Causal chain to apathy and/or suicide, grief counseling the initiator (Anxiety)

David H. Cook

Hills-Cook Outcomes Consulting Company

Abstract

Purpose: This discussion of the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide with grief counseling the initiator has the causal chain as an extension of loss (mourning) versus depression (melancholia), with references to protest, despair, detachment and grief the basis as set forth in the following statement: “Bowlby defines mourning as the process that ensues after separation and loss, a process that consists of three phases: protest, despair and detachment. He defines grief as the subjective experience of this process” [Italics added] (Mendelson, 1974, p.130; Bowlby, 1961).

Design/Methodology/Approach: To confront the simple either-or direction of activity in isolation that is immersed in a flurry of environmental and personal dynamics that are pivotal with respect to loss versus depression from three perspectives: (1) At the base of environmental is knowledge and experience; (2) at the base of personal is motivation; (3) at the base of the comingling of environmental and personal is the politics of medicine. To provide insight into knowledge and experience one must turn to Zeller’s reference to ‘Real’ (Zeller, 1875; Rogers, 1898). To provide insight into motivation one must turn to the idea of the wish as well as its basis (Humphrey, 1920). To provide insight into the politics of medicine one must turn to the historical basis of the shift toward a more biological orientation during and after the 1960s in the politics of medicine (Fenichel, 1945, chap. 1, pp. 3-10).

Research limitations/implications: Unpleasure being reduced to pleasure through the safe-harbor afforded by an individual’s appreciation for value and interest is the fundamental issue with grief counseling as a dangerous distraction.

Findings: The base issue has a dynamic causal chain to seduction and/or narcissism as the parent to a static causal chain to apathy and/or suicide, with seduction-apathy and narcissism-suicide the linkages.

Social implications: Included here is a concern about the character of each cognition and chance. “Every step the mind takes in its progress towards knowledge makes some discovery, which is not only new, but the best, too, for the time at least” (Locke, 1689, p. ix). Once the proverbial first of Locke’s many steps has been taken the concern then becomes the accommodation of Zeller’s ‘Real’ with respect to the four-step sequence that results when reactive and proactive are viewed as a seamless continuum, where reactive is aligned with (1) pleasure and unpleasure and (2) the realness of knowledge and experience, while proactive is aligned with (3) pragmatism and its limits and (4) traits and personality. This in turn allows a generalization about cognition to be recognized with chance resolved in-stream on the strength of items (2) and (3): “Theory is the cross-section of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should be” – (2) the realness of knowledge and experience; “practice is the realization of the idea thus gained: it is theory in action” – (3) pragmatism and its limits (Dewey, 1891).

Originality/value: This is about the rationalizations and their execution that fuel progression to the problem (Glover, 1936).

Keywords: seduction, narcissism, apathy, suicide, protest, despair, detachment, grief

Paper type: Original writing.
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Introduction

This discussion of the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide with grief counseling the initiator has the causal chain as an extension of loss (mourning) versus depression (melancholia), with references to protest, despair, detachment and grief the basis as set forth in the following statement and graphic:

“Bowlby defines mourning as the process that ensues after separation and loss, a process that consists of three phases: protest, despair and detachment. He defines grief as the subjective experience of this process” [Italics added] (Mendelson, 1974, p.130; Bowlby, 1961).

![Diagram](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

**Figure 1 – Apathy-Suicide Causal Chain**

Bowlby’s statement implies a sequential presentation – protest then despair then detachment with grief incorporated in-stream. Not so as shown in Figure 1 and its two regions, an upper and a lower. The upper region conforms to Freud’s ‘unpleasure principle’ (Freud, 1894a|1962), which includes the base relationship of Unpleasure-Pleasure-Repression (Freud, 1896a|1966) as well as his earliest position on sexual seduction, a position that was abandoned in favor of phantasy (Freud, 1896b|1962). Parallel to this period was work by Harlow Gale with seduction as a subset of experimental psychology, the psychology of advertising (Eighmey, 2007). The lower region conforms to Freud’s ‘reality principle’ (Freud, 1911|1958).

The position to be developed and as depicted in the graphic is that protest, despair and detachment co-exist but on an exclusive basis as molded by the “rigidity, insecurity and stress” (Ainsworth, L., 1958) that radiates from the original loss. The corollary to the position to be developed is the assertion that focus on depression (melancholia) is at the expense of focus on apathy, which results in the risk of visibility being diverted from apathy to suicide.
At this point one might assume that the terms ‘loss’ and ‘depression’ are synonyms even though loss has previously been associated with mourning while depression has previously been associated with melancholia. To be sure, the terms are not synonymous, nor do they behave in the same manner with respect to the causal chain as, to be developed, balance between the static ‘what’ of depression and the dynamic ‘why’ of loss is necessary where the difference is driven by the logic of depression related attitudes versus the logic of loss related beliefs. From this it follows that each representation of ‘logic of’ is a unique representation of ‘Real’ (Zeller, 1875) without regard for ‘sense’ – static versus dynamic. This ‘sense’, then, is the issue with respect to the causal chain, with static the anti-thesis to the causal chain and with dynamic the chain’s fundamental basis.

The terms ‘loss’ and ‘depression’ are not synonyms given each has a distinct historical basis with that basis accounted for in this paper’s references. The primary reference to this discussion is Sigmund Freud’s “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense” (Freud, 1894a|1962) while the secondary reference is attachment theory as crafted by John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth (Ainsworth, M., 1991).

Radiating from the first reference and into the second are the following six constructs: (1) Three methods of defence (phobias, hysterical symptoms, mixed neurosis). (2) Theory of repression (relation to reality). (3) Quota of affect (experience of feeling or emotion). (4) Cathexis (process of investment of emotional energy in the object world). (5) Principles of constancy and pleasure (tension management). (6) Working hypothesis (stigma (%) + self-esteem (%) = 100%), with affect-void apathy an acceptable substitute for self-esteem.

And, radiating from the second reference and into the first are the following six constructs: (1) The ego as defined by narcissism with support from “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (Freud, 1914|1957). (2) The superego as defined by seduction with support from “Mourning and Melancholia” (Freud, 1915c|1957) with one major departure that has seduction as the result of messages that may have a sexual basis (Cook, 2014, pp. 35-36), versus, e.g., in his 1894 essay Freud freely equated seduction with sexual activity. (3) The topographic model – conscious, preconscious, unconscious (Freud, 1900|1953, pp. 509-628; Freud, 1915b|1957). (4) The theory of instincts or drives – source, aim, object (Freud, 1905|1957; Freud, 1915a|1957; Freud, 1923|1961). (5) The structural model – id, ego, superego (Freud, 1923|1961). (6) The theory of security (without care, without anxiety) of William E. Blatz (Blatz, 1966).

Of the prior six constructs the theory of security is extensible to Freud’s “Civilization and its discontents” (Freud, 1930|1961). Specifically, …

“The question of the purpose of human life has been raised countless times; it has never yet received a satisfactory answer and perhaps does not admit of one. Some of those who have asked it have added that if it should turn out that life has no purpose, it would lose all value for them. But this threat alters nothing. It looks, on the contrary, as though one had a right to dismiss the question, for it seems to derive from the human presumptuousness, many other manifestations of which are already familiar to us. … One can hardly be wrong in concluding that the idea of life having a meaning stands and falls with the religious system, will therefore turn to the less ambitious question of what themselves show by their behaviour to be the purpose and intention of their lives. What do they demand of life and wish to achieve in it? The answer to this can hardly be in doubt. They strive after happiness; they want to become happy and to remain so. This endeavour has two sides, a positive and a negative aim. It aims, on the one hand, at an absence of pain and unpleasure, and, on the other, at the experiencing of strong feelings of pleasure. In its narrower sense the word ‘happiness’ only relates to the last. In conformity with this dichotomy in his aims, man’s activity develops in two directions, according as it seeks to realize — in the main, or even exclusively — the one or the other of these aims” (Ibid).
Freud’s positive and negative aim sets the tone for this paper from two perspectives – a static ‘what’ and a dynamic ‘why’ with grief the common initiator. The static ‘what’ has the positive aim set at the resolution of separation and loss at the stage that includes one or more of the three intermediate phases – protest, despair and detachment, with the negative aim set at the final endgame of apathy and/or suicide with suicide the least desirable. The dynamic ‘why’ has the positive aim set at the resolution of separation and loss at the intermediate endgame of seduction and/or narcissism, with the negative aim set at the final endgame of apathy and/or suicide. The static ‘what’ is about the avoidance of unpleasure while the dynamic ‘why’ is about the value of happiness on the strength of the reality principle.

Thus, Freud’s “the one or the other of these aims” implies a simple either-or direction which is not true as his “man’s activity” is not in isolation but is immersed in a flurry of environmental and personal dynamics each of which is pivotal with respect to loss versus depression from three perspectives: (1) At the base of environmental is knowledge and experience; (2) at the base of personal is motivation; (3) at the base of the comingling of environmental and personal is the politics of medicine.

To provide insight into knowledge and experience one must turn to Zeller’s reference to ‘Real’, the repository of the diametrically opposed logic of depression related attitudes and the logic of loss related beliefs. Stated simply, attitudes imply experience as do beliefs. From this it follows that experience from either attitudes or beliefs form the basis of knowledge without regard for the durability of that knowledge (Zeller, 1875; Rogers, 1898).

To provide insight into motivation one must turn to the idea of the wish as well as its basis. Staying with Freud’s “the one or the other of these aims” implies a reliance on his theory of instincts or drives, with emphasis on the emotional investment contained in the dream process (Freud, 1905|1957) and with focus on the unconscious. Alternatively, it is practical to focus only on conditioning and the resultant associations (Humphrey, 1920).

To provide insight into the politics of medicine one must turn to the opening paragraph of the DSM-I, a statement that fails to disclose the dynamics of a dated debate that continues to this day: “Previous changes of the Psychobiologic unit have been restricted by the timing of each revision. This revision is perfectly timed to include the experiences of psychiatrists of World War II, the results of several years usage by the military and Veterans Administration of a revised army nomenclature, the pattern of a new international code and the results of several years deliberation of the Nomenclature Committee of the American Psychiatric Association. As a result of all these we were enabled to offer a completely new classification in conformity with newer scientific and clinical knowledge, simpler in structure, easier to use and virtually identical with other national and international nomenclatures” (DSM-I, 1952, p. 1).

Further, “The publication of DSM-I in 1952, therefore, was a visible symbol of the transformation of American psychiatry. Unlike the Statistical Manual [the ten editions between 1918 and 1942], DSM-I elevated the significance of diagnosis. In presenting the new nosology, George N. Raines (68), chairperson of the APA Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics responsible for its publication, observed that ‘accurate diagnosis is the keystone of appropriate treatment and competent prognosis’. He was critical of the claim that individual differences precluded the use of standardized categories. ‘Sound diagnosis’, he added, ‘is possible only with a nomenclature in keeping with current concepts of psychiatric illness’. DSM-I, moreover, was ‘sufficiently flexible and inclusive to permit the introduction of new and original ideas’. …Nosologies – psychiatric or otherwise – are rarely etched permanently in stone. DSM-I, like its predecessor and successors, grew out of a specific historical context and reflected the dominance of psychodynamic and psychoanalytic concepts. The shift toward a more biological orientation during and after the 1960s [the factual fault to be addressed below] would become the occasion for renewed nosological debate and the creation of new categories. To contemporary
psychiatrists the history of nosology represents a version of the idea of progress; advances in knowledge supposedly lay the foundation for the creation of new categories that describe reality in better and more accurate terms. Within such a perspective, the history of psychiatry is moving on an upward gradient toward an ideal end. In this specific instance, the final goal is a definitive and presumably unchanging nosology of mental illnesses. To more skeptically minded historians, however, the only constant is the process of change itself. The search for a definitive nosology, therefore, may simply be an expression of the perennial human yearning for omniscience – an attribute eagerly sought by many but never yet found” [Italics in original] (Grob, 1991).

The shift toward a more biological orientation during and after the 1960s in the politics of medicine deserves special attention. “That the mind is to be explained in terms of constitution and milieu is a very old conception. What is characteristic for psychoanalysis is what it regards as biological structure, which environmental influences it recognizes as formative, and how it relates structural and environmental influences to each other. As to the biological structure, a scientific psychology first of all must posit itself within biology. Mental phenomena occur only in living organisms; mental phenomena are a special instance of life phenomena. The general laws that are valid for life phenomena are also valid for mental phenomena; special laws that are valid only for the level of mental phenomena must be added. Thus a scientific psychology investigates, as does any science, general laws. It is not satisfied with a mere description of individual psychic processes. An exact description of historical processes is it means, not its goal. Its subject is not the individual X but the comprehension of general laws governing mental functions. Besides, a scientific psychology is absolutely free of moral valuation. For it, there is no good or evil, no moral or immoral, and no what ought to be at all; for a scientific psychology, good and evil, moral and immoral, and what ought to be are products of human minds and have to be investigated as such. …Psychoanalysis maintains that there is an unconscious mental life and that it studies this unconscious. Since under the term ‘the human mind’ the conscious phenomena are usually understood, it would seem that psychoanalysis is concerned with more than just mental life. On the other hand it may be asked: is not psychoanalysis above all a psychology of neuroses, or a psychology of instincts, or a psychology of the emotional components in mental life – whereas the more intellectual components and the individual functions, such as perception, the formation of conceptions, judgment, would have to be investigated by other psychologies? These objections are not valid. The thesis that in investigating the unconscious, psychoanalysis is undertaking something that lies beyond psychic phenomena may be compared to an assertion that optics is investigating something other than the phenomena of light when it occupies itself with the wave lengths of light waves. The existence of the unconscious is an assumption that forced itself upon psychoanalytic research when it sought a scientific explanation and a comprehension of conscious phenomena. Without such an assumption the data of the conscious in their relationships remain incomprehensible; with such an assumption, that which characterizes the success of every science becomes possible: to predict the future and to exert systematic influence” [Italics in original] (Fenichel, 1945, pp. 5-7).

With the politics of medicine the container, knowledge, experience and motivation form the basis for an examination of the characteristics of the static ‘what’ of depression and the logic of related attitudes, and the dynamic ‘why’ of loss and the logic of related beliefs and is presented across seven tracks.

The first track – *History and the fault line* – develops the untold history as inherited by the DSM-I, a history that seems to have no end relative to today. The second track – *Baseline: static ‘what’ versus dynamic ‘why’* – organizes the basis of the politics of medicine; the double-down characteristic of the comingling of the politics of medicine in tandem with the politics of philosophy; and, the need for the recognition of time and uncertainty relative to the politics. The third track – *Costs and benefits of ‘what’ alone* – places emphasis on the characteristics of the static ‘what’ of depression and the logic of related
attitudes. The fourth track – *Costs and benefits of ‘why’ alone* – places emphasis on the characteristics of the dynamic ‘why’ of loss and the logic of related beliefs. The fifth track – *Costs and benefits of ‘what’ and ‘why’ taken together* – accepts the politics of medicine as a necessary debate with respect to the dynamics of living by independent persons. The sixth track – *Management of progression across the causal chain* – traverses the skills necessary to guide the causal chain to an orderly resolution of the risk of apathy and/or suicide. The seventh track – *Working hypothesis, simplified* – is a call for seriously sober thinking.

**History and the fault line**

The assumption here is that the character of each knowledge, experience and motivation on a person-by-person basis are generally constrained in the short term but do change in character over the long-term with inertia and/or change unique to each of the three. This same assumption does not apply to either attitudes or beliefs as each is quite pliable with the influence of commercial advertising – programmed seduction – a simple example. However, person-by-person is not the issue until attention turns to the three topics beginning with “costs and benefits” below. At issue here is in part about diversion from person-by-person in the form of masking and in part about the fault line which is deliberate distortions of contributions to the professional knowledge base.

**Masking:**

“Fads – those practices and concepts characterized by capaciousness and intense, but short-lived interest – included such things as brainstorming, Q technique, level of aspiration, forced choice, critical incidents, semantic differential, role playing, need theory, grids of various types, adjective checklists, two-factor theory, Theory X and Theory Y, social desirability, response sets and response styles, need hierarchies, and so on and so on.

Fashions – those manners or modes of action taking on the character of habits and enforced by social or scientific, norms defining what constitutes the ‘thing to do’—included theorizing and theory building, criterion fixation, model building, null hypothesis testing, sensitivity training, being productive at work, developing authentic relationships, devising ‘cute’ experiments, simulation, using ‘elegant’ statistics, and so on.

Finally, folderol – those practices characterized by excessive ornamentation, nonsensical and unnecessary actions, trifles and essentially useless and wasteful fiddle-faddle—includes tendencies to be fixated on theories, methods, and points of view, conducting ‘little’ studies with great precision, attaching dramatic but unnecessary trappings to experiments, asking unimportant or irrelevant questions, grantsmanship, coining new names for old concepts, fixation on methods and apparatus, seeking to ‘prove’ rather than ‘test’ theories, and myriad other methodological ceremonies conducted in the name of rigorous research” (Dunnette, 1966).

**Fault line:**

This is a logic problem – is life induced, or, is life interpreted. Now, two examples – the first is simple and has basis in interpreted, the second applies to the fault line and has basis in induced.

Simple: “One kind of paradox presents a proposition that seems self-contradictory or incompatible with generally accepted opinions. An example of that kind of paradox is the claim made by Aristarchus of Samos in the third century B.C.E. that our obviously stationary Earth rotates about our obviously moving Sun. Another kind of paradox presents two paired propositions, either of which, when considered alone, is supported by apparently sound arguments. But when the paired propositions are considered
together, they turn out to be mutually contradictory. An example of the paired proposition kind of paradox is the religious quandary to which the seventeenth-century German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1710) gave the name *theodicy*. The first of the paired propositions of the theodicy paradox asserts that God is all-powerful, righteous, and benign, whereas the second proposition asserts that the world that he created is full of evil and misery” [Italics in original] (Stent, 2004).

Complex: The lead proposition is the claim that the DSM-I was a writing that was psychoanalytically-oriented with little recognition of the biological tradition (Cooper, 2016), while the military population was based on the selection of the mainstream normal psychic through the induction process (Stouffer, 1950, chap. 13-14, pp. 486-567). The notion of mutually contradictory centers around the allure of the biological tradition. “If mental processes, including willing, were ordinary bodily functions, ...they would be ruled by the forces of determinism, and there could be no such thing as freedom of the will. But if mental phenomena were more than, or basically different from, ordinary bodily functions, ...some mental processes, especially willing, might not be governed by determinism. In that case, the will could enjoy the freedom required for the resolution of the Paradox of Moral Responsibility....Contemporary neurobiologist investigators of the human brain tend to consider freedom of the will as a pseudo-problem and its discussion as a waste of time. ...They confidently expect that recent advances in brain research will soon allow us to account for all mental processes, including willing, in terms of lawful neurobiological mechanisms” [Italics in original] (Stent, 2004).

Professional knowledge base:

With a nod to Freud’s preference to direct all effort to the development of psycho-analysis at the expense of seeking a connect point with biology, we have the focus on psychiatric genetics with the hope that major breakthroughs in psychiatric nosology will follow (Kendler, 2006). This is an extension of consensus-based research (induced) rather than clinical experience-based work (interpreted) as the basis for subsequent investigations, with consensus-based research radiating forward from Aristotle’s work with insects: "A careful, thoroughgoing evaluation of the ancient texts and archaeological evidence would contribute not only to the history of the natural sciences, entomology in particular, but even to the history of the humanities, since, for the ancient Greeks at least, science and philosophy were kindred disciplines" (Bodson, 1983). Further, ...

“It would be easy to think that the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)-5* evolved as a logical and scientific progression from *DSM-IV*. In fact, it evolved in a haphazard and politically driven manner from a century and a half of effort to get the classification of psychiatric illness right. In addition, the disappointing outcome of this entire endeavor is that, today, the field’s nosology seems even farther from ‘cutting nature at the joints’, — discerning the true illness entities locked in the brain — than in the days of Emil Kraepelin around 1900” [Italics in original] (Shorter, 2015).

Given that both the DSM-I and DSM-II have been identified as being driven by Freudian psychoanalysis and Kraepelin clinical experience, what is left is an accounting of DSM-III and DSM-IV with political prejudices already implied. In the DSM-III there is an entirely new nosology that over-trumped the alleged idiosyncratic diagnoses of psychoanalysis, such as “psychoneurosis”, with diagnoses that were consensus-based rather than clinical experience-based as in the Kraepelinian system (Ibid).

**Baseline: static ‘what’ versus dynamic ‘why’**

The character of the static ‘what’ versus the dynamic ‘why’ is suggested only by the construction of Figure 1 (p. 4). Instead, it is the dynamic imposed upon the causal chain by each member, independent
of interplay, that determines the overall character. Specifically, the reference to each the ego and superego must be taken as dynamic given persons are quite adaptive; the character of grief-oriented counseling is any guess relative to static versus dynamic as its impetus is external to the causal chain; and, the character of each of the remaining entries could easily be reasoned to be either static, dynamic or some combination of both.

Thus, the causal chain’s launch into existence is ill-defined as illustrated by the following example that is limited to two people – ‘A’ and ‘B’. ‘A’ for some reason makes known the availability of grief-oriented counseling to persons who might be contemplating suicide, or at least self-harm. This opens to question the willingness of ‘B’ to cooperate. The prognosis that ‘A’ and ‘B’ are on the “same page” is poor with evidence from two perspectives – macro and micro, and with that evidence re-enforced by the nature of the evolution of the mental health-oriented knowledgebase.

Macro: The “Need for and Receipt of Substance Use Treatment at a Specialty Facility in Past Year among Persons Aged 12 or Older”, Table 5.50A (p. 41), is among the many attributes associated with substance abuse that is exposed via the National Survey of Drug Use and Health as executed by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (NSDUH, 2018, Table 5.50A). That Table presents population-level statistics covering (1) persons identified to as needing treatment, (2) persons who did receive treatment, and (3) persons who felt no need for treatment. For the years 2016 and 2017 with data in the (000’s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>In Need of Treatment</th>
<th>Received Treatment</th>
<th>Felt No Need for Treatment</th>
<th>(%) No Need for Treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>20,959</td>
<td>2,229</td>
<td>18,730</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>20,707</td>
<td>2,530</td>
<td>18,176</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 – Need for treatment

Micro: “If patients with schizophrenia struggle with suicidal ideation prior to suicide, it appears as though they only rarely directly communicate this to their clinicians. Studies of completed suicides among schizophrenia patients both in the United States and Finland indicate that up to three quarters of schizophrenia patients who kill themselves have seen an apparently unsuspecting clinician within a week of their death. In the first two years of operation of the innovative Madison, Wisconsin Program of Assertive Community Treatment (PACT), for example, eight of ten schizophrenia patients who died by suicide saw a program clinician within 72 hours of death. Suicide may occur during an acute illness exacerbation, but the first three to six months following an inpatient stay (when post-episode depression may emerge) appears to be a particularly high-risk period for schizophrenia patients” (Fenton, 2000). Now, data that is supportive of observations. A study was executed that “aimed to investigate how recent suicidal behavior affects the risk of suicide in patients with different psychiatric diagnoses immediately after discharge. Registries with national coverage were linked to create a study cohort including all individuals discharged from psychiatric hospitals in Sweden from 1973 through 2009. Hazard ratios for discharge diagnoses were calculated. The risk of suicide within 30 days after discharge in each diagnostic category when suicidal behavior had been registered within 30 days before admission was estimated. A total of 3,695 suicides occurred after 2,883,088 discharges. If recent suicidal behavior was registered, the risk of completed suicide increased prominently in all diagnostic categories, but particularly for schizophrenia and other nonorganic psychosis. Patients suffering from depression had the highest overall risk of suicide post-discharge. This finding applied especially to male patients with depression or with reaction to crisis” (Haglund, 2019).
From these two divergent references, not only are assessments poorly received, but the level of communication is equally poor – with apathy the common element. “Apathy is not only common but is also associated with significant problems: reduced functional level, decreased response to treatment, poor illness outcome, caregiver distress, and chronicity” (van Reekum, 2005). This lack of recognition of the global character of apathy results from the intense focus on “materialistic monism” (Bleuler, 1924, pp. 3-8) which, in turn, sets the mind as an extension of biology. Further, that apathy is consistent with Freud’s Melancholia with his Mourning effectively limited to the lack of attachment by a person to their own self.

As an analyst-philosopher Freud stated – “We have found it necessary to hold aloof from biological considerations during our psycho-analytic work and to refrain from using them for heuristic purposes, so that we may not be misled in our impartial judgement of the psycho-analytic facts before us. But after we have completed our psycho-analytic work we shall have to find a point of contact with biology; and we may rightly feel glad if that contact is already assured at one important point or another” (Freud, 1913, 1915, pp. 181–182). Thus, the claim to be developed is this two-fold realization of ‘poor’ as cultivated by apathy, is re-enforced by the nature of the evolution of the mental health-oriented knowledgebase.

“[Psychology], like all other sciences, is based on premises or assumptions which it does not itself question. No matter how far back the investigation is carried this necessary dependence remains. New assumptions may take the place of old ones, but the science still rests on data which it as such cannot vouch for. Built upon these premises a more or less elaborate structure of reasoning and conclusion represents the constructive achievements of the science. There are two ways in which the science can progress. Starting with given premises we may reason forward to ever more remote and more detailed conclusions; or, returning to our starting point, we may work our way backward, questioning our original assumptions and modifying them as the result of wider investigation or in deference to discoveries in other sciences from which they are derived. The first process is in a sense the primary and normal one, but the second is a periodic necessity” [Italics added] (Powers, 1898).

This discussion of a person’s static ‘what’ versus dynamic ‘why’ is fundamental to an understanding of the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide. The thesis is that mental life is molded by a subjective interpretation of the environment. The immediate task is an examination of basis across six topics – (1) Ischemic heart disease, (2) crosscurrents of history, (3) conceptual collisions, (4) conceptual confirmations, (5) centrist thinking and (6) centrist economics.

**Ischemic heart disease**

To illustrate, the World Health Organization presents the causal chain of Ischemia as an example of dynamic health risks (WHO, 2009, pp. 1-2). The causal chain, Figure 2, includes four columns: (1) age, education, income; (2) physical activity, fat intake, overweight, alcohol, smoking; (3) Type 2 diabetes, cholesterol, blood pressure; (4) Ischemic heart disease. On a sequencing basis each column as a ‘what’ issue is accounted for by
the previous column as a ‘why’ issue – except for the second column. To state that the first column is the ‘why’ that leads to the ‘what’ of the second column is effectively declaring a person’s birth to be the cause of all problems.

Instead, a column is needed between the current first and second columns. The starting point must be a search for a common denominator to the five entries in the current second column – no easy task. Of the five Alcohol is clearly recognized as an addiction as is Smoking. However, Alcohol consumption stands alone while Smoking consumption is recognized to be comingled with air pollution (WHO, 2009, p.3). Of the remaining three – Physical Activity, Fat Intake and Overweight – neither are associated with addiction. This leaves the execution of a decision as the only logical choice versus each of the five entries, where that decision might be overt (e.g., narcissism) or covert (e.g., seduction) each of which is proactive versus the reactive character of apathy and/or suicide (Greenson, 1949). Additional comments about narcissism, seduction, apathy and suicide are deferred to the next topic, Crosscurrents of history, until after foundation material is presented.

For now, this is not about management of problematic addiction but is about highlighting the motivational trek that emerges as the problem. The fundamental issue is health psychology – the ‘why’ and not the ‘what’ – not the journey to the problem but the rationalizations and their execution that fuel progression to the problem (Glover, 1936).

**Crosscurrents of history**

Five topics are to be covered and include the (1) two outer boundaries of Figure 1 (p. 4) – reality principle and pleasure principle, and the character of pleasure versus unpleasure; (2) constructs of thought; (3) aberrations of thought to include PTSD and esteem; (4) personhood; (5) the importance of philosophy.

**Reality principle and pleasure principle, and, the character of pleasure versus unpleasure**:

This narrative is intended to serve as the outer boundary of this survey of history and is a child of Freud’s reference to “We have found it necessary to hold aloof from biological considerations during our psycho-analytic work” noted above. One might object to having Freud at center stage. However, such is fair given both the DSM-I and DSM-II were built from a psychoanalytic base as was Medical 203, the base upon which the DSM-I was designed.

The pleasure principle, or more properly the pleasure-unpleasure principle, was Freud’s starting point with respect to a neurosis in relation to normative reality. The initial objective was an accounting of neurosis which required that he accept the equilibrium of a neurosis as the attainment of pleasure and with that equilibrium as the expense of unpleasure. “The increased significance of external reality heightened the importance, too, of the sense-organs that are directed towards that external world, and of the consciousness attached to them. Consciousness now learned to comprehend sensory qualities in addition to the qualities of pleasure and unpleasure which hitherto had alone been of interest to it. A special function was instituted which had periodically to search the external world, in order that its data might be familiar already if an urgent internal need sh

Setting
grief-oriented counseling in Figure 1 (p. 4) as the dividing line between the pleasure and reality principles incorporates Freud’s intent.

The character of pleasure versus unpleasure alone allows the taking “for granted that the course of mental processes is automatically regulated by the pleasure-principle: that is to say, we believe that any given process originates in an unpleasant state of tension and thereupon determines for itself such a path that its ultimate issue coincides with a relaxation of this tension, i.e. with avoidance of pain or with production of pleasure. When we consider the psychic processes under observation in reference to such a sequence, we are introducing into our work the economic point of view. In our opinion a presentation which seeks to estimate, not only the topographical and dynamic, but also the economic element is the most complete that we can at present imagine and deserves to be distinguished by the term meta-psychological” (Freud, 1920|1955).

Thus, the reality and pleasure principles taken together maintain equilibrium with respect to the environment while the pleasure principle alone manages internal tension as depicted in Figure 1 (p. 4) by the orphaned pleasant-unpleasant-pleasant sequence that operates void of attachment to a literal dynamic.

Constructs of thought:

With psychology there are two opposing ‘ethics’ – the certainty of the biological approach and the uncertainty of tension influenced thought, effectively philosophy. The later ‘ethic’ is inductive reasoning, which is typically based on accumulated evidence with speculation allowable (Lachelier, 1876). Thus, inductive reasoning ranges from ‘facts’ (external perception) to ‘ideas’ (internal perception) (Tuthill, 1879). Further, it is assumed that ‘facts’ are oriented to the ‘what’ while ‘ideas’ are oriented to the ‘why’.

Aberrations of thought to include PTSD and esteem:

Continuing with a nod to Freud’s preference to direct all effort to psychoanalysis are PTSD and esteem as examples. With PTSD it is not only possible but common for some members of a military combat unit to experience PTSD while other members of the same unit do not. The same holds true for survivors of civilian-related trauma such as domestic violence. To attempt to craft “A one-size-fits-all diagnosis begs for a one-size-fits-all treatment but treating those with milder symptoms the same way as those who are incapacitated does justice to none” (Boone, 2011). This same one-size thinking applies to narcissism. Often taken as the negative notion of self-love, narcissism is adaptable to the negative (self-love), the positive (self-confidence), and the natural non-judgmental execution of life that allows for healthy relations between the ego and external objects (Freud, 1914|1957), with an understanding of the latter important to the understanding of the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide as depicted in Figure 1 (p. 4).

Personhood:

Joining consensus-based research rather than clinical experience-based work with a one-size-fits-all diagnosis as with PTSD says nothing about the value of a person (Cushman, 2002). Necessary to insight about the value of a person versus diagnosis is a clarification of what a person introduces to the decision-making process. Thus, two separate issues – knowledge and consciousness – each of which is necessary to a full analysis of the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide.

Personhood (knowledge):

Given the prior claim that inductive reasoning ranges from ‘facts’ (external perception) to ‘ideas’ (internal perception) the question then is where does knowledge fit.
“It may not be easy to say how many methods there are of thinking, especially if we count the ways that are not methods. But we may affirm that there are but two methods of getting knowledge — and indeed only one, since each of these two is partial, and needs the other for its own completion, and for the attainment of complete knowledge. For ‘knowledge’ now seems to be divided into ‘facts’ and ‘ideas’, neither of which is willing to admit the existence of the other ‘as such’, although they bear a family resemblance. This feud arises because one of these methods founds itself upon ‘external perception’ — a contradiction in terms; the other, upon ‘internal perception’, or, as it prefers to call it, ‘innate ideas’ — which is begging the question, because it assumes the ‘knowledge’ to be ‘innate’ to begin with. These two methods, therefore, seem to be correlative extremes, neither of which can really do without the other, and which most in fact, consciously or unconsciously, find and use a common basis. For, indeed, when severed, and each pursued abstractly, they lead to the same substantial result, though the former only points to it — since it refuses all basis, it can have no capstone; while the latter, we may say, begins with its result, and from that seeks to deduce all the particulars of the other method, and naturally finds no end in that process; or if, as it usually does, it refuses all reality to the material basis of the other, it ends, of course, in — nothing. Idealism is too fond of abolishing facts, especially hard facts, just because they are hard and gross. Materialism, on the other hand, would fain return the compliment by showing thought to be ‘a mere secretion of the brain’; but, in its zealous pursuit of the ‘positive’, it finds the ‘solid’ attenuating itself and escaping from scientific grasp like a very ‘spirit’. Shall we contemplate this deadly quarrel with Punch’s philosophy of indifferentism, or can we find a common ground in which the ‘differences’ disappear? Each of these methods takes a double direction - one of analysis, to find the infinitesimal element; the other, of synthesis, to find the Infinite All” (Tuthill, 1879).

**Personhood (consciousness):**

“The discussion of that underlying fact of consciousness, popularly known as the ‘Association of Ideas’, has usually centered in a classification of the kinds of association. The ordinary division into ‘Association by Contiguity’ and ‘Association by Similarity’ involves such misconceptions and makes such false assumptions that there is a growing tendency to reject it in favor of one more accurate and more discriminating. The most fundamental error of the ordinary classification is a sort of ‘prophecy after the event’. The connection between one object of my consciousness and a succeeding one cannot be explained by their contiguity since, as objects of any consciousness, they cannot be said to be contiguous until they have succeeded one another, that is, until the association is already a fact. In the same sense, objects of consciousness cannot be associated by their similarity, since similarity can be predicated of them only when the association is already accomplished. In fact, this classification involves either a consistent restriction of psychology to the standpoint of common realism and a restriction of association, as Dr. James says, to things not to thoughts; or it involves the baseless assumption of the Associationists and of the Herbartians, that states of consciousness are psychic entities, that they have an independent existence and may be revived. ...One important distinction has not yet been made: that between Spontaneous and Voluntary Association. ...It is the effort recall something forgotten or to discover something which we do not know. In either case, we of course know something about that which we call ‘entirely forgotten’ or ‘unknown’, else we should not be aware of our own ignorance. We know what other phenomena of consciousness are related to this which we seek, and we know something of the relation. The method of recollection is the same in both cases: simply the accentuation of the related phenomena, — and, for the rest, a blind reliance on this ultimate, unexplained fact of association, which, whether it be psychical or physical or both, we certainly do not further understand” (Calkins, 1892).
The importance of philosophy:

David Hume of the associationism school of thinking advocated protection of the development of thought taking great care in separating consensus-based research from clinical experience-based work while protecting the value of each. “In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible; but when we apply them, our fallible said uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them and fall into error. We must, therefore, in every reasoning form a new judgment, as a check or control on our first judgment or belief; and must enlarge our view to comprehend a kind of history of all the instances, wherein understanding has deceived us, compared with those, wherein its testimony was just and true. Our reason must be considered as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect; but such-a-one as by the irruption of other causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental powers, may frequently be prevented. By this means all knowledge degenerates into probability; and this probability is greater or less, according to our experience of the veracity or deceitfulness of our understanding, and according to the simplicity or intricacy of the question” (Hume, 1789|1888, p. 180).

Wilhelm Wundt in his 1913 essay entitled Psychology’s Struggle for Existence anticipated the problems that Hume warned of. “In his foreword to that essay, Wundt wrote: ‘Paging through the first section of this work, one might be inclined to view it as a provocation. But one who decides to read through to the end will be convinced that, on the contrary, the work could well be regarded as a peace offering. In the opinion of some, philosophy and psychology should divorce from each other. Now, it is well known that when a married couple seeks a divorce, both members usually are at fault. In these pages it will be shown that the same is true in this instance, and that if this matter takes the course that both parties want, philosophy will lose more than it will gain, but psychology will be damaged the most. Hence, the argument over the question of whether or not psychology is or is not a philosophical science is, for psychology, a struggle for its very existence’” (Wundt, 1913|2013). Wundt’s call for protection of the psychology/philosophy linkage was reflective of the human as a thinking ‘animal’, where the fundamental focus of thinking overshadows inductive reasoning with respect to experience versus the immediate invocation of life.

Conceptual collisions

In a remarkable turn of events, the joining of consensus-based research with clinical experience-based work was achieved with the DSM-I, and that joining included full recognition of the expression of personhood through knowledge and consciousness, and, through the incorporation of Freud’s and Kraepelin’s contributions (Cooper, 2016).

Unfortunately, with the pursuit of omniscience (Grob, 1991) collateral damage is the risk as was the case with the transition from the military “Medical 203” to the DSM-I with the issues now cited to include population inertia, response creep, relative indifference, psychopathology and sociopathy.

Population inertia:

Insight into population inertia is due to the four-volume Studies in Social Psychology in World War II – Vol. 1, The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life; Vol. 2, The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath; Vol. 3, Experiments on Mass Communication; and, Vol. 4, Measurement and Prediction. The Forward to Vol. 1 begins with “These volumes are the end product of the four-year activity of the Research Branch, Information and Education Division, United States Army. They provide a record of the American soldier in World War II and of the techniques developed to study these attitudes. It is a record in many ways unique. Never before had modern methods of social science been employed on so large a scale, by such competent technicians. Its value to the social scientist may be as great as its value to the military for whom the original research was done” (Stouffer, 1950a, p. vii).
"Stouffer and a distinguished team of social scientists working for the War Department surveyed over a half million American soldiers during World War II using interviews, over two hundred questionnaires, and other techniques to determine their attitudes on everything from racial integration to their officers’ performance. Their answers, almost always complex and often also counterintuitive, reveal individuals both defining and defined by their society and their primary groups. ...Additionally, it was Stouffer and his colleagues who during their research for The American Soldier developed the important sociological concept of 'relative deprivation', which roughly stated is the idea that one determines his status based on comparison with others" (Ryan, 2010).

“Relative deprivation” is then the measure of an attitude as driven by a person’s actual, imagined or implied presence of thoughts, feelings and behaviors, relative to a peer group of convenience. This “relative deprivation” alone accounts for the poor prognosis implied by the center track of Figure 1 (p. 4) – grief-despair-depression, as well as the observation that “If patients with schizophrenia struggle with suicidal ideation prior to suicide, it appears as though they only rarely directly communicate this to their clinicians” (Fenton, 2000), from which follows the two outer tracks – protest and detachment – have basis. The relative deprivation in a society is quantifiable with density functions (Yitzhaki, 1979), with the associated integral calculus beyond the scope of this writing.

Response creep:

There are two issues here.

First, “one of the objectives of social sciences is to develop techniques for prediction which will enable the user to predict more efficiently if these techniques did not exist. By more efficient we mean that the percentage of correct predictions is higher, on the average, than would otherwise be obtained for the same expenditure of effort. ...Thus, we have illustrated a central problem of prediction in social science – namely, the difficulties when making predictions when the behavior to be predicted (in this case, actually, the behavior of psychiatrists with respect to the individual tested) is itself unstandardized and subject to great variation” (Stouffer, 1950d, pp. 473-477).

Second, “The theory of screening test is not particularly new, they are merely devices for cutting off a portion of a population in such a way that it contains a disproportionate number of some subpopulation to be detected. ...In general, screening tests have either striven for criterion-exclusive or criterion-inclusive screening as shown in Figure 3. In the case of criterion-exclusive screening the goal is to select a group all of whom have the desired characteristic without necessarily including within that group all who have that trait. ...On the other hand, criterion-inclusive screening strives to include within the selected group all persons who have the desired characteristic even though not all persons in the group will have that characteristic” (Stouffer, 1950d, pp. 486-489). Thus, criterion-inclusive will capture the inclusive and the exclusive populations.
Relative indifference:
This is about measures of intensity where the plotted data takes the shape of either a ‘J’ or a ‘U’. The results in data across the lower region of the curve displays indifference that is relative to the left and right clusters of data. Such measures of intensity are typically related to attitude (Stouffer, 1950d, pp. 41 & 43).

Psychopathology:
The pursuit of omniscience as evidenced by the politically fueled “many lives” of the DSM has solved nothing, and, work (research) that fails to address population inertia, response creep and/or relative indifference only contributes to the problem. What is needed is a reference point that allows for a compare and contrast of psychopathy versus its absence – such is now the task.

The necessary reference point is provided by Freud in “Mourning and Melancholy” – “If the love for the object — a love which cannot be given up though the object itself is given up — takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering. The self-tormenting in melancholia, which is without doubt enjoyable, signifies, just like the corresponding phenomenon in obsessional neurosis, a satisfaction of trends of sadism and hate which relate to an object, and which have been turned round upon the subject's own self in the ways we have been discussing. In both disorders the patients usually still succeed, by the circuitous path of self-punishment, in taking revenge on the original object and in tormenting their loved one through their illness, having resorted to it in order to avoid the need to express their hostility to him openly. After all, the person who has occasioned the patient's emotional disorder, and on whom his illness is centred, is usually to be found in his immediate environment. The melancholic’s erotic cathexis in regard to his object has thus undergone a double vicissitude: part of it has regressed to identification, but the other part, under the influence of the conflict due to ambivalence, has been carried back to the stage of sadism, which is nearer to that conflict. It is this sadism alone that solves the riddle of the tendency to suicide which makes melancholia so interesting — and so dangerous. So immense is the ego's self-love, which we have come to recognize as the primal state from which instinctual life proceeds, and so vast is the amount of narcissistic libido which we see liberated in the fear that emerges at a threat to life, that we cannot conceive how that ego can consent to its own destruction. We have long known, it is true, that no neurotic harbours thoughts of suicide which he has not turned back upon himself from murderous impulses against others, but we have never been able to explain what interplay of forces can carry such a purpose through to execution. The analysis of melancholia now shows that the ego can kill itself only if, owing to the return of the object-cathexis, it can treat itself as an object — if it is able to direct against itself the hostility which relates to an object and which represents the ego's original reaction to objects in the external world. Thus, in regression from narcissistic object-choice the object has, it is true, been got rid of, but it has nevertheless proved more powerful than the ego itself. In the two opposed situations of being most intensely in love and of suicide the ego is overwhelmed by the object, though in totally different ways” [italics added] (Freud, 1915|1957).

Attachment theory as crafted by John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth (Ainsworth, M., 1991) is accounted for in the above, with – “So immense is the ego's self-love, which we have come to recognize as the primal state from which instinctual life proceeds, and so vast is the amount of narcissistic libido which we see liberated in the fear that emerges at a threat to life, that we cannot conceive how that ego can consent to its own destruction”. But this reference is not enough. To be able to move on and allow discussion to settle on population inertia, response creep and relative indifference – jointly – the character of seduction must first be addressed. Once done then population inertia, response creep and
relative indifference form the basis of psychopathology with respect to the *sadism alone that solves the riddle of the tendency to suicide* – the causal chain.

With seduction Freud's position from literally 'day one' was a person’s focus on their sexual life. The unconditional claim is his discussion “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (Freud, 1894a|1962) that sets the stage for all future work, and alone, “*solves the riddle of the tendency to suicide*” provided seduction is reframed from an act to an influence: “Employing seduction as an influence is accomplished by disconnecting seduction from a physical act, Freud’s construction, and connecting it to a voice. A very reasonable example – a small child has an accident during potty training, which is followed by their frustrated parent’s you-ought-to-be-a-shamed-of-yourself admonishment” (Cook, 2014, pp. 35-36). Specifically, ...“The recent publicized attention to Freud's abandonment of the seduction trauma theory to account for neurogenesis has led to considerable re-examination of numerous interrelated psychoanalytic issues. Freud's complemental series principle serves to reconcile the apparent polarities: memory and fantasy, early experience and libidinal fixations, historical truth and psychic reality, and interpersonal and intrapsychic representations. ...Transformations of meaning occur in reconstructive work during the course of a psychoanalysis itself. They also occur during individual development, as the child's mental capacities grow in more complex and diverse directions. Both processes enable the attribution of multiple and complex meanings to even the most overwhelming reality, limited as it may have been at the original moment to permitting only simpliform interpretation. Indeed, the remembered reality of seductions may exercise a seductive power in the direction of resistance to other issues. Then again, a fantasy linked to early trauma may serve as a screen memory [[Freud, 1899|1962]], regressively defending against danger situations of a somewhat later period in childhood, as well as serving other screen functions of compromise formations. Masson was not right in claiming that Freud was never completely comfortable in giving up the seduction theory. But he was right in sensing Freud's everlasting appreciation of the historical truth value of early trauma no matter what its later elaborations in the representational world of the mind. *Freud simply had not come to the point of integrating conceptually all of the various currents of experience influencing the development of psychic reality*. That was to be the task of all of his followers, not just those in the so-called 'avant garde'. It does make a difference if something really happened or not, especially insofar as traumatic overstimulation makes its indelible imprint on the course of fantasies as powerfully motivating forces in the personality' [italics added] (Gediman, 1991).

Thus, seduction as a dated ‘voice’ alone accounts for the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide. The task now is to strengthen the foundation that supports the dated ‘voice’ by returning to Freud's "The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence", particularly the editorial commentary by James Strachey in the form of "Appendix: The emergence of Freud’s fundamental hypotheses" (Freud, 1894b|1962).

**Sociopathy:**

While a sociopath can be defined as a person who is overtly manipulative, such a person as referenced here is manipulative only in a covert sense with respect to the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence. Thus, in line with Freud’s “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense”, is some combination of the following six defense-oriented constructs: (1) Overt behavior in the form of phobias, hysterical symptoms and/or mixed neurosis. (2) Covert relation to reality on the strength of repression. (3) Guarded experiencing of feeling or emotion. (4) Guarded process of investment of emotional energy in the object world. (5) Tension management driven by less common principles of constancy and pleasure. (6) The lack of a covert working hypothesis with respect to stigma versus self-esteem. This leaves an accounting of affect-void apathy versus self-esteem.
Security is regarded as the common element in each affect-void apathy and self-esteem where security is accepted as necessary to the Bowlby-Ainsworth attachment theory thus negating any precondition to a person’s age – youth versus adult – with security understood to be without care, without anxiety as hypothesized by Amariah Brigham, and fully transparent with respect to loss versus depression.

Amariah Brigham (1798-1849) was an American psychiatrist and, in 1844, one the founding members of the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane, which eventually became the American Psychiatric Association. While serving as the first director of the Utica Psychiatric Center, Brigham launched and became the first editor of the Association's official journal, The American Journal of Insanity now The American Journal of Psychiatry (Harms, 1973, p. v). Brigham’s core position was that balance in life between work and play was the antidote to psychosomatic disorders (Brigham, 1833, p. 92-101). Brigham makes his point about balance in life with a table that lists 286 persons – “Exhibiting the age attained by some of the most distinguished literary persons in ancient and modern times”, e.g., Shakespeare who died at age 51 and Hippocrates who died at age 109 (Brigham, 1833, p. 123-130).

Security in the absence of care and anxiety satisfies Brigham’s core position of balance in life as key to the achievement of ‘independent’ as shown in Figure 4. From this Figure it follows that Freud’s original specifications of ‘rationalization’, ‘compensation’ and ‘sublimation’ are key to the crafting of a contra-causal chain with respect to apathy and/or suicide, with emphasis on affect-void apathy at the expense of self-esteem if that is what it takes to defeat thoughts of suicide with emphasis on the above six defense-oriented constructs.

This is a practical approach given evidence gleaned from failed attempts at suicide: “The objective of a study covering 69 patients in India was to find out whether those who attempted suicide and recovered “perceived if their suicide attempt could have been prevented, to include the degree of intent of the attempt, warning signs, and the risk factors. Of the study participants, 57% of attempters were females and 39% were between 21 and 30 years of age, 30% were between 10 and 20 years of age, and 23% were > 40 years of age. There were 57% from a rural area, and 83% were from nuclear families. For the 62 patients who provided more detailed information, 48% expressed medium intent, 24% expressed high intent, and 27% expressed low intent. Most had no premeditation (61%), i.e., their attempt was an impulsive act, and 29% contemplated suicide for > 3 hours prior to the attempt. The primary purpose of the attempt for 48% was to escape or surcease or solve their problems; 37% wanted to manipulate or get attention or revenge through the attempt. After the attempt, 74%, felt sorry or were ashamed in reaction to their attempt, and 8% had regrets in the failure of attempt. Intent was high in 53% in the presence of stressful events, with significant association between stressful events in the last 6 months.
A significant association was observed between talking about feeling empty, hopeless, or having no reason to live and degree of intent: high intent was seen in 37%. Association was also observed between talking about feeling trapped or feeling that there are no solutions and degree of intent: intent was high 37%. Stressful events from the past were present in 78%, psychiatric illness was present in 70%, history of substance abuse was seen in 34%, history of family violence including physical and sexual abuse was present in 23%, and previous attempts and family history of attempt or completed suicide were present in 13% and 6%, respectively” (Sharma, 2019).

From this data it follows that each ‘substitution’, ‘rationalization’, ‘compensation’ and ‘sublimation’ must be confronted to achieve the notion of ‘independent’ of Figure 4 (p. 19) as that data is in line with two prior references: (1) “If patients with schizophrenia struggle with suicidal ideation prior to suicide, it appears as though they only rarely directly communicate this to their clinicians” (Fenton, 2000). (2) “A total of 3,695 suicides occurred after 2,883,088 discharges. If recent suicidal behavior was registered, the risk of completed suicide increased prominently in all diagnostic categories, but particularly for schizophrenia and other nonorganic psychosis. Patients suffering from depression had the highest overall risk of suicide post-discharge. This finding applied especially to male patients with depression or with reaction to crisis” (Haglund, 2019). To this end Blatz provides four elementary objectives each of which is observable in a systematic sense as suggested by the data in Table 1 (p. 10): Companionship versus ‘substitution’, Logic versus ‘rationalization’, Hobbies versus ‘compensation’ and Sports versus ‘sublimation’ (Blatz, 1944, p.171).

Conceptual confirmations

The starting point is the state of the intellectual world in 1880, the year before Freud finished his studies in medicine at the University of Vienna. The comments that follow are from a discussion on October 15, 1880 at the Moral Sciences Club, at the rooms of Mr. James Ward, M. A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University, England.

"Many admirable works have been written purporting to furnish analyses of mind; but almost all of them, in common with other works on psychology, proceed at once to the examination of special facts, such as Sensations, their authors apparently considering it unnecessary to discuss at any length the relation of the several elements of mind to each other. While cognitions are under discussion, emotions are out of view, and volitions in their turn are treated regardless of both; so that though the special analyses and descriptions are excellent, the tout ensemble of mind is never exhibited at all: we lose sight of the wood among the trees. The reason of this is not far to seek. First, in most states of mind as we know them some one aspect or element is prominent, the rest being obscure or of secondary interest. Hence, in common language, and very generally in psychology too, these obvious and obtrusive differences between one state and another have been regarded as concrete mental states, instead of being in reality only abstractions. 'The mind can seldom operate exclusively in one of these three modes', says Mr. Bain, referring to his own 'classification of mind'. 'A feeling is apt to be accompanied more or less by will and by thought'. Sir W. Hamilton is even more explicit: 'In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings, and conations', he says, 'it is not to be supposed that these phenomena are possible independently of each other. In our philosophical systems, they may stand separately from each other in books and chapters; in nature they are ever interwoven'. But neither of these writers can be said to have given any orderly exposition of nature's weaving. Secondly, the reference of these apparently distinct facts to distinct faculties diverted attention still more from their common connections. And, lastly, the obscurity of the term consciousness rendered any attempt at a general analysis of mind almost hopeless. For consciousness seemed at one time something outside those obvious facts of mind which the psychologist could describe; at another those facts seemed themselves the sum total of consciousness. Thus, to Reid it was a special faculty, while according to James Mill it was but a 'generical
mark ... under which all the names of the subordinate classes of the feelings of a sentient creature are included'. Neither signification was likely to turn psychologists from the accepted classifications of the salient facts of mind to a careful analysis of mind as a whole. Hamilton did indeed attempt an analysis of consciousness as 'the universal phenomenon of mind'; and so far with good results that, whereas James Mill and Bain barely mention the important fact of attention, Hamilton devotes a couple of lectures to it. Still, such is the vague and equivocal character of that word Consciousness that Hamilton's venture was in the main a disastrous one. We shall do well, therefore, to profit by his misfortune, and avoid the term while essaying in like manner to make a general analysis of mind” (Ward, 1882).

Compartmentalization of the mind, while satisfactory for books and chapters, and for a large part the cognitive psychology of this era, lends to sequencing of mental processes where the sequencing just might not be true – rains typically do not cause fires (Touborg, 2017). An example of the sequencing of rains versus fires lies in addiction neuroscience where the risk of unintended consequences lies in many iterations of its specification, e.g., “Promoting a brain disease concept is grounded in beneficent and utilitarian thinking: the language makes room for individuals living with addiction to receive the same level of compassion and access to healthcare services as individuals living with other medical diseases, and promotes enlightened social and legal policies. However such claims may yield unintended consequences by fostering discrimination commonly associated with pathology. Specifically, the language of neuroscience used to describe addiction may reduce attitudes such as blame and responsibility while inadvertently identifying addicted persons as neurobiological others” [Italics in original] (Buchman, 2011).

This reference to addiction neuroscience opens to discussion the base issue of ‘what’ versus ‘why’ – functional psychology with its focus on mental operations versus structural psychology with its focus on mental elements, with functional psychology a close cousin to philosophy and ‘why’, and structural psychology a close cousin to biology and ‘what’ (Angell, 1903). This distinction in turn justifies focus being set on metaphysics, the branch of philosophy that examines the fundamental nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, between substance and attribute, and between possibility and actuality: “…if any one feels tempted to maintain that philosophic speculation is a camp of refuge for those who, in consequence of temperamental limitations and infantile fixations which ought to be overcome, draw back from the more robust study of emotional repressions on scientific lines, I should admit that the allegation contains an element of truth. But in spite of this, and in spite of the fact that there is some truth also in the statement that the effects good and bad of emotional repression make themselves felt, as a partial influence, in all the highest reaches of human endeavor, including art, literature, and religion; in spite of these partial truths, philosophy and metaphysics are the only means through which the essential nature of many tendencies can be studied of which psychoanalysis describes only the transformations” (Putnam, 1915), the lifeblood of which is the forever subjective phenomena known as experience (Colvin, 1907).

Centrist thinking

The fundamental difficulty with crafting the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide is a proper and complete accounting of risk and uncertainty. Issues to be addressed include pragmatism and its limits, traits and personality, realness of knowledge and experience, and, pleasure and unpleasure.

Pragmatism and its limits:

“Broadly speaking, enquiries are pragmatic which, with more or less thoroughness, make such conceptions as thought, existence, truth, reality, etc., relative to other terms in a movement, development, or evolution; relative to antecedents, consequences, modes of function, ends. All such determinations are not only ends reached in a movement, but also means to ends yet to be reached;
and all of them, considered thus functionally, as terms of genetic organization, in so far forbid definition in a static, absolute, once-for-all-fixed system. ... The problem therefore of philosophy – as it arises from the discussion of the demands of pragmatism – is no longer that of the reconciliation of two logical categories, being and becoming, identity and diversity, teleology and mechanism, thought and reality; it is, on the contrary, that of the reconciliation of two opposed schemes of evaluation of experience in general, that of logical systematization and that of practical manipulation, each, by the very terms of their relation claiming to be valid. It is possible that there may be no reconciliation; but the consistent development of personality as a whole by the activities in which these two evaluations arise, would lead us to expect that they reveal modes rather than diverse kinds of reality, and that there is some possible experience which, while enriched by this contrast, is not torn asunder by it” [Italics in original] (Baldwin, 1904). From this, for centrist thinking to be valid it must reflect currency versus a historical accounting if risk and/or uncertainty are to be addressed. This brings to the fore the raw basis of personality, traits.

Traits and personality:
A trait of personality is in part historical, is in part in the now, and is in part in the future. Thus, “1. Has more than nominal existence. 2. Is more generalized than a habit. 3. Is dynamic, or at least determinative, in behavior. 4. May be established empirically. 5. Is only relatively independent of other traits. 6. Is not synonymous with moral or social judgment. 7. May be viewed either in the light of the personality which contains it, or in the light of its distribution in the population at large. 8. Acts, and even habits, that are inconsistent with a trait are not proof of the nonexistence of the trait” (Allport, 1966).

Given the lack of concreteness of a trait, which in turn reinforces risk and uncertainty, it is fair to wonder about the realness of knowledge and experience. “The 'ontologically' 'Real' is simply that which satisfies the logical or theoretical interest. The 'practically' 'Real' is that which satisfies the postulates of ethics and social life, whose worth system is entered into by activity rather than by thought; it is but another resort to a single mode. Our method on the contrary is the comparative one; it aims to find out why there are all these 'Real' modes each doing its own work and setting up its postulate. What do they signify? Does experience itself reach any adjustment of them? What does this scheme of 'realities' mean – this relativity of 'Real' – each of which so clearly stultifies itself by calling itself 'absolute'? Our conclusion is that each of them, despite its pretentions, belongs to a mode of developing experience; each has its instrumental role. But this allows us, also, to find the way that experience itself universalizes its partial and instrumental interests in a mode that imaginatively unifies the realities of its knowledge, its will, and its self-feeling in a more modest but more significant 'absolute'. Allowing each mode of psychic function its chance to make out what 'Real' it can in its own way, we find that the aesthetic mode of realizing gets the only meaning that can be called in any intelligible sense absolute. The word 'realize' as popularly used, indeed, suggests a more adequate experience than the 'finding Real' by logical proof, or the 'assuming Real' of practical life” (Baldwin, 1908). Now, to go one step further into this idea of centrist thinking by acknowledging the role of social forces in the pursuit of risk and uncertainty. In the main, social forces are additive with respect to the participants at any given time. This does not mean that knowledge and experience of the various persons will blend. “It is inconceivable, therefore, how conscious states can serve as stimuli; for all conscious states are but imperfect, subjective representations of stimuli in the objective world. The customary usage thus involves one in a vicious circle. In group relations, therefore, explanations must hark back to stimulus, disposition, and response instead of halting upon the plane of 'mental interaction', 'suggestion', 'social consciousness' and the like” (Kenagy, 1917).
Realness of knowledge and experience:

The realness of knowledge and experience is equally extensible to emotions, logic and doubt. While emotions are ‘Real’, the question is what kind of ‘Real’ are they – socially induced, biologically induced, or both (Barrett, 2012). The same concern applies to logic (Ormond, 1897) as well as doubt (Knapp, 1890) as each foster’s incessant speculation and hesitancy, numberless petty acts and an inability to perform the necessary duties of life. However, the true challenge to knowledge and experience is delivered by ambivalence (Koch, 1987), that which may lead to nowhere, to apathy as a manageable outcome (Greenson, 1949), or to suicide as the least desired result.

Pleasure and unpleasure:

Each pleasure and unpleasure are subjective happenings with respect to value and interest with pleasure a defensive reaction to unpleasure as depicted in Figure 1 (p. 4). Value will be dealt with first then interest with respect to motive as set forth by Blatz’s four elementary objectives – Companionship versus ‘substitution’, Logic versus ‘rationalization’, Hobbies versus ‘compensation’ and Sports versus ‘sublimation’ – each of which are applicable to protest, despair and detachment of Figure 1. At issue here are two ideas with grief counseling the fundamental contributor as depicted in Figure 1: “The treating of a name as excluding from the fact named what the name’s definition fails positively to include, is what I call ‘vicious intellectualism’” [Italics in original] (James, 1906, p. 60). (2) “intelligence is a slippery customer” (Langers, 1942, p. 86).

Value, according to Professor Wilbur M. Urban, is “a cursory examination of the more general terms of worth description, good and bad, useful and useless, beautiful and ugly, noble and ignoble, etc., or indeed the terms worth and worthless, valuable and valueless themselves, and the manner in which they are applied, makes us immediately aware of the fact that for the unreflective worth consciousness they are at first tertiary qualities as much a part of the object as the so-called primary and secondary qualities are parts of the physical object of cognition” (Urban, 1907a).

Urban’s opening statement sets in place a dynamic in static terms. Now the qualifications that are so necessary to an appreciation of the underlying dynamics of protest, despair and detachment that must be accounted for if any progress is expected against the causal chain – grief counseling is not the answer. “The material is now before us for a summary restatement of our original definition of value, as funded affective-volitional meaning, in terms of psychological equivalents. The psychological equivalent of the worth predicate is always a feeling, with certain meanings determined by actual cognitive presuppositions, types of cognitive reaction which actualize pre-existent conative dispositions. The value or funded meaning of the object is its capacity of becoming the object of feeling and desire through actualization of dispositional tendencies by acts of judgment, assumption, etc. The conative disposition is the fundamental determinant of the feeling of value or appreciative meaning of the object but the disposition may be actualized, represented in function by different cognitive attitudes, or acts, of the types described, and according as it is one or the other of these types are the feelings qualified in the manner described. All ‘disposition feelings’ however actualized, are feelings of value because they represent the funded meaning of affective-volitional process, although they have different reality meanings. From the standpoint of the extension of the term, the class, feelings of value, includes aesthetic feelings, feelings of the imagination, so called, as well as practical and ethical attitudes” (Ibid).

Emphasis on Urban’s assessment of the dynamics of value now follows in the form of an analytical question-answer format.

The question: “The analyses of the preceding paper have led to a demarcation of that type or class of meanings which are described as worths or values. ...Beginning with the preliminary definition of worth as the affective-volitional meaning of the object for the subject, we advanced by successive stages of
analysis to the more specific statement that the worth experience is always a feeling attitude which presupposes the actualization of some conative disposition by acts of presumption, judgment or assumption (implicit and explicit). This definition obviously involves a certain theory of the nature of feeling and of its relation to conation (desire and volition). For one thing, the broader use of the term feeling involves a relative distinction between feeling attitude and affective tone of sensation, a distinction which has in fact been insisted upon, and it also leads to the view that feeling, as worth feeling, has appreciative distinctions not found in passive affection. To this theory, of the nature of feeling, and the more abstract psychological analyses which it involves, we must turn our attention later; for the present (and indeed as a necessary preliminary of this later study) our problem is the further development of the appreciative distinctions of feeling. ...A. In concluding this study we may with advantage return to a consideration of that preliminary definition of worth and worth predicates from which this entire analysis took its start. This analysis, it will be seen, has given content to that definition. ...In general, we found worth or value to be the funded affective-volitional meaning of the object for the subject. That funded meaning, expressed in terms of the worth predicates, goodness, utility, beauty, obligation, desert, etc., represents the desirability of the object (although not necessarily the fact of actual desire). The funded meaning is acquired through actualization of conative dispositions by acts of presumption, judgment and assumption, and this actualization results in feeling which undergoes certain modifications, with change in presuppositions, and with repetition. ...B. But worth predication has a quantitative as well as qualitative side. Worth judgments express the degree of preferability of one object over another (as well as degrees of preferability of amounts of the same object). We are thus led to the problem of the measurement of the worth or funded meaning of objects. At this point several questions arise. Is worth or value, as we have conceived it, an object [time], a function [uncertainty], to which the concepts of quantity and measurement can be applied?” (Urban, 1907b).

The answer: “The question whether worth, or funded meaning of an object as we have defined it, is susceptible of measurement is reduced, then, to the still more fundamental question whether the psychological determinants of that meaning are objects of measurement. Into the acquired, funded meaning of an object enters various elements presupposing various processes and attitudes. If these can be analyzed out and their contributions to the total worth of the object determined, such measurement is possible. On the view which we have rejected – that degree of worth is to be equated with degree of intensity of pleasantness-unpleasantness (or as sometimes formulated, with a function of intensity and duration) – the problem is, at least theoretically, simple. The laws of habit, satiety, contrast, etc., for sensation feelings might be applied directly to feelings of value. ...But such a procedure is impossible after our analysis. The psychological determinants are for us more complex. Having defined feelings of value as feelings presupposing dispositions actualized by presumption, judgment and assumption, our problem is the determination of the capacity of the object, as presumed, judged or assumed to exist, to call out feelings of value. Since the worth of the object is a function of the capacity of the subject for feeling, as determined by these preceding processes of accommodation in judgment and assumption, we must inquire into the effect of these processes upon the dispositions presupposed. The analysis and formulation of these factors constitute the laws of valuation. Such laws are capable of determination, and when determined they enable us to explain the empirical laws of 'more and less' already described” (Ibid).

Now interest...

Interest, according to Felix Arnold, is an examination of the implied resilience of the underlying felt-attitude that is at the base of the pleasure-unpleasure duet: “In psychology interest seems to be, in certain respects, like charity, and in pedagogy, too, 'in never faileth’. What makes it useless, however, in many discussions, is the loose and varied manner in which the subject is treated. Whether the
discussion is dealing with instincts, impulses, feelings, attention, will, the term interest seems broad enough to cover them all. In pedagogy we have the most beautiful examples of argument in a circle due to similar misconceptions of the situation which has in it interest. ‘Get attention by making things interesting’. So at least we are told. And what is interest? Why, attention; and the formula now resolves itself into the tautology, ‘Get attention by making the children attentive’ (Arnold, 1906a).

Now, the felt-attitude of pleasure-unpleasure: “Any object not interesting in itself may become interesting through becoming associated with an object in which an interest already exists. The two associated objects grow, as it were, together; the interesting portion sheds its quality over the whole; and thus things not interesting in their own right borrow an interest which becomes as real and as strong as that of any natively interesting thing” (Ibid).

It is seen from the above that interest is most generally considered as a feeling and that it is closely connected in some manner with attention. In this section I shall try definitely to establish the relation between interest and feeling, between interest and attention, and to show wherein interest itself consists. ...First of all, is interest nothing more than a feeling of pleasure-pain? To make interest a feeling of this kind would be to establish an identity between interest and pleasure-pain. If this were so, then pleasure roused by an object would be interest in such object, and interest in it would likewise be pleasure in it, to take the positive aspect of the case. ...The outline as thus given is suggestive only and by no means complete. I wish solely to emphasize the importance of the process of imitation in the formation of interest, and the necessity of the right kind of 'copy' set. ...It is to be noted that such copy set may appeal to an already developed interest of curiosity but is of little value unless the actual process is attempted by the self-concerned. The interest to be developed is not the interest of curiosity, the interest of the idle who like to 'nose' around, but rather an interest in some creative control. The interest of curiosity is an elementary stage which should lead to more active expression. ...It is generally understood that habit deadens interest, that conscious meaning becomes less and less as the process becomes more and more automatic. Habit no less than instinct is more or less mechanical and as such is not interest. ...The laws above given deal with the development of an interest or system of interests; they are not the result of an interest or system of interests which is appealed to, but they are principles which govern the acquiring of interests. Once these interests are on a fair way of development, any appeal to them will be for the purpose of their further expansion and development and can be roused only by connecting with them in some manner the situation or some aspect of the situation in hand” (Arnold, 1906b).

Centrist economics

Two tasks remain to close out this discussion of the static ‘what’ versus the dynamic ‘why’: First, the prior references to ‘Centrist thinking’ – pragmatism and its limits, traits and personality, realness of knowledge and experience, and, pleasure and unpleasure – will now be addressed from the perspective of economics. Second, an alignment of risk and uncertainty with the underly attributes of interest versus value as implied in the four ‘Centrist thinking’ topics (p. 21).

The superset of what follows is the transition from unpleasure to pleasure (of Figure 1 (p. 4)) to the extent necessary to fully accommodate a successful defense (against the presumed despair of Figure 1) with the rule(s) of the transition determined by the momentary state of a person’s ego (the lower left corner of Figure 1) in cooperation with the situation specific interpreter of the dominant representation of seduction (the lower right corner of Figure 1).

With the intersection of psychology and economics, pragmatism emerges in the realization of empirical validity in the laboratory with individual subjects; the traits and personality of an individual becomes visible with observed selection as does the realness of knowledge and experience; the costs and benefits
of the transition from unpleasure to pleasure are governed by the relative elasticity of each value and interest (Hursh, 1984).

Continuing with the intersection of psychology and economics, an accounting of each risk and uncertainty is possible only through a discussion of interest versus value as each risk and uncertainty are resolved through a person’s discounting. The ability to predict future direction with respect to a possible action has a direct impact on risk, while that same ability is influenced by accumulated experience with respect to possible outcomes which limits consideration to value at the expense of interest: “The concepts of utility and value are commonly used in two distinct senses: (a) experience value, the degree of pleasure or pain, satisfaction or anguish in the actual experience of an outcome; and (b) decision value, the contribution of an anticipated outcome to the overall attractiveness or aversiveness of an option in a choice” [Italics in original] (Kahneman, 1984).

**Prelude to costs and benefits**

This prelude to costs and benefits, the three discussions that follow, begins by asserting that the causal chain is an economic event and that the parent to that event is the relationship between a person and society. The purpose of this assertion is to constrain seduction within the context of the prior four discussions – pragmatism and its limits, traits and personality, realness of knowledge and experience, and, pleasure and unpleasure.

It is with a liberal interpretation that the dynamic of Figure 5 comports on a one-to-one basis with working memory as depicted in Figure 6. This liberal interpretation is more than...
justified as the cognitive relationships in Figure 5 are intended to address the intersection of economics and psychology at the theoretical level. Alternatively, the dynamic of Figure 6 is intended to contribute to insight into the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide with grief counseling the initiator. There, however, is a distinct defect in Figure 6 that being working memory is a self-organizing catch basin that allows elements of history to ooze through to the present moment, a logic problem – is life induced, or, is life interpreted – where the fault line implies that life has basis in induced while history calls for interpreted.

The logical thinking has life as interpreted, the position advocated by psychoanalysis, thus setting life as being reactive with respect to the momentary influences. Specifically, "Reasoning is done deliberately and effortfully, but intuitive thoughts seem to come spontaneously to mind, without conscious search or computation, and without effort. ...The central characteristic of agents is not that they reason poorly but that they often act intuitively. And the behavior of these agents is not guided by what they are able to compute, but by what they happen to see at a given moment. ...The present treatment has developed several themes: that intuition and reasoning are alternative ways to solve problems, that intuition resembles perception, that people sometimes answer a difficult question by answering an easier one instead, that the processing of information is often superficial, that categories are represented by prototypes. ...Findings about the role of optimism in risk taking, the effects of emotion on decision weights, the role of fear in predictions of harm, and the role of liking and disliking in factual predictions – all indicate that the traditional separation between belief and preference in analyses of decision making is psychologically unrealistic” (Kahneman, 2003).

With the character of working memory recognized, there then follows value maximization auction processes with maximization of pleasure at the expense of unpleasure the objective. Any remaining strength is then allocated to the recognition of each pragmatism and its limits, traits and personality, and, realness of knowledge and experience (Simonson, 1992).

With momentary exchanges through working memory in place, the next step is to accommodate the fundamental fact of life – that each new day is a declining percentage of the longitudinal event known as life. This requires the acceptance of the formation of inertia that is now asserted to be encased in the unconscious with some measure of resilience and with that inertia in line with Freud’s “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense” (Burrow, 1912).

Included here are five topics: (1) Centrist assumptions about life. (2) Contra centrist adaptations. (3) Critique of cognitive-behavioral therapy. (4) Classical conditioning versus operant conditioning with timing of each the issue. (5) The impact of the fault line on the Veterans Administration Health Care System.

**Centrist assumptions about life**

With apathy and/or suicide the focus, affect, the experience of feeling or emotion, is the fundamental issue given the presence of insecurity as shown in Figure 4 (p. 19). For emphasis, the presence of insecurity is independent of age, hence, the earlier seated an insecure affect, the greater the available inertia.

Since this paper is about apathy and/or suicide, it is time to affirm an earlier statement with the wording of interest in italics: The primary reference to this discussion is Freud’s “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense” (Freud, 1894a|1962) while the secondary reference is attachment theory as crafted by John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth (Ainsworth, M., 1991). Radiating from the first reference and into the second are the following six constructs: (1) Three methods of defence (phobias, hysterical symptoms, mixed neurosis). (2) Theory of repression (relation to reality). (3) Quota of affect (experience of feeling or emotion). (4) Cathexis (process of investment of emotional energy in the object world). (5) Principles
of constancy and pleasure (tension management). (6) Working hypothesis (stigma (%) + self-esteem (%)
= 100%, with affect-void apathy an acceptable substitute for self-esteem. There are three possible
results from the causal chain – ‘nothing’, ‘apathy’ and ‘suicide’. Of the three, ‘suicide’ is clearly the
result to be avoided while intuitively, ‘nothing’ is the desired result. However, ‘nothing’ is ill-defined
while ‘apathy’ does have definition and is addressable through psychoanalysis, especially the most
insidious form as molded in the presence of regression in Figure 4 (p. 19).

Three views of affect follow – latent, active and overt, and, active and covert. Each form of active is
routine to everyday life as well as being a repository for denial and/or repression and susceptible to
being molded by subliminal messages, e.g., advertising.

Latent:
“The obscurity surrounding early stages of ego organization or the nature of early ideational content is
as nothing compared with the obscurity that clouds the understanding of primary affects and their
vicissitudes. And this for a number of reasons. Not only is ideational content easier to grasp than the
more labile and impermanent expressions of affect, but the exploration of affect tends to arouse greater
subjective resistances. Moreover, clinical observers naturally focus their attention rather exclusively on
those affective reactions that are most frequently and most obviously responsible for pathological
states. Thus the constant reference made during recent clinical discussions to the factor of ‘anxiety’
(either manifest or latent) tends to give the impression that analysts regard this state and its immediate
sequelæ, hate and guilt, as the only affective responses of early childhood and therefore as the
mainsprings of neurotic or psychotic reaction. Similarly, a recent recrudescence of interest in
transference is justified by its sponsors on the ground that the latent anxiety content of these
transferences has not been duly appreciated. Although praiseworthy enough this over-emphasis is not
without its dangers. Therapeutically regarded the essence of transference is the displacement of affect,
and undue concentration on the ‘anxiety-hate-guilt’ group is likely to impede understanding of other
important affective reactions. Yet another factor in the comparative neglect of affects is the tendency
to be too exclusively interested in ideational derivatives of instinct (e.g. in the more stereotyped forms
of primitive unconscious phantasy); or again, to consider such unconscious phantasies solely in terms of
the specific instinct from which they are felt to be derived. By so doing the observer is liable to gloss
over the fact that the driving power of instincts cannot be properly appreciated without some measure
of the affects they engender” (Glover, 1939).

Active and overt:
Active and overt has two representations – through the senses and through consciousness. Through the
senses is well accounted for by the Weber-Fechner Law, the merger of two related hypotheses in the
field of psychophysics, known as Weber's law and Fechner's law. Both laws relate to human perception,
more specifically the relation between the actual change in a physical stimulus and the perceived
change. This includes stimuli to all senses: vision, hearing, taste, touch, and smell (Urban, 1933). “We
have now ... the chief propositions for explaining the feelings generally. These are as follows. (a) The
feelings are the normal motor-ideas of our instinctive conduct. (b) The brain mechanism of the instincts
is nonplastic; their preservation demands this. (c) The distinguishing characteristic of the feelings,
presentatively, is their simplicity. (d) This simplicity is due to the non-serial character of the stimulations
which reach the instinct mechanism, and to this mechanism's lack of that plastic susceptibility which,
lending itself to serial modification, is, together with the latter, requisite for preventative organization
and development. Under these propositions, the feelings are brought into harmony with the same laws
as govern all our mental life, and into congruent relation with evolutionary biology in general” (Nichols,
1895).
Active and covert:

Active and covert includes the characteristics of both latent and active and overt. With respect to latent which was the object of no attention, active and covert is often the subject of over-emphasized fear of action versus phobias (Janet, 1921), where phobias are the obverse of feelings.

Contra centrist adaptations

The life’s circumstance that initiate the casual chain to apathy and/or suicide are not static nor defined but are time dependent with centrist definition of the circumstances time-appropriate – hence, the causal chain is a function of time-spawned inertia which in turn determines the momentary character of self-esteem to include the affect-void variant. With the changing state of affect as a defining theme, presented here is the as-is state of the human mental apparatus as evidenced by self-esteem as a continuum, self-esteem as a trait, and, the changing state of self-esteem, with Freud’s “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense” the thematic reference.

Self-esteem as a continuum:

The starting point with the initial specification of the Big Five of psychology its basis, is a qualifier: “In many ways it seems remarkable that such stability should be found in an area which to date has granted anything but consistent results. Undoubtedly the consistency has always been there, but it has been hidden by inconsistency of factorial techniques and philosophies, the lack of replication using identical variables, and disagreement among analysts as to factor titles” (Tupes, 1961). What this implies with the causal chain is a cookie cutter approach classification system of an array of suspect persons will not support the idea of reliable analysis as each of those persons is in possession of a unique relative maturity. Much of an individual’s equilibrium between self and society is driven by the inertia as inherited from life’s experiences. However, life’s experiences are not as simple as a sequential listing of events and with the underlying impetus of each comingled but are unique to what is implied by each member of the Big Five – openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.

A longitudinal study, 14,718 adults (7,719 women) across all of adulthood, of the mean levels and rank order of the Big Five personality traits provided four main findings: "First, age had a complex curvilinear
influence on mean levels of personality. Second, the rank-order stability of Emotional Stability, Extraversion, Openness, and Agreeableness all followed an inverted U-shaped function, reaching a peak between the ages of 40 and 60, and decreasing afterwards, whereas Conscientiousness showed continuously increasing rank-order stability across adulthood. Third, personality predicted the occurrence of several objective major life events (selection effects) and changed in reaction to experiencing these events (socialization effects), suggesting that personality can change due to factors other than intrinsic maturation. Fourth, when events were clustered according to their valence, as is commonly done, effects of the environment on changes in personality were either overlooked or over generalized” (Specht, 2011).

This reported level of relative uniformity implies that correlations are possible, perhaps practical, when the opposite is so very true as confirmed by a collection of macro statistics – global self-esteem (Figure 7 (p. 29)) versus binge alcohol use, non-fatal self-harm and completed suicides (Figure 8). The teaser is the mean self-esteem data in isolation: “This study provides a comprehensive picture of age differences in self-esteem from age 9 to 90 years using cross-sectional data collected from 326,641 individuals over the Internet. Self-esteem levels were high in childhood, dropped during adolescence, rose gradually throughout adulthood, and declined sharply in old age. This trajectory generally held across gender, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and nationality (U.S. citizens vs. non-U.S. citizens)” (Robins, 2002).

Self-esteem as a trait:

The prior citation – “This study provides a comprehensive picture of age differences in self-esteem from age 9 to 90 years using cross-sectional data collected from 326,641 individuals over the Internet” – was qualified by the authors that the findings should be taken with care given the reliance on the internet, that more work needs to be done. Attention here turns away from surveys and the attendant risks to two of the many building blocks of self-esteem – dominance and coping – survival, the rawness of life.

“It has been found necessary to distinguish between the following and to treat them as separate psychological data: dominance-feeling, dominance behavior, dominance status, craving or desire for dominance, feelings of inferiority and superiority, matter-of-fact superiority and inferiority, and compensatory dominance behavior” (Maslow, 1937). These listed psychological data are relative issues, they have the capacity to be circular in that they are mutually supportive but not necessarily co-dependent.

The prior focus on dominance was about normal survival-oriented behavior that may morph to psychosis. Referenced here are the survival-oriented expressive and coping components of behavior each of which has the capacity to be a contributor to Freud’s “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense”. “A distinction can be made between expressive and coping components of behavior. Coping is purposive, motivated, more determined by environmental variables, more often learned, more easily controlled, and designed to cause changes in the environment. Expression is more often unmotivated, determined by the state of the organism, more often unlearned, often uncontrolled, not designed to do anything, and an end in itself. Character structure is better revealed in expressive behavior. Neurotic symptoms are characteristically coping, while in catastrophic breakdown behavior has no particular function” (Maslow, 1949).

Changing state of self-esteem:

This is a logic problem – is life induced, or, is life interpreted – which has basis in Freud’s “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense”. Given the preceding comments on dominance and coping, the difference between life induced and life interpreted is a matter of in-kind versus in-fact with denial and/or repression – distortions of reality defenses – the result. The defenses include “certain mechanisms, such as isolation, denial, introjection, projection, which appear to play a far more prominent role in
borderline or psychotic patients than in neurotics. ...The memories and the massive memory defects are built on the same broad basis of denial and distortion of reality, on which their current pathology rests. ...

The analytic recovery and reconstruction of the past presuppose a reality testing, a historical dating, a grouping, a fitting and integration of current drive manifestations into an organized context of external and internal historical reality, of which the psychotic is all the less capable the more he denies and loses contact with reality. Sometimes we observe that to the extent to which the psychotic recovers his capacity for reality testing and the use of more normal defenses, he may develop the ability to work on his past. In principle, we find the same difficulties in neurotics whose acting out constitutes a resistance against ‘remembering’ and reconstruction of the past” (Jacobson, 1957).

Stepping away from the psychotics and neurotics but keeping dominance and coping in focus attention now turns to discontinuity between the self and the object world. This includes trauma-related affect and defenses, with dissociation most representative. Included here is PTSD, a most capable initiator of the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide. “Dissociation is a ‘glitch’ or a dead spot inside the self, or between the person and the world, that arises when the self is overwhelmed by terror, dread, or the perception of malevolence or danger. Dissociation blocks verbal access to experience and disrupts coherent self-experience. ...Memory for traumatic events, the feelings and sensations that go with them, and crucial aspects of self can be unintentionally blocked in what appears to be an attempt to preserve functioning. Awareness of the feelings of terror, helplessness, betrayal, and pain often returns in uncontrolled bursts of reenactments, nightmares, and flashbacks, only to be blocked off again as the dissociating person returns to a frozen state of affectless numbness. ...The diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) relies on the presence of both numbing and intrusive symptoms. Most often, traumatized patients alternate between being flooded by panic and painful affect on the one hand, and avoiding the pain and terror in a way that keeps it from being processed and symbolized on the other. This alternation leaves little room for development of a cohesive, integrated, flexible sense of self, adapted to more ordinary life experiences” (Hegeman, 2000). Dissociation will be re-addressed in the discussion of U. S. Military Veterans and the Fault Line below (p. 40).

Returning to recognition of the psychotics and neurotics while keeping dominance and coping and discontinuity between the self and the object world in focus, it is time for two general statements. First, any combination of the mentioned characteristics are most capable initiators of the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide. Second, any combination of the mentioned characteristics is addressable by contrarian approaches provided the selected approach(s) recognizes the characteristic(s) as being at the pinnacle of the longitudinal event known as life. For example, “...self-esteem has multiple components and that to understand fully its place in psychological functioning, we must go beyond whether it is high or low. ...In one form of fragile high self-esteem (i.e., defensive high self-esteem), a person may deliberately misrepresent self-feelings as positive when in reality they are negative, but the person is unwilling to admit to them. The secure counterpart to this form (i.e., genuine high self-esteem) involves a person accurately depicting self-feelings of worth as positive, as evidenced by a willingness to admit to negative characteristics in other domains. ... A second form of fragile high self-esteem (high explicit or low implicit self-esteem) occurs when a person consciously holds positive feelings of self-worth but non-consciously holds negative feelings. The secure counterpart to this form (high explicit or high implicit) involves possessing positive conscious and nonconscious feelings of self-worth. ...A third form of fragile high self-esteem (contingent high self-esteem) occurs when a person bases positive feelings of self-worth on specific attainments or evaluations. The secure counterpart to this form (true self-esteem) involves feelings of self-worth that do not require continual validation. ... A fourth form of fragile high self-esteem (unstable high self-esteem) involves instances in which a person reports typically holding positive feelings of worth, yet the person’s current, contextually based feelings of self-worth exhibit considerable short-term fluctuations. The secure counterpart to this form (stable high self-esteem)
involves contextually based feelings of self-worth that remain basically unchanged across time and contexts" (Kernis, 2003). Focus on nudging self-esteem to the positive, as the expense of “fads, fashions and folderol” (Dunnette, 1966), as the cure, remedy, solution to the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide will be a component in the three “costs and benefits” discussions below.

**Conditioning – Pavlovian Classical versus Skinnerian Operant**

Having surveyed the character of self-esteem and related motivations such as dominance, coping and discontinuity, the task now is to survey basis for motivation and the formation and maintenance of related behavior while assuming that life is both induced and interpreted. Induced will be approached from both the topics of initial conditions and the establishment of inertia, while interpreted will be approached from both the topics of conflict recognition and the establishment of reframing.

This material is being present in a compare-contrast sequential format, that a hierarchy is not implied. As such the hierarchy is an input to the following Critique of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy as well as the revisit of dissociation in the discussion of *U. S. Military Veterans and the Fault Line* below (p. 40).

**Initial conditions:**

The subject matter of a person at symbolic entry into the causal chain as depicted in Figure 1 (p. 4) has ‘thinking’ at the top of the list as will be made clear with the following three costs and benefits discussion to follow. The starting point is Pavlov who is then followed by Calkins who will implicitly invoke Wundt’s lamenting of the separation of psychology from philosophy (Wundt, 1913).

Pavlov’s theory of reflexes is direct: “Any number of examples can be given of the complex nervous co-ordinations which we call reflex action and which in common speech are often referred to as ‘unconsciously purposive’ acts. ...Instincts can be divided into two basic biological groups. The first group consists of sex reflexes in the wide sense, *i.e.*, those serving for the preservation of the species. The second group contains reflexes serving to safeguard the existence of the individual. The latter, in their turn, are divided into: *(a)* food reflexes, *i.e.*, those connected in one way or another with the act of assimilating food, and *(b)* defence reflexes in the narrower sense of the word, *i.e.*, those serving to maintain the inviolability of the organism” (Frolov, 1937, pp. 33 & 35). Relative to apathy and suicide, the most-to-least impactful reflexes are defense reflexes, food reflexes, then sex reflexes, with implicit support provided by Calkins, while Wundt (philosophy versus psychology) contributes the assertion. Keep in mind the sequence could very well be a thought of some discomfort, then a negative impact via one of the three reflexes, then validation relative to entry to the causal chain of the prior discomfort.

With Calkins, the starting point is her entry into the discipline of psychology which in turn will satisfy the inclusion of Wundt. Calkins was the first woman to be elected president of the American Psychology Association (1905), and, the first woman to be elected president of the American Philosophical Association (1918), and, the only person of any era who can be asserted as the common denominator to James, Freud and Janet. Her entry into psychology, on happenstance which cemented her connectivity to James, was a seminar in psychology with James the professor (Calkins, 1929|1961, p. 31). Aside from her coverage of psychology as an academic discipline, Calkins’ focus spanned thought, the fundamental structure of psychology (effectively Janet), and the intersection of thought and the fundamental structure – with the notion of fundamental not necessarily true with respect to James, Freud and Titchener. And, necessary to the support of Wundt is an obituary in honor of William James (1842-1910): “The progress of his mind can be traced in the successive topics of his teaching. In 1873, he became an instructor in anatomy at Harvard; but soon, finding greater interest in physiology, he accepted an assistant professorship in that subject, in 1876. For the next three years, in addition to teaching physiology, he offered a course on the theory of evolution in the department of philosophy. In 1880 he abandoned physiology altogether, becoming in that year assistant professor, and in 1885
professor, of philosophy. He now gave himself enthusiastically to psychology, and under his energetic
guidance a psychological laboratory was established here. But after the publication of his treatise on
psychology, in 1890, his interest in it declined, and he turned more toward the history of philosophy and
the theory of knowledge. In 1892, he resigned the directorship of the laboratory, and after 1897 was
never willing to offer a psychologic course. Religion and metaphysics claimed him, and his last years
were devoted to the elaboration of a comprehensive philosophy in which the portion known as
pragmatism has occasioned wide discussion” (Anonymous, 1910). Now, Calkins relative to the causal
chain with her query about the scope of psychology the starting point.

“...the study of psychology is made more difficult and that the advance of psychology is checked, first,
through the common failure to recognize explicitly the real subject-matter of the science and, secondly,
through the underestimate of adequate description in psychology. Both tendencies reveal themselves
in what I take to be a mischievous disregard for consistent, though provisional, definition and for
adequate classification. There is need of courage to make this avowal in the face of present-day
disparagement of definition and classification; but it seems to me very evident that for purposes as well
of useful introspection as of fruitful experiment, the psychologist – student or teacher – needs to know
what he is observing and describing. Until there shall be more explicit agreement on this fundamental
question, one may be pardoned for recurring to it again and again. Any serious attempt to define and to
classify forms of consciousness will act as a ‘red rag’ waved in the face of many critics. The effort to
define accurately and to classify in any detail is bound, they will urge, to result in a conservative clinging
to conclusions once reached and in a love of schedules and schemes for their own sake. The system
maker, they will insist, is likely to subordinate the facts to his classification and to cut down the truth
to the measure of his framework. ...classification presupposes definition, and no satisfactory classification
is possible unless the definitions on which it is based are self-consistent and strictly adhered to. Besides
being founded on adequate definition, an ideal classification must, furthermore, be made on a wise
principle-in other words, it must employ an obvious, a simple, and a fruitful principle of division, and it
must be complete enough to cover the facts under discussion. ...psychology, in so far as it is the science
of mental function, is necessarily and more fundamentally the science of the mental functioner” [Italics
added] (Calkins, 1907). From this it follows that psychology might be “(1) as science of ideas or
contents, often named structural psychology, or (2) as science of mental functions, so-called functional
psychology, or, finally, (3) as science of the conscious self. ...that the third form ... is fundamental to the
others and implied by both of them” (Calkins, 1908a), with introspection (Calkins, 1908d) completing the
link between the conscious self and philosophy.

Establishment of inertia:

The reference is Pavlov’s theory of reflexes “...which in common speech are often referred to as
‘unconsciously purposive’ acts”, and the assertion to be developed is inertia has no standardization and
this applies to hedonic as well as categorization.

Hedonic is personal to any given individual: “First, individuals’ set points are not hedonically neutral.
Second, people have different set points, which are partly dependent on their temperaments. Third, a
single person may have multiple happiness set points: Different components of well-being such as
pleasant emotions, unpleasant emotions, and life satisfaction can move in different directions. Fourth,
and perhaps most important, well-being set points can change under some conditions. Finally,
individuals differ in their adaptation to events, with some individuals changing their set point and others
not changing in reaction to some external event” (Diener, 2006).

Categorization is the intent (aside from cognitive science) to look to economics, at the expense of
philosophy, Calkin’s reference to structural and functional psychology (Dupré, 1998).
Conflict recognition:

Conflict recognition is not about conflict per se, it is about necessarily conflicting initial conditions across individual persons with Pavlov’s ‘unconsciously purposive’ the pivot, and with the basis for ‘purposive’ adhering to no standard. This ‘purposive’ dynamic has the capacity to feed seduction with strength, with self-aggrandizement an available reaction, e.g., “The tyranny of the should” (Horney, 1950, pp. 64-85), and, in line with this paper’s subject matter, the same dynamic enables focus on conflict that morphs to the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide.

Research into behavior by Pavlov and Skinner provide a basis for insight into unique-to-persons initial and continuing conditions with approach limited to interpretation (versus induced) at the expense of knowledge. This is not to imply that Pavlov and Skinner were the only workers with respect to behavior. There were others dating back to the ancient Greeks. What is here is focused on the contemporary scene with John B. Watson to be introduced shortly the only exception. Covered here are: (1) The classical foundation, Pavlov’s life-long work with conditioning and counterconditioning. (2) The fundamentals that resulted in the formation of operant conditioning. (3) The methods of radical operant conditioning. (4) John B. Watson’s affirmation of Pavlov’s ‘unconsciously purposive’.

(1) The classical foundation, Pavlov's life-long work with conditioning and counterconditioning: This is about both the obvious such as learning that results in the adherence to schedules and the not so obvious where induced habit results in modification of prior learned behavior (Wolpe, 1997).

(2) The fundamentals that resulted in the formation of operant conditioning: With behavior the focus, the fundamental points of Skinner’s written corpus span the following points: “the purpose of science, methodology, determinism, locus of behavioral control, consequential causality, materialism, behavior as subject matter, reductionism, nonreductionism, organism as the locus of biological change, classification of behavior into respondent and operant, stimulus control of operant behavior, and the generality of behavioral principles” (Delprato, 1992). An annotated listing of Skinner’s corpus effectively paints the ins and outs of Pavlov’s conditioning and counterconditioning:

(1) Purpose of Science: The Primary Purpose of Science is Prediction and Control
(2) Methodology: The Methodology Is Functional Analysis, Which Relates Environmental Independent Variables to Behavioral Dependent Variables
(3) Determinism: Behavior Is Determined; It Is Lawful
(4) Locus of Behavioral Control: The Causes of Behavior Are Localized in the Environment
(5) Consequential Causality: Selection by Consequences Is the Primary Causal Mode by Which Environment Determines Outcomes in Living Systems
(6) Materialism: Dualism Is False; the Only World Is a Physical World
(7) Behavior as Subject Matter: The Subject Matter of Psychological Science Is Behavior and Behavior Only
(8) Reductionism: The Subject Matter of Psychology Is Reducible (at Least to Biology), and, Nonreductionism: Behavior Cannot Be Completely Explained in Terms of Biology or Any Other "Lower-Level" Discipline
(9) Organism as the Locus of Biological Change: The Organism Changes Through Evolutional and Environmental Histories, and the Changes are Biological
(10) Classification of Behavior Into Respondent and Operant: There Are Two Major Classes of Behavior or, More Completely, Functional Relations: Respondent and Operant
(11) Stimulus Control of Operant Behavior: Operant Behavior Can Be Brought Under the Control of Antecedent Stimuli, and Description of Operant Behavior Usually Requires Three Elementary Terms and Their Functional Interrelations
(12) On the Generality of Behavioral Principles: The Full Complexities of Human Activity — Including
An important addendum – Skinner cited Freud more than any other author (Overskeid, 2007).

(3) The methods of radical operant conditioning: The altruistic intent of radical behaviorism from the perspective of operant conditioning spans cause, explanation, and theory – “meaning of explanation, about the conception of causation employed, and about the pragmatic value of theories and theoretical models. …Radical behaviorism’s explanatory system focuses on relations between behaving persons (or other organisms), the setting conditions of behavior, and its consequences – behavior in its context. Persons are illustrated in this system as indivisible wholes, active in and interactive with their environments, changing and changed by the context and consequences of their behavior. …Relations between organisms and their world are the focus of causal accounts, expressed in integrative theoretical terms that explain behavior over time without the need for mechanistic links between functionally dependent events” (Chiesa, 1992).

(4) John B. Watson’s affirmation of Pavlov’s ‘unconsciously purposive’. The starting point is a retort to a claim against the idea of consciousness. “One extreme line of thought, exemplified in the American doctrine of behaviorism, thinks it possible to construct a psychology which disregards this fundamental fact!” (Freud, 1938|1964, p. 157).

John Broadus Watson (1878-1958), who established the behaviorist line of thinking asserted “... the easiest way to bring out the contrast between the old psychology [introspective] and the new is to say that all schools of psychology except that of behaviorism claim that ‘consciousness’ is the subject matter of psychology. Behaviorism, on the contrary, holds that the subject matter of human psychology is the behavior or activities of the human being. Behaviorism claims that ‘consciousness’ is neither a definable nor a usable concept; that it is merely another word for the ‘soul’ of more ancient times. The old psychology is thus dominated by a kind of subtle religious philosophy. … No one knows just how the idea of a soul or the supernatural started. It probably had its origin in the general laziness of mankind. Certain individuals who in primitive society declined to work with their hands, to go out hunting, to make flints, to dig for roots, became keen observers of human nature” [Italics in original] (Watson, 1925, p. 3). Watson capitalized on his formulation of behaviorism by joining the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency where he moved advertising to a science that was predicated on prediction and control, the goal of both the proponents of social control and of the business community with respect to consumer loyalty (Kreshel, 1990). In effect, Watson with advertising created the obverse of Adler’s inferiority reaction (Bagby, 1923), a class of individuals who react with confidence in social situations and who have an underlying feeling of superiority as evidenced by their brand loyalty – basically, upscale primates who can be taught to ‘fetch [a brand]’ on demand, thus replicating Pavlov’s work with dogs while contributing nothing to the resolution of substance abuse to include participation in lethal criminal and terrorist organizations, all of which was an extension of Harlow Gale’s prior advertising research at the University of Minnesota from 1895 to 1903 where he ran an experimental psychology laboratory with the development of the psychology of advertising the result. Prior to 1895 Gale was a student of Wundt (Eighmey, 2007). Of note is Watson’s doctoral research – “…on the correlation between increasing complexity of the behavior of the white rat and the growth of medullation in the central nervous system” (Watson, 1936|1961, p. 273) – from which follows “…‘consciousness’ is neither a definable nor a usable concept…” . However, John B. Watson’s declaration that consciousness is an invention with no basis in fact skips over consequences. As an example of consequences, Watson developed a campaign for Pebeco toothpaste. The ad featured “a seductively dressed young woman smoking a cigarette. The ad encouraged women to smoke as long as Pebeco toothpaste was used...
regularly. Smoking was glorified as an act of independence and assertiveness for women. ...they were buying sex appeal” (Buckley, 1989, p. 141).

**Establishment of reframing:**

Concluding with the interpreted versus induced implementation of logic provides an opportunity to expose on an in-general basis the Achilles heel of cognitive-behavioral therapy.

The principle difficulty is over-generalization that results from correlation of incremental observations – inhibition, experimental extinction, spontaneous recovery, etc. – that have no equality with time the base measure (Mitrano, 1939), and this includes reinforcement which does not happen in isolation (Skinner, 1963). A third characteristic of over-generalization is the either-or scientific approach to conditioning – mechanistic (deterministic) versus functional (probabilistic) – again, Pavlov versus Skinner with the realness of knowledge and experience the wager (Moxley, 1992). Finally, the ultimate smack, behavioral scientists are certain that they know more about what a person’s self-views should be than the person alone (Swann, 2007).

**Critique of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy**

This critique of cognitive-behavioral therapy has basis in both Pavlov’s ‘unconsciously purposive’ and the fault line, resulting in ‘what’ versus ‘why’ as the fundamental issue. There are three phenomena that must be considered for a therapeutic approach to be able to claim adherence to ‘what’ and ‘why’ – recognition of the environment through behavior, recognition of being in communion with the environment through cognition, and recognition of the self through introspection. With cognitive-behavioral therapy recognition through an understanding of each behavior and cognition only accounts for the ‘what’ leaving the basis for recognition – introspection – unaccounted for to include an over-generalization of the passage of time.

Given the limited what-versus-why focus of cognitive-behavioral therapy, there remains advantages on the ‘what’ side. “Although a number of different cognitive-behavioral techniques have been developed to address a variety of specific clinical problems, a set of basic principles and assumptions underlies all of these techniques. ...First, psychological dysfunction is understood in terms of mechanisms of learning and information processing. ...Second, the cognitive-behavioral approach to treatment is guided by an experimental orientation to human behavior, in which any given behavior is seen as a function of the specific environmental and internal conditions surrounding it. ...Third is the premise that change is effected through new learning experiences that overpower previous forms of maladaptive learning and information processing. ...Fourth is the value of scientific method for CBT, as reflected in the therapist’s ongoing evaluation of change at the level of the individual patient” (Hazlett-Stevens, 2005).

While these four assumptions do not translate into a therapy procedure that is appropriate to the ‘why’ side of the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide, cognitive-behavioral therapy must be retained as a mainstream procedure given its structured basis, clinician experience with that basis, and focus on depression while being balanced with a companion procedure that calls for the patient’s personal and emotional investment for two reasons: First, the companion procedure must accommodate the needs of persons who are very private as history as shown through recorded suicides of persons within the timeframe of contact with a program clinician (Fenton, 2000; Haglund, 2019) – this is a fitness issue. Second, the companion procedure must allow the needs of persons for self-recognition – this is a self-esteem issue.

The following discusses issues that must be addressed to satisfy each Warranty as to fitness, Warranty as to self-esteem, and The Interpersonal Theory of Suicide versus Pavlov’s ‘unconsciously purposive’ and the fault line.
Warranty as to fitness:

This is a very difficult issue given studies of the application of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for two reasons. First, “In general, the evidence-base of CBT is very strong. However, additional research is needed to examine the efficacy of CBT for randomized-controlled studies. Moreover, except for children and elderly populations, no meta-analytic studies of CBT have been reported on specific subgroups, such as ethnic minorities and low-income samples” (Hofmann, 2012). Second, until proven otherwise persons who participate in CBT are effectively self-nominated thus ruling out random arrival (e.g., Maslow, 1952).

The alternative to what has been presented in studies that purport to expose evidence that is claimed to be worthy of recognition, should be the development and publication of “empirically supported principles of change” (Rosen, 2003), where emphasis is on before-the-fact assumptions rather than after-the-fact evidence given, at the very minimum, that the random arrival of each the clinician and the patient is the unavoidable norm. Hence, “it is justifiable to wonder (1) whether the factors alleged to be operating in a given therapy are identical with the factors that actually are operating, and (2) whether the factors that actually are operating in several different therapies may not have much more in common than have the factors alleged to be operating” (Rosenzweig, 1936).

Warranty as to self-esteem:

This is a very basic issue that is both fundamental to self-esteem and largely outside the application of cognitive-behavioral therapy. Discussion is limited to three topics that taken together account for the core of the ‘why’: internal object relations, the coping characteristic of hope, and the incremental characteristics of cognitive-behavioral therapy.

Internal objects apart from internal object relations encompass the elements of ‘gravity’ within a person’s psyche, with the inventory of objects including subjective perceptual and fantasy experiences as accumulated over time, with random arrival of each incremental experience the determinant of both the order in which the psyche is built and the fundamental characteristic of the unconscious. “The internal objects in turn influence perception, thought, fantasy, current object relations, and transference. From the point of view of the clinician, the concepts of internal object and of internal object relation act as useful organizing constructs for both analyst and patient” (Sandler, 1990).

With mathematics as the frame of reference, if internal objects are regarded as a measurable static area, then hope is a measurable physical force that has the capacity to re-shape the boundaries of the static area as well as the positioning of the incremental features of the internal objects – perhaps even to change the expanse of the inventory of objects. Hope as used here is not about the likes of a childish wish for a certain gift but is about a possible future incremental experience as being key to the antithesis to despair (Lazarus, 1999).

While cognitive-behavioral therapy at the macro level is not considered to be in line with ‘why’, the incremental characteristics of cognitive-behavioral therapy with respect to techniques “...altering thoughts, sensations, emotions and behaviors by addressing identified maintenance mechanisms such as distorted thinking or avoidance” and techniques “...psychoeducation, self-monitoring, cognitive restructuring, in vivo exposure, imaginal exposure, and homework assignments” (Huppert, 2009).

The Interpersonal Theory of Suicide versus Pavlov’s ‘unconsciously purposive’ and the fault line:

The “Interpersonal Theory of Suicidal Behavior ...[maintains] that the most dangerous form of suicidal desire is caused by the simultaneous presence of two interpersonal constructs – thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness (and hopelessness about these states) – and further, that the capability to engage in suicidal behavior is separate from the desire to engage in suicidal behavior.
...[that] the capability for suicidal behavior emerges, via habituation and opponent processes, in response to repeated exposure to physically painful and/or fear-inducing experiences” (Van Orden, 2010). This definition includes two separate phenomena – the two interpersonal constructs as basis and the capability to engage in suicidal behavior as action. The position here is the presence of one implies the inclusion of the other: If the thinking about basis exists so does thinking about action with the obverse obvious – the currency of action affirms a preexisting basis.

The task now is to account for the Theory versus each Pavlov’s ‘unconsciously purposive’ and the fault line.

This theory is based on a two-tiered recognition of the dimensions of ‘what’ while maintaining silence with respect to an underlying ‘why’ as depicted in Figure 9 (below) in tandem with the cited supporting hypotheses in Table 2 (also below). The parent tier’s two dynamics – thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness – are tantamount to each being the state of a trait, while the second-tier dynamics – loneliness, etc. – are effectively a state of a state. And each of the four supporting hypotheses is effectively a supposition about the state of a trait by the construction of Figure 9.

![Figure 9 – Interpersonal Theory of Suicidal Behavior Causal Chain](image)

**Hypotheses of the Interpersonal Theory of Suicide**

1. Thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness are proximal and sufficient causes of passive suicidal ideation.
2. The simultaneous presence of thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness, when perceived as stable and unchanging (i.e., hopelessness regarding these states), is a proximal and sufficient cause of active suicidal desire.
3. The simultaneous presence of suicidal desire and lowered fear of death serves as the condition under which suicidal desire will transform into suicidal intent.
4. The outcome of serious suicidal behavior (i.e., lethal or near lethal suicide attempts) is most likely to occur in the context of thwarted belongingness, perceived burdensomeness (and hopelessness regarding both), reduced fear of suicide, and elevated physical pain tolerance.

**Table 2 – Interpersonal Theory of Suicidal Behavior Supporting Hypotheses**
Even the reference to hopelessness, which could easily be re-labeled as ‘resolve’, fails to offer insight into the fundamental dynamic – unpleasure being morphed to pleasure – possibly the basis for post-clinician suicides even when depression is the primary suspect. To state that “the capability to engage in suicidal behavior is separate from the desire to engage in suicidal behavior” fails to account for persons who are very private as history as shown through recorded suicides of persons within the timeframe of contact with a program clinician (Fenton, 2000; Haglund, 2019).

To this point the two interpersonal constructs as basis of the Interpersonal Theory of Suicidal Behavior is in line with Pavlov’s ‘unconsciously purposive’, as well as being in line with ‘what’ but silent about ‘why’ with investigations into brain anatomy from two narrations (Frolov, 1937; Shore, 1997) providing the confirmation:

(1) “Such eminent scientists as Charcot, Bernheim, Claparede, Ziehen, Pierre Janet and Kretschmer have made an analysis of this characteristic illness such as might be thought exhaustive. Nevertheless a modern psychopathologist, Hoche, recently declared that in spite of all successes that had been achieved, ‘in hysteria we are still facing a locked door’. When this remark of Hoche came to the knowledge of Pavlov, it acted as a challenge to him to mobilize all his energies for a last great battle against the ultra-conservative views of psychiatrists on this question. It stimulated him to make a final summing up of all the wealth of data which he had accumulated in the recent period in the laboratory and clinic. As a result we now have a very important and interesting document of Pavlov’s entitled An Attempt at the Physiological Understanding of the Symptomatology of Hysteria. This paper was written by Pavlov in 1932 and represents a trial excursion into the sphere of psychiatry on the part of a physiologist. Pavlov first of all establishes the fact that hysteria is a disease ‘belonging mainly to the higher section of the central nervous system and especially to the cerebral hemispheres’. It represents the result of Constitutional weakness and temporary exhaustion of the nervous system. This substantially confirms the view held by many investigators before him, e.g., Pierre Janet. But Pavlov’s merit lies in the fact that he went much deeper than the psychiatrists into the analysis of the internal connection between the cortex and subcortical centres in the brain of hysterical patients, a subject which Kretschmer could only hint at” [Italics in original] (Frolov, 1937, p. 226).

(2) “…the ‘point of contact with biology’ that Freud sought is to be found specifically in the central role of right brain psychobiological processes in the organization and regulation of affect, motivation, and unconscious cognition. Although psychoanalysis has reworked many of Freud’s initial conceptualizations, it is only now beginning to reevaluate his original model of emotion. Moreover, an ever-increasing number of theoreticians and clinicians are now emphasizing the fundamental significance of affect regulation in both intrapsychic and interpersonal functioning. Indeed, ‘affect theory is increasingly recognized as the most likely candidate to bridge the gap between clinical theory and general theory in psychoanalysis’” (Shore, 1997).

The first narrative provides insight into the neurobiology that is involved by the human mental apparatus while the second exposes the results of ‘why’. This takes discussion back to the opening statement with the Fault line – is life induced, or, is life interpreted. If the dynamic development as portrayed in Figure 9 (p. 38) in Tandem with the hypotheses of Table 2 (p. 38) is correct, then life is induced and nothing else needs to be said. However, given induced versus interpreted is a logic problem, then it is appropriate that investigation into ‘why’ continues from logic... “Immanuel Kant epitomized his insight into this fundamental limitation of human reason with his aphorism ‘Out of timber so crooked as that from which man is made nothing entirely straight can be built’. And Niels Bohr drew attention to the limits of human reason by citing what he referred to as an 'old saying'. According to that old saying, there are two kinds of truths: one kind is an ordinary truth, which is so
simple and clear that its opposite is obviously false, while the other kind is a deep truth, whose opposite is also a deep truth” [Italics added] (Stent, 2004).

Thus, Kant’s position is that human reasoning is unpredictable while Bohr’s position is that human reasoning is built on circular logic. The unraveling of the unpredictable/circular sense of ‘why’ is the issue that is to be resolved with the costs-benefits discussions. While the Figure 9 (p. 38) narrative, like cognitive-behavioral therapy, is to be retained due to the fixed basis, the preferred approach to the protest, despair, detachment, grief dynamic of Figure 1 (p. 4) is self-directed psychoanalysis in a structured autobiography format and as a short story with Veterans of the U. S. Military at the base of study.

U. S. Military Veterans and the Fault Line

This focus on the Veteran of the U. S. Military is due to that population being very well defined and, is thus, the perfect place to test approaches to durable mental health with the notion of durable well beyond what could be expected if the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide were the limited focus.

“The Veterans Health Administration, within the Department of Veterans Affairs, operates the nation’s largest integrated direct health care delivery system, provides care to approximately 6.7 million unique Veteran patients, and employs more than 311,000 full-time equivalent employees. While Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program are also publicly funded programs, most health care services under these programs are delivered by private providers in private facilities. In contrast, the VA health care system could be categorized as a Veteran-specific national health care system, in the sense that the federal government owns a majority of its health care delivery sites, employs the health care providers, and directly provides the majority of health care services to Veterans” (Panangala, 2016).

Given the inertia that is inherent in the approximately 6.7 million unique Veteran patients, that environment is the perfect test environment to, as already stated above, confront the simple either-or direction of activity that is immersed in a flurry of environmental and personal dynamics each of which is pivotal with respect to loss versus depression from three perspectives: (1) At the base of environmental is knowledge and experience; (2) at the base of personal is motivation; (3) at the base of the comingling of environmental and personal is the politics of medicine. Of these three perspectives item (1) is satisfied by the operation of the Veterans Health Administration. Item (2) is the pivot superset of both The Interpersonal Theory of Suicidal Behavior (Figure 9 (p. 38)) and cognitive-behavioral therapy and is limited to resolving the protest, despair, detachment, grief dynamic of Figure 1 (p. 4) with self-directed psychoanalysis by the Veteran in a structured autobiography format and as a short story. Item (3) has the fault line held at bay by the pursuit of the notion of durable with that pursuit limited to characterizations that are portrayed by Tables 5.50A, 5.51A and 5.53A (NSDUH, 2018). Note: abbreviated data from Table 5.50A (p. 41) is presented above as Table 1 (p. 10).
### Table 3 – NSDUH Table 5.50A

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### Table 4 – NSDUH Table 5.51A

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>10,874</td>
<td>10,674</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>2,440</td>
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<td>Part-Time</td>
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<td>2,563</td>
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<td>18.2</td>
<td>82.7</td>
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April 22, 2019 © 2019 David H. Cook, Ph.D., M.B.A. All rights reserved. Page 41 - 108
With ‘additional information’ the motive, item (2) [“the ‘point of contact with biology’ that Freud sought”] has limited precedence in methodology already implement at the Madison, Wisconsin Veterans Administration Medical Center in the form of a program where trained volunteers help Veterans write their life’s story for review by their health care providers (Ringler, 2015) with but one modification – the Veteran creates the timeline of their life and then dictates affect-centric elements to a trained volunteer who then ghost writes the Veteran’s story with the Veteran the intended audience, with no editing by the Veteran if at all practical. Item (3) has extensive precedence in the mature methodology of the NSDUH. Table 5.53A, is the ‘grief’ indicator.

Discussion now follows this sequence – Application of knowledge and experience; Cognitive processing therapy; Surveillance and interventions; Recovery community; Square peg, round hole; and, Personal resilience.

Application of knowledge and experience:

The current application of knowledge and experience is through both a formal macro statement and an informal micro declaration. The formal statement is in the form of Executive Order 13625 of August 31, 2012 which mandates the Improving Access to Mental Health Services for Veterans, Service Members, and Military Families (Schuman, 2016) a macro statement that is tantamount to thou shalt. The informal micro declaration nudges attention towards the various reasons shown in Table 5.53A in the form of a considerable modification to occupational therapy research. “Actively exploring occupational therapy’s role in suicide prevention is a professional responsibility aligned with tenets of the Centennial Vision and Vision 2025” (Kashiwa, 2017).

Given suicides are now reported at a daily rate of 20.6 by the Department of Veterans Affairs based on 2018 survey of state-by-state death certificates, there is a call for both Warranty as to fitness and Warranty as to self-esteem to counteract the needs of persons who are very private as history as shown through recorded suicides of persons within the timeframe of contact with a program clinician (Fenton, 2000; Haglund, 2019) as well as the needs of persons for self-recognition.
Cognitive processing therapy:

The internal mechanics of cognitive processing therapy that was developed between the Boston and Cincinnati Veterans Administration Medical Centers, fits well with the incremental step-through of The Interpersonal Theory of Suicidal Behavior but remains another view of 'what' at the expense of 'why'. The incremental internal mechanics fit well with the intent of the inventory of reasons in the NSDUH Table 5.53A.

Cognitive processing therapy "is based on a social cognitive theory of PTSD that focuses on how the traumatic event is construed and coped with by a person who is trying to regain a sense of mastery and control in his/her life. The other major theory explaining PTSD is Lang’s information processing theory, which was extended to PTSD by Foa, Steketee, and Rothbaum in their emotional processing theory of PTSD. In this theory, PTSD is believed to emerge due to the development of a fear network in memory that elicits escape and avoidance behavior. Mental fear structures include stimuli, responses, and meaning elements. Anything associated with the trauma may elicit the fear structure or schema and subsequent avoidance behavior. The fear network in people with PTSD is thought to be stable and broadly generalized so that it is easily accessed. When the fear network is activated by reminders of the trauma, the information in the network enters consciousness (intrusive symptoms). Attempts to avoid this activation result in the avoidance symptoms of PTSD. According to emotional processing theory, repetitive exposure to the traumatic memory in a safe environment will result in habituation of the fear and subsequent change in the fear structure. As emotion decreases, patients with PTSD will begin to modify their meaning elements spontaneously and will change their self-statements and reduce their generalization. Repeated exposures to the traumatic memory are thought to result in habituation or a change in the information about the event, and subsequently, the fear structure. ...  

Although social cognitive theories are not incompatible with information/emotional processing theories, these theories focus beyond the development of a fear network to other pertinent affective responses such as horror, anger, sadness, humiliation, or guilt. Some emotions such as fear, anger, or sadness may emanate directly from the trauma (primary emotions), because the event is interpreted as dangerous, abusive, and/or resulting in losses. It is possible that secondary, or manufactured, emotions can also result from faulty interpretations made by the patient. ...  

Social-cognitive theories focus more on the content of cognitions and the effect that distorted cognitions have upon emotional responses and behavior. In order to reconcile the information about the traumatic event with prior schemas, people tend to do one or more of three things: assimilate, accommodate, or over-accommodate. Assimilation is altering the incoming information to match prior beliefs. Accommodation is altering beliefs enough to incorporate the new information. Over-accommodation is altering one’s beliefs about oneself and the world to the extreme in order to feel safer and more in control.  

Obviously, therapists are working toward accommodation, a balance in beliefs that takes into account the reality of the traumatic event without going overboard” (Resick, 2006).

Surveillance and interventions:

“The Veterans Health Administration’s approach to suicide prevention is based on a public health framework, which has three major components: (1) surveillance, (2) risk and protective factors, and (3) interventions.

Surveillance, or systematic collection of data on completed suicides, is essential to define the scope of the problem, identify characteristics associated with higher or lower risk of suicide, and track changes in the suicide rate. No nationwide surveillance system exists for suicide among all veterans. Information
about deaths is collected in death certificates by state, territorial, and local governments. Death certificate data are aggregated into the National Death Index, which can be combined with data about who is a veteran to identify veteran suicides. ... 

Information collected in surveillance is used to identify suicide risk factors and protective factors. This is essential in order to design interventions that reduce risk factors and/or increase protective factors, thus lowering overall risk of suicide. Risk factors are also helpful in identifying at-risk groups or individuals so that interventions can be delivered to the people who need them most. ... 

The intervention cycle includes three stages: (1) design and test interventions, (2) implement interventions, and (3) evaluate interventions. ...[which] include easy access to care, screening and treatment, suicide prevention coordinators, suicide hotline, education and outreach, and limited access to lethal means” (Bagalman, 2016).

Each characteristic that is elementary to any of the three major components is adaptable to a trackable reason in the equivalent to NSDUH Table 5.53A.

Recovery community:

This discussion is an introduction to the next “Square peg, round hole” as the characteristics of the idea of a “Recovery community” are awfully close to that smacks of square versus round. Yes, this author is a Veteran, has been diagnosed with PTSD, is burdened on a daily basis with survivor guilt to include random flashbacks, and has a Pacemaker to keep heart rate above the swamp-induced rate of 32 beats per minute. However, opportunity has allowed the accumulation of clinical management experience, quite the education, with writing production well past 500,000 words – for the benefit of those who fell.

The idea behind an implementation in Michigan of intended professional support for returning “Citizen Soldiers” – National Guard and Army Reserve troops – was to aid the transition from an active deploy to their prior in-the-community Reserve status but with broad human-relations support that encompasses more than mental health (Greden, 2010). The idea sounds good but fails to encompass the unsaid burden that equates to the presumed despair of Figure 1 (p. 4) with respect to the inertia that is the prime characteristic of the unconscious as depicted in Figure 6 (p. 26). Freud makes that inertia in his discussion of wish-fulfilment: “When we decide to go to sleep, we may succeed in temporarily bringing to an end the cathexes of energy attaching to our waking thoughts. Anyone who can do this easily is a good sleeper; the first Napoleon seems to have been a model of this class. But we do not always succeed in doing so, nor do we always succeed completely. Unsolved problems, tormenting worries, overwhelming impressions – all these carry thought-activity over into sleep and sustain mental processes in the system that we have named the preconscious. If we wish to classify the thought-impulses which persist in sleep, we may divide them into the following groups: (1) what has not been carried to a conclusion during the day owing to some chance hindrance; (2) what has not been dealt with owing to the insufficiency of our intellectual power – what is unsolved; (3) what has been rejected and suppressed during the daytime. To these we must add (4) a powerful group consisting of what has been set in action in our unconscious by the activity of preconscious in the course of the day; and finally (5) the group of daytime impressions which are indifferent and have for that reason not been dealt with” [Italics added] (Freud, 1900|1953, p. 554).

As well-meaning the intended professional support is configured to be, that effort is nothing more than another view of ‘what’, while Freud’s “(4) a powerful group...” is a characterological call for recognition of an underlying ‘why’. This point will be re-visited with the discussion of Costs and benefits of ‘what’ and ‘why’ taken together below.
Square peg, round hole:

Again, this author is a Veteran. The fundamental problem behind the various efforts to now be addressed is the belief that intellectualizing is a practical approach to analysis of what cannot be experienced. Further, the fault line is a factor as well as Pavlov’s ‘unconsciously purposive’ but on an implicit basis – the fault line is decidedly explicit. The following is organized in three groups: ‘what’, ‘intellectualizing’, and ‘what’ plus ‘intellectualizing’.

‘what’

Included here are two studies – “Randomized trial of trauma-focused group therapy for PTSD” (Schnurr, 2003) and “Cognitive processing therapy for Veterans with military-related PTSD” (Monson, 2006). On the surface each study reflects an altruistic goal given PTSD is the focus. While PTSD as a destination makes sense, the journey to that destination is of a poor construction.

The randomized trial seems to assume that the starting point with any group of any configuration will have the same base. This is in violation of what was learned in the “Screening of psychoneurotics…” (Stouffer, 1950, pp. 548-567) where the upfront understanding was uniformity was not expected in the examination results across the various induction stations.

The social cognitive base of cognitive processing therapy implies that Pavlov’s ‘unconsciously purposive’ is a static starting point. First ’purposive’ is the framing of a random ‘what’ with no information implied about the companion ‘why’.

‘intellectualizing’

Included here are three studies each of which was crafted by well-meaning persons who had invested heavily in a prior academic environment and as such were well-equipped with enthusiasm, but, again, immersed in analysis of what cannot be experienced, with analysis based on a personal connection to perfection.

The first is about the pursuit of intellectual perfection, it is an analysis of the “four-year impact of a VA fellowship program on the recovery orientation of rehabilitation programs” (Kymalainen, 2010). Given the current estimate is 20.6 suicides per day, this four-year evaluation equates to about 30,000 dead bodies. At what point of intellectualizing will there be a focus on the currency of the real problem.

The second is about imagined perfection with respect to a person’s total military experience when the presentation, “Problems with a Cognitive Reappraisal of Guilt” (Finlay, 2015), applies to only the entry period of a person’s military experience. On entry there is basic training which includes elementary weapons familiarity. During that phase a person becomes acquainted the realities of the intent of a military formation that being to kill an opposing combatant – a reality that is in stark contrast to beliefs about killing where the beliefs are conveyed through a value system. However, once a person is past the initial training and becomes immersed in the daily business of military life, even if they are never part of deployment, they became aware of others who have made the Final Sacrifice. That knowledge wears on any person and the idea of being ‘lucky’ itself wears quite thin, to wit, a story: “female soldiers and PTSD” (Golodryga, 2015). The story was about a young woman named Jamie Brunette (September 12, 1984 - February 9, 2015), who on February 9th took her own life. She had served in the U. S. Air Force for eleven years, had reached the rank of Captain, served two tours in Afghanistan, and was burdened with survivor guilt – why them, why not me – an exact line of thinking that is this author’s burden – having protected the mission remains a precarious solution. Brunette’s original obituary was replaced by a short-lived obituary that declared “Brunette was an alcoholic”, then replaced by another short-lived obituary that “Brunette was a barroom [retracted]”, with the funeral home’s formal obituary the survivor. In the original obituary the U. S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs admitted to 22 Veteran suicides.
a day – 8,000 a year. At issue is “Groupthink” (Kelman, 2014). An explicit example of groupthink is the last sentence of a published paper – “…and help make good on the VA’s overall commitment to end veteran homelessness by 2015” (Metraux, 2013). Imagined perfection is just another take on groupthink.

The third is about the reframing of perfection. “A Faculty Development Workshop on Veteran-Centered Care” (Lypson, 2016) is nothing more than a post-graduate take on the intellectualizing of what should have already been known particularly with respect to the knowledge that was transferred into the development of the DSM-I.

‘what’ plus ‘intellectualizing’

Included here are four studies each of which was crafted by well-meaning persons who had invested heavily in a prior academic environment with focus set on their failure to deliver on their basis for enthusiasm.

The first is effectively presumptuous, “The problem of dropout from ‘gold standard’ PTSD therapies” (Najavits, 2015).

The second is an honest effort at pre-planning, “Pretreatment Predictors of Dropout from Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for PTSD” (Garcia, 2011).

The third is an attempt to gain insight in the failure to maintain the interest of the Veteran: “Treatment Initiation and Dropout from Prolonged Exposure and Cognitive Processing Therapy” (Kehle-Forbes, 2015).

The fourth is another honest effort at pre-planning, “Predictors of Dropout from Residential Treatment for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder” (Smith, 2019).

**Personal resilience:**

This is about the ability to balance the trials of life, loss and/or stress, to a pragmatic resolution of the realness of knowledge and experience recognizing all along there exists in the dreamwork of life Freud’s assertion that there is “a powerful group consisting of what has been set in action in our unconscious by the activity of preconscious in the course of the day”. The key to personal resilience is without exception the ongoing ability to resolve pleasure and unpleasure to a state of peaceful coexistence, which, in turn, encompasses the momentary occurrences of ‘what’ and ‘why’.

The starting point in this survey of personal resilience is the ‘Anna O’ case of 1880, Breuer’s patient, the first case history of “the talking cure”, the free associations of psychoanalysis – the flattening of life as will be advanced with the cost-benefit discussions below. A qualification – the flattening of life is not synonymous with ‘in perspective’ as the latter is intellectualizing – the importance of which will be exposed through the exposure of survival as a life stressor, a retrace of philosophy with Joseph Haven’s 1862 textbook the guide, that retrace advanced to the international stage, and with stoicism presented as the key to the quest to resolve pleasure and unpleasure to a state of peaceful coexistence. Now, Josef Breuer’s patient Bertha Pappenheim, referenced as ‘Anna O’, circa 1895 (Freud, 1895|1955, pp. 21-47).

At that time Freud and Breuer were colleagues with Anna O Breuer’s case – “During the therapy, Breuer must have developed a fascination for the richness and complexity of Pappenheim’s inner world. ...He was privileged to be present at the solving of an intellectual puzzle worthy of the attention of the best scientist. As her telling of stories brought emotional and physical relief, and later as her own formulation of working backward to the origin of a symptom led to the disappearance of the symptom, he must have felt the excitement of discovery” [Italics added] (Kimball, 2000).
While Anna O’s joking reference was to “chimney sweeping” (Freud, 1895|1955, p. 30), she had her own recap – “I want to say that a living organization can only exist against the background of a spiritual or ethical goal. Observation of all details, collection of all experiences, which may accomplish the end, uncompromising determination, not to lose the ethical background from view, and most of all: a blessed phantasy – which will keep the creation (you call it organization) alive in outlook. I go so far as to say that it is impossible to organize without phantasy” (Edinger, 1968, p. 69; Kimball, 2000). The task now is to take the firmness of “chimney sweeping” forward to the uncertainty associated with survival as a life stressor.

At issue here is loss and/or stress versus factual experience with military combat experience a pivot: “War’s influence on emotional health includes potential psychological gains as well as losses. ...two questions on the legacy of combat in World War II and the Korean conflict. The first concerns the subjective experience or meanings of combat that veterans hold in later life, with particular attention to how such accounts are linked to the seventy of combat and postwar adaptations. The second question links these accounts to the psychosocial functioning of veterans before the war and in later life using reports from veterans and their spouses and Q-sort ratings in adolescence and at age 40. ...Clinical ratings show that heavy combat veterans became more resilient and less helpless over time when compared to other men. As in the case of life events generally, short- and long-term effects may impair and enhance personal growth” (Elder, 1989).

The idea that “short- and long-term effects may impair and enhance personal growth” should be assumed to be sufficient basis for a call to flatten life given the implied resilience associated with that there exists in the dreamwork of life Freud’s assertion that there is “a powerful group consisting of what has been set in action in our unconscious by the activity of preconscious in the course of the day”. Hence, the appropriateness of a reliance on philosophy – first the establishment of basis by Hume and Wundt, second the application of basis by Haven. In short, Hume advocated coordinated research into the basis of a ‘what’ in tandem with the same effort being applied to an understanding of the basis of a ‘why’, with Wundt’s emphasis placed on the importance of philosophy to each increment investigation. For his part, Haven placed philosophy as the link between the two research efforts advocated by Hume. Given the timing through history of the underlying writings, Hume (1789), Haven (1862) and Wundt (1913), with Wundt affirming Haven’s position based on dating.

Every ‘happening’ encompasses a start, middle and end, leaving open to question the transition that is the middle. It is fair to assume that the character of the transition is an objective evaluation of what is accepted as available opportunity. There are two issues here. The first is the need to recognize the structure of life’s experience as an evolving continuum yet as rigid as law. The second is the need to recognize that it is possible to think of life as an evolving ‘happening’ that encompasses a series of ‘bus stops’ that are not rigid determinants of the future.

Haven has precedent with John Locke who begins his An essay concerning human understanding – “Every step the mind takes in its progress towards knowledge makes some discovery, which is not only new, but the best, too, for the time at least” (Locke, 1689, p. ix). These few words expose Locke’s full position, that a person is born with a mind that is a clean slate, i.e., “No innate principles in the mind” (Ibid, pp. 12-42).

The second, how the start of any ‘happening’ determines the strategic execution of the middle requires acceptance that the human mind is an interpretive dynamic that has the capacity to capitalize on each unfortunate and fortunate extensions to Locke’s “but the best, too, for the time at least”. Based on experience that has formed the Preservative-Perception dynamic in Table 6, the unfortunate qualification to Locke is Freud’s reference to the “slip of the tongue” and other day-to-day speed bumps of life that have the capacity to harm self-esteem. Alternatively, based on experience that has formed
the Representative and Reflective dynamics in Table 6, the fortunate qualification to Locke is the recognition of opportunity in the environment that has the capacity to influence a state of becoming (Allport, 1960).

The retrace of philosophy was advanced to the international stage in the form of the submission of an abstract to the 14th International Conference on Urban Health in Coimbra, Portugal on 26 September 2017 titled “To resolve monism to dualism, to change the course of human history (Mentoring)”, with the Acceptance Letter issued on 18-May-2017.

With respect to the causal chain, the entire effort behind the idea of resolving monism to dualism is to frustrate the formation of the causal chain on the strength of the matching of human curiosity with the ever-present unconscious which philosophy the guide. Now the “Mentoring” abstract.

“This paper is about the matching of at-risk youth with unrelated senior citizens for mentoring, tutoring, the youth in the 3 R's – reading writing and arithmetic. The assumption is that at-risk youth are attachment-avoidant versus traditional role models.

The core is about youth viewing life as wholeness (monism) versus the lack of equality between subject and object (dualism), with life the wager. That, with wholeness, the inclination is to progress to safe harbor with nothing gained the risk. That, with subject and object, the inclination is to recognize that a person's fears and foibles both define and protect them, leaving progression open to evaluation. It is the unrelated senior citizens who help the youth in the sorting of fears from foibles.

This paper is presented across eight tracks. The first track summarizes the intent behind mentoring, to circumvent diversions in the environment, to encourage responsibility in youth by accounting for the expression of the human condition in humanness and personality. The second track focuses on philosophy and spans mentalism (monism versus dualism), progression versus safe-harbor, and existentialism (the acting, feeling, thinking human). The third track is about apathy, the everyday life side of philosophy, and accountability (consequences) as that which separates should (presumption) from reality (reasonableness). The fourth track is about dependency and covers the phobia, empathy and simplicity. The fifth track is about boredom and covers mood, identification and boundaries. The sixth track is about resignation and covers indifference, feeling and appreciation. The seventh track is about enthusiasm and covers anxiety, accomplishment and satisfaction. The eighth track is about youth gaining attachment to their own self and their fears and foibles” (Cook, 2017).

The envisioned philosophical consequence of the notion of Mentoring is that it in effect modifies Freud’s assertion to a less toxic there is “a powerful group consisting of what has been set in action in our unconscious by the activity of curiosity in the course of the day”. Further, Mentoring does accomplish Anna O’s assertion of “chimney sweeping” while it sets in motion as a life-long ethic her own recap – “I want to say that a living organization can only exist against the background of a spiritual or ethical goal. Observation of all details, collection of all experiences, which may accomplish the end, uncompromising determination, not to lose the ethical background from view, and most of all: a blessed phantasy –
which will keep the creation (you call it organization) alive in outlook. I go so far as to say that it is impossible to organize without phantasy”.

**Costs and benefits of ‘what’ alone**

Each ‘what’ and ‘why’ are about the relationship between a person and their surrounding world. The difference between the two is the general characterization of that relationship – ‘what’ is reactive while ‘why’ is proactive – with the management of anxiety an objective that is common to both ‘what’ and ‘why’. Accompanying this reactive versus proactive characterization are Freud’s topographic and structural models of the human mental apparatus, where the dream-based topographic model (Freud, 1900|1953, pp. 59-621; Arlow, 1964, pp. 9-30) implements the reactive, and the structural model (Freud, 1923|1961, pp. 3-68; Arlow, 1964, pp. 31-55) implements the proactive. A further distinction between reactive and proactive has basis in the accounting of risk and uncertainty where reactive is aligned with pleasure and unpleasure and the realness of knowledge and experience, while proactive is aligned with both pragmatism and traits and personality.

The principle beneficiary of how an accounting of risk and uncertainty is allocated is that accounting allows security, Figure 4 (p. 19) to be examined in isolation where it is fair to assume that security is both a synonym and an antonym to the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide. This line of thinking is a return to the original ‘loss’ versus ‘depression’ concern of this paper, the logic of depression related attitudes versus the logic of loss related beliefs, where each representation of ‘logic of’ is a unique representation of ‘Real’ at the expense of security. From this it follows that Freud’s “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense” as the primary reference is an extension of reactive while the Bowlby-Ainsworth attachment theory as the secondary reference is an extension of proactive. This sets security as the objective versus each pleasure and unpleasure and the realness of knowledge and experience.

A mental orientation towards suicide, apathy included, at any level, implies a lack of responsibility to self with the notion of responsibility aligned with that same sense expected of youth (Blatz, 1944, pp. 187-193). However, that same sense of responsibility can be a result of a sense-of-self being overtrumped by a lack of security of any measure – financial, relationship, etc. “Two sets of circumstances are necessary for the experience of security. The individual is secure (1) if the situation is sufficiently familiar that, he, whether by reason of unlearned or learned patterns of behavior, is confident of his ability to deal with the situation as he understands it, or if he feels assured that he can depend on some other factor or person to do so for him, and (2) where he is confident that whatever the consequences of his activity he can either meet them adequately or feels assured that some other factor or person will prevent him from suffering unacceptable consequences" (Ainsworth, 1988).

The relationship between attachment and suicide is much deeper than the notion of responsibility but reaches into the very fabric of humanness – well past pleasure and unpleasure and the realness of knowledge and experience. Specifically, with the formation over time of attachment by first Bowlby alone then he in collaboration with Ainsworth, recognition of Freud’s dream-based topographic model emerges: “Despite disagreeing with important elements of classical psychoanalytic theory, John Bowlby considered many of Freud's ideas about infant-parent and adult-adult relationships to be genuine insights. Among the most important of these propositions are (1) that infants have a complex social and emotional life, (2) that early experiences can have lifelong implications, (3) that mental representations of early experiences mediate effects on later behavior and development, (4) that defensive processes play a role in affect regulation, and (5) that loss of an attachment figure – at any age – is an emergency and mourning is a process that serves an adaptive affect-regulation function” (Lay, 1995).
Freud’s topographic model

The topographic model of the human mental apparatus is comprised of three regions – the conscious, the preconscious and the unconscious, as already depicted in Figure 6 (p. 26). These regions are not physical in nature but are representations of mental energy and are deemed to be independent of each other. As such, it is customary but not necessary to refer to each region with the prefix of ‘system’.

The unconscious “is defined by the fact that its elements are (1) inaccessible to consciousness. In addition it is characterized (2) by a particular mode of functioning known as the primary process; (3) by the nonverbal nature of its memory traces; (4) by the fact that it is incapable of any form of mentation other than to wish, i.e., by the fact that it operates according to the pleasure principle; (5) by its relation to the instinctual life; and, (6) by its generally infantile character” (Arlow, 1964, p.12).

The preconscious “comprises those elements of the mind which are accessible to consciousness. For an element of the system unconscious to be conscious, it first must become preconscious. This it does ... by becoming joined to the corresponding word traces. Thus elements of the system preconscious, and in particular memory traces which belong to that system, are verbal in nature” (Ibid).

The conscious “the close relationship between the system conscious and the system preconscious is a relationship that develops pari passu with the development of the system preconscious. The tendency is for conscious awareness to be limited to (1) sensations due to stimuli from the outer world, and (2) events, i.e., thoughts, memories, emotions, etc., within the system preconscious. In other words, the normal waking adult is not directly conscious of anything going on in the system unconscious. As far as what is going on within his own mind is concerned, he can be conscious only of what is going on in the system preconscious. Elements of that system can be made conscious by being cathected by the system conscious. The cathexis is called the cathexis of attention. Elements of the system unconscious cannot ordinarily be cathected by the system conscious, that is, they cannot attract or receive the cathexis of attention. They must first become preconscious by being joined with the corresponding word trace. Thus, for an element of the system unconscious to become conscious it must receive an additional cathexis or hyper cathexis from two sources. First it must be cathected by the system preconscious, i.e., it must receive the word cathexis that belongs to it; and second it must receive attention cathexis from the system conscious. Exceptions to this rule are to be found in dreaming, in jokes, and above all in neurotic symptom formation. Thus, for example, an obsessional idea does not become conscious by first being cathected by the system preconscious. On the contrary, it becomes conscious despite every effort on the part of the censor of the system preconscious to repress it” [Italics in original] (Ibid).

With the topographic model repression is the feature that will be given attention in the discussion of Management of progression across the causal chain below, as well as being central to the functioning of working memory in Figure 6 (p. 26). For now, it is worthy of note that repression is depicted in Figure 1 (p. 4) as being tantamount to a friend given unpleasant is resolved to pleasant before the realization of depression.

Cost: Consciousness and self-esteem

Mean self-esteem across the life span has already been presented in Figure 7 (p. 29). Discussion here will be about the necessary enablers of self-esteem with focus limited to the interface between the preconscious and the conscious. Discussion of repression and the unconscious is deferred to the following reference to Benefit. Topics to be covered include self-conceptions to self-worth, self-investment and self-esteem, social stigma and self-esteem, dark side of high self-esteem, and self-esteem in perspective.
Self-conceptions to self-worth:

This is about taking a grief-oriented position against some presumption of loss with a person when that person’s issue is about emotional investment in self. This is about the full-force application of the constructs of social, developmental and personality psychology. Specifically, “(a) people's negative and positive affective states. (b) people’s specific self-views and (c) the manner in which people framed their self-views (in terms of importance, certainty, and the self-ideal discrepancy)” (Pelham, 1989).

Self-investment and self-esteem:

Now the backlash versus the prior reference to self-conceptions. From time to time William James is referenced at the expense of Sigmund Freud with the result of such prejudice a misplaced view of a person’s emotional investment in self. James’ involvement in psychology was from 1885 to 1892 (Anonymous, 1910) and as a professor with no patient contact. Freud committed himself to psychology based on his patient contact with his term as a professor an aside versus psychology. With James, at issue is his claim “the importance people attach to their self-views determines the impact of these self-views on people's global feelings of self-worth” (Pelham, 1995). This claim is a firm ‘what’ issue and is silent to any associated ‘why’. The prime concern here is the risk of glossing over a preexisting pathological narcissism, which will be argued with the Costs and benefits of ‘why’ alone discussion below to be the primary initiator to the causal chain to suicide with apathy not a consideration.

Social stigma and self-esteem:

Now a second backlash versus the prior reference to self-conceptions. This is about the less fortunate of society who in turn become stigmatized for any number of reasons with a presumed lack of social clout likely at the top of the list and with that presumption basis for an attempt at grief-oriented counseling when there is in fact no evidence of a loss. The less fortunate of society possess the capacity to be cohesive with their mutual identity functioning as validity – “members of stigmatized groups may (a) attribute negative feedback to prejudice against their group, (b) compare their outcomes with those of the ingroup, rather than with the relatively advantaged outgroup, and (c) selectively devalue those dimensions on which their group fares poorly and value those dimensions on which their group excels” (Crocker, 1989).

Dark side of high self-esteem:

Now a third and final backlash versus the prior reference to self-conceptions. This is an extension of over-correcting self-esteem in the presence of social stigma. At issue is high self-esteem where the reference to high is based on presumption and not on earned experience. “Inflated, unstable, or tentative beliefs in the self's superiority may be most prone to encountering threats and hence to causing violence. The mediating process may involve directing anger outward as a way of avoiding a downward revision of the self-concept” (Baumeister, 1996).

Self-esteem in perspective:

Staying with ‘what’ at the expense of ‘why’ the prior three back-lash counters to the initiating description of self-conceptions paint the problem with self-esteem by putting the character of self-esteem in perspective. That notion of perspective is independent of the situs of thinking – system conscious, system preconscious, system unconscious – and is wholly dependent upon self-imposed expectations with inflation of expectations a function of security. The greater personal security then the lower the inflation, a line of thinking that is a return to the original ‘loss’ versus ‘depression’ concern of this paper, the logic of depression related attitudes versus the logic of loss related beliefs, where each representation of ‘logic of’ is a unique representation of ‘Real’ at the expense of security.
“Researchers have recently questioned the benefits associated with having high self-esteem. ...that the importance of self-esteem lies more in how people strive for it rather than whether it is high or low. ...that in domains in which their self-worth is invested, people adopt the goal to validate their abilities and qualities, and hence their self-worth. When people have self-validation goals, they react to threats in these domains in ways that undermine learning; relatedness; autonomy and self-regulation; and over time, mental and physical health. The short-term emotional benefits of pursuing self-esteem are often outweighed by long-term costs” (Crocker, 2004).

**Benefit: Intelligence and its misapplication aside from commercial inducements**

This is about a person’s ability to exercise their system conscious in a manner that is consistent with their environmental reality. If accomplished, then that in turn enables the capacity to overtrump repression with conscious decisions, which, in turn, frustrates the formation of the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide, with the character of each apathy and suicide determined by the operation of seduction and narcissism. Topics to be covered include evolving character of life, evolving character of security, evolving character of intellect, variability in traits and states, and centrist approach to therapy.

**Evolving character of life:**

Life is a longitudinal event with the accumulation of experience the expectation, with the alignment of that experience to intelligence or its misapplication the concern. If the misapplication of experience is the realization, then that misapplication is nothing more than a contribution to the inertia of the longitudinal event. Otherwise, with system conscious not a consideration, the experience is potentially a contribution to the knowledge base of life. If a contribution is certifiable in some fashion, then it is practical to assume a person’s self-awareness of their identity has been realized where that self-awareness is not necessarily subjected to a qualitative measure.

However, if an anti-thesis to the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide is sought, then that experience needs to be evaluated from the perspective of identity from the developmental perspective where that evaluation is relative to the then-understood health of the knowledge base of life, system conscious a consideration, as it must be assumed that identity development is a lifelong process (Sokol, 2009).

**Evolving character of security:**

A prerequisite to healthy identity development is the insecurity of Figure 4 (p. 19) being resolved to security. To this end, as previously noted, Blatz provides four elementary objectives: Companionship versus ‘substitution’, Logic versus ‘rationalization’, Hobbies versus ‘compensation’ and Sports versus ‘sublimation’ (Blatz, 1944, p.171). A general accounting of unpleasure being resolved to pleasure is available. Either pleasure is gained as an escape from unpleasure such as the orphan portion of Figure 1 (p. 4) where unpleasant is resolved to pleasant, or pleasure is gained on the strength of incremental identity development which is a direct result of self-awareness.

**Evolving character of intellect:**

An additional prerequisite to healthy identity development is the general realness of knowledge and experience. Realness of knowledge allows acceptance that the human mind is an interpretive dynamic that has the capacity to capitalize on each unfortunate and fortunate extensions to the Preservative-Perception dynamic in Table 6 (p. 48), while it is the realness of experience that permits the formation of the Representative and Reflective dynamics in Table 6. The two invocations of realness taken together allows a state of becoming, an abstraction of identity.

**Variability in traits and states:**

This discussion is an extension of the prior segment titled *Square peg, round hole* (p. 45), with each term
of this discussion – variability, traits, states – equally dismissible to intellectualizing without guidance. Prior investigations in psychology have demonstrated repeatedly that grandiosity in analysis leads only to circular logic, which, in turn, runs the risk of postponing the discovery of a contribution to the overall knowledge base. Consider the following qualifier, a repeat from above: “In many ways it seems remarkable that such stability should be found in an area which to date has granted anything but consistent results. Undoubtedly the consistency has always been there, but it has been hidden by inconsistency of factorial techniques and philosophies, the lack of replication using identical variables, and disagreement among analysts as to factor titles” (Tupes, 1961). This implies that the same difficulty exists with each term of this discussion – variability, traits, states – when such need not be as an explicit accounting of states has been developed with that accounting a starting point for an understanding of each variability and states. The accounting spans the next eight paragraphs:

“Sooner or later every psychologist working in the field of personality collides with the problem of trait-names. Whatever method he employs, — rating scales, tests, factor-analysis, clinical interviews or any other technique, — he is forced to ask himself whether the terms he is using in describing qualities and attributes of personality do actually denote psychic dispositions or traits, or whether these terms are mischievous verbal snares tempting him into the pitfalls of hypostatization and other perils of 'verbal magic'. It is small comfort to him to realize that the problem is an ancient one, disputed long ago by the Nominalist and the Realist, and up to the present time remaining a persistent and unsolved problem. It would seem foolhardy to attempt an answer to the riddle of names, including that most difficult question concerning the correspondence between symbols and the phenomena that lie 'in the depths of nature'. Yet the psychologist dealing with personality must have some guidance. The nature of his work forces him to seek out and to identify dynamic mental structures and sub-structures (habits, needs, sentiments, attitudes, or traits) and to name them. Mathematical symbols cannot be used, for they are utterly foreign to the vital functions with which the psychologist is dealing. Only verbal symbols (ambiguous and troublesome as they are) seem appropriate.

Much research in the past has suffered from the haphazard use of trait-names. Often terms emotionally toned have been employed instead of those that are affectively neutral and more appropriate for science. And some investigators have been so naive as to assign an arbitrary name to a hypothetical disposition and then to turn about and 'explain' conduct with the magical aid of the name. Others have committed the opposite fallacy, assuming because names may be used ill-advisedly that therefore symbols never correspond to psychic structures; in a burst of skepticism they sometimes even conclude that there are no psychic structures of any sort. Every alleged structure is a 'fiction'. What is clearly needed is a logic for naming traits that will engender caution and yet will not paralyze psychological investigators with metaphysical misgivings.

The guiding theory advanced in this monograph is based upon inductive considerations drawn from the appended tabulation of all the trait-names in the English language, — all at least that are included in Webster's New Unabridged New International Dictionary. At various times in the past other students of personality have felt the need for such a lexicon of trait-names, and have undertaken the labor of preparing lists, but for one reason or another all these attempts were unfinished.

Although the chief purpose in preparing the present list is theoretical, the classification has several practical uses as well:

(1) Taken as a whole the list is a thesaurus of 17,953 terms, a treasury not only of symbols but also of problems for the psychologist as well. Each single term specifies in some way a form of human behavior; each term is a record of commonsense observation, inexact perhaps, but nevertheless constituting an authentic problem for the science that has taken as its task the purification and
codification of commonsense views of human nature. No easy fly-by-night conception of human personality will satisfy the psychologist who keeps the list at hand. It suggests enough problems to keep him at work for a lifetime.

(2) Psychologists often need to construct schedules of one sort or another for the systematic investigation of personality. Checklists, rating scales, psychographs, guides for interviews, guides for self-study, terms to be used in studies of synonyms or in the construction of questionnaires, — many such selected lists — can be drawn from our tabulation. For the first time the investigator who constructs such special lists may be certain that he can make it as complete as he wishes without having to comb for himself the entire lexicon of the language. In this monograph he will find the preliminary sifting done for him.

... The usefulness of our classification, we feel, is not in the slightest degree dependent upon the acceptance of any particular theory of the nature of human traits. The data are all spread before the reader. If from them he can find support for newer and better theories of personality he is welcome to do so” [Italics added] (Allport, 1936, pp. v-vii).

Centrist approach to therapy:

This is about system conscious operating in defiance of system unconscious hosted repression to include any and all involvement by system preconscious. While the seven-paragraph quote to follow is the antithesis to the causal chain, the way the antithesis occurs is less important than realizing a reduction in the number of persons who did not receive the treatment indicated by a prior diagnosis, NSDUH, Table 5.50A (p. 41).

“Before a person can receive help from a therapist or counsellor, it is essential that certain basic conditions be met. It is probably necessary that the client, whether child or adult, should feel some dissatisfaction with present adjustment, some fundamental need of help. Other treatment techniques, such as changes in the environment, may be effective without this feeling of need, but therapy, as the word has come to be used, can scarcely take place without it. Likewise, therapy has no chance of being successful if there is too heavy a weight of adverse social factors making adjustment impossible except through radical alteration of circumstances. It is also necessary that the client have intelligence above the borderline level. These would seem to be the essential conditions for therapy.

I. Rapport is established. There must be a warmth of relationship between counsellor and counselee if any progress is to be made. Interviewing 'tricks' will not do. There must be on the part of the counsellor a genuine interest in the individual, a degree of identification which is none the less real because it is understood and to some extent controlled. Identification and objectivity are delicately balanced components in the counsellor's approach. In successful therapy these attitudes on the part of the therapist help to build up in the client the confidence and trust which make possible the subsequent elements in the process. The rapport which is established is a lasting thing throughout therapy and constitutes a personal bond which needs to be gradually broken at the conclusion of the interviews. While its emotional value for the client is much greater than for the therapist, yet both are involved and do much better to admit this involvement frankly.

II. There is free expression of feeling on the part of the client. Some of our most significant recent advances in therapy have been in this area. The values of catharsis, of release of feeling, have long been recognized, but only recently have we learned new ways of encouraging such release. The development of play therapy which uses all sorts of media for expression, and the development of psychodramatics are indications that we have only begun to discover the possible procedures in this field. In interview
techniques progress has also been made so that we tend to avoid that blocking of free expression which is so characteristic of our older case records. It is worth noting that some schools of thought encourage expression of material related to past experience, others material related to present feelings. There seems to be no evidence that one is more therapeutic than the other, since, in an important sense, ‘all roads lead to Rome’. Our most profound emotional patterns are as evident in our daily experience as in our past history, as plain in the immediate counselling relationship as in our childhood reactions.

III. Recognition and acceptance, by the client, of his spontaneous self. This process is so closely interrelated with the previous one that they might almost be classed together. As material is given by the client, it is the therapist’s function to help him recognize and clarify the emotions which he feels. In the rapport situation, where he is accepted rather than criticized, the individual is free to see himself without defensiveness, and gradually to recognize and admit his real self with its childish patterns, its aggressive feelings, and its ambivalences, as well as its mature impulses, and rationalized exterior. Often this recognition of self is achieved almost spontaneously, the therapist’s only contribution having been to verbalize the feelings which are expressed in words or behavior or play activities. This process is very much akin to insight, except that it is on a basis of feeling, whereas the term insight is apt to have more of an intellectual connotation.

IV. The making of responsible choices. Perhaps the sharpest difference between present day psychotherapy and earlier practice, is the degree to which the responsibility for the client's life is left in his own hands. The therapist at his best does not suggest, advise, or persuade. He does not assume responsibility for the client's decisions. Instead he encourages the individual, now more clearly aware of his true feelings, and with more acceptance of his total self, to take the responsibility for making new choices. Often hesitantly, often fearfully, the client does so, and is cheered and encouraged by the fact that he finds he can successfully take responsibility for himself, and can direct his energies toward new, self-chosen goals.

V. The gaining of insight through assimilated interpretation. The foundation of insight seems to be the emotional acceptance of self-mentioned under III. In addition, however, insight is often enriched by the therapist’s interpretation of emotional patterns in the life of the individual which have not been recognized. Such interpretations, largely explanations of motives for behavior, serve no useful purpose, and may retard progress, if they are not accepted by the client. Hence, the use of the term 'assimilated interpretation'. Although this process has deep roots in Freudian psychoanalytic procedures, it is probably much less used than formerly. It is the one process described which may play very little, if any, part. We undoubtedly owe much to Rank and Jung for the declining emphasis on insight alone. Insight plus responsible, self-directed choices toward new goals produces new and effective integration. Insight alone, as we see from some of the personal accounts of analysis in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, may leave the individual wiser, but little better able to cope with his situation.

VI. Growing into independence with support. The final period of any therapeutic experience is the process of education or re-education which makes possible the effective continuance of the fundamental gains which have been made. In choosing new goals, the client may need new information which the therapist may supply or help him to obtain. In taking independent steps to cope with his adjustment problems, there will be discouragements and defeats, which the rapport situation helps to neutralize. In these new experiences there are fresh opportunities for the client to see himself even more clearly and to make use of the insight he has previously gained. If the initial aspects of therapy have been successful, this final period comes to a close quite naturally, with some feeling of loss on both sides to be sure, but with the client's feeling of assurance that he can now handle his situation alone” [Italics added] (Rogers, 1940).
Costs and benefits of ‘why’ alone

For the benefit of comparison the starting point is a repeat of material from the above discussion of Costs and benefits of ‘what’ alone.

Each ‘what’ and ‘why’ are about the relationship between a person and their surrounding world. The difference between the two is the general characterization of that relationship – ‘what’ is reactive while ‘why’ is proactive – with the management of anxiety an objective that is common to both ‘what’ and ‘why’. Accompanying this reactive versus proactive characterization are Freud’s topographic and structural models of the human mental apparatus, where the dream-based topographic model (Freud, 1900|1953, pp. 59-621; Arlow, 1964, pp. 9-30) implements the reactive, and the structural model (Freud, 1923|1961, pp. 3-68; Arlow, 1964, pp. 31-55) implements the proactive. A further distinction between reactive and proactive has basis in the accounting of risk and uncertainty where reactive is aligned with pleasure and displeasure and the realness of knowledge and experience, while proactive is aligned with both pragmatism and its limits and traits and personality. This line of thinking is a return to the original ‘loss’ versus ‘depression’ concern of this paper, the logic of depression related attitudes versus the logic of loss related beliefs, where each representation of ‘logic of’ is a unique representation of ‘Real’ at the expense of security. From this it follows that Freud’s “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense” as the primary reference is an extension of reactive while the Bowlby-Ainsworth attachment theory as the secondary reference is an extension of proactive.

Given that origin of the causal chain is grief-oriented counseling which in turn is common to each region of Figure 1 (p. 4), it then follows that there are equal amounts of each Freud’s “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense” and the Bowlby-Ainsworth attachment theory in the enabling dynamics of proactive. Topics to be covered include the enabling dynamics of proactive, pragmatism and its limits and traits and personality.

Enabling dynamics of proactive:

The objective is to provide a preliminary accounting of each the ego as defined by narcissism and the superego as defined by seduction with the inferiority reaction as the point of reference.

Above (p. 35) it was noted that John B. Watson with his work with advertising created the obverse of Adler’s inferiority reaction, a class of individuals who react with confidence in social situations and who have an underlying feeling of superiority as evidenced by their brand loyalty – basically, upscale primates who can be taught to ‘fetch [a brand]’ on demand, thus replicating Pavlov’s work with dogs while contributing nothing to the resolution of substance abuse to include participation in lethal criminal and terrorist organizations, all of which was an extension of Harlow Gale’s prior advertising research at the University of Minnesota from 1895 to 1903 where he conducted an experimental psychology laboratory with the development of the psychology of advertising the result. Further, given that Gale was a student of Wundt, the entire inferiority narrative is then a child of experimental psychology, a claim that affirms Gale’s own laboratory.

Such an affect-void claim about inferiority is valid if for no other reason than the position taken by William James in the Preface to Volume 1 of his two-volume Principles of Psychology: “The treatise which follows has in the main grown up in connection with the author’s class-room instruction in Psychology, although it is true that some of the chapters are more ‘metaphysical,’ and others fuller of detail, than is suitable for students who are going over the subject for the first time. The consequence of this is that, in spite of the exclusion of the important subjects of pleasure and pain, and moral and aesthetic feelings and judgments, the work has grown to a length which no one can regret more than the writer himself” [Italics added] (James, 1890a, p. v).
From an affect-void claim about inferiority it follows that the prior surveys of each system conscious, system preconscious and system unconscious are theoretical with no practical application to reality, from which follows that Freud’s “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense” is a production about prose while his claim of patient experience is unfounded as well as the equal claims of his students and colleagues, to include Freud’s performance as a professor at the University of Vienna. Finally, do keep in mind that having each of the three members of Freud’s topographic model – conscious, preconscious, unconscious – qualified with the term ‘system’ allows each the Quota of affect (experience of feeling or emotion), Cathexis (process of investment of emotional energy in the object world) and Principles of constancy and pleasure (tension management) to be viewed as the economic aspect of each member of Freud’s tripartite topographic model.

The point thus far is that inferiority resolves itself into either the narcissism basis of the ego or the seduction basis of the superego with both the likely result but not of equal strength given the lack of coexistence between the three members of the topographic model. The circa 2000 versus circa 1900 representation of the human mental apparatus has seduction emerging from static voices from the past and narcissistic emerging from dynamic personal theories of what is and what might be as depicted in Figure 10 (p. 57).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>mental label</th>
<th>id</th>
<th>ego</th>
<th>superego</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mental representation</td>
<td>the influence of heredity</td>
<td>the individual’s own experiences</td>
<td>the influence of other people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>mental label</th>
<th>bio-psycho-social continuum</th>
<th>concept of self</th>
<th>seduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mental representation</td>
<td>snapshot of a person’s reality</td>
<td>personal theories of what is and what might be</td>
<td>voices from the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>permanence</td>
<td>dynamic and static</td>
<td>dynamic only</td>
<td>static only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>visibility of source impetus</td>
<td>describable and/or observable</td>
<td>describable only</td>
<td>neither describable nor observable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary cognitive focus</td>
<td>decision</td>
<td>deduction</td>
<td>reasoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cognitive selectivity</td>
<td>more selective attention</td>
<td>less selective awareness</td>
<td>less selective perception</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10 – Distribution of Thought

Source: Cook, 2014, pp. 32-35

What remains are two realizations of the future with the realizations supportive of the prior noted basis for each seduction and narcissistic.

First, in 1924 Freud added a footnote to the section titled “The Nature and Mechanism of Obsessional Neurosis” of his 1896 Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defense Freud where he remarked “This section is dominated by an error which I have since repeatedly acknowledged and corrected. At that time I was not yet able to distinguish between my patients’ phantasies about their childhood years and their real recollections. As a result, I attributed to the aetiological factor of seduction a significance and universality which it does not possess. When this error had been overcome, it became possible to obtain an insight into the spontaneous manifestations of sexuality of children which I described in my Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905). Nevertheless, we need not reject everything written in the text above. Seduction retains a certain aetiological importance, and even to-day I think some of
these psychological comments are to the point” [Italics in original] (Freud, 1896b|1964, p. 168).

Second, in 1939 Grover introduced the notion of progression as opposed to Freud’s regression where progression reduces to the pursuit of safe harbor versus some perceived threat to the emotional self. This alone defines seduction, which, in turn, is reinforced by the simple trials of life such as a small child has an accident during potty training, which is followed by their frustrated parent’s “you ought to be ashamed of yourself” admonishment (Cook, 2014, p. 36).

**Pragmatism and its limits:**

Given the claim that has seduction emerging from static voices from the past and narcissistic emerging from dynamic personal theories of what is and what might be, the question that needs to be addressed is how this claim merges with both the Allport/Odbert investigation of trait names (p. 53) and the Rogers investigation of the process of therapy (p. 54). Clearly this is a question about practical as only that idea can lead to a path of least resistance, perhaps a contra causal chain. Included here is a concern about the character of each cognition and chance.

Locke as already noted has provided an unbiased reference point – “Every step the mind takes in its progress towards knowledge makes some discovery, which is not only new, but the best, too, for the time at least” (Locke, 1689, p. ix). Once the proverbial first of Locke’s many steps has been taken the concern then becomes the accommodation of Zeller’s ‘Real’ with respect to the four-step sequence that results when reactive and proactive are viewed as a seamless continuum, where reactive is aligned with (1) pleasure and displeasure and (2) the realness of knowledge and experience, while proactive is aligned with both (3) pragmatism and its limits and (4) traits and personality. This in turn allows a generalization about cognition to be recognized with (2) and (3) pivotal...

“Theory is the cross-section of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should be” – (2) the realness of knowledge and experience; “practice is the realization of the idea thus gained: it is theory in action” – (3) pragmatism and its limits (Dewey, 1891).

Extending this metaphor through cognition to the self and the object world – “Logic is the name given, for the past two thousand years, to the entire course of those inquiries which relate to the thinking faculty purely as such, aside from the distinct content of thought. It is to exhibit the forms and laws of thought, without pretending to assert anything concerning the objects cognizable through them. To this Logic of an earlier date is opposed another of a more modern origin, taught by Hegel and his followers. It claims to furnish not only a knowledge of the forms of thought, but also a knowledge of the ‘Real’ which constitutes the object of thought; it claims that its subject does not simply embrace logic but also metaphysics, and for this reason is known by the name of the Speculative in contradistinction to the ordinary purely Formal logic. In my opinion, this co-ordination of logic and metaphysics, or the ontological part of metaphysics, is improper. It is said, of course, that the form cannot be separated from the substance; mere forms of thought, which may be applied to any substance equally well are devoid of truth; the forms of thought can claim objective validity only when the essential properties of Being, which in the shape of objective concepts form the very essence of things, can be known along with them” (Zeller, 1875). Now chance...

**Traits and personality:**

The Allport/Odbert inventory of 17,953 terms, a treasury of symbols and problems for the psychologist as well, presents an opportunity for a study of chance with the question limited to the importance of a single term. Chance however seems to be conditioned by the passage of time with the inertia of personality the indicator – “Logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but one law of mind, namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to
them in a peculiar relation of affectability. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with other ideas” (Peirce, 1892). This ‘become welded’ defers consideration to wholeness and ownership with respect to personality. Ownership now with wholeness deferred to after the technical of Freud’s structural model.

In 1932, Erika Fromm, a student of Max Wertheimer, the Father of Gestalt Theory, responded to Wertheimer’s challenge to write a paper about productive thinking. Fromm crafted a letter which she sent to 100 scientists and famous philosophers (such as Albert Einstein, Max Planck, Ernst Kretschmer, Kurt Koffka, Kurt Goldstein, Kurt Lewin, Sigmund Freud, Sandor Ferenczi, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger), asking them to reflect on the process that occurred when they had their most productive thought; she made it very clear that she was only a student. Einstein’s response:

“I will describe for you, as example, the situation which led to the construction of the special theory of relativity.

In mechanics, all inertial frames are equivalent. Experience shows that this equivalence also extends to optics, and thus to electrodynamics. In the theory of the latter, this equivalence appeared to be unachievable. I had earlier become convinced that this was rooted in a profound defect of the theoretical framework. The desire to discover and remove it led to a state of psychic tension in me, which after seven years of fruitless search was released through the relativization of the concept of time and distance. It was similar for the general theory of relativity. Here it was the empirically known relationship between inertial and gravitational mass that required a meaningful interpretation.

It was always the search for a logically simple meaning of empirically established relationships, propelled by the conviction that there existed a simple logical meaning.

The psychological situation is comparable with the attitude of somebody who wants to solve a puzzle or a chess problem, who is convinced that the solution exists, because the creator of the problem possesses the solution. The only difference lies in that the psychic energy arises from the generality of the problem [gestalt], and from its root in the relationship to reality [aesthetics]” [Italics added] (Fromm, 1998).

With respect to an anti-thesis to the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide, Einstein’s generality of the problem and relationship to reality is entirely in line with Anna O’s previously noted recap – “I want to say that a living organization can only exist against the background of a spiritual or ethical goal. Observation of all details, collection of all experiences, which may accomplish the end, uncompromising determination, not to lose the ethical background from view, and most of all: a blessed phantasy – which will keep the creation (you call it organization) alive in outlook. I go so far as to say that it is impossible to organize without phantasy”. These two statements confirm Peirce’s “Logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but one law of mind, namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectability. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with other ideas”.

**Freud’s structural model**

That each new day of life is a declining percentage of the longitudinal event known as life, and, is what sets inertia as the fundamental justification of the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide. To be developed are the two ‘why’ representations of Figure 1 (p. 4). The first and less threatening is the superego as defined by seduction, which triggers detachment then on to suicide ideation only to settle on apathy. The second and most ominous is the ego as defined by narcissism, which triggers protest, then on to apathy only to settle on suicide as a factual event. This latter point is entirely in line with
reports of “eight of ten schizophrenia patients who died by suicide saw a program clinician within 72 hours of death” (Fenton, 2000).

Unlike the topographic model which includes three ‘domains’ – system conscious, system preconscious and system unconscious, Freud’s structural model includes two dimensions the id and the ego, with the ego further divided into two sub-dimensions the ego and the superego, and, then, the three topographic systems are incorporated on an id, ego, superego basis.

The id is the mental functionality a person is born with. Some of the id is repressed while some functions as the autopilot of life. The ego develops with time – as a child gains maturity. There are three concerns here – neurology and philosophy, depth psychology, ego psychology, and, the aetiology of the neurosis.

Neurology and philosophy:

There are a series of timewise disconnects all of which are summarized in the 100-year gap as shown on Figure 10 (p. 57). One might be inclined to object to the structural model as being circa 1900 when the theoretical publication, *The Ego and the Id*, was published in 1923. The ego was introduced as a neurological construct in the Project for a Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1895|1966, pp. 322-324) but with prior attention as a psychiatric construct covered in the *Draft H, Paranoia* to Fleiss (Freud, 1892|1966, pp. 206-212). Now the id...

“Now I think we shall gain a great deal by following the suggestion of a writer who, from personal motives, vainly asserts that he has nothing to do with the rigors of pure science. I am speaking of Georg Groddeck, who is never tired of insisting that what we call our ego behaves essentially passively in life, and that, as he expresses it, we are ‘lived’ by unknown and uncontrollable forces. We have all had impressions of the same kind, even though they may not have overwhelmed us to the exclusion of all others, and we need feel no hesitation in finding a place for Groddeck's discovery in the structure of science. I propose to take it into account by calling the entity which starts out from the system Pcpt. [perception] and begins by being Pcs. [system preconscious] the ‘ego’, and by following Groddeck in calling the other part of the mind, into which this entity extends, and which behaves as though it were Ucs. [system unconscious] the 'id'” (Freud, 1923|1961, p. 23).

Note: "Groddeck himself no doubt followed the example of Nietzsche, who habitually used this grammatical term for whatever in our nature is impersonal and, so to speak, subject to natural law" (Ibid, p. 23).

Depth psychology:

Of the two ‘why’ representations of Figure 1 (p. 4), depth psychology will be advanced in the next topic, *Cost: Ego and the object world*, to the first ‘why’, the less threatening superego as defined by seduction, which triggers detachment then on to suicide ideation only to settle on apathy.

"Dynamic considerations caused us to make our first correction; our insight into the structure of the mind leads to the second. We recognize that the system unconscious does not coincide with the repressed; it is still true that all that is repressed is system unconscious, but not all that is system unconscious is repressed. A part of the ego, too – and Heaven knows how important a part – may be system unconscious, undoubtedly is system unconscious. And this system unconscious belonging to the ego is not latent like the system preconscious; for if it were, it could not be activated without becoming system conscious, and the process of making it conscious would encounter such great difficulties. When we find ourselves thus confronted by the necessity of postulating a third system unconscious, which is not repressed, we must admit that the characteristic of being unconscious begins to lose significance for us. It becomes a quality which can have many meanings, a quality which we are unable to make, as we
should have hoped to do so, the basis of far-reaching and inevitable conclusions. Nevertheless we must beware of ignoring this characteristic, for the property of being conscious or not is in the last resort our one beacon-light in the darkness of depth psychology" (Ibid, pp. 17-18).

**Ego psychology:**

And, of the two ‘why’ representations of Figure 1 (p. 4), ego psychology will be advanced in the following topic, *Benefit: Denial as the prime human motive that frustrates progress*, to the second ‘why’, the more threatening ego as defined by narcissism, which triggers protest, then on to apathy only to settle on suicide as a factual event.

“Consciousness is a continuum, with the waking state at one extreme and the deepest forms of sleep at the other. The various altered states of consciousness range themselves in between. ... (1) primary and secondary process; (2) ego activity, ego passivity, and ego receptivity; and (3) automatization and deautomatization.

1. Primary and secondary processes. According to psychoanalytic theory, cognitive modes and organization range on a continuum from drive-dominated primary process to the reality-oriented secondary process. Primary process is a 'primitive' cognitive mode typical of preverbal childhood. It denotes thinking in images, not in words and logical concepts. When it occurs spontaneously in the adult, it represents an input from the unconscious that transcends waking logic and ordinary modes of thought. ...

2. Ego activity, passivity and receptivity. The ego can be defined as the reality-testing, choice-making apparatus. ...the central element in the distinction between ego activity and ego passivity is the presence or absence of choice: the ego is active when the individual can make a choice of his own free will; it is passive when he loses this autonomy vis-a-vis the stimuli he receives from his instinctual drives, from the environment, or from the superego.

The issue of activity and passivity of the ego is essentially tied to the concept of coping (or failing to cope), ...creative coping and protective or defensive coping. In both the ego maintains relative autonomy. In creative coping the ego actively meets the demands coming from the instincts, from reality, or from the superego and handles them masterfully at its own leisure and pace. In protective coping the individual defends himself against these demands, but the action lacks the free, smooth elegance of sovereign mastery.

When the ego is passive, the person accedes to the demands coming from the instincts, the superego, or the external world and acts in accordance with these demands. He submits even though such action is ego dystonic. Or he may be so helpless in the face of demands that he feels overwhelmed and cannot act at all. The latter is a characteristic occurrence in catastrophic reactions, in psychoses, and in psychedelic 'bad trips'. ...

3. Automatization and deautomatization. Automatization is the result of systematic habit forming for the purpose of economy in the expenditure of conscious attention and energy. For instance, the child's acquired automatic knowledge of the multiplication tables or the automatic reflex of the right foot that steps on the brake at the first sign of danger while one drives a car renders superfluous having to figure out the solution each time anew. With increasing exercise of an action, the intermediate steps at the perceptual and cognitive level disappear from consciousness, and the related responses in the motor and cognitive systems are habitualized. ...

Deautomatization dissolves the assumption of unproblematic familiarity with one's environment. It dissolves the cognitive and reality structure ossified by habit and brings the individual into a fresh rapport with his 'biosphere'" (Fromm, 1976).
Aetiology of the neurosis:

This is a return to the global qualifier applied to Figure 1 (p. 4).

One might assume that the terms ‘loss’ and ‘depression’ are synonyms even though loss has previously been associated with mourning while depression has previously been associated with melancholia. To be sure, the terms are not synonymous, nor do they behave in the same manner with respect to the causal chain as balance between the static ‘what’ of depression and the dynamic ‘why’ of loss is necessary where the difference is driven by the logic of depression related attitudes versus the logic of loss related beliefs.

From this it follows that each representation of ‘logic of’ is a unique representation of ‘Real’ (Zeller, 1875) without regard for ‘sense’ – static versus dynamic. This ‘sense’, then, is the issue with respect to the causal chain, with static the anti-thesis to the causal chain and with dynamic the chain’s fundamental basis, with static equated to theory and dynamic equated to practice: “Theory is the cross-section of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should be” – (2) the realness of knowledge and experience; “practice is the realization of the idea thus gained: it is theory in action” – (3) pragmatism and its limits (Dewey, 1891).

The terms ‘loss’ and ‘depression’ are not synonyms given each has a distinct historical basis with that basis accounted for in this paper’s references two main references – “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense” and attachment theory with focus limited to the following six constructs from the first reference: (1) Three methods of defence (phobias, hysterical symptoms, mixed neurosis). (2) Theory of repression (relation to reality). (3) Quota of affect (experience of feeling or emotion). (4) Cathexis (process of investment of emotional energy in the object world). (5) Principles of constancy and pleasure (tension management). (6) Working hypothesis (stigma (%) + self-esteem (%) = 100%), with affect-void apathy an acceptable substitute for self-esteem (Freud, 1894a|1962).

Cost: Ego and the object world

Given, with depth psychology the basis, that system unconscious is a mixture of repressed material as well as an inventory of artifacts of life, and given that system unconscious is not known to be organized by some cataloging scheme, it then becomes necessary to think first in terms of global, with detail about Zeller’s ‘Real’ to follow if information is supportive.

This means that pragmatism is not about strategic analysis of the Allport/Odbert array of trait names (p. 53) nor strategic planning against Rogers’ process of therapy (p. 54) but is global to a path of least resistance regarding the ego and its relationship to its object world. Thus, with the possibility of ‘loss’ considered as being equal to the possibility of ‘depression’, consideration needs to span the principles of Gestalt, supportive characterization of cognition, and a practical counter to system unconscious.

Principles of Gestalt:

There are in general three ways of viewing behavior. One stresses the importance of the stimulus; another, the self; and the third the whole situation which gives rise to the act. The first is popularly known as stimulus-response psychology and is mechanistic in tone. The second is an organismic and purposive view of behavior. It is sometimes called hormic psychology. The third position, stressed by Gestalt psychology, can best be understood by a consideration of the weaknesses of the other two.

The stimulus-response psychology is weak in two respects. First, it treats the self as passive until aroused to action by some activating condition. According to it, the self is like a 'model T' Ford waiting to be cranked. And secondly, it does not explain what makes a stimulus a stimulus. A given object, say one's phone, may long be ignored; suddenly it is responded to. Why it becomes a stimulus, the
stimulus-response psychology cannot explain. Hormic psychology finds no difficulty in doing so or in accounting for activity. It regards the organism as innately active and sets for itself the task of understanding why it acts as it does. Objects, it holds, become stimuli when they are in line with the needs or desires of the organism. This view, however, does not give a satisfactory account of the rise of needs or desires of the self. Instead it seems to regard them as rising in Leibnizian fashion purely spontaneously, unaffected by conditions outside of the self. In stressing the importance of the self, it neglects the environment.

Gestalt psychology seeks to combine the part truths of the mechanistic and the hormic views of behavior into a more comprehensive one. The stimulus (environment) is important; so is the self; for behavior is related to both. It is an outgrowth of a set of conditions, the psychological whole, of which the self and environment are parts. Desires, emotions, and activities of all kinds are outgrowths of the whole, in much the same way that pressure is an outgrowth of the whole situation one-body-bearing-down-on-another” (Josey, 1935).

Taking the intent of the Gestalt into personality organization as an abstraction is the syndrome. Borrowed from medicine, “a syndrome is used to mean a complex of symptoms which are usually found to occur together, which are therefore given a unifying name, and which are usually considered, even in the absence of proof, to have some common single origin, or determination. Used thus, the word has its shortcomings as well as its advantages. For one thing it usually connotes disease and abnormality rather than health or normality. We shall not use it in any such special sense, considering it rather to be a general concept which refers only to a type of organization without reference to the ‘value’ of this organization” (Maslow, 1943c).

With the idea of a syndrome as a pivot and with the understanding that a syndrome is not the result of some edict but an adaptation of popular use, to be presented next is a list of six unities as a snapshot of a Gestalt at any particular point in time:

1. “Dynamic (teleological, teleonomic, motivational) unities. – This form of unity is Allport’s and Stern's directive unity, in which the parts are integrated by the fact that they all lie on the path to some one goal of the organism. They have a common purpose. A very appreciable proportion of the more important traits in trait lists thee fall in this category, including the definitely 'dispositional' (21) traits, e.g., timidity, amorousness, assertiveness, acquisitiveness” (Cattell, 1943a).

2. “Social mold (environmental demand] unities. – Many trait terms point to a unity from the standpoint of society's needs or as occasioned by the pressure of the environment rather than from that of the individual's ergic goals. For example, society needs, in certain fields of the individual's total activities, the quality of honesty. Educational pressure is brought to bear creating a number of specific habits, each of which is directed to the common social purpose of ensuring public honesty. These behavior elements may be attached to quite diverge dynamic systems within the individual, e.g., to affection, fear or self-assertion, to patriotism or filial loyalty. Such unities will arise when the press of the environment tends to act with equal strength with respect to all the elements demanded, as in a mold or die press. Thus with respect to honesty, if the individual has lived in a good environment he will have been strongly pressed for all kinds of honest behavior, whereas if one kind of honest behavior has been neglected in his upbringing it will be likely that all the rest have had an equally faint imprint. Consequently, as between individuals, the trait elements will vary together, and in one individual, will be united by common origin and fate, notably common rate of extinction, depending on common age of formation” (Ibid).

3. “Constitutional, non-dynamic (temperamental) unities. – There exist behavior -elements united in a common variation and common fate because they spring from some unitary constitutional endowment
of the organism, which, however, is not of a dynamic teleological nature.' The endowment concerned is one of physical energy, nervous sensitivity, fatigability, reaction-time speed, susceptibility to inhibition, or some other unitary character not imposed by the environment. Although the unitary character does not reside in the environment the behavior elements are, of course, an interaction between an heredity and an environment, and in some cases the role of the environment is evident in provoking the emergence of the pattern even though it plays little or no part in deciding the nature of the pattern, e.g., in hereditary psychotic unities, as when manic depressive disorder is precipitated by environmental stress or epilepsy by a tumor. In a true constitutional trait, environment, in so far as it affects it, affects it as a whole. Prolonged excessive demands on the part of environment might reduce the trait of 'energeticness,' or disease (e.g., myxedema) might affect general speed of response. On the other hand the 'general inhibition' or 'introversion' produced by an unduly punishing environment should be distinguishable from that general inhibition and introversion due to constitutional sensitivity by the fact that the former has a restricted pattern, depending on the elements of the environmental mold which have been repressive. Furthermore the constitutional trait will be more common and similar for all individuals, in so far as human genetic endowment is more uniform than are cultural patterns and accidents of upbringing” (Ibid).

4. “Co-nascent (developmental, emergent) unities. – A basis for classification which naturally occurs to one in thinking over the principal grounds for the classification of living objects and their characters is that of age and development. A trait would then be considered unitary if its parts emerge at the same time, ontogenetically or phylogenetically. Incidentally the word co-nascent is employed because both 'developmental' and 'genetic' would be misleading. All traits develop, and genetic is best used as synonymous with 'hereditary.' Actual trait names of this class are to be found, though they are rare, somewhat anomalous and not particularly important. We find 'infantile,' 'adolescent,' 'mature' and 'senile.' 'Beastly' and 'monkey-like' perhaps illustrate the phylogenetic usage” (Ibid).

5. “Logical (stylistic, evaluative, semantic) unities. – This category is suggested by Allport's stylistic trait but extends much more widely. He contrasted such traits with dynamic traits, for the former describe the individual's characteristic way of working toward some goal whereas the latter are labelled by the goal itself. Examples are forceful, polite, dainty, gruff, eloquent, direct, debonair and ceremonious” (Ibid).

6. “Miscellaneous forms of trait unity. – The kinds of unity according to which trait elements could be grouped in unitary traits are presumably unlimited. Classification could be made, for example, according to such bizarre features as the relative frequency of use of various motor organs or according to the alphabetical order of the stimuli which evoke the trait elements. Our task has been, however, to discover the senses in which the term trait is already implied by its dictionary examples, and to ask which of these or other senses are psychologically meaningful or desirable. The existing usages which remain to be surveyed are few or unimportant. Chief among them is the view that traits might be named by the stimulus situations which evoke them or the kind of response habit by which they are expressed” (Ibid).

As objective as the prior list of six unities might appear to be, they are still a snapshot of a Gestalt at any particular point in time: “Finally we have to note that all the above methodology says nothing about the permanence of traits within the individual. Except in factor analysis one is taking a picture with a flashlight, discovering configurations that exist at a given moment. (In most rating, as opposed to test, studies, it would be a fairly long 'moment'). Thus one might catch, in addition to what are usually called traits, the patterns of states of maladjustment or even moods, needs-in-action, and physiological transient states. These patterns could be sorted out from the more permanent ones by examining
consistency coefficients over various intervals. What degree of permanence is required to constitute a trait rather than a state is a relatively arbitrary issue” (Ibid).

Supportive characterization of cognition:

A contrarian approach to a best-guess configuration of system unconscious is a proper extension of the wholeness advocated by Gestalt. This includes believable testimonials and clearly stated technique and objectives.

Testimonials are to built-up from easily recognizable sources, e.g., Einstein’s generality of the problem and relationship to reality; Anna O’s “I want to say that a living organization can only exist against the background of a spiritual or ethical goal”; and, Peirce’s “law of mind”.

Clearly stated technique requires care in communicating assumptions about the likes of trauma and phobias. Clearly stated objectives require care in communicating assumptions about a contrarian approach to prevent, or at least minimize, the feeling of threat (Verhaeghe, 2005).

Practical counter to system unconscious:

Plausible configurations covering any possible combination of the following five approaches to the likes of frustration: (1) methods of defence, (2) repression in relation to reality, (3) characterizations of feeling or emotion, (4) emotional investment in the object world, (5) tension management.

Here the contrarian approach involves reactions to external stimuli such as guilt oriented advertising (Coulter, 1995). The idea being a determination of the durability of frustration, with insight gained into durability basis for a working hypothesis (stigma (%) + self-esteem (%) = 100%), with affect-void apathy an acceptable substitute for self-esteem.

Benefit: Denial as the prime human motive that frustrates progress

Given, with ego psychology the basis, that system unconscious is comprised of contributors to denial with no allowance for an assessment of real versus imagined, it is only practical to consider Zeller’s reference to ‘Real’ as subordinate to (1) attachment being molded by the ego as defined by narcissism, (2) protest being sanctioned by a personal theory of instincts or drives, and, (3) apathy not being satisfied by a personal theory of security. The parallel topics are primary and secondary processes, ego activity, passivity and receptivity, and, automatization and deautomatization, with biology versus psychology the lead discussion.

Biology versus psychology:

The starting point is differentiation in thought as set forth by Freud. “I try in general to keep psychology clear from everything that is different in nature from it, even biological lines of thought. For that very reason I should like at this point expressly to admit that the hypothesis of separate ego-instincts and sexual instincts (that is to say, the libido theory) rests scarcely at all upon a psychological basis but derives its principal support from biology. But I shall be consistent enough [with my general rule] to drop this hypothesis if psycho-analytic work should itself produce some other, more serviceable hypothesis about the instincts. So far, this has not happened. It may turn out that, most basically and on the longest view, sexual energy – libido – is only the product of a differentiation in the energy at work generally in the mind. But such an assertion has no relevance. It relates to matters which are so remote from the problems of our observation, and of which we have so little cognizance, that it is as idle to dispute it as to affirm it; this primal identity may well have as little to do with our analytical interests as the primal kinship of all the races of mankind has to do with the proof of kinship required in order to establish a legal right of inheritance. All these speculations take us nowhere. Since we cannot wait for another science to present us with the final conclusions on the theory of the instincts, it is far more to
the purpose that we should try to see what light may be thrown upon this basic problem of biology by a synthesis of the psychological phenomena. Let us face the possibility of error; but do not let us be deterred from pursuing the logical implications of the hypothesis we first adopted of an antithesis between ego-instincts and sexual instincts (a hypothesis to which we were forcibly led by analysis of the transference neuroses), and from seeing whether it turns out to be without contradictions and fruitful, and whether it can be applied to other disorders as well, such as schizophrenia” [Italics in original] (Freud, 1914|1957, pp. 78-79). This was written in 1914, the year of this writing is 2019, a gap of 105 years and the jury is still out with no hint about deliberations available.

There are available approaches – (1) unconditionally accept biology as the elementary basis of instinct thus following the associations by the early Greeks between cognition and the senses (Beare, 1905), thinking that seems to have replicated itself in the prior discussion of Square peg, round hole (p. 45), and, lest we forget, the idea of sex appeal behind the Pebeco advertising campaign (p. 35). (2) unconditionally accept psychology as the elementary basis of instinct thus following the assertions contained in Jung’s analysis of introversion versus extraversion (Jung, 1921, pp. 10-14). (3) provisionally accept the self-conscious characterization that is at the base of Ovid’s Narcissus (Metamorphoses 3.339-510): Echoes of Oedipus (Gildenhard, 2000). (4) Accept Allport’s call for life to be treated “as a process (becoming) and not as a state (being in equilibrium)” (Allport, 1960), and with that call recognized to have been expanded through the Allport/Odbert investigation of trait names (p. 53), Cattell’s unities (p. 63) and the Rogers investigation of the process of therapy (p. 54).

The decision is to accept all four with the fourth set as the senior member given the narrative develops the self-conscious characterization; now analysis of that decision.

There is no point in crafting a challenge to (1), the notion that has biology as the elementary basis of instinct. The discipline known as advertising is in command.

The idea of (2) and (3) unconditionally accepting psychology as the elementary basis of instinct thus accepting Jung’s analysis of each introversion and extraversion runs the risk of accepting a static notion. However, setting each introversion and extraversion as being driven by delusions changes static to dynamic given that there are two distinct kinds of delusions – extraversion-oriented positive wish fulfilling delusions of grandeur and introversion-oriented negative delusions of persecution and depreciation (Jung, 1915).

The idea of (4) being about self-conscious has great appeal. First self-conscious is undeniable a representation of some configuration of systems conscious, preconscious and unconscious, with or without the influence of biology as the elementary basis of instinct or the influence of psychology as the elementary basis of instinct due to the influence of dynamic delusions. Second, self-conscious is the face of self-esteem with narcissism nothing more than a mask.

Primary and secondary processes:

The idea of self-conscious implies in-stream auditing of possible what-is alliances that may advance to a what-might-be attachment. This implies a reliance on supportive information that is in line with the then-understood what-is self, with a what-might-be that is not in the best interest of a person in the long term (Tafarodi, 1998). As time goes on the risk of a gap between the factual what-is and the sought what-might-be representation widens (Geukes, 2017) to the point that each representation is at risk of a collapse.

Ego activity, passivity and receptivity:

There are three possibilities here. The first is an introversion-oriented negative delusion that operates parallel to social stigma that in turn protects self-esteem. The operative feature here is attachment-
related decisions increase the protection of self-esteem through the pursuit of like-minded persons which defuses the identified stigma (Crocker, 1989). The second is an extraversion-oriented positive delusion that operates as a protective shield to the point where the shield becomes the objective, where the poison is more attractive than the cure (Baumeister, 2001). The third is centered on self-consciousness where delusions if any are minimal. This is about living in the ‘now’ with the then-understood self (Di Pierro, 2016).

**Automatization and deautomatization:**

This is an extension of self-consciousness where delusions if any are minimal but not understood. There are two issues here – the routine of life and the unexpected. With the routine of life, delusions, negative or positive, skew the psychological reality away from a state of being that is contrary to the likes of an entrenched habit that alone might be satisfying. Being that the delusions are recognized as not understood, the only defense is a belief in self (Sedikides, 2004). With the unexpected, the state of self-consciousness is wholly dependent on a person’s penchant for risk within the confines of the time available to react to the unexpected (Besser, 2010).

**Costs and benefits of 'what' and ‘why’ taken together**

The focus of this discussion is grief as the subjective basis for the causal chain of Figure 1 (p. 4), even though it is the least influential dynamic by the construction of that Figure.

Grief however is not without substantial influence on two counts. First, grief activates presumed despair that, in turn, either exhausts itself as a presumed depression or it becomes a phantom trigger of either protest or detachment. Second, grief facilitates attention being directed to either the ego as defined by narcissism or the superego as defined by seduction leaving a final resolution to the dictates of therapeutic technique and time.

This second route exposes the true issue – resolution of an unstated impetus with self-consciousness the only defense, which, in turn, is a call for recognition of emotional development.

The unstated impetus is assumed to be anxiety, which is challenged by loneliness with a more defined anxiety the result from two perspectives. First, “The most unpleasant and at the same time the most universal experience except loneliness is anxiety. We observe both healthy and mentally disturbed people doing everything possible to ward off anxiety or to keep it from awareness” (Fromm-Reichmann, 1955). Second, “The loneliness of modern life may be considered in two ways: the existential loneliness which inevitably is a part of human experience, and the loneliness of self-alienation and self-rejection which is not loneliness at all but a vague and disturbing anxiety. Existential loneliness is an intrinsic and organic reality of human life in which there is both pain and triumphant creation emerging out of long periods of desolation. In existential loneliness man is fully aware of himself as an isolated and solitary individual while in loneliness anxiety man is separated from himself as a feeling and a knowing person" [Italics added] (Moustakas, 1961, p. 24).

The approach to now be developed is an extension of the Practical counter to system unconscious (p. 65). Specifically, with Figure 1 (p. 4), the focus will not be on the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide, but on the causal chain to seduction and/or narcissism, in the form of a set of three prescriptive assumptions ranging from most general to least general.

Most general: Loneliness anxiety.
Middle general: Plausible configurations covering any possible combination of the following five approaches to the likes of frustration: (1) methods of defence, (2) repression in relation to reality, (3) characterizations of feeling or emotion, (4) emotional investment in the object world, (5) tension management.

Least general: “Theory is the cross-section of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should be” – (2) the realness of knowledge and experience; “practice is the realization of the idea thus gained: it is theory in action” – (3) pragmatism and its limits (Dewey, 1891).

These three prescriptive assumptions will be covered from the least general to the most general: Pragmatism will be addressed via the prescriptive assumptions of Plato and Aristotle; frustration via feelings and emotions, and, loneliness and anxiety via self-worth. The ethics of the recognition of emotional development will be the final topic.

Pragmatism via the prescriptive assumptions of Plato and Aristotle:

What follows are two long quotes with each selected based on educational content. Keep in mind that while what follows was written 100 years ago – 1919 versus 2019 – the conveyed information is prescriptive of life unlike the intellectualizing that characterizes the material presented in the Square peg, round hole (p. 45). Plato, then Aristotle:

"The earliest Greek thinkers show comparatively little interest in the inner life of man. Their speculations are characteristically cosmological, not psychological. Human nature is not altogether ignored; human life, in the large sense, is contemplated and criticized; a beginning is made of the unending philosophical task of distinguishing a realm of the spirit and of relating it to the order of the world. But there is at first no clear recognition of conscious phenomena worthy of study on their own account. Such subordinate attention as is given to the scientific study of man is largely confined to his bodily constitution, his physical generation and his elementary processes of cognition. His pleasures, pains and passions, so far as they are considered at all, are treated for the most part from the practical point of view of ethics or in their relation to health and disease. The free, psychological discussion of the affections is an achievement of modern times, but the roots of all modern doctrines strike deep in the speculations of the Greeks. The first considerable attempt at an affective psychology was made by Plato. But Plato drew largely on his predecessors and his work in this field, with all its originality, marks rather the end of a period than the beginning of a new one. His point of departure is the discussion concerning the relation of pleasure to good in contemporary ethics, but his views concerning the nature of pleasure and the affective life generally are greatly influenced by earlier opinion, which in its main trend was biological or physiological.

... No one will be deceived as to the significance of these beginnings of a scientific treatment of the emotions. Their outlines are vague. They rest on no such independent examination, no such attempted isolation and classification of the phenomena as Plato attempted in the case of pleasure. He could describe the play of emotions in individual characters in particular situations with the skill of a supreme artist. But what he has to say on emotions in general is fragmentary and on its physiological side, to all appearance, a reflection of current medical opinion on the nature of disease. Such expression as he gives of the best scientific thought of his time on this subject only makes manifest the necessity for fresh beginnings and further developments. These we have in Aristotle, who not only gives us a new theory of pleasure, but also the first connected and relatively systematic study of the emotions and passions" (Gardiner, 1918).

“Aristotle's treatment of the affections, like Plato's, is conditioned throughout by other than purely
psychological interests. His principal discussion of pleasure is in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, where the primary aim is to define the relation of pleasure to the pursuit of the moral end; and his principal discussion of the emotions is in the second book of the Rhetoric, where the main object is to relate the emotional susceptibilities of an audience to the art of persuasion. In the De Anima, where psychological problems are handled more from the point of view of a philosophy of mind, with the emphasis on cognition, references to the phenomena of the affective life are few and incidental.

Nevertheless, wherever Aristotle does treat of these phenomena, whether incidentally or in a connected discussion subordinate to an ulterior purpose, he seems to be genuinely interested in the facts. His inventory of the facts is far fuller than Plato's, his analysis more thorough. In constructing a theory there is always a certain selection of the material, a guiding idea and a mutual adaptation and molding of the two as the theory develops. But the emphasis may be now on the one factor, and now on the other. Plato's emphasis is on the ideal factor, Aristotle is more careful in the manipulation of the material. Thus in the doctrine of pleasure Aristotle's theory seems to be more molded on the facts, whereas Plato makes the impression of fitting the facts to the requirements of ideas. The antithesis is not absolute; both writers deal reflectively with experience, and neither succeeds in clearly discriminating the psychological from logical and practical points of view. But Aristotle comes nearest to such discrimination of any ancient writer, and although, as has been said, 'he studied psychology as a philosopher and was chiefly interested in it as it bore on philosophical problems', he nevertheless exhibits in a remarkable degree the spirit of scientific detachment in surveying and handling his material. Hence his account of the emotions, imperfect as it is, and particularly his conception of pleasure as a concomitant of the normal exercise of vital function, though that too is incomplete, are not only of importance historically, but contain large elements of permanent psychological value.

Aristotle begins the discussion of pleasure by criticizing the definition of it as a kind of motion, especially Plato's view of it as originating in a process of the replenishment of a deficiency, and, therefore, as conditioned on a state of pain. Pleasure cannot be a motion, he argues, for motion implies rate; but while the transition to pleasure may be quick or slow, these terms are not applicable to the pleasure itself. The conception of it as a process of replenishment and as conditioned on pain was suggested, he thinks, by the pains and pleasures of nutrition, such as hunger and thirst and the satisfaction of these wants. But this conception, besides making pleasure a bodily state, is plainly inadequate to meet the case of many pleasures in which no pain of want precedes. Plato, as we have seen, admitted and glorified these pure, painless pleasures without, however, being able to explain them in terms of his original theory. As against the view that pleasure is a motion or process, Aristotle maintains that it is something which at any moment of its actual existence is naturally complete. Duration is essential to motion, but not to pleasure; even a momentary pleasure is wholly and entirely pleasure. Like the act of vision or a mathematical point, pleasure is without beginning, middle or end.

Aristotle must not be held responsible for these special observations and explanations, though we may fairly ascribe to him the general direction which they follow, and which was followed in the school for generations. Thus in the Problems falsely ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisia (C.200 B.C.) we find a number of the same and similar questions raised and essentially the same principles used to solve them. Here 'nature', which, following the usage of Hippocrates, appears as the synonym of the pneuma or physical soul, plays a prominent part in the crude teleologico-biological explanations. We turn pale in fear because 'nature' and the provident force of the body seek the body's safety by retreating downwards, as we, when in danger, take refuge in our houses. We color in joy because 'nature', self-taught, goes out to meet the object of pleasure as we go to meet a friend or a child. We blush in shame because 'nature', with a certain instinctive consciousness of evil, decently retires, like a well-born maiden, to the interior and inferior part of the body, and the blood, separating and diffusing itself,
invests the body like a covering veil, as the maiden covers her face with her hands. Fantastic as these speculations appear, they nevertheless contain the germs of the idea that the organic expressions of the emotions are essential parts of the phenomena to be studied and that they arise in the main instinctively and spontaneously with reference to the welfare of the organism. This idea could not be duly developed until for notions of hot and cold, dry and moist, 'nature', pneuma, vital heat and the physical soul there were substituted more precise conceptions of the nervous system with its sensory, motor and vaso-motor functions, and of the whole organism as related to its environment through a process of evolution. But this is a late achievement of the present time, and we are still far from the solution of the problems of emotion. The imperfect physiology of the ancients naturally led to much futile writing; on the other hand, the interest taken in the study of the phenomena led to some not unimportant observations of fact and not infrequently to explanations which were correct in principle. The same writer who compares the blush of shame to a girl's hiding of her face with her hands notes with scientific acuteness the closing or semi-closing of the eyes in the enjoyment of voluptuous pleasure, ascribing the phenomenon to the withdrawal of energy, or as we should say attention, from external perception and its absorption in the voluptuous sensations themselves, and explains the sighs of grief, love and anger as phenomena of physical oppression and relief involving at once the condition of the lungs and of the heart" (Gardiner, 1919).

Frustration via feelings and emotions:
Covered here is an extension of both the prior discussion of Biology and psychology (p. 65) and the above Aristotle-associated reference to "...blush of shame to a girl's hiding of her face with her hands..."

For those familiar with the James-Lange and Cannon-Bard physiology-based (thalamic) theories of emotion, while the material is important, it is a distraction from the current focus on the starkness of emotion with respect to apathy and/or suicide.

There are four differentiable feelings that differ only in tone: pain-unpleasantness, pleasure-pleasantness, excitement and depression (Harlow, 1932). These four are then associated with the likes of frustration on the basis of (1) methods of defence, (2) repression in relation to reality, (3) characterizations of feeling or emotion, (4) emotional investment in the object world, (5) tension management.

The feelings are associated with the id while the corresponding emotions are learned and are thus associated with the ego (Harlow, 1933).

Loneliness and anxiety via self-worth:
This is about an understanding of self as well as a need to hone the subject material of the *Square peg, round hole* (p. 45) to fit an understanding of self at the expense of intellectualizing.

While there is an age correlation between mean self-esteem (Figure 7 (p. 29)), there remains the issue of learning. “Three factors were identified that uniquely contribute to people's global self-esteem: (a) people's tendencies to experience positive and negative affective states, (b) people's specific self-views (i.e., their conceptions of their strengths and weaknesses), and (c) the way people frame their self-views. Framing factors included the relative certainty and importance of people's positive versus negative self-views and the discrepancy between people's actual and ideal self-views. The contribution of importance to people's self-esteem, however, was qualified in two ways. First, importance contributed only to the self-esteem of those who perceived that they had relatively few talents. Second, individuals who saw their positive self-views as important were especially likely to be high in self-esteem when they were also highly certain of these positive self-views” (Pelham, 1989).
Loneliness and anxiety are at the purest point of differentiation between the terms ‘loss’ and ‘depression’. With respect to the causal chain, loneliness and anxiety form the backbone of the logic of loss related beliefs with the logic of depression related attitudes holding a supporting role only.

**Ethics of the recognition of emotional development:**

Covered here is an extension of ego psychology with basis in the above Aristotle-associated reference to “…blush of shame to a girl’s hiding of her face with her hands...”.

Emotional development is a function of conditioning with time incremental behavior forming the bridge. Contrary to the likes of cognitive psychology and its addiction to ‘what’, there is a ‘why’ side to life. A person’s hand touches a hot plate and the body reacts while the brain records the experience, not the other way around where the brain anticipates the presence of a hot plate and then takes a proactive stance. Behavior is real (Skinner, 1987).

**Cost: Ambivalence-repression versus decisiveness-suppression**

There are two objectives here with respect to ‘what’ versus ‘why’. The first is to align ‘what’ to suicide via an accounting of decisiveness-suppression, and the second is to align ‘why’ to apathy via an accounting of ambivalence-repression. Once done then attention turns to anxiety and frustration.

With the anxiety of loneliness the focus, grief is incrementally aligned to systems conscious, preconscious and unconscious; and, with anxiety spawned frustration the focus, a dynamic causal chain to seduction and/or narcissism is aligned with a static causal chain to apathy and/or suicide.

‘what’ – suicide resolved to an accounting of decisiveness-suppression:

Discussion spans conditioning as learning, suicide ideation as result of conditioning, impaired awareness and emotion regulation.

Conditioning as learning is a process that follows basic rules which include “conditioning, inhibitory conditioning, remote conditioning, the effects of practice, forgeting, temporary extinction, emotional reinforcement, irradiation, response to patterns as such, and insight, may all be understood as instances of a very simple and very familiar principle, the ancient principle of association by contiguity in time. …In order to examine its possibilities, the principle of conditioning may be stated in a simple form: *Stimuli acting at a given instant tend to acquire some effectiveness toward the eliciting of concurrent responses, and this effectiveness tends to last indefinitely*” [Italics in original] (Guthrie, 1930).

Suicide ideation is the result of conditioning, a defendable claim as suicide as a goal is no different than any other goal one might associate with classical (Pavlovian) or operant (Skinnerian) condition. The alternative is to take the cognitive approach where the “central argument is that suicide is often an escape from the self – that is, from meaningful awareness of certain symbolic interpretations or implications about the self” (Baumeister, 1990). The difference is that “meaningful awareness” is an observation while conditioning is a long-term action.

Impaired awareness as a placeholder for decisiveness is the application of Freud’s non-repressed system unconscious. Impaired awareness is a dynamic counter to a static conscious awareness as host to the relationship between repression and suppression (Boag, 2010) with that action conducted in working memory as depicted in Figure 6 (p. 26) with the dynamic-versus-static exchange accounted for by the bounded rationality Figure 5 (p. 26) overlay of working memory.

The dynamic-versus-static exchange might be claimed to be a subset of emotion regulation – not true – the exchange is the result of learning and not cognition (Gross, 1993).
'why’ – apathy resolved to an accounting of ambivalence-repression:

This is about boundaries. On one end are self-imposed boundaries as hosted by system unconscious. At the other end are boundaries as set by the object world. In between are apathy and ambivalence.

Self-imposed boundaries as hosted by system unconscious range from the general array of habits, through learned repression, and then on to the philosophical side of the object world.

The general array of habits, the ‘auto-pilot’ of life, are likely voluntarily hosted by system unconscious. “(1) Habit responses are definite responses of the individual to specific stimuli; (2) there is close integration between stimulus and response; (3) points and enable one to regard habits as being both general and specific capacities (habit may be regarded as a generic symbol for various types of morphological responses); (4) the integrativeness of habits is responsible for each distinct habit connection comprising some specific response to a specific stimulus; (5) the principle of integration furnishes a basis for calling social, intellectual, and emotional reactions habits, not merely confining the term to overt reactions; (6) notwithstanding point five, the term habit does not comprise all reactions acquired by the individual; (7) a repetition of Munsterberg’s and Holt's objections to the old cortex-to-lower-center-relegation doctrine; and (8) while in various complex actions, attention and cognition reaction systems are autonomous acts intervening between stimulus and the final response by which the behavior segment is named, in the habit the action phase is so closely integrated with the stimulus situation that the attention and cognition reaction intermediaries are syncopated and serve no elaborate function” (Kantor, 1922).

Learned repression ranges from economizing principles applied to habit, to neuroses that may be irregular in occurrence. The economizing principles range from association either by contiguity or similarity while dissociation keeps the mind quite tidy. Repression in a non-neurotic sense is a deferral function (Brown, 1927). Regarding neuroses that likely operate under repetive principles (versus economizing), “Among the manifold defenses employed by the ego we find certain mechanisms, such as isolation, denial, introjection, projection, which appear to play a far more prominent role in borderline or psychotic patients than in neurotics. Apparently, such patients call upon this type of defense because of a deficient repressive ability of the ego. But this statement does not cover the much more complicated facts. ...In principle, we find the same difficulties in neurotics whose acting out constitutes a resistance against ‘remembering’ and reconstruction of the past. ...in general, patients who deny show a propensity for acting out. To put it reversely: acting out appears to be regularly linked up with a bent for denial. From the therapeutic standpoint we should be aware that our endeavors to make patients relinquish their acting out, in favor of recovery and reconstruction of the past, must be directed essentially against their denial and distortion of reality” (Jacobson, 1957).

The philosophical side of the object world is a direct retort to the Square peg, round hole (p. 45). “It is argued that logical phenomenology provides a framework for understanding teleological behavior in humans. Three areas of relevance to psychotherapy that would benefit from phenomenological-theoretical investigation are (1) the role of awareness in human conditioning, (2) the false distinction between insight and non-insight therapies, and (3) the telic [ordered] nature of mental health” (Rychlak, 1982).

Object world-imposed boundaries as also hosted by system unconscious range from the superficial conforming to inherited inertia.

There are two sides to superficial conforming object world-imposed boundaries – the over-intellectual self and the over-intellectual professionalizing of a person. The over-intellectualized self involves any number of variants of narcissism that could be interpreted as hypocritical but are more in line with
circular thinking. The circular thinking is the issue as that involves “the human capacity for moral disengagement” (Naso, 2006).

The over-intellectual professionalizing of a person is driven by the “The desire to understand and conceptualise experience ... one of the animating forces underlying work in the humanities and the literature of memory in particular. ...this conceptualisation is manifesting as a turn to the study of affect and/or the emotions. Such a turn has meant that the understanding of memory (whether individual or social) has become tethered to non-representational embodied models. Affect is seductive to cultural theorists insofar as it is understood as not entirely bound by any psychic or social structuration and working beneath the threshold of representation, thereby problematising the models through which both memory and subjectivity have been apprehended in cultural theory. In turning their attention to affect, these scholars have increasingly engaged psychological and scientific literatures in order to undo what they see as the hegemony of representational theories in the understanding of experience within the humanities and social sciences” (Callard, 2010).

Imposed inertia is a subset of the longitudinal event known as life and includes the psychological self, the relational unconscious and the binding realities.

The psychological self operates on both a close functional relationship and a diverse uncoordinated reaction to reality with Figure 10 (p. 57) the reference. The functional relationship is between the ego and the personality (Bertocci, 1945) while the uncoordinated reaction to reality is exactly that – the id is lost in the past, the ego is lost in imaginary land and the superego is busy constructing a new fantasy land.

The relational unconscious includes “three interconnected ideas about human interaction. First, meaning and understanding are co-constructed and intersubjective and not universal, absolute, and preformed. Second, there is a fluid boundary between conscious and unconscious experience that is intersubjectively mediated. Third, language is basic to human experience, whether or not a particular experience can be verbally expressed” (Zeddies, 2000).

The binding realities, the phenomena that keeps the psychological self-synchronized with the relational unconscious – “Psychoanalysis works with three views of reality: factual reality, psychic reality, and co-constructed reality. The history of clinical psychoanalytic thinking about trauma demonstrates that these realities are often in conflict with each other and that they have cycled in use without any consensus developing about which is most correct. These three realities have also been used without consensus by the broader mental health field and in the study of myths, indicating that these realities are fundamental ways of understanding ambiguous psychological data. The uncertainty as to which reality is most correct is resolved by recognizing that it is part of the human condition to be constantly differentiating and integrating these realities, and so we best help our patients by engaging with them in the process of applying all three, rather than by making definite static decisions about which is most applicable” (Rosegrant, 2010).

Attention now turns to apathy and ambivalence.

Apathy begins with the practical association between people, residence is the label of convenience with the notion of nation a more encompassing idea. “The word nation signifies a distinct, peculiar people, united to each other by the strongest and most endearing ties; speaking the same language; attached to each other by a similarity of manners and customs, and separated from, and unconnected with any other society of men. Every nation may be considered as a numerous and widely-extended family; governed by the same laws; professing obedience to the same supreme head; attached to each other by the strong ties of interest and relationship; feeling the same partiality towards their native country; and the same disgust, or antipathy, towards strangers and foreigners. Considered in so grand a point of
view, the duties, which we owe to society become more distinct and clear. Family duties become in some measure social. With that strong and ardent love which unites and connects the members of a family, should we love our countrymen. With that fervent zeal which every member of a family evinces, in endeavoring to promote the interest, honor, and respectability of his family, should we be animated in behalf of our country. Patriotism and, loyalty should glow in our breasts: philanthropy and love should characterize our actions; and all our talents and resources, nay, even our lives and fortunes, should be offered at the shrine of duty, if such a sacrifice could have the smallest tendency to rescue our country from impending danger, or promote her glory or happiness” (Marcellus, 1813).

Apathy continues through the practical association between people to miscues in the associations, with the miscues generally referred to as frustrations. “The frustration process seems to have aspects of emotion, tension, conflict, inhibition, aggression, withdrawal, and the like, which have been examined in terms of the studies of frustration. The frustration process is delineated as consisting of a frustrating situation, a pattern of effects involving the frustrated organism, and a reactional system. ... The factors of failure, change in tension, cognitive effects, and frustration-tolerance are attributed to the frustrated organism. ... Reactions to frustration may be aggression, withdrawal, regression, resistance, anger, guilt and remorse, shame and embarrassment” (Britt, 1940).

The frustrations that result from apathy then become a static reference point in person-to-person associations: “…’role distance’ gains theoretical relevance if integrated into the theory of reference-group behavior. Taking ‘role distance’ is seen as normative and as occurring in situations where the status occupant faces contradictory expectations. Through a clarification of the concept of ‘role’ and a distinction between role differentiation and division of labor, it is possible to identify two types of behavior … under one concept of ‘role distance’: (1) pretense of detachment from some status prerogatives in order better to perform a role, as when humor is used to deny the conflict of contradictory expectations; (2) taking distance from one role in order to prepare for taking another role. The latter has an element of non-conformity to the expectations of some role partners in an attempt to live up to the expectations of others. It tends to occur primarily in transitional status systems, i.e., in the movement of a status occupant to another status, as when he moves up on the social ladder or grows up in age. Consequently, ‘role distance’ is identified as a mechanism at work during socialization, used for role articulation in the face of a progressively increasing number of expectations emanating from a progressively extending role-set” (Coser, 1966).

Once apathy-defined frustrations stabilize they then become a characteristic of personality, perhaps even a self-fulfilling prophesy, only to fall victim to the over-intellectual professionalizing of a person. The over-intellectual is then at risk of being a self-fulfilling prophesy itself, with either circular logic or over-zealous decisions the result. Over-zealous versus professional ambivalence then becomes worth of consideration given “…how debate over the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders has tended to privilege certain conceptions of psychiatric diagnosis over others, as well as to polarize positions regarding psychiatric diagnosis” (Callard, 2014).

Anxiety of loneliness, grief incrementally aligned to systems conscious, preconscious and unconscious:

Frustration is the result of deprivation and or threat. The position being taken here is that left unattended the deprivation variant comports with the possibility of seduction while the threat variant comports with narcissism. Justification of this position begins with the assumption that deprivation and threat are two sides of the same coin with that coin known as conflict. This allows one of four forms of conflict to be the cause of frustration: 1. Sheer choice, 2. Choice between two paths to the same (vital, important) goal, 3. Threatening conflicts, 4. Catastrophic conflict (Maslow, 1943a).
How each of the four operates through depravation or threat and on to seduction or narcissism respectively is a function of the level of involvement of systems conscious, preconscious and unconscious with or without preexisting repressed experiences which have the capacity to prejudice the current frustration all the way to an abnormality with emotional investment the preferred counter.

Testimonials as to the value of emotional investment are built-up from easily recognizable sources, e.g., Einstein’s *generality of the problem and relationship to reality*; Anna O’s “I want to say that a living organization can only exist against the background of a spiritual or ethical goal”; and, Peirce’s “law of mind”.

Continuing with emotional investment and avoiding abnormality, we have – “if frustration is *causal* in its manifestation, it is related to emotion as stimulus is to response; if it is *effect*, it is then possible to show that it may also be aroused by external stimuli and directed toward the environment. These two concepts are not incompatible; the notion of frustration either as cause or as effect is equally tenable, provided that frustration is in turn related to its proper context. Thus, to speak of a frustrating situation or external obstacle ... in no way negates the proposition that the organism per se may be frustrated, i.e., suffer the obstacle of its activity” [Italics in original] (Britt, 1940).

The task now is to take the firmness of “chimney sweeping” forward to the uncertainty associated with survival as a life stressor with Maslow’s four forms of conflict the starting point.

1. “Conflict that is the result of sheer choice. This is conflict in the simplest sense of all and would include such examples as a rat at a choice point in the maze. The daily life of every human being is filled with numberless choices of this sort. I would conceive the difference between this kind of choice and the next type to be discussed to be as follows: Type i involves a choice between two paths to the same goal, this goal being relatively unimportant for the organism, or else not being threatened at all. The psychological reaction to such a choice situation is practically never a pathological one. As a matter of fact, most often there is no feeling of conflict at all” (Maslow, 1943a).

2. “Conflict that is the result of choice between two paths to the same (vital, important) goal. In such a situation the goal itself is important for the organism but there are alternative ways of reaching this goal. The goal itself is not endangered. The importance or non-importance of the goal is, of course, a matter to be determined for each individual organism. What is important for one may not be for another. An example could be a woman trying to decide whether to wear one pair of shoes or another, one dress or another, to a party which happened to be important for her and at which she hoped to make a good impression. When the decision is made here the apparent feeling of conflict usually disappears. It is true, however, that such conflicts may become very intense as in a woman’s choosing, not between two dresses, but between two possible husbands. We are reminded of Rosenzweig’s distinction between ‘need-persistent' effects and ‘threat' effects” (Ibid).

3. “Conflict that is the result of threatening conflicts. This type of conflict is fundamentally different in kind from conflicts of the first two types. It is still a choice situation but now it is a choice between two different goals, both vitally necessary. Here a choice reaction usually does not settle the conflict since the decision means giving up something that is almost as necessary as what is chosen. Giving up a necessary goal or need-satisfaction is threatening, and even after the choice has been made, threat-effects persist. In a word, this sort of choice can eventuate only in chronic feelings of conflict and in chronic thwarting of a basic need. These are pathogenic” (Ibid).

4. “Conflict that is the result of catastrophic conflict. This might better be called pure threat with no alternative or possibilities of choice. All the choices are equally catastrophic or threatening in their effects or else there is only one possibility, and this is a catastrophic threat. Such a situation can be called a conflict situation only by an extension of the meaning of the word. This can be seen readily if
we take the example of a man who is to be executed in a few minutes, or the animal who is forced in the direction of a decision which he knows to be a punishing one and in which all possibilities of escape, attack, or substitute behavior are cut off, as is the case in many experiments on animal 'neuroses'" (Ibid).

Frustration of anxiety, dynamic seduction and/or narcissism versus static apathy and/or suicide:

Now a retrace of these four forms of conflict. From the descriptions of each form of conflict, loneliness is relative ranging from 'of no consequence' to some combination of deprivation and/or threat. Further, from the description of each it is clear activity is in system conscious.

If activity of each form of conflict, even the first, occurs in either system preconscious or system unconscious, and that activity is evaluated with and without a preexisting repression, the dynamic causal chain to seduction and/or narcissism has asserted itself.

Benefit: Mindfulness and identity formation versus the usefulness of identification

Given that the causal chain to seduction and/or narcissism has asserted itself, the task now is to account for the distribution of the forms of conflict relative to each system conscious, preconscious and unconscious with and without a pre-existing repression. The approach to be taken covers an accounting of static, then dynamic. Maslow's hierarchy of needs satisfies the accounting of static, and his dynamics of personality organization satisfies the accounting of dynamic.

Accounting of static:

Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943b) is a five-tiered model as shown in Figure 11. Each tier alone is a direct manager of some combination of seduction and narcissism with basis in the intersection of elements of Freud’s topographic and structural models, with the presence of elements of each model far from uniform across the five tiers, and with elements of the structural model the manager of elements of the topographic model in each tier.

Freud’s structural model: From bottom to top each the id, ego and superego are present but with a logical, tier appropriate, distribution.

The id will likely be the senior member in the first tier with the superego having at best a token presence. The impact on either seduction or narcissistic will be minimal if any.

The next three tiers will likely be dominated by the ego with the id providing a frame-of-reference relative to the needs of life beyond physiology to include the rudiments of emotional investment while the superego will likely build on the emerging emotional investment. The impact on each seduction and narcissism will be opposing. The impact on seduction will be dependent upon the neurosis-free quality of emotional investment and the resultant drain on mental energy. The impact on narcissism will dependent upon the configuration of the three prescriptive assumptions ranging from most general to least general that in turn define the causal chain to seduction and/or narcissism (p. 71). The most
general prescriptive assumption of loneliness anxiety will determine the amount of mental energy available to the middle general’s five approaches to the likes of frustration: (1) methods of defence, (2) repression in relation to reality, (3) characterizations of feeling or emotion, (4) emotional investment in the object world, (5) tension management. Any residual mental energy will then be directed to the least general theory-practice duet of the realness of knowledge and experience and pragmatism and its limits. The superego will likely be the senior member in the top tier with the ego having an organizing presence and the id having a regulatory presence. The impact on each seduction and narcissism will be the opposite of the prior narrative with durability of emotional investment the determinant. The greater the durability then the allocation of mental energy to expect is to the least general theory-practice duet of the realness of knowledge and experience and pragmatism and its limits, which will determine the amount of mental energy available to the middle general’s five approaches to the likes of frustration, with the final level of mental energy required by the most general prescriptive assumption of loneliness anxiety being the level of neurosis-free quality of the initiating emotional investment. Freud’s topographic model: From bottom to top the presence of each system conscious, preconscious and unconscious will be dependent first on preexisting repressed material, and second on the neurosis-free quality of the in-the-moment active emotional investment. Of the three prescriptive assumptions only the most general prescriptive assumption of loneliness anxiety will be a factor with its impact on each seduction and narcissism dependent on the character of associated insecurities. The more defined loneliness anxiety spawned insecurity will increase the level of narcissism while the less defined will increase the level of seduction. Accounting of dynamic: Maslow’s dynamics of personality organization (Maslow, 1943c; Maslow, 1943d) is holistic, functional, dynamic and purposive – a Gestalt – it is a study in the personality syndrome, a structured, organized complex of apparently diverse specificities (behaviors, thoughts, impulses to action, perceptions, etc.) which, however, when studied carefully and validly, are found to have a common unity which may be phrased variously as a similar dynamic ‘meaning’, ‘flavor’, function, purpose or aim. The personality syndrome includes ten defining characteristics. The collection of characteristics can be applied to any one of the five tiers of the hierarchy of needs. This tier independence is necessary to an understanding of the formation and maintenance of seduction and or narcissism. (1) Interchangeability – “The parts of a syndrome are interchangeable or equivalent in the dynamic sense..., namely in the sense that two behaviorally different parts or symptoms, since they have the same aim, can substitute for each other, can do the same job, have equal expectancy of appearing, or may be predicted with equal probability or confidence” (Maslow, 1943c). (2) Circular determination – “The best descriptions of this phenomenon have come from psychopathological studies, for example, Horney’s concept of the vicious circle which is a special case of circular determination. Horney’s is one attempt to describe the continual flux of dynamic interaction within a syndrome, whereby any one part is always affecting every other part in some way and is in turn being affected by all other parts, the entire action going on simultaneously. Complete neurotic dependence implies expectations which must be thwarted. This necessary thwarting creates anger additional to that probably already involved by the admission of weakness and helplessness implicit in complete dependence. This anger, however, tends to be directed against the very person upon whom one is dependent and through whose help one hopes to avoid catastrophe, and such anger feelings immediately lead to guilt, anxiety, fear of retaliation, etc. But these states are among the very factors which produced need for complete dependence in the first place. Examination of such a patient will show at any one moment most of these factors coexisting in continual flux and mutual re-enforcement.
While a genetic analysis may show priority of one feature over another in time, a dynamic analysis will never show this. All the factors will be equally causes and effects” (Ibid).

(3) Tendency of the well-organized syndrome to resist change or to maintain itself – “No matter what the level of security may be, it is difficult either to raise or to lower it. This phenomenon is something like that described by Freud as resistance but has a much wider and more general application. Thus we find some tendency to hang on to the life style in the normal as well as in the abnormal person. The person who tends to believe that all people are essentially good will show the same resistance to change of this belief as will the person who believes all people are essentially bad. Operationally this resistance to change may be defined in terms of the difficulty experienced by the psychological practitioner or experimenter when he attempts to raise or lower an individual’s security level. Personality syndromes can sometimes maintain a relative constancy under the most surprising conditions of external change. There are many examples of the maintenance of security feelings in emigres who have undergone the most grueling and harrowing experiences. Studies of morale in bombed areas also give us proof of the surprising resistance that most healthy people have to external horrors. Statistics show that depressions and wars do not make for any large increase in the incidence of psychoses. Changes in the syndrome of security are usually in great disproportion to changes in the environment and sometimes there seems to be almost no personality change at all” (Ibid).

(4) Tendency of the well-organized syndrome to reestablish itself after change – “If a syndrome level has been forced to change, it is often observed that such shift is only temporary. For instance, a traumatic experience very frequently has only a passing effect. There may then be a spontaneous readjustment back to the previous status quo. Or else the symptoms created by the trauma are nullified with especial ease. Sometimes also this tendency of the syndrome can be inferred as one of the processes in a larger system of changes in which other syndrome tendencies are also involved. It is a tribute to the ubiquity of this tendency that our ordinary expectations in respect to friends who are regarded as normally healthy, is that they can recover from any shock at all if only given enough time. The death of a wife or a son, financial ruin, and other such basic traumatic experiences may throw individuals badly off balance for a while, but they usually recover almost wholly. It is only a chronically bad external situation that is able to create permanent changes in the healthy character structure” (Ibid).

(5) Tendency of the syndrome to change as a whole – “This tendency is perhaps the easiest of all to see. If the syndrome changes at all in any part, the right kind of investigation will practically always show some other concomitant changes in the same direction in other parts of the syndrome. Often enough, such concomitant changes may be seen in almost all parts of the syndrome. The reason these changes are so often overlooked is simply that they are not expected and therefore not looked for. It should be emphasized that this tendency to holistic change, like all the other tendencies we have spoken of, is just that – a tendency and not a certainty. There have been cases in which a particular stimulus seemed to have a specific and localized effect with no detectable generalized effect. These cases are rare, however, if we exclude the obviously superficial derangements” (Ibid).

(6) The tendency to internal consistency – “Even though a person is mostly insecure there may yet persist for various reasons a few specific behaviors, beliefs or feelings that are characteristic of security. Thus, although a very insecure person more often than not has chronic nightmares, anxiety dreams or other unpleasant dreams, still in a fair percentage of all such individuals the dream life is not unusually unpleasant. In such individuals, however, relatively slight changes in the environment will induce such unpleasant dreams. There seems to be a special tension upon these inconsistent elements always acting to pull them into line with the rest of the syndrome. Specific fears are often found in very secure persons who are not at all generally fearful. These fears can often be, accounted for by specific conditioning experiences. It is very easy to get rid of these fears in such people. Simple reconditioning,
the force of example, exhortation to be strong-willed, intellectual explanation and other such superficial psychotherapeutic measures are often quite sufficient. These simple and external techniques, however, ordinarily fail miserably with fears in definitely insecure people. We might say that the fear which is inconsistent with the rest of the personality is easily removed; the fear which is consistent with the rest of the personality is very tenacious. In other words, a person who is insecure tends to become more perfectly or consistently insecure; a person who is high in self-esteem tends to become more consistently high in self-esteem” (Ibid).

(7) The tendency to extremeness of the syndrome level – “Side by side with the conserving tendencies we have already described, there is at least one opposing force deriving from the internal dynamics of the syndrome which favors change rather than constancy. It is the tendency for a fairly insecure person to become extremely insecure, for a fairly secure person to become extremely secure. In a fairly insecure person every external influence, every stimulus impinging on the organism is somewhat more apt to be interpreted insecurely rather than securely. For example, a grin is apt to be seen as a sneer, forgetfulness is apt to be interpreted as insult, indifference is apt to be seen as dislike and mild affection as indifference. In such a person’s world then, there are more insecure influences than there are secure ones. We might say that the weight of evidence for him is on the side of insecurity. And so he is pulled steadily, even though slightly, in the direction of more and more extreme insecurity. This factor is of course reinforced by the fact that an insecure person tends to behave insecurely, which encourages people to dislike and reject him, which makes him more insecure, which makes him behave still more insecurely – and so on in a vicious circle. Thus he tends, because of his inner dynamics, to bring about just what he fears most. The prize example can be seen in jealous behavior. It springs from insecurity and practically always breeds further rejection and deeper insecurity” (Ibid).

(8) Tendency of the syndrome to change under external pressures – “It is very easy when preoccupied with inner dynamics of syndromes to forget temporarily that all syndromes are of course responsive to the external situation. This obvious fact is mentioned here only for the sake of completeness and as a reminder that the personality syndromes of the organism are not isolated systems” (Ibid).

(9) Syndrome variables – “The most important and most obvious variable is that of syndrome level. A person is either high, middle, or low in security, high, middle, or low in self-esteem. We do not necessarily imply that this variation is on a single continuum; we imply only variation from much too little, from high to low. Syndrome quality has been discussed chiefly with respect to the self-esteem or dominance syndrome. In the various species of infra-human primates the phenomenon of dominance may be seen in all of them, but it will have a different quality of expression in each. In the human being with high self-esteem we have been able to differentiate at least two qualities of high self-esteem that we have chosen to designate on the one hand as strength and on the other hand as power. A person with high self-esteem, who is also secure, shows this feeling of strength or self-confidence in a kind, cooperative and friendly fashion. The person who is high in self-esteem but who is also insecure shows it not so much in helping weaker people as in dominating them and hurting them. Both individuals have high self-esteem but show it in different ways depending upon other characteristics of the organism. In extremely insecure people there are many ways in which this insecurity can express itself. For instance, it may have the quality of seclusiveness and withdrawal (if he is low in self-esteem), or it may have the quality of hostility, aggressiveness and nastiness (if he is high in self-esteem)” (Ibid).

(10) Cultural determination of syndrome expression – “Certainly the relationships between culture and personality are too profound and too complex to treat briefly. More for the sake of completeness than for any other reason it must be pointed out that in general the paths by which the main goals in life are achieved (more than the goals themselves) are often determined by the nature of the particular culture. The ways in which self-esteem may be expressed are in large part, although not completely, culturally
determined. The same is true for the love relations. We win the love of other people and express our affection for them through culturally approved channels. The fact that in a complex society, status roles are also in part culturally determined will often shift the expression of personality syndromes” (Ibid).

With the ten defining characteristics now listed, attention turns to the abstract with respect to the personality syndrome. An appreciation of the abstract with respect to syndrome organization is necessary in the identification of the incremental characteristics of each seduction and narcissism.

“Within the syndrome organization we find hierarchies of importance, and clusterings. If we look for a heuristic criterion by which to differentiate between syndromes and sub-syndromes, we can find it theoretically in the concept of concentration. What is the difference between the natural groupings in the self-esteem syndrome? Conventionality, morality, modesty, and regard for rules were found to cluster together into a group which could be differentiated from another cluster formed by the characteristics of self-confidence, poise, unembarrassability, and boldness. These clusters or sub-syndromes of course correlate with each other and with self-esteem as a whole. Furthermore, within each cluster the various elements correlate with one another” (Maslow, 1943d).

“In a broad fashion, preliminary to more specific analysis, we can say that the relations between the syndromes and overt behavior are about as follows: Each act tends to be an expression of the whole integrated personality. This means, more specifically, that each act tends to be determined by each and all of the personality syndromes (in addition to other determinants to be spoken of below). As John Doe laughs and responds to a joke, we can theoretically tease out from among the various determinants of this unitary act his security level, his self-esteem, his energy, his intelligence, etc. Such a viewpoint is in clear contrast to that brand of trait theory in which the typical instance is of a single behavior act determined wholly by a single trait. Our theoretical statement gets its best exemplification in certain tasks that are thought of as ‘more important’, like artistic creation. In producing a painting or a concerto, the artist clearly ‘puts himself completely into the task, and, accordingly, it is an expression of his whole personality. But such an example, or, let us say, any creative response to an unstructured situation – as in the Rorschach test – is at the extreme of the continuum. At the other end is the isolated, specific act which has little or no relation to the character structure. Examples of such are immediate responses to the demands of a momentary situation (getting out of the way of a truck), purely habitual, cultural responses which have long since lost their psychological meaning for most people (getting up when a lady enters the room), or finally, reflex acts. Such behavior can tell us little or nothing about the character, for in these cases it is negligible as a determining factor. Between these extremes we find all sorts of gradations. There are, for example, acts which tend to be almost wholly determined by only one or two syndromes. A particular act of kindness is more closely related to the security syndrome than to any other. The feeling of modesty is largely determined by self-esteem, and so on” (Ibid).

“These facts may raise the question why, if all these types of behavior-syndrome relations exist, should it be said at the outset that behavior is generally determined by all the syndromes?” (Ibid).

“It is obvious that, by a kind of theoretical requiredness, a holistic theory would start with such a statement, while an atomistic approach would start with the selection of an isolated, discrete behavior, cut away from all its connection to the organism – a sensation or conditioned reflex, for instance. Here it is a problem of ‘centering’ (from the point of view of which part is the whole to be organized). For atomistic theory the ‘simplest’ fundamental datum would be a bit of behavior obtained by reductive analysis, i.e., a behavior cut away from all its relationships to the rest of the organism” (Ibid).

“Perhaps more to the point is the contention that the first type of syndrome-behavior relationship is more important. Isolated behaviors tend to be on the fringe of life’s main concerns. They are isolated
simply because they are unimportant, i.e., have nothing to do with the main problems, the main answers, or the main goals of the organism. It is quite true that my leg kicks out when the patellar tendon is struck, or that I eat olives with my fingers, or that I cannot eat boiled onions because I was conditioned against them. It is certainly no truer that I have a certain life philosophy, that I love my family, or that I am drawn to do experiments of a certain kind – but the latter situations are far more important” (Ibid).

While it is true that the inner nature of the organism is a determinant of behavior, it is not the only determinant of behavior. The cultural setting in which the organism behaves, and which has already helped to determine the inner nature of the organism, is also a determinant of behavior. Finally another set of determinants of behavior may be lumped under the head of ‘the immediate situation’. While the goals and aims of the behavior are determined by the nature of the organism, and the paths to the goals by the culture, the immediate situation determines the realistic possibilities and impossibilities: which behavior is wise, which not; which partial goals are available and which not; what offers a threat and what offers a possible tool with which the goals may be achieved” (Ibid).

“Holistic theory does not deny the possibility of isolated impulses or of isolated conditionings or habits which have little or nothing to do with the character structure. To say it in another way, this theory does not claim that all responses are necessarily expressions of the total personality” (Ibid).

**Management of progression across the causal chain**

With the pliability of objectivity the starting point, what follows is the rigidity of ‘what’ oriented thinking at the expense of dynamic reaches of ‘why’ based concepts.

**Pliability of objectivity:**

Objectivity is the mark of professionalism of investigators across many disciplines with self-serving variations an unfortunate deviation (Hager, 1982). Typically the perpetrators of deviations cannot always be identified before damage is done, and even if they are identified very little remedy is usually available given that time is the normal ally of the perpetrator. The only practical defense against variations that prove to be suspect, not just damaging, is recall of communications via any media to be followed by a reenactment-type of education that is intended to counteract seductive influences. Fortunately the impact of deviations is not a long-term problem as such annoyances are the handiwork actors of limited means.

The long-term problem is the professional investment – time and funds – in the pursuit of proof of a ‘what’ at the expense of any understanding of a ‘why’, and this is despite the most fundamental defect of such a pursuit, the identity of the mechanics of time and uncertainty when each is so basic to a ‘why’. There are many cognitive neuroscience related projects with each sharing the same defect – the study of the human brain via an imaging tool of a technology at a point in time only. Such a study is a feeble attempt to violate the fundamental law of geometry – it takes more than one point to describe trend. Caveat – two or more measurements of the same brain only captures disconnected states with no warranty about continuity available.

“Current diagnostic systems for mental disorders were established before the tools of neuroscience were available, and although they have improved the reliability of psychiatric classification, progress toward the discovery of disease etiologies and novel approaches to treatment and prevention may benefit from alternative conceptualizations of mental disorders. The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative is the centerpiece of National Institutes of Mental Health’s effort to achieve its strategic goal of
developing new methods to classify mental disorders for research purposes. The RDoC matrix provides a research framework that encourages investigators to reorient their research perspective by taking a dimensional approach to the study of the genetic, neural, and behavioral features of mental disorders. RDoC’s integrative approach includes cognition along with social processes, arousal/regulatory systems, and negative and positive valence systems as the major domains, because these neurobehavioral systems have all evolved to serve the motivational and adaptive needs of the organism. With its focus on neural circuits informed by the growing evidence of the neurodevelopmental nature of many disorders and its capacity to capture the patterns of co-occurrence of behaviors and symptoms, the RDoC approach holds promise to advance our understanding of the nature of mental disorders” (Morris, 2012).

None of this professionalizing of a ‘what’ contributes to recognition – forget understanding – of the fundamentals of the causal chain to seduction and/or narcissism, the precursor to the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide. And, dimensionalization is a most dangerous idea as it is subjective with a point in time the only reference. Most important, stigmatization is only one thought away from dimensionalization

Rigidity of ‘what’ oriented thinking:
The foundation of cognitive behavior therapy has already been addressed with the narrative about John B. Watson’s rejection of consciousness in favor of behaviorism (p. 35) sets focus on conditioning with application rigidly limited to ‘what’ at the expense of ‘why’. What is troublesome is experience is limited to selected disorders with application of therapy in the short-term (Rachman, 2015). Taking troublesome one step further, conditioning is nothing more than the reversal of habit that seems not to be in the best interest of a person (Ouellette, 1998). Taking troublesome one additional step further “the American Psychological Association’s Division 12 Task Force on Psychological Interventions currently lists CBT as the only treatment with ‘strong research support’ in almost 80% of all mental disorders included in its listing” (Leichsenring, 2017). This translates into treatment of selectivity with selection based on prejudice. “Overall, CBT appears to be both efficacious and effective in the treatment of anxiety disorders, but dismantling studies are needed to determine which specific treatment components lead to beneficial outcomes and which patients are most likely to benefit from these treatment components” (Kaczkurkin, 2015).

Beyond conditioning there are two unaddressed issue – life as a continuum and life in its execution – both of which are outside the realm of cognitive behavioral therapy.

Life as a continuum is about emotion and rationality. “Two types of emotional phenomena are examined--incidental emotional states and integral emotional responses--and three conceptions of rationality are considered--logical, material, and ecological. Emotional states influence reasoning processes, are often misattributed to focal objects, distort beliefs in an assimilative fashion, disrupt self-control when intensely negative, but do not necessarily increase risk-taking. Integral emotional responses are often used as proxies for values, and valuations based on these responses exhibit distinct properties: efficiency, consistency, polarization, myopia, scale-insensitivity, and reference-dependence. A major function of emotion appears to be the promotion of socially and morally desirable behavior and the deterrence of undesirable behavior. Emotions are a necessary component of empathic responses, which are important drivers of prosocial behavior. Emotions are also very sensitive to the fulfillment or violation of social and moral norms, and therefore an essential component of social and moral self-regulation. Finally, in social and economic interactions, emotions promote the fulfillment and enforcement of social and moral obligations by overriding the players’ material self-interests. In this sense, the emotional person is not irrational, but ecologically rational. Therefore, although the physiological drive systems (fatigue, pain, hunger, sexual arousal, etc.) may be inherently selfish, the
affective system (love, pride, anger, guilt, shame, etc.) may be distinctively social and moral” (Pham, 2007).

Life in its execution is about accommodation in the least organized sense – reactionary in the absence of planning that is nevertheless based on conditioning with habit at the front of the lineup of suspects. “In 1908 the Welsh neurologist and psychoanalyst Ernest Jones described human beings as rationalizers whose behavior is governed by 'the necessity of providing an explanation' [[Jones, 1908]]. We construct a formal model of rationalization. In our model a decision maker is constrained to select the best feasible alternative (according to her preferences) from among those that she can rationalize. We show that this theory is falsifiable and can be tested non-parametrically like the standard theory of choice. We also show that the theory of rationalization subsumes the standard theory and several alternative theories. Rationalization theory can accommodate behavioral patterns often presented in the empirical literature as anomalies (i.e., violations of the standard theory of choice). Hence, these anomalies are consistent with the basic principle in economics that choice follows from a constrained optimization process. Moreover, anomalies like cyclic choices do not imply cyclic preferences and can be accommodated with preference orders. In fact, anomalies can be used to make inferences about the decision maker’s preferences. Rationalization theory reveals a unique preference order in a variety of cases when standard theory cannot. Conversely, when standard theory reveals an order rationalization reveals the same order. These results show that, under suitable assumptions, rationalization theory allows for complete, non-parametric identification of preferences. In addition, rationalization theory can be easily incorporated into game theory” (Cherepanov, 2008).

Dynamic reaches of ‘why’ based concepts:

Both life as a continuum and life in its execution have an exception – system unconscious that is void of repression, the director of traffic. Mental lapses (Oberndorf, 1914) simply happen with distractions the likely culprit. Alternatively, distractions are necessary to survival in situations marked by isolation such as employment in a “a Greenland weather station” (Buechler, 1998). From these two simple exceptions, Allport’s call for life to be treated “as a process (becoming) and not as a state (being in equilibrium)” (Allport, 1960).

Beyond conditioning there are two unaddressed issue – life as a continuum and life in its execution – both of which are outside the realm of cognitive behavioral therapy. “The study of psychosis has a long history in psychoanalysis, as does the debate over the suitability of psychoanalysis for treating schizophrenia. For decades, Chestnut Lodge was not only a hospital but also a clinical research and educational institution. A unique patient-staff ratio – about twenty analytic therapists for a hundred patients – made possible prolonged and intense clinical work with schizophrenic and other severely disturbed patients. Inter staff discussions were encouraged and facilitated. This quasi academic approach to in-depth individual case studies led to clinical findings and theoretical formulations that had a significant impact on developments in psychoanalysis, both here and abroad. Many of these findings and theoretical formulations are relevant to current studies and treatments of psychotic and nonpsychotic patients” (Kafka, 2011).

The alternative is about isolation from life, about being caught up in idealism that applies to no one person, hence, ethics. Hartley’s Vibrations (Priestley, 1775, pp. 7-11) are no more static than his ideas, with Associations (Ibid, pp. 12-28) the net of a multitude of variables that morph in character from realization to realization. Thus, the problem is the risk of looking at everyday life as being in isolation as conditioning so carefully assumes. In fact, the greater risk is in ignoring the varying realities that occur from day-to-day – “In view of the rapid progress made in recent years in Psychology, as evidenced by the continuous and ever-increasing output of books, monographs, articles and journals covering a wide range of subjects, it is worthy of note that practically nothing has been written upon our most common,
everyday mental experiences, such as hope, disappointment, despair, modesty and shame, arrogance and pride, patience and endurance, friendship and loyalty, courage, ambition and very many others” [Italics added] (Morse, 1907) – as well as loneliness and aloneness.

Then there is blindness to life as the wager - This is about a very dangerous hornet’s nest and its anti-thesis. On the ‘dangerous’ side is an “alarmingly high morbidity and mortality” in addiction specialty clinics or programs (Hser, 2017) while on the anti-thesis side are Frieda Fromm-Reichmann and Harry Stack Sullivan and the focus on psychoanalysis and occupational therapy at the Chestnut Lodge (Stanton, 1961). However, given the experience with the non-pharmaceutical intervention, psychoanalysis and occupational therapy, and, successful recovery of schizophrenia as related with Fromm-Reichmann, with empathy the principle focus (Silver, 2015), this should be enough to justify pursuit of out-patient supervision at least initially, perhaps longer, and there is nothing wrong with expecting a person to be their own provider of empathy – to include self-directed conditioning in the form of self-directed psychoanalysis.

Circumstances (reality) and ambiguity (pleasure)

This is about the challenges to be resolved to insure the realization of objectivity in the quest to balance ‘what’ with ‘why’. Included here is a discussion of practical constraints in the identification of objectivity, the attempts at expediency with ‘what’ oriented approaches, and the idealism inherent in the ‘why’ oriented approaches.

Practical constraints in the identification of objectivity:

This is about the availability of communications in the history of psychology versus what is the norm today. Today we have the internet, rapid transit to forums, conferences, etc., rapid review cycles for new writings to include the rapid dissemination of accepted writings into well-indexed databases while in 1900 there was no internet, no rapid transit and no rapid dissemination. In fact, if, in 1894, Harlow Gale in Minneapolis, Minnesota and Sigmund Freud in Vienna, Austria knew of each other, that was probably it. Care must be exercised in the selection of citations (Murray, 2000).

Attempts at expediency with ‘what’ oriented approaches:

“Limitations to integrating psychoanalytic and behavior therapies are seen to reside partly in contrasting perspectives of reality that, in various ways, focus either on the inner world of experience or on the outer world of consensual reality. In addition, psychoanalysis and behavior therapy embody alternate visions of life that imply different basic possibilities in human existence” (Messer, 1980).

Idealism inherent in the ‘why’ oriented approaches:

This is about hope versus hopelessness – “hope as an essentially positive phenomenon necessary for healthy coping, its key purpose being the avoidance of despair, with the secondary function of permitting the individual psychologically to bypass ongoing unpleasant or stressful situations. Hoping is differentiated from wishing by hope's reality-oriented focus, and from expecting or anticipating by its intense affective component” (Korner, 1970). In broader terms hope is equally applicable to the logic of depression related attitudes and the logic of loss related beliefs. Hope is heavily dependent upon the alignment between knowledge and experience, and, pragmatism and its limits.

Education as the counter to motives that support denial

Education as an ethic as opposed to the immediacy of the 3-R’s is an expansive counter to the supportive rudiments of seduction and narcissism. Included here are three surveys – (1) the inertia available to retard the advancement of mental energy, (2) the contra-inertia of the maturation of mental energy, and (3) the behavioral economics of the ‘why’ approach.
Inertia available to retard the advancement of mental energy:

The call for conditioning seems to be independent of the state of mental energy. Two issues are presented – determinism and lapses.

A contributing issue that has survived to this day is biological (genetic) determinism. “The recent work of M. Felix Le Dantec on biological determinism and conscious personality seems to me likely to perform a great service, since it expresses with remarkable precision, if I may say so, the confusion of ideas and words that has been tending to insert itself for some years into philosophical language; as a consequence this book may with advantage serve as occasion for a discussion which has really a more general range” (Binet, 1897). Now a summary of the included concepts of determinism, mechanism, physiological functions, spontaneity, choice and psychic functions:

“Determinism. Determinism, in the very broad meaning which it received from Claude Bernard, expresses the law of universal causation; it means that there is no phenomenon without a cause, that the succession of phenomena is regular and determinate; in still other terms, it is the negative of freedom, contingency, and incoherence. Most scientists to-day admit the determinism of phenomena of the physical order; as to psychological determinism – the position opposed to that of free-will – it is accepted by some and rejected by others; the two chief arguments that are urged in opposition to it are that it compromises moral responsibility and contradicts the inner sense which everyone possesses of his own free-will. I am not debating any theory now, consequently I need not take either side. To sum up, there exist two forms of determinism, physical determinism and psychological determinism; against the first is urged the doctrine of the contingency of the laws of nature, and against the second the doctrine of free-will” [Italics in original] (Ibid).

“Mechanism. This is a concept radically distinct from the preceding; it is one of those which have been expressed in the greatest number of different terms, and which have consequently suffered most from equivocation. Let us, first of all, define the concept itself. In man the acts of thought, voluntary movements, etc., are of a twofold nature; they are at once physiological phenomena, occurring in the nervous system, and phenomena of consciousness. Many philosophers have supported the idea that the phenomenon of consciousness is an epiphenomenon – something superadded, which does not intervene in the series of physiological modifications, but whose role is that of a passive witness. Huxley was one of the most strenuous partisans of this theory, which he expressed in several striking figures; he compares consciousness to the shadow which follows the footsteps of the traveler without affecting his progress; or to light, which may illumine the wheels of a machine without exercising the slightest influence upon its functions. In France, Ribot for some time accepted this conception and popularized it; but he afterwards rejected it.

There are, indeed, some points of contact between determinism and mechanism; nevertheless these two concepts are quite distinct. One may be a determinist, for instance, without being a mechanist; one may admit that all phenomena are subject to the law of causation, and at the same time admit that the phenomena of consciousness play an active role, are influenced by physical phenomena, and influence them in turn; this is the theory of the mutual influence of the physical and the moral, a theory which is just the opposite of mechanism” [Italics in original] (Ibid).

“Physiological function. Another notion which has become singularly obscure. Let us recall first some simple facts. We do not yet know the inner nature of the material phenomena which occur in a nerve center, in its cells and its nerves, when that center becomes active; it has nevertheless been held that many of the material modifications which occur there are chemical reactions; thus for a long time it has been maintained that vision has for its starting point a photo-chemical action in the retina, and quite recently Frey has gone so far as to suppose that the simple stimulation of the tactile papillae is
propagated by means of a chemical reaction which the contact sets up in the papilla or in the neighboring cells. However this may be, there still remains an essential difference between a chemical reaction set up in a test-tube and a physiological process properly so called; the latter is composed of a series, a chain of reactions, which mutually command and influence one another – which, in a word, are organized. Now this notion, so simple and natural, of the physiological process, has been greatly obscured of late; some authors have rejected it, thinking that it involved a denial of physical determinism” [Italics in original] (Ibid).

“Spontaneity. The notion of spontaneity is very important both in psychology and in physiology. It is contrasted with that of a stimulated or a reflex act. A reflex act is one which follows directly upon external stimulation; it is the response, or echo to it; it would not have been produced if this external stimulation had not taken place. A spontaneous act is one which does not directly respond to external irritation; it is produced by a memory, an act of reasoning, or an internal physiological cause, as for example the circulation of the blood. From every standpoint, not only from that of science, but also from that of practice and even of law, there is the greatest interest in distinguishing between spontaneous acts and stimulated acts; the former are in general more reflective; they are more personal to their author; they carry a greater juridical and moral responsibility. This is, therefore, a useful distinction and one which should be preserved. Many authors have sought to abolish it and to condemn the use of the term spontaneity as being unscientific. Why? It is easy to guess. These authors have misunderstood the meaning of the word spontaneous; they imagine that spontaneity means first cause, the absence of determination, and that it is a synonym for freedom” [Italics in original] (Ibid).

“Choice. This word is probably the one that has occasioned the greatest amount of equivocation. It seemed as if the faculty of choosing implied free-will, and that if this faculty were accorded to any animalcule he was thereby removed from the influences of environment, and all determinism was suppressed. The responsibility for this confusion of ideas certainly rests upon the philosophers; it is they who, in the discussion of the free-will position, have represented choice as a demonstration of that position. A falling stone does not choose, it has been said, because its fall is determined by the laws of gravitation, whereas a thinking being can choose between several different courses; this is proof of his possessing a freewill. We need not enter into this discussion. Our aim is to show that apart from every theory, laying aside that of free-will and even admitting a determinism that is universal and without exception, it is possible to give a specific meaning to the word choice” [Italics in original] (Ibid).

"Psychic functions. It is here that the greatest errors have accumulated – as it were, by choice! To a number of our contemporaries, little versed in psychology – which fact does not prevent them from constructing wretched psychology without knowing it – the phenomena of consciousness present a sort of phantasy, or phantasmagoria without cause and without law. We need not reply that a phenomenon of consciousness appears to us to be as rigorously determined, in its production, its quality and its minutest details, as the fall of a stone or the budding of a plant; but it is useless to stop over this point, since these are errors which it is only necessary to clearly set forth in order to refute with the same stroke. Let us follow out the effects of this preconceived idea on the interpretation of phenomena. The question comes up again in the interpretation of the movements and acts performed by micro-organisms. Some authors wishing to endow micro-organisms with psychic properties – a disputable point, be it understood, on which only hypothesis can be made – the principal objection raised against this interpretation consists in a naive declaration that this would mean the suppression of fixed laws” [Italics in original] (Ibid).

Now the second contributing issue that has survived to this day, lapses, an issue that will likely survive for quite some time to come.
“Everyone has experienced those unaccountable lapses in thought and expression which form the subject of this study. A study of lapses is a study of automatic, not of voluntary mental process, since the errors are perpetrated before they are recognized as such. The lapse is as truly an involuntary act as that of the absentminded man who draws his stocking over his shoe or blows out the gas, or that of the woman who smells her watch to see if it has stopped. Lapses begin as semi-conscious inhibitions and over-lappings” (Bawden, 1900).

Contra-inertia of the maturation of mental energy:

With the lapse system conscious is assumed to be in working order with the fundamentals of identity out of synch. The opposite is required for learning.

First, system conscious is required to be in good working order. The next issue is animal-related behavior, typical Pavlovian prompts such as a traffic light, where learning is the adoption of responses. The main issue is retention of presented material that is retrievable (Ordahl, 1911).

Learning is a dependency to the causal chain to seduction and/or narcissism in the form of object-choice, or more generally, the self and the object world – “In object-choice, there is an attempt to repeat and/or rework conflicntual aspects of the original objects and the self. That is, object-choice can be examined in terms of the degree of repetitive torment vs. reworking and growth” (Blum, 1991).

Behavioral economics of the ‘why’ approach:

Ignoring the two issues of ‘what’ versus ‘why’ and static versus dynamic, and with developmental psychology the basis (Bowlby, 1984), there are similarities between cognitive science and its derivatives and psychoanalysis. The similarities generally span the normative relations between the self and the object world – the senses, and the resolution of frustration: (1) methods of defence, (2) repression in relation to reality, (3) characterizations of feeling or emotion, (4) emotional investment in the object world, (5) tension management.

Where psychoanalysis stands alone is with loneliness anxiety, time and uncertainty.

Working hypothesis, simplified

This is about emotional investment in a process with focus on process and without prejudice to participants.

This working hypothesis as a simplified statement is presented as an alternative to a detailed set of prescriptive assumptions, the entire issue behind ‘what’ versus ‘why’. With ‘what’, far too many assumptions are declared leaving defense to an incremental absorption of experience. With a simplified ‘why’ basis, expectations are limited to a call for commitment to the discovery of impediments to the causal chain to seduction and/or narcissism with realized of progress extensible to the discovery of impediments to the causal chain to apathy and/or suicide.

Most important, this call for commitment includes no prejudice to grief-oriented counseling as a co-conspirator in any sense. Concluding comments – specification of commitment by all players, incremental execution of commitment and altruism and commitment.

Specification of commitment by all players:

From a remote (intellectually speaking) vantage point there are two sides to commitment – daily activity and philosophizing. However, on a closer look it is discovered that the two sides are one.
The first is lateness to a commitment (Adler, 1981), a procedural issue with embellishment not needed. The second is the discussion of the contributing issue that has survived to this day – biological (genetic) determinism and its eight-paragraph narrative (p. 85) – with emphasis on investment in the entire philosophical argument to include unintended consequences. With biological determinism, the argument has the protozoa at center stage – “Let us say at the outset, to put ourselves in touch with M. Le Dantec, that this prolific author has published, within the last two or three years, a number of biological papers on the mechanism of digestion and on theories of life; he has, moreover, conceived a new theory of life... His present volume is a continuation and development of the same ideas; the author endeavors to support two principal propositions: first, that the phenomena of consciousness have no sort of influence on material biological phenomena; and second, that the atoms and the molecules, not only of organic bodies, but also of inert substances, are endowed with consciousness.

But there is no need of stopping over the question whether infusoria possess any rudiments of consciousness and sensibility; in the present article I do not propose to interpret observations or to fight for a theory. I limit myself to a criticism of ideas, and from this standpoint I find that the principal objection advanced against those who wish to allow psychical faculties to the protozoa is that such psychical faculties would be the expression of arbitrariness and phantasy, that they would be incompatible with the idea that 'every operation performed by a protozoan depends solely on the conditions of environment and being under determinate conditions is itself determinate'.

In a word, to place well in relief the matrix-idea of all the contradictions which have been noted, we may say that there exists, even among the best minds, a tendency to admit that determinism applies less vigorously to living matter than to inert matter, to the facts of consciousness than to the facts of physics, to complex phenomena than to simple phenomena" [Italics added] (Binet, 1897).

Now the contributing philosophical argument that has survived to this day with conditioning the base issue. The starting point is a caution about confidence to the proponents of conditioning with the same material highlighted in the body towards the end of the third paragraph.

The caution: “But it is instructive in passing to call attention to the latter belief as an illustration of crypto-rationalism, i.e., whenever reason is ostentatiously banished through the front door, it is avowedly or secretly admitted through the back door to perform its necessary functions” (Cohen, 1925).

Now the caution against conditioning – five paragraphs.

“Current anti-rationalism endeavors to soften its opposition to rigorous scientific procedure, by representing modern science as empirical rather than rational. But if reason be used in its classical sense to denote the process of drawing logical inference from premises or assumptions, there is obviously no science that is non-rational. We may grant this without prejudging the claims of mystic vision, intuition, or higher non-rational illumination. Even if reason be used in its narrowest sense to denote strictly rigorous or mathematical reasoning, there is very little developed science that is non-rational. The proper relation between the rational and empirical elements in science will occupy our attention later. Here it is sufficient to note that none of the great founders of modern science felt any opposition between the rational (mathematical or logical) and the empirical (or experimental) elements in their procedure. Literary historians and philosophers, unacquainted with the actual scientific work of men like Harvey, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton, have been misled in this respect by Bacon, and by some polemic passages in the more popular works of Galileo and Descartes. But Bacon was certainly not himself a scientist and the great scientific achievements of Galileo and Descartes were thoroughly mathematical and rationalistic” (Ibid)
1. Reason and Psychology: The first and the most widespread of the arguments is the psychological one. The most popular version of it may be stated as follows: The old rationalism absurdly overemphasized the power of conscious reasons or motives. For instance, it thought of law and religion as the conscious invention of some legislator or priest. The sentiment that 'Courts for cowards were erected, Churches built to please the priests' may not have been typically respectable, but all classes, Tories as well as revolutionists, appealed to the terms of the social contract by which human society was supposed to have been instituted. Not only the state and the family, but even language, was regarded as instituted by conscious convention. Against this, the romantic movement since Schlegel, Schelling, and Savigny has emphasized the fact that human institutions are matters of growth rather than creation; and that the great achievements of life are the result of unconscious spirit rather than conscious deliberation. Even Hegel, despite all his extravagant panlogism, so emphasized the immanent necessary evolution (or dialectic) at the basis of human history, politics, religion, arts, and philosophy as to leave nothing to human effort. It cannot well be denied that the roots of our conscious being are in a dark soil where the light of conscious reflection seldom if ever enters. But the admittedly weak and fragile character of conscious reflection, in contrast with other cosmic or vital forces, does not deny its reality or diminish its unique worth. It certainly does not justify the romantic moral that we should trust our 'unconscious' promptings. For the latter are often conflicting and sometimes self-destructive and none of the specifically human values which we call civilization are independent of long and painful conscious effort" (Ibid).

2. Reason and History: Similar to the attempt to dispense with reason by reducing everything to the facts of psychology is the attempt to dispense with reason by reducing everything to the facts of history. The historical studies of the nineteenth century, as is well known, were largely stimulated by the romantic and nationalistic reaction against the cosmopolitan naturalism of the eighteenth century. Hence history became in large measure a basis for attacks on rationalism. Thus no argument is more familiar than that the eighteenth century, the century of rationalism, was unhistorical. Nor can it be denied that it tried to derive the detailed nature of human institutions, such as those of government or religion, from reasons which seemed plausible a priori, but ignored actual history and the perverse complexity of the facts. We cannot reject this argument by pointing to the great historical work produced by typical representatives of eighteenth-century rationalism like Voltaire and Gibbon. There really was in the heyday of the enlightenment a great deal of effort to paint the history of mankind on the basis of a priori considerations. It is no denial of this to show that the naturalism of the nineteenth century has produced a great deal more a priori history under the guise of Spencerian evolution, with its sweeping dogma that all peoples and institutions as well as all forms of life and inorganic matter must pass through certain stages of development from the simple to the complex. But it is instructive in passing to call attention to the latter belief as an illustration of crypto-rationalism, i.e., whenever reason is ostentatiously banished through the front door, it is avowedly or secretly admitted through the back door to perform its necessary functions" [Italics added] (Ibid).

3. Reason and Change: As mathematics and physics were the first sciences to be developed systematically, rationalism has always preferred to draw on them for illustrations of rational truth. The great eclat, however, of the doctrine of evolution brought it to the foreground as the popular example of scientific truth. Moreover, the progress of the kinetic theory of matter, the gradual elimination of the inert atom, and the abandonment of Maxwell's view that each individual molecule has remained unaltered since the day of creation, have fortified the impression of universal change. Molecules, like the hills and the forms of species, have lost their traditional eternity. The sight of so much change where formerly we saw only constancy has produced the dizzy generalization that only change is real and that nature contains no constant elements. Despite the widespread character of this assertion, we need not hesitate to characterize it as a snap judgment resting on no proof of logic or fact. Indeed, how
could such a metaphysical universal ever be proved by changing empirical facts. Change is doubtless a universal aspect of nature, but so is its correlative constancy. Mortality is undoubtedly a universal trait of mankind, but any reader of history or of the dictionary of National Biography, who should exclaim 'Death is the only reality, there is no life!' would be no less wise than those who argue from the universality of change to the denial of any constancy. The truth is simply that there is no change except in reference to something constant. An object, for instance, can be said to move only in so far as it remains the same object and changes its distance from a definite point as measured by some definite unit. Abolish the fixed starting point or goal, the definite direction and the constancy which we call the identity of the object and nothing is left of the fact of motion" [Italics in original] (Ibid).

"4. The Necessary Limitation of Reason: In the sense in which romanticism denotes impatience and distrust of the orderly routine of reason, the three foregoing arguments are essentially romantic. Romanticism, however, is not merely negative. It involves an abounding faith in some inner but creative and unlimited source of illumination or revelation superior to ordinary reason. The typical nineteenth-century forms of such super-rational claims are those of individual intuition, creative imagination, instinctive faith or the urge of life in general. Despite their some-what mutually conflicting claims, all these involve a common argument against rationalism, viz., that reason (in the form of mathematics and logic) is not creative, that it at best enables us to deduce consequences from premises but does not and cannot supply us with premises. In other words, reason can determine only subordinate means and not our supreme ends" (Ibid).

**Incremental execution of commitment:**

As simple as it sounds, homework as part of cognitive behavioral therapy counters in part the core element of conditioning with personal involvement (Decker, 2016). What is left to be determined is the extent to which the personal involvement is factual emotional investment.

If the homework task is the personal story as noted in the reference to the methodology already implement at the Madison, Wisconsin Veterans Administration Medical Center in the form of a program where trained volunteers help Veterans write their life’s story for review by their health care providers (Ringler, 2015) then personal involvement is a fact. However, emotional investment becomes the norm with the noted modification – the Veteran creates the timeline of their life and then dictates affect-centric elements to a trained volunteer who then ghost writes the Veteran’s story with the Veteran the intended audience, with no editing by the Veteran if at all practical (p. 42; p. 90).

**Altruism and commitment:**

The causal chain to apathy and/or suicide has the causal chain to seduction and/or narcissism as its precursor. This sets apathy as the safe-harbor outcome (Neumann, 1990).

Human progress begins when apathy assumes a supporting role within the routine decisions of the day. While reasoning and choice form the nucleus of life, boundaries are needed, and, when not available, apathy is a noble substitute for the missing boundaries. Such is “the source and aim of human progress” (Sidis, 1919).

The relationship between the self and the object world is not as clean and simple as one might think from the perspective of day-to-day living, with rationalizations just one of many examples. The critical issue is how time and uncertainty are resolved.

“To be sane, or true, thought and belief must be consistent with coherent, organized human experience, with common knowledge of such, and also with synthetic science. To be consistent, our theories and doctrines should proceed from true knowledge by some method of valid reason or logic. Live we may, or must, in a helter-skelter course of experience, mainly by apprehension of momentary, personal
sensations and ideas, by instant recognitions and ever various interests, purposes, and actions, but we can know and reason only through coherent and consistent comprehension of certain essential relations in which things subsist and exist and appear. Without consistence life may indeed have its values, but reasoned thought without consistency is valueless and vain” (Bliss, 1917).
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