, 1908, pp. 281-288).

**Preconscious:** This is about the picosecond-by-picosecond resolution of the longitudinal event known as life with the environment – the dynamics between the self and the object world. The dynamics – James’ exclusion of important subjects and the Cartesian physical mind – are not freeform but are premolded by a static unconscious and causation as a philosophical phenomenon.

The static unconscious includes five implicit processes – “attribution (awareness of surrounding happenings), implicit memory (procedural memory, life on autopilot), implicit learning (incidental grasp of complex information), affective salience (discriminate detail), and automaticity (involuntary and spontaneous), none of which are motivated by conflict, defense, or deprivation” (Stoycheva, 2014).

Causation – the dynamic unconscious and as a philosophical phenomenon, includes the interpretation of each causes and effects. At issue is real versus imagined – identity versus interpretation. Beginning with times before Aristotle philosophers have been concerned “with what causation actually is (and this includes the idea that it may be only a construction of the human mind)” – hence, identity. “Psychology is concerned with how people understand and perceive causation, make causal inferences and attributions, and so forth” – hence, interpretation (White, 1990).

This focus on James’ exclusion of important subjects is an extension of the dynamic unconscious and its contribution to the formation of emotion. “At the heart of emotion, mood, and any other emotionally charged event are states experienced as simply feeling good or bad, energized or enervated. These states – called core affect – influence reflexes, perception, cognition, and behavior and are influenced by many causes internal and external, but people have no direct access to these causal connections. Core affect can therefore be experienced as free-floating (mood) or can be attributed to some cause (and thereby begin an emotional episode). These basic processes spawn a broad framework that includes perception of the core-affect-altering properties of stimuli, motives, empathy, emotional meta-experience, and affect versus emotion regulation; it accounts for prototypical emotional episodes, such
as fear and anger, as core affect attributed to something plus various non-emotional processes” [Italics in original] (Russell, 2003).

This focus on the Cartesian physical mind is an extension of the static unconscious. Implicit memory is more that unique to any individual but is molded as well by clear and distinct ideas from the social environment, with the Cartesian physical mind a clear component. However, to claim that a sense of self is not the normative guide of life fails to acknowledge a person’s historical self as configured in working memory. That historical-self forms cookie-cutter types of expectations, relational schemas, about how to interpret interactions with other persons and objects. “The elements of a relational schema include an interpersonal script for the interaction pattern, a self-schema for how self is experienced in that interpersonal situation, and a schema for the other person in the interaction” (Baldwin, 1992).

Rejoinder to the Retrace: The starting point is a return to the iceberg. The above discussion of the ‘Retrace of history’ (p. 161) focused on the portion of the iceberg that is below the water line. This Rejoinder is concerned with the portion of the iceberg that is above the water line with attention directed to projections of mortality and disability, current-day validity of the James-Freud transition from philosophy to psychology, and, a call for jurisprudence to be remolded as a child of philosophy.

Projections of mortality and disability apply equally to the ‘why’ of Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6) and to jurisprudence, with the reasoning a child of cost-benefit. Any approach to any malady requires assumptions as to cause to be followed by one or more candidate resolutions. There are two ways to look at the analysis. The first is bio-psycho-social with respect to the ‘why’ of Figure 1. The second is also bio-psycho-social but with emphasis on instigators of behavior with respect to jurisprudence. From computational analysis, “Plausible projections of future mortality and disability are a useful aid in decisions on priorities for health research, capital investment, and training. Rates and patterns of ill health are determined by factors such as socioeconomic development, educational attainment, technological developments, and their dispersion among populations, as well as exposure to hazards such as tobacco” (Murray, 1997).

Current-day validity of the James-Freud transition from philosophy to psychology is not open to dispute. Writings over the past century have been rooted in investigation with some of that work truly innovative in the form of ‘build on the work of others’ as was Skinner and Cattell – and James and Freud, some of that work enabled by the modern technology of medical imaging which allows investigations in real-time, and, some of that work was hypothesis testing. What must be remembered is Wundt’s warning about the consequences of the divorce of psychology from philosophy (p. 19). Each James and Freud entered psychology from a prior dedication to medical science – anatomy and neurology, hence, each were very deliberate scientists. In-stream exposure to philosophy honed their scientific skills in that philosophy demand study of dynamics such as society. What remains unaltered is knowing versus known.

“Jung once remarked that, in his opinion, the reason why scientists rejected Freud's sexual theories was so that they did not have to acknowledge the reality of the unconscious. James himself at the end of his life advised psychologists to study the fall of the threshold of consciousness. Further, he said that we should do this as psychologists even if we did not know what we were looking at, as it would take us more than a few generations just to grasp the outlines of the larger picture. His radical empiricism suggests that this larger picture refers to the inextricable dependence of the knower on the object as well as what is known about it. According to James' view, experimental psychology may yet incorporate more of the phenomenology of the science-making process into its purview, at the same time that our understanding of consciousness, which has already changed dramatically through cognitive information
processing models and the hidden determinants of perception revealed by artificial intelligence, will become considerably more wide and deep. In all likelihood, this is what James was alluding to when he allegedly put his arm around Ernest Jones, then a young, newly converted psychoanalyst, at the Clark University conference in 1909 and assured him by saying: 'The future of psychology belongs to your work'" (Taylor, 1999).

With respect to the self and the object world vulnerabilities remain. “Freud presented the image of man as the unfinished product of nature: struggling against unreason, impelled by driving inner vicissitudes and urges that had to be contained if man were to live in society, host alike to seeds of madness and majesty, never fully free from an infancy anything but innocent. What Freud was proposing was that man at best and man at worst is subject to a common set of explanations: good and evil grow from a common process. It is our heritage from Freud that the all-or-none distinction between mental illness and mental health has been replaced by a more humane conception of the continuity of these states. Freud's sense of the continuity of human conditions, of the likeness of the human plight, has made possible a deeper sense of the brotherhood of man. It has in any case tempered the spirit of punitiveness toward what once we took as evil and what we now see as sick. We have not yet resolved the dilemma posed by these two ways of viewing. Its resolution is one of the great moral challenges of our age” (Bruner, 1956).

A call for jurisprudence to be remolded as a child of philosophy adopts Wundt’s warning about the divorce of psychology from philosophy. At issue here is not therapeutic and/or psychoanalytic jurisprudence but jurisprudence as an extension of the positiveness of self-help as introduced by Samuel Smiles in 1860 (p. 158). Now, focus is set on positive, effectively cause versus effect.

"The positive school of criminology was inaugurated by the work of Cesare Lombroso, in 1872. From 1872 to 1876 he opened a new way for the study of criminality by demonstrating in his own person that we must first understand the criminal who offends, before we can study and understand his crime" (Ferri, 1906|1968, p. 15) . “The positive school of criminology accomplished the same revolution in the views concerning the treatment of criminals that the above-named men of science [Pinel, Chiarugi, and others] accomplished for the treatment of the insane. The general opinion of classiccriminalists and of the people at large is that crime involves a moral guilt, because it is due to the free will of the individual who leaves the path of virtue and chooses the path of crime, and therefore it must be suppressed by meeting it with a proportionate quantity of punishment. This is to this day the current conception of crime. And the illusion of a free human will (the only miraculous factor in the eternal ocean of cause and effect) leads to the assumption that one can choose freely between virtue and vice. How can you still believe in the existence of a free will, when modern psychology armed with all the instruments of positive modern research, denies that there is any free will and demonstrates that every act of a human being is the result of an interaction between the personality and the environment of man?” [Italics added] (Ibid, pp. 21-22).

The self [personality] and the object world [environment of man] is real but not static. Education as a philosophical process is responsive to the cultivation of free will. “Plato was faced by the same questions as those which puzzle us today. ...Plato approaches the subject of education by a path different from that followed by most modern writers. Holding as he does that education is a means and not an end, he treats it, not as an isolated process, but as part of a larger whole. Thus, neither of the two books which expound his educational views in detail is ostensibly devoted to the subject. The Republic is concerned with the conditions of right living, and it deals with education as the chief means by which those conditions can be fulfilled. The Laws sets forth the principles upon which the city-state should base its common life and institutions, and education is considered because it is one great
instrument by which the state can secure its own well-being and the well-being of its citizens. In both cases, the center of interest is the social or supra-social end to be attained, and in the discussion of educational questions this end is kept constantly before us" [Italics in original] (Smith, 1923).

Attention now turns to this track’s three supporting discussions: (1) Summary of mechanics of value and choice versus regression and fixation (and bias and individualism), (2) Soft costs and soft benefits of value and choice based on bias, (3) Resolving motivation, bias and individualism.

**Summary of mechanics of value and choice versus regression and fixation**

This is an investigation of free will with emphasis on investigative sophistication relative to one’s conduct, with the role of accommodation versus emotional investment the issue. Accommodation is the placeholder for the current therapeutic jurisprudence while emotional investment is the placeholder for the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

An accounting of the self [personality] and the object world [social environment] is the objective, where the self is dependent on free will (versus investigative sophistication) and the object world is dependent upon accommodation (versus emotional investment). This accounting then sets free will and investigative sophistication as antonyms, with the same holding true for accommodation and emotional investment. To give character to the two sets of antonyms the Table below appends characteristics of Table 5 (Haven’s intellect, p. 71) and Table 6 (Burton’s melancholy, p. 78) to Figure 3 (Adaptation p. 21). This results in outer and inner dynamics. The outer dynamics for ‘sociality’ are time and reality and for ‘individualism’ they are uncertainty and knowledge. The inner dynamics for ‘sociality’ have free will as an expression of the ideal with accommodation an expression of synthetic. The inner dynamics for ‘individualism’ have investigative sophistication as an expression of the actual with emotional investment an expression of analytic. The task now is to address each pair of antonyms with a centrist starting point set at Descartes’ formula: “I doubt, I think: therefore, I exist”.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘sociality’</td>
<td>‘individualism’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>When I go musing all alone,</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Thinking of divers things fore-known,</em></td>
<td><em>uncertainty</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>When I build Castles in the air,</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Void of sorrow and void of fear,</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preservative</td>
<td>Reflective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free will</td>
<td>investigative sophistication</td>
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<tr>
<td>of the ideal</td>
<td>Memory</td>
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<tr>
<td>synthetic</td>
<td>of the actual</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imagination</td>
<td>Reasoning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generalization</td>
<td>analytic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>emotional investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accommodation</td>
<td>Intuitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>All my joys to this are folly,</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Naught so sweet as Melancholy.</em></td>
<td><em>Pleasing myself with phantasms sweet,</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Methinks the time runs very fleet.</em></td>
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Figure 14 - Composite Powers
Given the broad philosophical versus psychological implications of Descartes’ formula, a compare-contrast scenario will be limited to Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), to set the scenario in the same timeframe. Note: Hobbes was a reviewer of Descartes’ Meditations (Haldane, 1911b, p. 60). Discussion will follow: (1) (‘sociality’) free will as an expression of the ideal, (2) (‘sociality’) accommodation an expression of synthetic, (3) (‘individualism’) investigative sophistication as an expression of the actual, (4) (‘individualism’) emotional investment an expression of analytic.

(‘Sociality’) free will as an expression of the ideal

Descartes maintains in his Fourth Meditation, Of the True and the False: “Whereupon, regarding myself more closely, and considering what are my errors (for they alone testify to there being any imperfection in me), I answer that they depend on a combination of two causes, to wit, on the faculty of knowledge that rests in me, and on the power of choice or of free will – that is to say, of the understanding and at the same time of the will. For by the understanding alone I [neither assert nor deny anything, but] apprehend [percipio] the ideas of things as to which I can form a judgment. But no error is properly speaking found in it, provided the word error is taken in its proper signification: and though there is possibly an infinitude of things in the world of which I have no idea in my understanding, we cannot for all that say that it is deprived of these ideas [as we might say of something which is required by its nature], but simply it does not possess these; because in truth there is no reason to prove that God should have given me a greater faculty of knowledge than He has given me; and however skilful a workman I represent Him to be, I should not for all that consider that He was bound to have placed in each of His works all the perfections which He may have been able to place in some. I likewise cannot complain that God has not given me a free choice or a will which is sufficient, ample and perfect, since as a matter of fact I am conscious of a will so extended as to be subject to no limits” [Italics added] (Haldane, 1911a, p. 174).

The statement “I answer that they depend on a combination of two causes, to wit, on the faculty of knowledge that rests in me, and on the power of choice or of free will – that is to say, of the understanding and at the same time of the will”, while an expression of the ideal, is more than an extension of the Cartesian physical mind, particularly bottom up, but opens to consideration the principle of alternative possibilities or determinism (present actions are decided by past experience and its interpretation) – “On the other hand, individualism is also motivated by the idea that it is how an agent herself conceives of the world rather than the nature of the physical world itself that explains her actions” (Wilson, 1995, p. 20).

(‘Sociality’) accommodation an expression of synthetic

This idea of principle of alternative possibilities is the fundamental assumption of the current therapeutic jurisprudence. “Basically, therapeutic jurisprudence is a perspective that regards the law as a social force that produces behaviors and consequences” (Wexler, 1991a). Further, the explicit focus of therapeutic jurisprudence on cognitive psychology and social psychology (Wexler, 1991b, pp. 219-290) simply plays into Skinner’s assertion about the three Obstacles – Humanistic Psychology, Psychotherapy and Cognitive Psychology. Now, two objections.

“This principle [of alternative possibilities] states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Its exact meaning is a subject of controversy, particularly concerning whether someone who accepts it is thereby committed to believing that moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible. Practically no one, however, seems inclined to deny or even to question that the principle of alternate possibilities (construed in some way or other) is true. It has generally seemed so overwhelmingly plausible that some philosophers have even characterized it as an
a priori truth. People whose accounts of free will or of moral responsibility are radically at odds evidently find in it a firm and convenient common ground upon which they can profitably take their opposing stands. But the principle of alternate possibilities is false. A person may well be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. The principle’s plausibility is an illusion, which can be made to vanish by bringing the relevant moral phenomena into sharper focus” (Frankfurt, 1969).

A stronger objection comes from one of Descartes’ reviewers – Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) (Haldane, 1911b, p. 135-203). “You next ask: what is the cause of the existence of falsity or error in you. In the first place I do not question your right of calling understanding only the faculty of being aware of ideas, or of apprehending things themselves simply and without any affirmation or denial, while you make the will and the power of free choice the faculty of judgment, to which it belongs to affirm or deny, to assent or dissent. The sole question I propound is why the will and liberty of choice is circumscribed by no limits in your account, while the range of the understanding is circumscribed. The truth is that these two faculties seem to have domains of equal extent and that the understanding has at least no narrower a range than the will, since will is newer directed towards anything of which the understanding has not previously had cognizance” [Italics in original] (Ibid, p. 179).

(‘Individualism’) investigative sophistication as an expression of the actual

Regarding a treatise Written by the Bishop of Londonderry, Hobbes – “Whereas he says thus, If I be free to write this discourse, I have obtained the cause; I deny that to be true, for it is enough to his freedom of writing that he had not written it, unless he would himself. ... It may be his Lordship [the Bishop] thinks it all one to say, I was free to write it, and, it was not necessary I should write it. But I think otherwise. For he is free to do a thing, that may do it if he has the will to do it; and may forbear if he has the will to forbear. And yet if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it, the action is necessarily to follow; and if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The question therefore is not, whether a man be a free agent, that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to his will; but whether the will to write and the will to forbear come upon him according to his will or according to anything else in his own power, I acknowledge this liberty that I can do if I will; but to say I can will if I will I take to be an absurd speech” [Italics added] (Rickaby, 1906, Pp. 1-2).

(‘Individualism’) emotional investment an expression of analytic

The claim here is “For he is free to do a thing, that may do it if he has the will to do it; and may forbear if he has the will to forbear” is sufficient basis for the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence. The second part affirms the claimed basis – “All voluntary actions, where the thing that induceth the will is not fear, are called also spontaneous. ...But every spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary, for voluntary presupposes some precedent deliberation. ...His Lordship is deceived, if he think any spontaneous action, after once being checked in it, differs from an action voluntary and elective; for even the setting of a man’s foot in the posture for walking, and the action of ordinary eating, was once deliberated of how and when it should be done; and though afterwards it became easy and habitual so as to be done without forethought, yet that does not hinder but that the act is voluntary and proceedeth from election” (Ibid, p. 7).

In summary, Descartes’ position is a person’s history is preordained while Hobbes’ position is a person’s history is moldable. The task now is to expand on each free will and accommodation, and, investigative sophistication and emotional investment.
Free will and accommodation

Therapeutic jurisprudence grew out of mental health law in the 1970’s (Wexler, 1991b, pp. 3-15). That history however is far too narrow for the present purposes. Instead, focus will be on mens rea, the guilty mind, the fundamental focus of therapeutic jurisprudence, particularly, the reference to free will in Figure 14 (Composite Powers, p. 171). For reference, “No problem of criminal law is of more fundamental importance or has proved more baffling through the centuries than the determination of the precise mental element or mens rea necessary for crime. For hundreds of years the books have repeated with unbroken cadence that A ctus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. ‘There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind,’ says Bishop. ‘It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offence is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist’. But when it comes to attaching a precise meaning to mens rea, courts and writers are in hopeless disagreement. Some define it in the broadest and most general terms; others define it with more precision, but with greatly varying meanings. It becomes important, therefore, to examine with some particularity the mental requisites of criminality and for this purpose to understand something of the historical development which has made the law what it is today” [Italics in original] (Sayre, 1932).

The task now is to address the character of each ‘Imagination – of the ideal’ and ‘Generalization – synthetic’ in Figure 14, and, in doing so, to reframe the origin of today’s therapeutic jurisprudence. ‘Imagination’ will be addressed via the focus on introspection, ‘Generalization’ will be addressed via the focus on induction, and origin will be set at Enrico Ferri’s three lectures given at The University of Naples, Italy, April 22, 23 and 24, 1901 (Ferri, 1906|1968). Those lectures marked the transition from the Classical School of Criminology to the Positive School of Criminology, with the latter the fundamental base of today’s therapeutic jurisprudence.

Ferri’s first lecture was devoted to both a critique of the Classical School of Criminology and gratitude for that School’s accomplishments – “...the adherents of the positive school of criminology feel the most sincere reverence for the classic school of criminology” (Ferri, 1906|1968, p. 9). The origin of the Classical School, spans Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794), by way of Francesco Carrara (1805-1888), to Enrico Pessina (1828-1916). Included in the timespan associated with the Classical School was Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) whose contributions reach through the Positive School to the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

Beccaria introduced social considerations at the expense of legalized barbarism. “When Cesare Beccaria printed his book on crime and penalties in 1774 under a false date and place of publication, reflecting the aspirations which gave rise to the impending hurricane of the French revolution; when he hurled himself against all that was barbarian in the mediaeval laws and set loose a storm of enthusiasm among the encyclopedists, and even some of the members of government, in France, he was met by a wave of opposition, calumny and accusation on the part of the majority of jurists, judges and lights of philosophy. The abbe Jachinci published four volumes against Beccaria, calling him the destroyer of justice and morality, simply because he had combatted the tortures and the death penalty” (Ibid, p. 51).

Carrara, more as a pioneer than a scientist, fought the death penalty while embracing literally free-thought. Ferri’s retort to Carrara’s lack of definition – “Crime has its natural causes, which lie outside of that mathematical point called the free will of the criminal. Aside from being a juridical phenomenon, which it would be well to examine by itself, every crime is above all a natural and social phenomenon and should be studied primarily as such. We need not go through so hard a course of study merely for the purpose of walking over the razor edge of juristic definitions and to find out, for instance, that from the time Romagnosi made a distinction between incompleted and attempted crime rivers of ink have been spilled in the attempt to find the distinguishing elements of these two degrees of crime. And
finally, when the German legislator concluded to make no distinction between incompleted and attempted crime and to recognize only the completed crime in his code of 1871, we witnessed the spectacle of Carrara praising that legislator for leaving that subtle distinction out of his code. A strange conclusion on the part of a science, which cudgels its brains for a century to find the marks of distinction between attempted and incompleted crime, and then praises the legislator for ignoring it. And another classic jurist, Buccellati, proposed to do away with the theory of attempted crime by simply defining it as a crime by itself, or as—a violation of police laws! A science which comes to such conclusions is a science which moves in metaphysical abstractions, and we shall see that all these finespun questions which abound in classical science lose all practical value before the necessity of saving society from the plague of crime” (Ibid, p. 75).

“Enrico Pessina alone remains of the two giants who concluded the cycle of classic school of criminology. In a lucid moment of his scientific consciousness, which soon reverted to the old abstract and metaphysical theories, he announced in an introductory statement in 1879, that criminal justice would have to rejuvenate itself in the pure bath of the natural sciences and substitute in place of abstraction the living and concrete study of facts” (Ibid, pp. 46-47).

Philippine Pinel, a French physician, was instrumental in the development of a more humane psychological approach to the custody and care of psychiatric patients. “He advanced the revolutionary idea that insanity was not a sin, but a disease like all other diseases. This idea is now a commonplace, but in his time, it revolutionized the world. It seemed as though this innovation inaugurated by Pinel would overthrow the world and the foundations of society. Well, two years before the storming of the Bastille Pinel walked into the sanitarium of the Salpetriere and committed the brave act of freeing the insane of the chains that weighed them down. He demonstrated in practice that the insane, when freed of their chains, became quieter, instead of creating wild disorder and destruction. This great revolution of Pinel, Chiarugi, and others, changed the attitude of the public mind toward the insane. While formerly insanity had been regarded as a moral sin, the public conscience, thanks to the enlightening work of science, henceforth had to adapt itself to the truth that insanity is a disease like all others, that a man does not become insane because he wants to, but that he becomes insane through hereditary transmission and the influence of the environment in which he lives, being predisposed toward insanity and becoming insane under the pressure of circumstances” (Ibid, p. 53).

Ferri’s second lecture was devoted to the causes of criminality and classification of criminals with discussion limited to ‘why’ and ‘what’. He opens his presentation by making note of the common reaction in the general population as being about a query into why a person would commit a crime, any crime, versus, the focus of the technical legal apparatus being limited to discovered actions (Ibid, pp. 70-72), with a contrast between the Classical and Positive Schools well-stated.

The Classical—“This school alone makes an attempt to solve in every case of crime the problem of its natural origin, of the reasons and conditions that induced a man to commit such and such a crime. ...It is useless to open any work of classical criminology for this purpose, for you will not find an answer to these questions in than. No one, from Beccaria to Carrara, has ever thought of this problem, and they could not have asked it, considering their point of departure and their method. In fact, the classic criminologists accept the phenomenon of criminality as an accomplished fact. They analyze it from the point of view of the technical jurist, without asking how this criminal fact may have been produced, and why it repeats itself in greater or smaller numbers from year to year, in every country. The theory of a free will, which is their foundation, excludes the possibility of this scientific question, for according to it the crime is the product of the fiat of the human will. And if that is admitted as a fact, there is nothing left to account for. The manslaughter was committed, because the criminal wanted to commit it; and
that is all there is to it. Once the theory of a free will is accepted as a fact, the deed depends on the fiat, the voluntary determination, of the criminal, and all is said” (Ibid, pp. 72-73).

The Positive – “But if, on the other hand, the positive school of criminology denies, on the ground of researches in scientific physiological psychology, that the human will is free and does not admit that one is a criminal because he wants to be, but declares that a man commits this or that crime only when he lives in definitely determined conditions of personality and environment which induce him necessarily to act in a certain way, then alone does the problem of the origin of criminality begin to be submitted to a preliminary analysis, and then alone does criminal law step out of the narrow and arid limits of technical jurisprudence and become a true social and human science in the highest and noblest meaning of the word. It is vain to insist with such stubbornness as that of the classic school of criminology on juristic formulas by which the distinction between illegal appropriation and theft, between fraud and other forms of crime against property, and so forth, is determined, when this method does not give to society one single word which would throw light upon the reasons that make a man a criminal and upon the efficacious remedy by which society could protect itself against criminality” (Ibid, p. 73).

Ferri’s third lecture was devoted to remedies proposed by the Positive School. Ferri’s selected material spans four paragraphs to be followed by ‘Imagination’ and ‘Generalization’. Ferri’s first two paragraphs apply to ‘Imagination’ while the last two apply to ‘Generalization’.

“The legislator should apply the rules of social hygiene in order to reach the roots of criminality. But this would require that he should bring his mind and will to bear daily on a legislative reform of individual and social life, in the field of economics and morals as well as in that of administration, politics, and intelligence. Instead of that, the legislators permit the microbes of criminality to develop their pathogenic powers in society. When crimes become manifest, the legislator knows no other remedy but imprisonment in order to punish an evil which he should have prevented. Unfortunately, this scientific conviction is not yet rooted and potent in the minds of the legislators of most of the civilized countries, because they represent on an average the backward scientific convictions of one or two previous generations. The legislator who sits in parliament today was the university student of 30 years ago. With a few very rare exceptions he is supplied only with knowledge of outgrown scientific research. It is a historical law that the work of the legislator is always behind the science of his time. But nevertheless, the scientist has the urgent duty to spread the conviction that hygiene is worth as much on the field of civilization as it is in medicine for the public health.

This is the fundamental conviction at which the positive school arrives: That which has happened in medicine will happen in criminology. The great value of practical hygiene, especially of social hygiene, which is greater than that of individual hygiene, has been recognized after the marvelous scientific discoveries concerning the origin and primitive causes of the most dangerous diseases. So long as Pasteur and his disciples had not given to the world their discovery of the pathogenic microbes of all infectious diseases, such as typhoid fever, cholera, diphtheria, tuberculosis, etc., more or less absurd remedies were demanded of the science of medicine.

...This is the modern lesson which we wish to teach in the field of criminology, a field which will always retain its repressive functions as an exceptional and ultimate refuge, because we do not believe that we shall succeed in eliminating all forms of criminality. Hence, if a crime manifests itself, repression may be employed as one of the remedies of criminology, but it should be the very last, not the exclusively dominating one, as it is today” (Ibid, p. 99).

“The teaching of science tells us plainly that in such a case of endemic criminality social remedies must be applied to social evils. Unless the remedy of social reforms accompanies the development and
protection of labor; unless justice is assured to every member of the collectivity, the courage of this or that citizen is spent in vain, and the evil plant will continue to thrive in the jungle. Taught by the masterly and inflexible logic of facts, we come to the adoption of the scientific method in criminal research and conclude that a simple and uniform remedy like punishment is not adequate to cure such a natural and social phenomenon as crime, which has its own natural and social causes. The measures for the preservation of society against criminality must be manifold, complex and varied, and must be the outcome of persevering and systematic work on the part of legislators and citizens on the solid foundation of a systematic collective economy” (Ibid, p. 111).

‘Imagination’ is dynamic while introspection remains a rationalization together with dissociation and transference (p. 6). Introspection alone provides self-reports about observations (Boring, 1953). Ferri’s position is the roots of criminality are unresolved frustrations that morph through ‘Imagination’ and introspection taken together and on to aggression. That public health begins by addressing the cause of frustrations.

‘Generalization’ is static while self-reports about observations are dynamic that in turn account for efficient causes (Lachelier, 1876b) apart from final causes (Lachelier, 1877). Efficient causes are the surface issues that insure, but do not guarantee, an if-then relationship between unresolved frustrations and the aggressions that are recognized as criminality – Ferri’s social evils. These causes are recognized as if guided by some array of natural laws. While those natural laws have validity, they also have impetus akin to mechanical laws. It is the impetus that comprise the final causes.

Investigative sophistication and emotional investment

The prior discussion of Free will and accommodation implied a point-in-time precision that is absent in this discussion. Learning by an individual person is the key element with respect to each investigative sophistication and emotional investment. Defenses against anxiety as advanced to latent schizophrenia (intrapunitive) versus narcissism (extrapunitive) as shown in Figure 6 (Defenses, p. 47) is the reference for this discussion. The objective is to resolve each the efficient and the final causes, to the investigative and emotional dynamics.

To insure there is a lack of precision in the discussion that follows the starting point is a dated reference – “Cornelius Celsus (c. 25 BC – c. 50 AD), a Roman physician of very general and extensive information, has left us a short but very valuable tract upon mental disorders. His precepts, which are not allowed by any theoretical disquisitions, appear to be the dictates of observation and experience; and what gives them an additional value, is, that they chiefly relate to the moral management of the insane. His nosological distribution of the different species of insanity is, however, unscientific and confused” (Pinel, 1806, p. xxxii).

Pinel chose to address the reality of ‘unscientific and confused’ in his preface – “On my entrance upon the duties of that hospital, everything presented to me the appearance of chaos and confusion. Some of my unfortunate patients labored under the horrors of a most gloomy and desponding melancholy. Others were furious, and subject to the influence of a perpetual delirium. Some appeared to possess a correct judgement upon most subjects but were occasionally agitated by violent sallies of maniacal fury; while those of another class were sunk into a state of stupid ideotism and imbecility. Symptoms so different, and all comprehended under the general title of insanity, required, on my part, much study and discrimination; and to secure order in the establishment and success to the practice, I determined upon adopting such a variety of measures, both as to discipline and treatment, as my patients required, and my limited opportunity permitted. From systems of nosology, I had little assistance to expect; since
The arbitrary distributions of Sauvages and Cullen were better calculated to impress the conviction of their insufficiency than to simplify my labour. I, therefore, resolved to adopt that method of investigation which has invariably succeeded in all the departments of natural history, viz, to notice successively every fact, without any other object than that of collecting materials for future use; and to endeavor, as far as possible, to divest myself of the influence, both of my own prepossessions and the authority of others. With this view, I first of all took a general statement of the symptoms of my patients. To ascertain their characteristic peculiarities, the above survey was followed by cautious and repeated examinations into the condition of individuals. All our new cases were entered at great length upon the journals of the house. Due attention was paid to the changes of the seasons and the weather, and their respective influences upon the patients were minutely noticed. Having a peculiar attachment for the more general method of descriptive history, I did not confine myself to any exclusive mode of arranging my observations, nor to any one system of nosography. The facts which I have thus collected are now submitted to the consideration of the public, in the form of a regular treatise” (Ibid, pp. 1-3).

The task now is to develop a resolution of ‘unscientific and confused’ with respect to each investigative sophistication and emotional investment while treating ‘individualism’ as a child of ‘sociality’ of Figure 6 (Defenses, p. 47). With Pinel’s preface the guide discussion spans five topics: (1) The general objectives of therapeutic jurisprudence; (2) Porous boundaries as enforced by chaos and confusion versus judgement; (3) Confounding environmental factors; (4) Centrist resolution of distortions and disengagements; (5) Centrist resolution of efficient and final causes.

The general objectives of therapeutic jurisprudence span procedure with compliance principally in the here-and-now by the involved person the final objective. The process is about adaptation with respect to anxiety leaving open to chance distortions and disengagements that result in thought that comports to middle across effectively leaving unaddressed the situation-parallel to the ‘why’ of Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6). With compliance there is risk with respect to motivation that translates into vulnerabilities between a person’s self and their object world.

Porous boundaries as enforced by chaos and confusion versus judgement is the risk that radiates from compliance at the expense of motivation. This advances the unconscious processes – perception and reasoning – of Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43) with respect to Figure 15. Compliance comports with both perception and top down of Figure 5, and, perception and intuition of Figure 15, where the individual alignment has perception to perception and top down to intuition, the individual’s past experiences and expectations. Motivation comports with reasoning in both

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Source: Kahneman, 2003

Adapted from the lecture Daniel Kahneman delivered in Stockholm, Sweden, on December 8, 2002, when he received the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.
Figure 5 and Figure 15, while risk is accounted for the unaddressed repression.

Confounding environmental factors result from “symptoms so different, and all comprehended under the general title of insanity” (Pinel, 1806, p. 2). ‘Insanity’ as used here raises two issues. First, the objective mismatch of timing between the two columns of each Process and Content of Figure 15. Second, the ‘insane’ part, the subjective mismatch of timing between those two columns with the mismatch driven by the weather – rain one day, sunshine the next (Dowling, 2005), with weather identified as a contributing factor in the analysis of the multiple personality of Sally Beauchamp by Morton Prince (p. 138).

Centrist resolution of distortions and disengagements that result from inadvertent assumptions are about timing, a cost-benefit issue with respect to uncertainty and knowledge. Knowledge of a candidate benefit is based on assumptions that are inconsistent with the in-good-faith applied effort.

Centrist resolution of efficient and final causes, reflect the ultimate value of experience. The material to follow addresses experience, then, as caveats, efficient and final causes.

Experience: “The true point of view seems to be that there are elements in our experience that have what may be termed a final value in the moment of that experience, that point back to no conditioning reality, nor forward to a growing system of facts. Here are found impulses and feelings that lie at the basis of our moral and intellectual judgments and give all experience its significance, not only because of that which is to follow, but also because of that which actually is. These impulses and feelings are necessary for our right living and true thinking. They give a final worth to action and an abiding value to truth” (Colvin, 1907).

Efficient causes: “Induction is the operation by which we pass from the knowledge of facts to that of the laws which govern them. The possibility of this operation is doubted by none; and yet on the other side it seems strange that some facts, observed in a time and place thus determined, should suffice to establish a law which may be applicable to all places and to all time. The best experience teaches at most only how phenomena connect themselves under our eyes; but that they should connect themselves in the same manner always and everywhere – that, no experience can teach us, and yet we do not hesitate to affirm this. …Apparently the most natural solution consists in pretending that our mind passes from facts to laws by a logical process, which does not confound itself with deduction, but which rests as deduction does upon the principle of identity. Without doubt a law is not logically contained in any portion, be it small or great, of the facts which it regulates; but it seems as if it might be contained at least, in the whole of these facts, in their totality – and we might even say that it does not in reality differ from this totality, of which it is only the abridged expression. If this should be so, induction might be subject to some practical difficulties, but it would be in theory the simplest thing in the world. It would suffice to form, by force of time and patience, a complete collection of facts of each species. These collections once made, each law would establish itself by the institution of one term for several and would then be above the shadow of all contestation” (Lachelier, 1876b).

Final causes: “It is true that if we knew at a given moment the direction and swiftness of all the movements which are going the universe, we might be able to deduce vigorously from all the combinations which ought to result from them; but induction consists precisely in the reverse of this problem, in supposing, on the contrary, that the whole of these directions and this swiftness ought to be such as will be reproduced at a named point of these combinations. But, to say that a complex phenomenon contains the reason of simple phenomena which concur to produce it, is to say that it is the final cause of it. The law final causes is then an element, and even the characteristic element of the principle of induction. …The law of final causes is, then, as well as that of efficient causes, an
indispensable element of the principle of induction: but there is between these laws a double difference, which not useless to notice. We may remark primarily that the judgments by which we apply them to phenomena are hypothetical for the first, and categorical for the second: that is to say, first determines each phenomenon only through relation to precedent of which it supposes the existence, while the second absolutely and without condition each of the real or presumed ends of nature. In way of compensation, the law of efficient causes is of a necessary and vigorous application, which admit of degrees; since as soon as all the conditions of phenomenon are united, we cannot admit without absurdity that phenomenon would not reproduce itself, or would reproduce self otherwise than the mechanical law would exact of law of final causes is, on the contrary, a flexible and contingent law in each one of its applications. It exacts absolutely certain harmony in the whole of phenomena, but it does not guarantee to us either that this harmony will be always composed of the same elements, nor even that it will never be troubled by order” (Lachelier, 1877).

**Soft costs and soft benefits of value and choice based on bias**

The task now is to address the application of working memory.

This discussion focuses on Imagination versus time, and, Memory versus uncertainty of Figure 14 (Composite Powers, p. 171), with Generalization versus reality, and, Reasoning versus knowledge to follow.

Discussion will follow: (1) uniformity of assumptions with emphasis on Imagination versus time, (2) uniformity of focus with emphasis on Memory versus uncertainty, (3) uniformity of purpose with emphasis on ‘sociality’.

**Uniformity of assumptions**

Imagination is about relative priorities while time is about relative progression versus the various priorities. From this it follows that inferior may only be a mismatch between the characteristics of the selected criteria (Heidbreder, 1927).

**Uniformity of focus**

There are no guarantees in life, yet, choice always remains an option particularly with respect to uncertainty. The idea is the greater the focus on choice the less impact of uncertainty. To take this idea into Memory sets experience as a function of choice with durability the final consideration.

If choice is impulsive then durability is probably least expected. However, if choice is deliberate with respect to personal value then durability is probably highly expected (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999).

**Uniformity of purpose**

Progression and choice in isolation is tantamount to “reinventing the wheel”. The idea of “common factors” (Weinberger, 2002) is the issue. Included here are elements that should be a foregone conclusion of the current therapeutic jurisprudence – “the therapeutic relationship, a therapeutic rationale, the interdependence of aspects of the patient’s personality, and the therapist’s personality” (Ibid).

**Resolving motivation, bias and individualism**

This discussion focuses on Generalization versus reality, and, Reasoning versus knowledge of Figure 14.

Discussion will follow: (1) basis in history, (2) uniformity of assumptions with emphasis on Generalization versus reality, (3) uniformity of focus with emphasis on Reasoning versus knowledge, (4) uniformity of purpose with emphasis on ‘individualism’.
Basis in history

Emphasis in the early development of this paper was on the knowledge base Freud inherited (p. 8). Much of that knowledge base however has fallen victim to writings that fail the test of professionalism (e.g., Levin, 1993); shortsighted literature search with the lack of any reference to Enrico Ferri in the current literature about therapeutic jurisprudence an example; scientific fraud (e.g., Crocker, 2011a; Crocker, 2011b); papers that reference William James as if he is the only surviving intellect of his era; and, resilience in the knowledge base being overtrumped by trends in the surrounding culture and society as if those trends are superior to history.

“The history of psychiatry [and psychology] should be a fundamental part of [professional] training. More than a mere grab bag of historical curiosities for the diversion of established clinicians, psychiatric history offers insights into treatments and diagnoses that once flourished and now, perhaps unfairly, have been crowded from the stage to the advantage of patent-protected remedies and trendy diagnoses. There is much of benefit in psychiatry’s past – safe and effective therapeutic agents and diagnoses that cut nature at the joints perhaps even better than the current crop. Psychiatrists in training as well as senior practitioners should become aware of the historical existence of alternative therapies and diagnoses” (Shorter, 2008).

More to the point is the entire issue of ‘what’ versus ‘why’, where ‘what’ is literally obedient to the addictive nature of the internet at the expense of the ‘why’ of life, e.g., Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6).

Not to be ignored are the positions taken by each Skinner and Cattell: Skinner’s philosophy of behavior, his here-and-now assertion about the three Obstacles – Humanistic Psychology, Psychotherapy and Cognitive Psychology (p. 132). Cattell’s philosophy of mentalism that exists between motivation and vulnerabilities, where vulnerabilities are formed then driven by his Constitutional, non-dynamic (temperamental) unities with supporting actions provided by his Dynamic (teleological, teleonomic, motivational), Social mould (environmental demand) and Co-nascent (developmental, emergent) unities (p. 138).

“A robust critical literature argues that psychology is animated by powerful, but unacknowledged commitments to a culturally based vision of the human good in spite of its ideal of value neutrality. Inasmuch as such commitments seem ineliminable, it seems preferable to address questions of the good directly rather than by tacitly absorbing cultural views. This article explores the human good directly and explicitly within an Aristotelian framework to foster a critical conversation on the good life in psychology. The framework takes human flourishing as the overarching good. Flourishing consists in ongoing participation in characteristic human goods such as knowledge and belonging. Aristotle presented two distinctions in types of goods or ends. First, some ends are chosen for themselves and some are means to other ends. Following Aristotle’s function argument, goods such as knowledge and belonging are chosen for themselves because they directly express key features of human nature (i.e., rationality and sociality). I term these goods constitutive because the activities constitute the end. Instrumental goods are means to other ends (e.g., money helps to provide the infrastructure for living well). Second, some goods can be pursued and possessed by individuals and some goods can only be pursued and achieved in concert with others. The latter are shared goals such as friendship and democracy. Virtues or excellences are the personal strengths that make it possible to pursue these goods. In this Aristotelian framework, there are many characteristic human goods, each of which can be pursued in many ways, indicating that there is no single correct form of the good life” (Fowers, 2012).
Uniformity of assumptions

Freud’s source-aim-object is more than a conceptual theory, it is a guide that finds use in organizing comments about assumptions. The reference here is Table 1 (Evolution, p. 13). In that Table Darwin is presented as ‘source’, Lamarck as ‘aim’, and, Freud as ‘object’, with that sequence spanning evolution to propagation, from static to dynamic.

If Generalization is the sole focus, then static earns emphasis which sets Freud as subordinate to Lamarck who in turn is subordinate to Darwin. This sets Darwin as subordinate to ‘sociality’, the biological reality. If reality is the sole focus, then dynamic earns emphasis which sets Darwin as subordinate to Lamarck who in turn is subordinate to Freud. This sets Freud as subordinate to ‘individualism’, which, in turn, is the execution of ‘sociality’. This leaves Lamarck unaccounted for. The solution is to allow Lamarck to stand as equal to working memory of Figure 5 (Mind, p. 43) thereby setting Lamarck as the effective interpreter in the overall process of adaptation, a position that has much support at the DNA level (Koonin, 2009).

Uniformity of focus

Lamarck and DNA are now addressed as a continuation of ‘what’ versus ‘why’ as basis for nature versus nurture versus individual change (Mullen, 2006).

To set focus on DNA alone asserts that ‘what’ and nature define life at least on an iterative basis, with definition not necessarily extensible to individual change. Definition however does allow for the creation of knowledge.

To set focus on Lamarck alone (apart from any reference to biology) asserts that ‘why’ and nurture define life on potentially a durable basis, with definition extensible to individual change. Here, definition allows for Reasoning to emerge.

Uniformity of purpose

Uniformity of purpose with emphasis on ‘individualism’ is to understand the individual style of life as a part of the whole. What follows is a four-paragraph quote by Alfred Adler that summarizes the quest towards the understanding of the individual style of life.

“The development of the science of psychology began with the consideration of the abnormal expressions of the psyche. Perceptible scientific points of view lie in the theories of hypnotism as taught in the School of Nancy. Charcot pierced the Avail and opened the great field for inquiries into the nervous symptoms diminished or increased by hypnosis. Janet developed a great and astonishing work regarding the reciprocal influence between body and psyche. He also saw the weakness of neurotic persons expressed sometimes in a sentiment d'incomplétude. Breuer (Vienna) found, as he wrote to me in a letter, ‘the sparkling stone lying on the road’, describing the importance of suppressed experiences. Freud continued this idea and reduced all the expressions of life, of the human being and mankind, to a suppressed and unconscious sexual desire, the ‘Oedipus Complex’. In the last fifteen years there has been much more inquiry into the influences of the ego and the desire for death. I myself have emphasized the unity of the style of life which is always fixed and established by the ruling actions line, the real creative power in life, a part of life itself beginning with a feeling of inferiority and continually striving toward a goal of totality, of superiority. This goal dominates the innate possibilities and gives the answers to the questions of life in each individual solution. The superstition of inherited powers and mistakes was done away with – the human being became the master of his life. But in the individual the wrong and mistaken style of life, built up in early childhood, brings up aggravated conflicts connected with the hesitating attitude towards new situations and decisions. This hesitation, stopping or escaping
from the questions of life, conditions the three remarkable mistaken forms of life: wrong characteristics (problem children and adults), neurosis, crimes. Jung's attitude, closely connected with the Freudian psychoanalysis, takes for granted more than his teacher the inherited qualities in the introverted and extraverted types. The former, more occupied with his own person, and the latter, connected with the environment, are described by individual psychology not as a beginning but as the results of a varied degree of courage and social feeling. We must insist upon the same difference in regard to his ‘innate’ types of intellectual feeling, acting, and intuitive life. And the social unconsciousness is no other than the social feeling, only that we cannot agree with the great importance given to the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness. Then too, the conscious is no more and no better understood than the unconscious, but the degree of their development is formed by the demands of the goal of superiority.

The nearest to the individual psychologists, and really their predecessors, are among the Americans – William James and Stanley Hall. The latter completely accepted individual psychology in the last years of his fruitful life. Watson in his more mechanical views clearly presupposes the conditions of the goal of superiority and the striving of the mind and psyche. McDougall in his specialized inquiries into the 14 instincts could easily combine all these movements in the feeling of inferiority and its compensations and in social feeling.

The great and worthwhile efforts of mental hygiene in America approach the lines and purposes of individual psychology. The great importance of the feeling of inferiority especially is clearly recognized by all serious authors. On this path the great progresses in education and understanding of the psyche are made. The mistakes made in the family, due to the lacks in courage and social feeling, as the driving factors in the development of problem children, are well known and a great number of men and women are trying to teach the parents and the children.

Individual psychology has recognized that the problems begin before or in a new situation for which a child or adult is not prepared. His style of life fixed after the third or fourth year does not agree with the existing social laws, of these situations, i.e.: kindergarten, school, society, occupation, love, marriage, old age, etc. The greater feeling of inferiority (among organically defective, spoiled or hated children) strives to exclude social connections because of the strongly developed selfishness. Under these circumstances we notice all the deviations as difficulties, neurosis, crimes. The only rescue and preservation lie in courage and social feeling” [Italics in original] (Adler, 1927).
Objective: Professional responsibility versus life as the ultimate wager

The purpose of this final track is to cement the relationship between the many professionals who are engaged with members of the client population for quite an array of reasons which span institutional and personal.

This paper’s abstract began with “To build an argument based on cost-benefit at the private person level and with the primary care physician tasked with a supporting role, an argument that radiates through normal and abnormal thinking, and on to ‘costs’ ranging from everyday life to the likes of today’s skewed reliance on opioid based pain medications”. From that sentence to this point little reference has been made to the primary care physician beyond Balint’s “mutual investment company” (p. 7) for good reason. Any focus on that person’s execution of their relationship with a patient fails to highlight the difference between the ‘facts’ associated with adaptation and the ‘ideas’ associated with attachment. Referring to the primary care physicians as wearing two ‘hats’ (pp. 7 & 51) highlights the “relational aspect of interaction” (Lipsitt, 1999) between the primary care physician and the patient. To that end, covered here is a survey of the cross currents of contributions to the knowledge base in tandem with the dynamics of culture and society (Shorter, 2008).

The ultimate wager remains the bridge between a person’s object world and their self with that bridge the execution of a person’s dynamic constitution.

This discussion traverses five topics: (1) Objectives of professional training (static-dynamic), (2) Challenges of society (dynamic-static), (3) Skinner’s position and Cattell’s Constitutional unities, (4) Dynamics related to Skinner and Cattell, (5) Dynamics related to the individual person. These topics are preliminary to this track’s four supporting discussions: (1) Strategic/altruistic designs to initiate progress, (2) Tactical attempts to create progress, (3) Practical route to cause progress, (4) In the absence of progress, life, the ultimate wager.

Objectives of professional training (static-dynamic): There are two sides to the development of professionalism – static and dynamic. The static side is the development of definition, the macro view, while the dynamic side is execution of definition through accumulated experience, the micro view.

The history of each psychology and psychiatry is no different than any other discipline, there is a learning curve. Unfortunately, as that curve develops, that period becomes attractive to the maverick who all too often is a damage to progress (Jones, 1909). That damage continues to this day as already noted in references to academic fraud (e.g., p. 9). To this end professional responsibility has taken the lead with a formal study of Medical Ethics Education, The Romanell Report (Carrese, 2015), providing gravity to a standard. The final element of the development of definition is the self-referencing audit. An example of such an audit Drug Abuse Treatment Outcome Study covering adult clients entering treatment from 1991 to 1993 (Flynn, 1997). While this study is quite dated, subsequent work has led to the National Survey Drug Use and Health (e.g., NSDUH, p. 11). This survey from the development of definition to the development of sophisticated measures, the span of the macro view, applies primarily to the current therapeutic jurisprudence. The task now is a retrace of the execution of definition and on to accumulated experience from which there emerges an array of lessons learned versus formal reports.

Aside from mandated participation in a therapeutic jurisprudence situation, a person’s engagement in psycho-therapy is due to some combination of frustration and anxiety. Given the grip such problems have on a person’s thinking, the here-and-now holds focus. To nudge a person away from the immediate time frame suggestion becomes necessary. The role of suggestion is important to the specification of the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence as well development of progress in general
– “The term suggestion covers two processes, 'verbal suggestion' and 'affective suggestion', of which the latter is the more primary, and is necessary for the action of the former. Affective suggestion is a rapport, which depends on the transference (übertragung) of certain positive affective processes in the unconscious region of the subject's mind; these are always components or derivatives of the psycho-sexual group of activities. The occurrence is a normal one but takes place to an excessive degree in the psycho-neuroses, on account of the large amount here present of desires that find no adequate outlet; it is one form of the more general mechanism of displacement (Verschiebung), by means of which an affect is transposed from an original, unpleasant, and repressed (verdrängt) conception to another less unacceptable one. Suggestion plays the chief part in all methods of treatment of the psycho-neuroses except the psycho-analytic one. It acts by releasing the repressed desires that are finding expression in the form of symptoms and allowing them to become attached to the idea of the physician; psychologically this means the replacement of one symptom by another, namely psycho-sexual dependence on the physician. This is often of temporary, and sometimes of permanent benefit, but in severe cases the replacement is permanently released by being made conscious, and hence can be directed, by sublimation, to more useful, non-sexual, social aims” [Italics in original] (Jones, 1910). Now, the application of suggestion beginning with comments about the fundamental process, which applies equally to therapist-directed and to the self-directed character of the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence.

The application of suggestion begins with a person recognizing that some combination of frustration and anxiety has taken hold in their life. From this realization that is that person’s voluntary engagement of therapy. For success to be realized, that person must follow a general sequence – “(1) establishment of rapport with a delicate balance between identification and objectivity; (2) a client’s free expression of thoughts and feelings; (3) his recognition and acceptance of his spontaneous self; (4) his responsibility for making his own choices; (5) his gain in insight through assimilated interpretation; and (6) his growth of independence” (Rogers, 1940). With suggestion in motion it is reasonable to expect insight to emerge spontaneously, “new perceptions and understandings of self that follow free expression of negative emotion” (Rogers, 1946). The critical element in the transition from suggestion to the freeing of negative emotion is an active involvement (Rogers, 1946). Now, some fundamental assumptions about personality, the overall process and the role of time.

The most fundamental assumption about personality is the approach taken to any single person at any point in time (Rogers, 1947). There are three issues here. The first is the ‘sociality’ versus ‘individualism’ of Figure 14 (Composite Powers, p. 171), particularly ‘of the ideal’ versus ‘of the actual’, the cookie-cutter approach versus what is personal. The second is timing implied by synthetic versus analytic where the former adapts life to the here-and-now while the latter recognizes that time is quite fluid. The third is the attitude and the orientation (Rogers, 1949) – frustration, anxiety, compliant, etc. – of the person and the therapist if there is one. This leads to process versus the longitudinal event known as life.

Regarding the process itself, formal therapy or self-directed, as an extension of Uniformity of assumptions, focus and purpose (p. 179) – “The process involves a change in the manner of experiencing. ...a loosening of the cognitive maps of experience. ...There are other elements, too, involved in the process: movement from ineffective to effective choice, from fear of relationships to freely living in relationship, from inadequate differentiation of feelings and meanings to sharp differentiation. In general, the process moves from a point of fixity, where all these elements and threads are separately discernible and separately understandable, to the flowing peak moments of therapy in which all these threads become inseparably woven together. In the new experiencing with immediacy which occurs at such moments, feeling and cognition interpenetrate, self is subjectively
present in the experience, volition is simply the subjective following of a harmonious balance of organismic direction. Thus, as the process reaches this point, the person becomes a unity of flow, of motion, He has changed; but, what seems most significant, he has become an integrated process of changingness” (Rogers, 1958).

Regarding the longitudinal event known as life, in the discussion of Figure 13 (Big Five, p. 160) it was noted that therapeutic jurisprudence allows mood to consideration while the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence – and life – is limited to personality. There is an additional influence, the surrounding socialization (Specht, 2011), with advances in technology just an example.

Challenges of society (dynamic-static): There are two sides to recognition of the challenges of society – dynamic and static. The dynamic side is the development of research and hypothesis that presuppose that the longitudinal event known as life is itself static, the macro view, while the static side is the presumption that the individual person will conform, the micro view.

The prior alignment of socialization with advances in technology is a micro issue. The primary issue is macro, social ties – “It is generally agreed that social ties play a beneficial role in the maintenance of psychological well-being. ...four sets of insights that emerge from the literature on social ties and mental health outcomes (defined as stress reactions, psychological well-being, and psychological distress, including depressive symptoms and anxiety). First, the pathways by which social networks and social supports influence mental health can be described by two alternative (although not mutually exclusive) causal models – the main effect model and the stress-buffering model. Second, the protective effects of social ties on mental health are not uniform across groups in society. Gender differences in support derived from social network participation may partly account for the higher prevalence of psychological distress among women compared to men. Social connections may paradoxically increase levels of mental illness symptoms among women with low resources, especially if such connections entail role strain associated with obligations to provide social support to others. Third, egocentric networks are nested within a broader structure of social relationships. The notion of social capital embraces the embeddedness of individual social ties within the broader social structure. Fourth, despite some successes reported in social support interventions to enhance mental health, further work is needed to deepen our understanding of the design, timing, and dose of interventions that work, as well as the characteristics of individuals who benefit the most” [Italics added] (Kawachi, 2001).

With the stage set by the prior Fourth, despite some successes..., it must be noted that cookie-cutter approaches to precision medicine, precision psychiatry, precision psychology and so forth are being pursued such as the National Institute of Mental Health Research Domain Criteria project (p. 33). “The RDoC was designed to address the need for a new approach to classifying mental disorders, an approach that would begin with, but not be limited to, symptoms, ...and then on to a deeper understanding of the biological and psychosocial basis of a group of disorders that is unambiguously among the most disabling disorders in medicine” (Insel, 2014), as if life radiates from a point in time. Figure 13 (Big Five, p. 160) makes clear there is difference between scientific studies and the longitudinal event known as life. Alternatively, having studies as a centrist approach to the resolution of debilitating issues – with the current therapeutic jurisprudence included here – does result in macro-oriented insight, with value limited to the realization of macro-oriented limitations.

With the RDoC the starting point, that approach has been extended to the opioid crisis with less than certain results – “Conclusions – Retention in methadone and buprenorphine treatment is associated with substantial reductions in the risk for all cause and overdose mortality in people dependent on opioids. The induction phase onto methadone treatment and the time immediately after leaving treatment with both drugs are periods of particularly increased mortality risk, which should be dealt
with by both public health and clinical strategies to mitigate such risk. These findings are potentially important, but further research must be conducted to properly account for potential confounding and selection bias in comparisons of mortality risk between opioid substitution treatments, as well as throughout periods in and out of each treatment” [Italics added] (Sordo, 2017).

The prior particularly increased mortality risk notation raises another extension of Uniformity of assumptions, focus and purpose (p. 179) – the autotelic experience, or flow – “Despite this recognition on the part of the human sciences that happiness is the fundamental goal of life, there has been slow progress in understanding what happiness itself consists of. Perhaps because the heyday of utilitarian philosophy coincided with the start of the enormous forward strides in public health and in the manufacturing and distribution of goods, the majority of those who thought about such things assumed that increases in pleasure and happiness would come from increased affluence, from greater control over the material environment. The great self-confidence of the Western technological nations, and especially of the United States, was in large part because of the belief that materialism – the prolongation of a healthy life, the acquisition of wealth, the ownership of consumer goods – would be the royal road to a happy life. …

However, the virtual monopoly of materialism as the dominant ideology has come at the price of a trivialization that has robbed it of much of the truth it once contained. In current use, it amounts to little more than a thoughtless hedonism, a call to do one’s thing regardless of consequences, a belief that whatever feels good at the moment must be worth doing. …

This is a far cry from the original view of materialists, such as John Locke, who were aware of the futility of pursuing happiness without qualifications and who advocated the pursuit of happiness through prudence – making sure that people do not mistake imaginary happiness for real happiness. …

There is at least one more important issue left to consider. In reviewing the history of materialism, I have discussed John Locke’s warnings about the necessity of pursuing happiness with prudence and about the importance of distinguishing real from imaginary happiness. Are similar caveats applicable to flow? Indeed, flow is necessary to happiness, but it is not sufficient. This is because people can experience flow in activities that are enjoyable at the moment but will detract from enjoyment in the long run. For instance, when a person finds few meaningful opportunities for action in the environment, he or she will often resort to finding flow in activities that are destructive, addictive, or at the very least wasteful. Juvenile crime is rarely a direct consequence of deprivation but rather is caused by boredom or the frustration teenagers experience when other opportunities for flow are blocked. Vandalism, gang fights, promiscuous sex, and experimenting with psychotropic drugs might provide flow at first, but such experiences are rarely enjoyable for long” [Italics added] (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999).

Skinner’s position and Cattell’s Constitutional unities: It is time for a substantial clarification with a consideration of motivation the destination versus two anchors. The first is the above Objectives of professional training (static-dynamic) (p. 184) was dependent on the writings of Carl Rogers, a humanist. The second is that society does not necessarily endorse the idea of the mistake imaginary happiness for real happiness.

Skinner’s position (pp. 39-40) was against the staircase transition from the conditioning-behaviorism linkage to the three Obstacles – Humanistic Psychology, Psychotherapy and Cognitive Psychology – that impact on the philosophy of behavior with if-why-then being overtrumped by if-what-then, effectively induced or imaginary happiness. Skinner was not opposed to alternative investigations into motivation by serious authors (using Alfred Adler’s reference), particularly extensions of progression as set forth by
Edward Glover. Rogers focus was the untangling of progression, effectively, a contribution to the understanding of the ‘why’ as associated with Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6).

Cattell’s Constitutional unities (pp. 137-138), Dynamic (teleological, teleonomic, motivational), Social mould (environmental demand), Constitutional, non-dynamic (temperamental), Co-nascent (developmental, emergent), Logical (stylistic, evaluative, semantic) and Miscellaneous forms of trait unity either affirmed existing writings or anticipated yet-to-be-exposed writings.

With focus limited to Skinner and Cattell the fundamental issue then is bottom up and top down mental processing in isolation as such processing offers no insight into the nature of motivation (Simpson, 1993) necessary to address particularly increased mortality risk. The task now is expansion of if-why-then.

Dynamics related to Skinner and Cattell: The starting point is a summary of Rogers’ conception of therapy summarized as some combination of problem solving that results in behavioral change (behavior modification) – “Problem solving was defined as a behavioral process which (a) makes available a variety of response alternatives for dealing with a problematic situation, and (b) increases the probability of selecting the most effective response from among these alternatives. Five stages of problem solving were identified: (a) general orientation or ‘set’, (b) problem definition and formulation, (c) generation of alternatives, (d) decision making, and (e) verification. Training in problem solving was conceptualized as a form of self-control training, i.e., the individual ‘learns how to solve problems’ and thus discovers for himself the most effective way of responding” (D’Zurilla, 1971). Regarding behavioral change (behavior modification) as a result with focus limited to overt behavior versus feelings, that process includes six steps – “(a) present behavior viewed externally, (b) ideal behavior viewed externally, (c) forced change, (d) ideal behavior experienced, (e) habitual behavior experienced, and (f) behavior change” (Eaton, 1971).

The task now is to address feelings as molded by Skinner’s conditioning and Cattell’s unities, a lengthy task. Here both behavior and feelings are treated because of some comingling of motivation and personality, with traits the basis of personality only. That by gaining insight into the inventory of traits that it is possible to gain a view of the ‘what’ of personality thus opening Rogers’ conception of therapy as the investigative tool versus the ‘why’ of personality. “As differences of personality are of a qualitative rather than a quantitative sort and difficult to measure, the author’s aim is personality study and description rather than personality testing. Problems arising from the interaction of personalities are social problems, and personality measurements aim at readjustments, beneficial both to society and the individual. An effort has been made to consider only ‘those fundamental and pervasive tendencies which constitute the main currents of human personality’ rather than superficial traits, such as tactfulness, which can be referred to by more fundamental traits. A tentative outline of such tendencies falls into four main divisions; first, intelligence, which determines the quality and success of an individual's general adjustments; second, temperament, as judged by emotional breadth and emotional strength; third, self-expression or strength, terms which are used to include such traits as intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or intro-version or 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personality collides with the problem of trait-names. Whatever method he employs, – rating scales, tests, factor-analysis, clinical interviews or any other technique, – he is forced to ask himself whether the terms he is using in describing qualities and attributes of personality do actually denote psychic dispositions or traits, or whether these terms are mischievous verbal snares tempting him into the pitfalls of hypostatization and other perils of 'verbal magic'. It is small comfort to him to realize that the problem is an ancient one, disputed long ago by the Nominalist and the Realist, and up to the present time remaining a persistent and unsolved problem. ...

It would seem foolhardy to attempt an answer to the riddle of names, including that most difficult question concerning the correspondence between symbols and the phenomena that lie 'in the depths of nature'. Yet the psychologist dealing with personality must have some guidance. The nature of his work forces him to seek out and to identify dynamic mental structures and sub-structures (habits, needs, sentiments, attitudes, or traits) and to name them. Mathematical symbols cannot be used, for they are utterly foreign to the vital functions with which the psychologist is dealing. Only verbal symbols (ambiguous and troublesome as they are) seem appropriate. ...

Much research in the past has suffered from the haphazard use of trait-names. Often terms emotionally toned have been employed instead of those that are affectively neutral and more appropriate for science. And some investigators have been so naive as to assign an arbitrary name to a hypothetical disposition and then to turn about and 'explain' conduct with the magical aid of the name. Others have committed the opposite fallacy, assuming because names may be used ill-advisedly that therefore symbols never correspond to psychic structures; in a burst of skepticism they sometimes even conclude that there are no psychic structures of any sort. Every alleged structure is a 'fiction'. What is clearly needed is a logic for naming traits that will engender caution and yet will not paralyze psychological investigators with metaphysical misgivings. ...

The guiding theory advanced in this monograph is based upon inductive considerations drawn from the appended tabulation of all the trait-names in the English language, – all at least that are included in Webster's unabridged New International Dictionary. At various times in the past other students of personality have felt the need for such a lexicon of trait-names, and have undertaken the labor of preparing lists, but for one reason or another all these attempts were unfinished" (Allport, 1936).

Now, motivation, which is more about ‘why’ than ‘what’. For example, consider the distribution of the impact of the Big Five across the ages, Figure 13 (Big Five, p. 160). Each stage of life – youth, etc. – presents unique challenges that are met by corresponding needs – material and psychological. Those needs dictate the construction of motivation (Maslow, 1943c). Taking trait names and age appropriate motivation as basis, it then follows that personality is described through trait clusters (Cattell, 1945). These clusters then become stable structures that do morph in ‘shape’ as experience with life unfolds (Steer, 1957). With experience acknowledged as acting in concert with adapting trait clusters, it then follows that it is best to think of the human personality as a process of becoming versus attaining some state of equilibrium (Allport, 1960).

The stage is now set to address feelings and to confirm the appropriateness of Skinner’s Obstacles as well as the importance of Cattell’s unities.

Much work in psychology has become over-burdened with systems thinking forgetting to pay attention to ‘life as it is lived’ – and the same holds true for studies of feelings, the emotional reaction. Human beings are just that and not statistics to be reduced to regression models. Human beings are dynamic. Regression models are static assumptions about lives that simply do not comport in every respect with
respect to how life unfolds. “Tendencies, as McDougall (1937) insisted, remain the ‘indispensable postulates of all psychology’” (Allport, 1966). Now, feelings...

An approach to feelings is only possible by looking at the boundaries of feelings – states and traits. “The distinction between trait and state has played a central historical role in the psychology of personality. There has been a desire to distinguish between behaviors that individuals appear to perform regularly (traits) and behaviors that individuals appear to perform occasionally as a result of exposure to unusually strong external constraints or the presence of unusual physiological conditions (states). Behaviors performed with apparent regularity are judged to emanate from within individuals. Behaviors performed only occasionally are seen as being dictated by fleeting social, physiological, or environmental conditions. Thus the ‘person on the street’ has distinguished between state and trait, giving the label ‘mood’ (state) to that which appears ephemeral and due to temporary conditions and giving the label ‘trait’ to that which appears to be due to relatively permanent internal dispositions” (Allen, 1981).

**Dynamics related to the individual person:** Now, mood, the phenomenon that enables feelings. What follows is from two perspectives – the immediate time frame which is consistent with ‘individualism’ of Figure 14 (Composite Powers, p. 170), and the remote time frame which is consistent with ‘sociality’ of that Figure.

The immediate timeframe is about goals relative to ‘likes’, i.e., pro/con feelings versus goals with procrastination versus goal focus the issue. Emotional investment is necessary as a counter to the lack of focus that enables procrastination, with that investment equally necessary as a counter to over confidence when goal focus is the preferred action (Krause, 2014).

The remote timeframe is also about goals relative to ‘likes’, but, given the idea of ‘remote’, risk and uncertainty are factors that must be considered even if neither risk nor uncertainty can be identified at any point in time. At issue is the “‘divergence problem’ regarding choosing between different future possibilities” (Aoyama, 2015). Divergence begins with a closeness to a personal conception of freedom and ends with multiple goals that appear equally attractive and attainable, but goals that must be prioritized while not knowing the character of challenges that may be lurking in the future.

Attention now turns to this track’s four supporting discussions: (1) Strategic/altruistic designs to initiate progress, (2) Tactical attempts to create progress, (3) Practical route to cause progress, (4) In the absence of progress, life, the ultimate wager.

**Strategic/altruistic designs to initiate progress**

This is an overview of the dynamics of thought and free will relative to an individual’s surrounding world. Discussion will follow (1) conceptual approach to thought, (2) static representations of thought, (3) dynamic representations of thought.

**Conceptual approach to thought**

The issue here is character of challenges that may be lurking in the future with basis not necessarily in the possibility of risk or uncertainty, but in current knowledge.

“It may not be easy to say how many methods there are of thinking, especially if we count the ways that are not methods. But we may affirm that there are but two methods of getting knowledge – and indeed only one, since each of these two is partial, and needs the other for its own completion, and for the attainment of complete knowledge. For ‘knowledge’ now seems to be divided into ‘facts’ and ‘ideas’, neither of which is willing to admit the existence of the other ‘as such’, although they bear a family
resemblance. This feud arises because one of these methods founds itself upon ‘external perception’ – a contradiction in terms; the other, ‘internal perception’, or, as it prefers to call it, ‘innate ideas’ – which is begging the question, because it assumes the ‘knowledge’ to be ‘innate’ to begin with. These two methods, therefore, seem to be correlative extremes, neither of which can really do without the other, and which most in fact, consciously or unconsciously, find and use a common basis. For, indeed, when severed, and each pursued abstractly, they lead to the same substantial result, though the former only points to it – since it refuses all basis, it can have no capstone; while the latter, we may say, begins with its result, and from that seeks to deduce all the particulars of the other method, and naturally finds no end in that process; or if, as it usually does, it refuses all reality to the material basis of the other, it ends, of course, in – nothing. Idealism is too fond of abolishing facts, especially hard facts; Materialism, on the other hand, would fain return the compliment by showing thought to be ‘a mere secretion of the brain’; but, in its zealous pursuit of the ‘positive’, it finds the ‘solid’ attenuating itself and escaping from scientific grasp like a very ‘spirit” [Italics added] (Tuthill, 1879).

And, beyond the possibility of risk or uncertainty in current knowledge there lies in failed assumptions about the historicity of life – “Immanuel Kant, the eighteenth-century German philosopher, and Niels Bohr, the twentieth-century Danish physicist, both noted that driving human reason too far in the analysis of deep problems often leads to irresolvable contradictions. Kant epitomized his insight into this fundamental limitation of human reason with his aphorism ‘Out of timber so crooked as that from which man is made nothing entirely straight can be built’. And Bohr drew attention to the limits of human reason by citing what he referred to as an ‘old saying’. According to that old saying, there are two kinds of truths: one kind is an ordinary truth, which is so simple and clear that its opposite is obviously false, while the other kind is a deep truth, whose opposite is also a deep truth” (Stent, 2004).

Static representations of thought
The formation of the historicity of life as summarized by John Dewey – “The following concepts are essential to Dewey’s system: (1) Habits constitute the content of perception, thought, meaning, object, imagination, mind, and self. The genesis of impulse, desire, purpose, motive, and consciousness is through blocking or conflict among habits. Habits are dynamic, persistent, learned, selective, and purposive. (2) Character is the interpenetration of habits. The self is a complex gestalt of habits. (3) Impulse is the dynamic phase of habit. (4) Emotion is perturbation from the clash or failure of habit. (5) Motive is an impulse viewed as a constituent of habit. (6) Desire is activity surging forward to break through obstacles. (7) Thought is the mode of organic behavior in which past experience, as habit, controls the present course of behavior in fulfilling some desire or purpose. (8) Mind is a way in which organisms behave on the basis of past experience. It is not private and subjective but is known through experimental observation. (9) Consciousness is either bare immediacy or awareness of meaning, having ideas. (10) Meanings are ways of viewing things in the interests of action” (Crissman, 1942).

The survey of Dewey’s concepts is centrist and does not include the ‘micro suicides’ (Firestone, 1987) of life – effective all of the candidates for explanation of the ‘why’ of Figure 1 (Ischemia, p. 6). Beyond the presence of the candidates behind the ‘why’ there lies the “dark side of high self-esteem” (Baumeister, 1996), where self-esteem, high or low, masks over unmet psychological needs (McGlashan, 2007).

Dynamic representations of thought
The unraveling of the historicity of life is a challenge that applies equally to the current therapeutic jurisprudence and the advocated psychoanalytic jurisprudence and includes the communications of
objectives of jurisprudence, active participation of the participants, and a well-being-oriented environment.

The communications of objectives begin with listening – by all parties. Once in place then a re-education process can be conceptualized (Rahn, 1918). Next is feedback (Talen, 2008) only to be accompanied by a nurturing environment (Biglan, 2012), the critical factor.

Communications, feedback and environment could be construed as social engineering but needs to be construed as social re-engineering. The issue is the common denominator to all psychological needs – the incorporation of influences as provided by society. Hence, the references to emotional investment and accommodation in Figure 14 (Composite Powers, p. 170).

**Tactical attempts to create progress**

This is about conflict resolution with respect to each free will versus investigative sophistication and accommodation versus emotional investment. The position here is conflict is derived from alternative approached to candidate lifestyles, with a die-is-cast” awareness that fails to differentiate between the typical *if-then* construction which emphasizes ‘what’, and, a candidate *if-why-then* which allows for consideration of ‘what’: essentially circumstances (reality) versus ambiguity (pleasure). Discussion will follow (1) conceptual accommodation of life, (2) static cost of accommodation, (3) practical view of accommodation.

*Conceptual accommodation of life*

The focus here could be on Rogers’ conception of therapy that is summarized as some combination of problem solving techniques that result in behavior change. However, such a focus evades the die-is-cast awareness. The only practical option is to accept Dewey’s concept of the historicity of life as his analysis accounts for both the static and dynamic changes that are natural components of everyday living. Thus, it must be recognized in jurisprudence as well as in therapy in general, that all parties are operating from the unknown when it comes to the likely lack of comparison of life’s experiences by each party. From this it follows resistance must be expected be that resistance covert of overt, with focus then limited to “quality of life or forced, unwanted health care services” (Mayer, 2000).

*Static cost of accommodation*

This is about burnout, as “characterized by emotional exhaustion, physical fatigue, and cognitive weariness, resulting from prolonged exposure to work–related stress” (Melamed, 2006). Burnout potentially applies to all parties, but, more than likely, to the participant in the current therapeutic jurisprudence in the form of unqualified compliance.

*Practical view of accommodation*

This is about reasonableness (Nubiola, 2009) versus over-jealous approaches to change, beginning with the use of language and spanning assumptions about historicity and possible therapeutic approaches.

*Practical route to cause progress*

A centrist application of professionalism without sacrificing controversy is necessary to any good debate much of which just might be moot – individual persons do differ. Nevertheless, centrist is required to insure a starting point that can be independently critiqued as a defense against the presumption of anxiety by any person who is party to a process.

With emphasis on centrist taken as a given, application of that position needs to mimic the mature normals of Figure 4 (Everyday life, p. Error! Bookmark not defined.) with respect to each free will and
investigative sophistication while mimicking the unstable actors as depicted in that Figure with respect to each accommodation and emotional investment – hence, past experiences and expectations versus environmental stimuli.

The fundamental issue is the post-1960 environment as identified by Skinner – Early Behaviorism versus the three Obstacles of Humanistic Psychology, Psychotherapy and Cognitive Psychology. Discussion will follow (1) practical focus on centrist, (2) static conception of centrist, (3) dynamic impediment to centrist.

Practical focus on centrist
This is about "memory recovery" (McCullough, 2001) and its relation to seduction. The starting point is Krafft-Ebing’s 1886 statement – “The sudden loss of virile powers often produces melancholia, or is the cause of suicide when life without love is a blank” (p. 1111), where the reference to ‘love’ is about self-worth.

What must be accepted in any therapy situation and this applies to the therapist as well, is that with each person’s historicity there are many seductions where each amount to a declaration that that person is wrong for some reason where the reason may be practical with respect to real or punishing with respect to imagined.

A centrist focus on self-worth is so very necessary.

Static conception of centrist
This is about satisfaction of life as being a corollary to self-worth, and is another extension of Uniformity of assumptions, focus and purpose (p. 180) – the autotelic experience, or flow, with happiness a presumed objective. From the centrist perspective the issue is not happiness versus suffering as there probably no uniform definition of either happiness or suffering (Thompson, 2004) – each is a personal issue – but to accept Locke’s position as iterative throughout life, “Every step the mind takes in its progress towards knowledge makes some discovery, which is not only new, but the best, too, for the time at least” (p. 68) as the alternative to focus on happiness versus suffering. The risk in not following Locke’s lead is the enforcement of either or both repression and suppression.

Another view of satisfaction with life is having self-worth as an extension of historicity most of which is clouded over by the passage of time, the iceberg again, the tip is today while that below the water line is history which begins with today.

Freud’s specification of the unconscious was based on his early transition from neurology to psychology during which time he gathered evidence from clinical contacts with patients (Fayek, 2005). That kind of contact – psychoanalysis – is not normal to life, even in the application of jurisprudence. While it is necessary to accept Freud’s association of the unconscious with repression, the simple act of not having a reason to remember something must be recognized as a part of the reality of 86,400 seconds for each day of life.

Dynamic impediment to centrist
This is about priorities that cloud self-worth as a result. At the center of this is could be claimed the impediment radiates from recovered memories (Boag, 2006) but is in fact another extension of Uniformity of assumptions, focus and purpose. The retrieval from memory of events long past are influenced by repression alone, but, more than likely, by objectivity versus repression. There is no reason to doubt that repression was effective at the time of an event in the past while recollection in
the current timeframe is truly objective – there is nothing in psychology that justifies the invocation of doubt.

**In the absence of progress, life, the ultimate wager**

This discussion is in response to Wundt’s fear of the consequences of the divorce of psychology from philosophy. Discussion will follow (1) philosophy of knowledge, (2) philosophy and self, (3) philosophy and accommodation.

**Philosophy of knowledge**

This is about doubt versus – “For ‘knowledge’ now seems to be divided into ‘facts’ and ‘ideas’, neither of which is willing to admit the existence of the other ‘as such’, although they bear a family resemblance. Given the ‘as such’ qualification, this is either about doubt versus ‘facts’ or doubt versus ‘ideas’, which sets thinking as a hostage, that, in turn, challenges the limits of pragmatism.

“Discusses the limits of pragmatism. Pragmatic inquiries make conceptions such as thought, existence, truth and reality, relative to other terms. …Consciousness reaches the dualism of the ‘thinking principle' and 'reality' through genetic processes. It is a genetic fallacy to treat the ‘thinking principle' as valid and to deny that the other is. 'Logical reality' is, genetically, the term in which pragmatic gains are reflected. The universal and normative modes of thought do not get adequate logical justification in a theory which is based solely on the reality of concrete experiences of usefulness, workableness, and the like. There is a need to resolve the dualism of 'logical truth' and 'experienced value', in order to interpret reality” (Baldwin, 1904).

There is another side to the limits of pragmatism and that is an over-focus on precision. “The psychologist should sympathize with philosophers and metaphysicians who study the implication that points to the bonds between the individual and the universe. The misleading effects of dealing with mental phenomena in terms of the laws of physics can be seen when conclusions are to be drawn from researches. Suggests the following conclusions: (1) 'libido' should not be taken as if it were a fixed quantity, but as one manifestation of an energy (2) 'sublimation', as an outcome of individual evolution, has a strictly social meaning; the ethical motives of the acts and motives of our lives are only thoroughly studied by philosophy, and (3) human beings seem predestined, not only in a physical sense, but in a mental sense, and the indications of this in the mental field is greater than the conditions of organic evolution can readily account for” (Putnam, 1915).

To resolve the doubt debate as well as the problem of over-focus on precision, the only viable solution is to accept the uniqueness of the individual personality in tandem with the common goals of the many personalities (Todd, 1920). This idea of individuality contrasts quite sharply with the reception of Freudian thinking – libido, sublimation, etc. – in the academic world. For example, in the majority of textbooks published between 1910 and 1930, “are sympathetic with a Freudian interpretation of dreams, complexes, compulsions, repressions, and the use of the free association technique; but are critical of Freud’s emphasis on ‘libido’ and ‘unconscious mind’” (Park, 1931). Progress in resolution of the doubt debate as well as the problem of over-focus on precision has, unfortunately, been overruled by fads, fashions, and folderol in psychology – “Fads include brain-storming, Q technique, level of aspiration, forced choice, critical incidents, semantic differential, role playing, and need theory. Fashions include theorizing and theory building, criterion fixation, model building, null-hypothesis testing, and sensitivity training. Folderol includes tendencies to be fixated on theories, methods, and points of view, conducting ‘little’ studies with great precision, attaching dramatic but unnecessary trappings to experiments, grantsmanship, coin new names for old concepts, fixation on methods and apparatus, etc.” (Dunnette, 1966).
Philosophy and self

The alternative to professional theorizing as well as quasi-professional grandstanding is for an individual person to take responsibility for their own self in the form of carefully constructed chance-taking in the form of self-initiated suggestions.

“It is around the word ‘suggestion’ that laymen and even many of the medical profession, have allowed their ideas to crystallize as a complete and final interpretation of all psychotherapy. All the phenomena of psychotherapy were explained by the talismanic word ‘suggestion’, it was utilized to elucidate everything in the cure or amelioration of a psychoneurosis and yet what was meant by suggestion, what it exactly connoted was left exempt from any explanation. ...The tendency to react to suggestion has in all times and under varying social conditions been a fundamental fact in the life of mankind. This is easily understandable if one accepts the conception that in all suggestion there are two aspects which are mankind’s heritage from the time when he first appeared upon this earth, namely, on the part of the operator his narcissistic omnipotence and on the part of the subject a blind belief in the infallibility of the operator, both of which aspects are found in magic” (Coriat, 1923).

The idea of self-initiated suggestions should not be taken lightly. Personality is dynamic and as such includes iterative elements of personality called traits that both define and protect a person. Some of the traits are normal, i.e., seem to make sense, while some of the traits qualify as abnormal, i.e., in a clinical sense, with the normal-abnormal mix necessary to the longitudinal event known as life. While the abnormal may seem on the surface to be a disadvantage, suggestion just might add meaningful character to the trait in question (Prince, 1929).

One trait that is worthy of examination via suggestion is frustration. “This is an attempt to set up criteria of frustration through an analysis of its various aspects, with emphasis upon the experimental work of the past five or six years. The frustration process seems to have aspects of emotion, tension, conflict, inhibition, aggression, withdrawal, and the like, which have been examined in terms of the studies of frustration. The frustration process is delineated as consisting of a frustrating situation, a pattern of effects involving the frustrated organism, and a reactional system. The frustrating situation is analyzed in terms of barrier or obstruction, and of interference with goal-attainment and of reward-expectation. The factors of failure, change in tension, cognitive effects, and frustration-tolerance are attributed to the frustrated organism. The cultural implications of frustration are also considered in this connection. Reactions to frustration may be aggression, withdrawal, regression, resistance, anger, guilt and remorse, shame and embarrassment” (Britt, 1940).

As a continuation of an examination of frustration by suggestion is the potential to realize the boundaries of the psychological self. That a person is both knowing and wanting, and who is capable to be in a continuous state of change with respect to self, as well as an agent of change with respect to the object world (Bertocci, 1945). The alternative, to allow frustration to continue without challenge has the potential to be quite costly – suicide in kind, or, suicide in fact (Baumeister, 1990). The entire idea of suggestion, when coupled with self-persuasion, can impact both knowing and wanting thereby avoiding self-damaging alternatives (Aronson, 1999).

Philosophy and accommodation

“Sometimes the correctness of this title [Individual Psychology] has been doubted. But the opponents are entirely wrong. Particular knowledge already of this science and art can prove that our aim is to understand the individual style of life as a part of the whole. Therefore, our subject involves at the same time the understanding of the whole, the life of mankind, connected with this poor earthcrust, and the social relation with the other sex. These three ties are inseparable and every human being answers in
his individual attitude the questions growing out of these relations. These questions are inevitable. They must be established; i.e., in friendship, comradeship and social connection towards others and develop all those characteristics necessary to become a fellow man such as truth, responsibility, interest for the welfare of others and for the present and future of mankind. The second question demanded by the cosmic influence gives postulations for being useful, working, creating. As is easy to see, this question is deeply conditioned also by the social life and proves that 'useful' means useful for society. Out of the relation between the two sexes originates the third call asking for the solution of the question of love and marriage. This question is also related to the first one, connected with the facts of a social life and with a view to the future — children!" [Italics in original] (Adler, 1927).

This opens resources for resilience to consideration. The issue here is the transformation of private pain into public action with Josef Breuer’s patient ‘Anna O’, Bertha Pappenheim, the focus. “I suggest five reasons that may have accounted for Pappenheim's choices. First, although she never regretted not marrying, she did regret not having children. By forming close relationships with the children in her care and following their lives as they grew and became adults, she realized a very concrete form of spiritual motherhood. Second, these relationships provided contact yet left her free to pursue her goals in the world without guilt or hesitation. Third, avoiding close relationships may have been important in protecting the secret of her past. She was careful to hide her past as 'Anna O' from her colleagues and friends in Frankfurt. At some point, probably on a visit to Vienna in 1935, she destroyed all of her own papers for the period up to 1890. This secrecy was so important to her that Jones’s disclosure of her identity almost 20 years after her death was protested by her executor. Fourth, her relationship with Breuer was marked by an inequality of age and power in which she was decidedly in the less powerful position. Her experience of emotional dependency in this relationship may have prompted her in maturity to choose close relationships in which she had the greater experience and authority. Fifth, the trauma of being lied to about her father’s state of health, as well as his death, by both her mother and brother may have made it hard to trust and feel safe in any close emotional or sexual relationship” (Kimball, 2000).

Allowing Adler’s comments to merge with the brief overview of Anna O allows attention to be directed to optimism (Peterson, 2000). With optimism we have “The human experience of meaning in life ... as a cornerstone of well-being and a central human motivation” (Heintzelman, 2014).
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